Thoracic Society of Australia and New Zealand Position Statement on Acute Oxygen Use in Adults: 'Swimming between the flags'.

Oxygen is a life-saving therapy but, when given inappropriately, may also be hazardous. Therefore, in the acute medical setting, oxygen should only be given as treatment for hypoxaemia and requires appropriate prescription, monitoring and review. This update to the Thoracic Society of Australia and New Zealand (TSANZ) guidance on acute oxygen therapy is a brief and practical resource for all healthcare workers involved with administering oxygen therapy to adults in the acute medical setting. It does not apply to intubated or paediatric patients. Recommendations are made in the following six clinical areas: assessment of hypoxaemia (including use of arterial blood gases); prescription of oxygen; peripheral oxygen saturation targets; delivery, including non-invasive ventilation and humidified high-flow nasal cannulae; the significance of high oxygen requirements; and acute hypercapnic respiratory failure. There are three sections which provide (1) a brief summary, (2) recommendations in detail with practice points and (3) a detailed explanation of the reasoning and evidence behind the recommendations. It is anticipated that these recommendations will be disseminated widely in structured programmes across Australia and New Zealand.

Overdiagnosis: one concept, three perspectives, and a model.

Defining, estimating, communicating about, and dealing with overdiagnosis is challenging. One reason for this is because overdiagnosis is a complex phenomenon. In this article we try to show that the complexity can be analysed and addressed in terms of three perspectives, i.e., that of the person, the professional, and the population. Individuals are informed about overdiagnosis based on population-based estimates. These estimates depend on professionals' conceptions and models of disease and diagnostic criteria. These conceptions in turn depend on individuals' experience of suffering, and on population level outcomes from diagnostics and treatment. As the personal, professional, and populational perspectives are not easy to reconcile, we must address them explicitly and facilitate interaction. Population-based estimates of overdiagnosis must be more directly informed by personal need for information. So must disease definitions and diagnostic criteria. Only then can individuals be appropriately informed about overdiagnosis.

Half a Century of Wilson & Jungner: Reflections on the Governance of Population Screening.

Background: In their landmark report on the "Principles and Practice of Screening for Disease" (1968), Wilson and Jungner noted that the practice of screening is just as important for securing beneficial outcomes and avoiding harms as the formulation of principles. Many jurisdictions have since established various kinds of "screening governance organizations" to provide oversight of screening practice. Yet to date there has been relatively little reflection on the nature and organization of screening governance itself, or on how different governance arrangements affect the way screening is implemented and perceived and the balance of benefits and harms it delivers. Methods: An international expert policy workshop convened by Sturdy, Miller and Hogarth. Results: While effective governance is essential to promote beneficial screening practices and avoid attendant harms, screening governance organizations face enduring challenges. These challenges are social and ethical as much as technical. Evidence-based adjudication of the benefits and harms of population screening must take account of factors that inform the production and interpretation of evidence, including the divergent professional, financial and personal commitments of stakeholders. Similarly, when planning and overseeing organized screening programs, screening governance organizations must persuade or compel multiple stakeholders to work together to a common end. Screening governance organizations in different jurisdictions vary widely in how they are constituted, how they relate to other interested organizations and actors, and what powers and authority they wield. Yet we know little about how these differences affect the way screening is implemented, and with what consequences. Conclusions: Systematic research into how screening governance is organized in different jurisdictions would facilitate policy learning to address enduring challenges. Even without such research, informal exchange and sharing of experiences between screening governance organizations can deliver invaluable insights into the social as well as the technical aspects of governance.

Triage of critical care resources in COVID-19: a stronger role for justice.

Some ethicists assert that there is a consensus that maximising medical outcomes takes precedence as a principle of resource allocation in emergency triage of absolutely scarce resources. But the nature of the current severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus 2 pandemic and the history of debate about balancing equity and efficiency in resource allocation do not support this assertion. I distinguish a number of concerns with justice and balancing considerations that should play a role in critical care triage policy, focusing on discrimination and on fundamental egalitarian and social justice concerns.

Is an indistinct picture "exactly what we need"? Objectivity, accuracy, and harm in imaging for cancer.

Assumptions about the epistemic ideal of objectivity, closely related to ontological assumptions about the nature of disease as pathophysiological abnormality, lead us into oversimplified ways of thinking about medical imaging. This is illustrated by current controversies in the early detection of cancer. Improvements in the technical quality of imaging failed to address the problem of overdiagnosis in breast cancer screening and exacerbate the problem in thyroid cancer diagnosis. Drawing on Douglas and on Daston and Galison, I distinguish 3 dimensions of objectivity (accuracy, reliability, and precision) and demonstrate ways they may be at odds, as illustrated in the early detection of cancer. Guidelines for evaluating the efficacy of diagnostic imaging are insufficiently sensitive to this complexity. Improving imaging quality may raise epistemic issues, place disease definitions in question, and lead to overall harm or to changes in the distribution of harms and benefits among population subgroups. With a nod to Wittgenstein, I argue that we cannot take for granted that "an indistinct picture" is not "exactly what we need."

Scientism in Medical Education and the Improvement of Medical Care: Opioids, Competencies, and Social Accountability.

Scientism in medical education distracts educators from focusing on the content of learning; it focuses attention instead on individual achievement and validity in its measurement. I analyze the specific form that scientism takes in medicine and in medical education. The competencies movement attempts to challenge old "scientistic" views of the role of physicians, but in the end it has invited medical educators to focus on validity in the measurement of individual performance for attitudes and skills that medicine resists conceptualizing as objective. Academic medicine should focus its efforts instead on quality and relevance of care. The social accountability movement proposes to shift the focus of academic medicine to the goal of high quality and relevant care in the context of community service and partnership with the institutions that together with medicine create and cope with health and with health deficits. I make the case for this agenda through a discussion of the linked histories of the opioid prescribing crisis and the professionalism movement.

Les questions éthiques dans la philanthropie en santé.

Les leaders en santé du Canada affrontent une foule de défis dans le secteur de la philanthropie en santé. Ces défis ne se limitent pas à l'aspect pratique des mesures à prendre pour réussir, mais également à des questions éthiques. Est-ce que la collecte de fonds est acceptable si elle donne lieu à des partenariats avec des entreprises qui participent à l'apparition de maladies causées par le mode de vie? Quand la reconnaissance méritée envers les donateurs ou les bénévoles dépasse-t-elle les bornes et favorise-t-elle un accès privilégié aux soins? Les décisions éthiques de la philanthropie en santé doivent opposer les témoignages de reconnaissance ou les partenariats avec les donateurs au bien public, qui s'inscrit dans le mandat des établissements de santé et qui fait partie et des obligations fiduciaires des hôpitaux et des cliniciens envers les patients.

Ethical issues in health philanthropy.

Health leaders in Canada face a myriad of challenges with healthcare philanthropy-not just the practical question of how to be successful but also ethical questions. Is fundraising in partnership with companies that are implicated in the so-called lifestyle diseases appropriate? When does appropriate recognition for donors or volunteers cross the line into facilitating preferential access to care? Ethical decision-making in health philanthropy considers appropriate recognition or partnership in donor relations in the context of the public good with which healthcare institutions are entrusted and the fiduciary responsibilities of hospitals and clinicians to patients.

Truth or Spin? Disease Definition in Cancer Screening.

Are the small and indolent cancers found in abundance in cancer screening normal variations, risk factors, or disease? Naturalists in philosophy of medicine turn to pathophysiological findings to decide such questions objectively. To understand the role of pathophysiological findings in disease definition, we must understand how they mislead in diagnostic reasoning. Participants on all sides of the definition of disease debate attempt to secure objectivity via reductionism. These reductivist routes to objectivity are inconsistent with the Bayesian nature of clinical reasoning; when they appeal to the sciences, they are inconsistent with what philosophy of biology tells us about its natural kinds. Proposals that we narrow the scope of our claims in the disease definition debates (proposing adoption of a specific disease paradigm for a specific context) are useful, but paradigms can still distort our reasoning in particular cases, even when we are self-conscious about their status.

Introduction to the Special Issue: Precarious Solidarity-Preferential Access in Canadian Health Care.

Systems of universal health coverage may aspire to provide care based on need and not ability to pay; the complexities of this aspiration (conceptual, practical, and ethical) call for normative analysis. This special issue arises in the wake of a judicial inquiry into preferential access in the Canadian province of Alberta, the Vertes Commission. I describe this inquiry and set out a taxonomy of forms of differential and preferential access. Papers in this special issue focus on the conceptual specification of health system boundaries (the concept of medical need) and on the normative questions raised by complex models of funding and delivery of care, where patients, providers, and services cross system boundaries.

Medical Need: Evaluating a Conceptual Critique of Universal Health Coverage.

Some argue that the concept of medical need is inadequate to inform the design of a universal health care system-particularly an institutional (universal, comprehensive) rather than a residual (minimalist, safety net) system. They argue that the concept (a) contradicts the idea of comprehensiveness; (b) leads to unsustainable expenditures; (c) is too indeterminate for policy; and (d) supports only a prioritarian distribution (and therefore a residual system). I argue (a) that 'comprehensive' understood as 'including the full continuum of care' and 'medically necessary' understood as 'prioritized by medical criteria' are not contradictory, and (b) that UHC is a solution to the problem of sustainability, not its cause. Those who criticize 'medical need' for indeterminacy (c) are not transparent about the source (ethical, semantic, political, or other) of their commitment to their standards of determinacy: they promote standards that are higher than is necessary for legitimate policy, ignoring opportunity costs. Furthermore, the indeterminacy of concepts affects all risk-sharing systems and all systems that rely on medical standard of care. I then argue that (d) the concept of need in itself does not imply a minimal sufficientist standard or a prioritarian distribution; neither does the idea of legitimate public policy dictate that public services be minimalist. The policy choice for a system of health care that is comprehensive and offers as good care as can be achieved when delivered on equal terms and conditions for all is a coherent option.

Concierge, Wellness, and Block Fee Models of Primary Care: Ethical and Regulatory Concerns at the Public-Private Boundary.

In bioethics and health policy, we often discuss the appropriate boundaries of public funding; how the interface of public and private purchasers and providers should be organized and regulated receives less attention. In this paper, I discuss ethical and regulatory issues raised at this interface by three medical practice models (concierge care, executive wellness clinics, and block fee charges) in which physicians provide insured services (whether publicly insured, privately insured, or privately insured by public mandate) while requiring or requesting that patients pay for services or for the non-insured services of the physicians themselves or their associates. This choice for such practice models is different from the decision to design an insurance plan to include or exclude user fees, co-payments and deductibles. I analyze the issues raised with regards to familiar health care values of equity and efficiency, while highlighting additional concerns about fair terms of access, provider integrity, and fair competition. I then analyze the common Canadian regulatory response to block fee models, considering their extension to wellness clinics, with regards to fiduciary standards governing the physician-patient relationship and the role of informed consent. I close by highlighting briefly issues that are of common concern across different fundamental normative frameworks for health policy.

The speakers' bureau system: a form of peer selling.

In the speakers' bureau system, physicians are recruited and trained by pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical device companies to deliver information about products to other physicians, in exchange for a fee. Using publicly available disclosures, we assessed the thesis that speakers' bureau involvement is not a feature of academic medicine in Canada, by estimating the prevalence of participation in speakers' bureaus among Canadian faculty in one medical specialty, cardiology. We analyzed the relevant features of an actual contract made public by the physician addressee and applied the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) guidelines on physician-industry relations to participation in a speakers' bureau. We argue that speakers' bureau participation constitutes a form of peer selling that should be understood to contravene the prohibition on product endorsement in the CMA Code of Ethics. Academic medical institutions, in conjunction with regulatory colleges, should continue and strengthen their policies to address participation in speakers' bureaus.

Ethics in radiology: wait lists queue jumping.

Education in ethics is a requirement for all Royal College residency training programs as laid out in the General Standards of Accreditation for residency programs in Canada. The ethical challenges that face radiologists in clinical practice are often different from those that face other physicians, because the nature of the physician-patient interaction is unlike that of many other specialties. Ethics education for radiologists and radiology residents will benefit from the development of teaching materials and resources that focus on the issues that are specific to the specialty. This article is intended to serve as an educational resource for radiology training programs to facilitate teaching ethics to residents and also as a continuing medical education resource for practicing radiologists. In an environment of limited health care resources, radiologists are frequently asked to expedite imaging studies for patients and, in some respects, act as gatekeepers for specialty care. The issues of wait lists, queue jumping, and balancing the needs of individuals and society are explored from the perspective of a radiologist.

Deliberative curriculum inquiry for integration in an MD curriculum: Dalhousie University's curriculum renewal process.

BACKGROUND: Dalhousie University's MD Programme faced a one-year timeline for renewal of its undergraduate curriculum. AIM: Key goals were renewed faculty engagement for ongoing quality improvement and increased collaboration across disciplines for an integrated curriculum, with the goal of preparing physicians for practice in the twenty-first century. METHODS: We engaged approximately 600 faculty members, students, staff and stakeholders external to the faculty of medicine in a process described by Harris (1993) as 'deliberative curriculum inquiry'. Temporally overlapping and networked intraprofessional and interprofessional teams developed programme outcomes, completed environment scans of emerging content and best practices, and designed curricular units. RESULTS: The resulting curriculum is the product of new collaborations among faculty and exemplifies distinct forms of integration. Innovations include content and cases shared by concurrent units, foundations courses at the beginning of each year and integrative experiences at the end, and an interprofessional community health mentors programme. CONCLUSION: The use of deliberative inquiry for pre-med curriculum renewal on a one-year time frame is feasible, in part through the use of technology. Ongoing structures for integration remain challenging. Although faculty collaboration fosters integration, a learner-centred lens must guide its design.

Medical professionalism and the social contract.

Conceptions of professionalism in medicine draw on social contract theory; its strengths and weaknesses play out in how we reason about professionalism. The social contract metaphor may be a heuristic device prompting reflection on social responsibility, and as such is appealing: it encourages reasoning about privilege and responsibility, the broader context and consequences of action, and diverse perspectives on medical practice. However, when this metaphor is elevated to the status of a theory, it has well-known limits: the assumed subject position of contractors engenders blind spots about privilege, not critical reflection; its tendency to dress up the status quo in the trappings of a theoretical agreement may limit social negotiation; its attempted reconciliation of social obligation and self-interest fosters the view that ethics and self-interest should coincide; it sets up false expectations by identifying appearance and reality in morality; and its construal of prima facie duties as conditional misdirects ethical attention in particular situations from current needs to supposed past agreements or reciprocities. Using philosophical ideas as heuristic devices in medical ethics is inevitable, but we should be conscious of their limitations. When they limit the ethical scope of debate, we should seek new metaphors.