Activation of the motivation-related ventral striatum during delusional experience.

Delusion is the most characteristic symptom of psychosis, occurring in almost all first-episode psychosis patients. The motivational salience hypothesis suggests delusion to originate from the experience of abnormal motivational salience. Whether the motivation-related brain circuitries are activated during the actual delusional experience remains, however, unknown. We used a forced-choice answering tree at random intervals during functional magnetic resonance imaging to capture delusional and non-delusional spontaneous experiences in patients with first-episode psychosis (n = 31) or clinical high-risk state (n = 7). The motivation-related brain regions were identified by an automated meta-analysis of 149 studies. Thirteen first-episode patients reported both delusional and non-delusional spontaneous experiences. In these patients, delusional experiences were related to stronger activation of the ventral striatum in both hemispheres. This activation overlapped with the most strongly motivation-related brain regions. These findings provide an empirical link between the actual delusional experience and the motivational salience hypothesis. Further use and development of the present methods in localizing the neurobiological basis of the most characteristic symptoms may be useful in the search for etiopathogenic pathways that result in psychotic disorders.

Autonomy, Competence, Relatedness, and Beneficence: A Multicultural Comparison of the Four Pathways to Meaningful Work.

Meaningful work is a key element of positive functioning of employees, but what makes work meaningful? Based on research on self-determination theory, basic psychological needs, and prosocial impact, we suggest that there are four psychological satisfactions that substantially influence work meaningfulness across cultures: autonomy (sense of volition), competence (sense of efficacy), relatedness (sense of caring relationships), and beneficence (sense of making a positive contribution). We test the relationships between these satisfactions and perceived meaningful work in Finland (n = 594, employees of several organizations), India (n = 342, collected through Mturk), and the United States (n = 373, collected through Mturk). Regression analyses show that - except for competence in United States - all four satisfactions are significantly and independently associated with meaningful work. Moreover, structural equation modeling shows that they fully mediated the relationship between occupational position and work meaningfulness in India and in the United States. In sum, the results support the importance of these four satisfactions in explaining the psychological underpinnings of meaningful work.

Intuitive physics ability in systemizers relies on differential use of the internalizing system and long-term spatial representations.

According to the Empathizing-Systemizing theory (E-S Theory), individual differences in how people understand the physical world (systemizing) and the social world (empathizing), are two continuums in the general population with several implications, from vocational interests to skills in the social and physical domains. The underlying mechanisms of intuitive physics performance among individuals with strong systemizing and weak empathizing (systemizers) are, however, unknown. Our results affirm higher intuitive physics skills in healthy adult systemizers (N=36), and further reveal the brain mechanisms that are characteristic for those individuals in carrying out such tasks. When the participants performed intuitive physics tasks during functional magnetic resonance imaging, combined higher systemizing and lower empathizing was associated with stronger activations in parts of the default mode network (DMN, cuneus and posterior cingulate gyrus), middle occipital gyrus, and parahippocampal region. The posterior cingulate gyrus and parahippocampal gyrus were specifically associated with systemizing "brain type" even after controlling for task performance, while especially in the parietal cortex, the activation changes were simply explained by higher task performance. We therefore suggest that utilization of DMN-parahippocampal complex, suggested to play a role in internalizing and activating long-term spatial memory representations, is the factor that distinguishes systemizers from empathizers with the opposite "brain type" in intuitive physics tasks.

Empathizers and systemizers process social information differently.

Using the empathizing-systemizing theory as our framework, we investigated how people with high self-reported empathizing (having good social skills and being interested in people) and systemizing (being interested in physical things and processes) differ in the social information processing of emotionally negative photographs of people during "spontaneous watching" and emotional and cognitive empathy tasks. Empathizers evaluated the pictures as more emotionally touching and the reactions in the photographs more understandable than the systemizers. Compared to the empathizers, systemizers had stronger activations in the posterior cingulate cortex, an area related to cognitive empathy, as well as in the left superior temporal gyrus and middle frontal gyrus when watching emotional photographs spontaneously. During guided emotional and cognitive empathy tasks, these differences disappeared. However, during the emotional empathy task, higher systemizing was associated with weaker activation of the right inferior frontal gyrus /insula. Furthermore, during emotional and cognitive empathy tasks, empathizing was related to increased activations of the amygdala which were in turn related to higher behavioral ratings of emotional and cognitive empathy. The results suggest that empathizers and systemizers engage in social information processing differently: systemizers in more cognitive terms and empathizers with stronger automatic emotional reactions.

Skepticism: Genuine unbelief or implicit beliefs in the supernatural?

We examined whether skeptics hold implicit supernatural beliefs or implicit cognitive underpinnings of the beliefs. In study 1 (N=57), participants read a biological or a religious story about death. The story content had no effect on skeptics' (or believers') afterlife beliefs. Study 2 examined the relationships between religious and non-religious paranormal beliefs and implicit views about whether supernatural and religious phenomena are imaginary or real (n1=33, n2=31). The less supernatural beliefs were endorsed the easier it was to connect "supernatural" with "imaginary". Study 3 (N=63) investigated whether participants' supernatural beliefs and ontological confusions differ between speeded and non-speeded response conditions. Only non-analytical skeptics' ontological confusions increased in speeded conditions. The results indicate that skeptics overall do not hold implicit supernatural beliefs, but that non-analytically thinking skeptics may, under supporting conditions, be prone to biases that predispose to supernatural beliefs.

Supernatural believers attribute more intentions to random movement than skeptics: an fMRI study.

A host of research has attempted to explain why some believe in the supernatural and some do not. One suggested explanation for commonly held supernatural beliefs is that they are a by-product of theory of mind (ToM) processing. However, this does not explain why skeptics with intact ToM processes do not believe. We employed fMRI to investigate activation differences in ToM-related brain circuitries between supernatural believers (N = 12) and skeptics (N = 11) while they watched 2D animations of geometric objects moving intentionally or randomly and rated the intentionality of the animations. The ToM-related circuitries in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) were localized by contrasting intention-rating-related and control-rating-related brain activation. Compared with the skeptics, the supernatural believers rated the random movements as more intentional and had stronger activation of the ToM-related circuitries during the animation with random movement. The strength of the ToM-related activation covaried with the intentionality ratings. These findings provide evidence that differences in ToM-related activations are associated with supernatural believers' tendency to interpret random phenomena in mental terms. Thus, differences in ToM processing may contribute to differences between believing and unbelieving.

Association of stigma resistance with emotion regulation - functional magnetic resonance imaging and neuropsychological findings.

BACKGROUND: [corrected] Personal characteristics contribute to whether negative attitudes in society are internalized as deteriorating self-stigma. Studies in healthy subjects suggest that resilience is associated with the regulation of amygdala activation by the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), but little is known about the factors that contribute to individual stigma resistance in psychiatric patients. METHODS: We assessed stigma (by measuring association strengths between social inferiority and schizophrenia by an implicit association test) in 20 patients with schizophrenia and in 16 age- and sex-matched healthy control subjects. The brain activation strengths were measured by functional magnetic resonance imaging during evaluation of schizophrenia-related statements and of control statements. RESULTS: Association strengths between social inferiority and schizophrenia were inversely related to the strength of the activation of the rostro-ventral mPFC. This inverse correlation survived adjustment for global functioning, depression symptom scores, and insight. Activation of the rostro-ventral mPFC was negatively correlated with activation of the amygdala. The association strengths between social inferiority and schizophrenia correlated with the compromised performance in a Stroop task, which is a measure of cognitive regulation. DISCUSSION: Our findings suggest that individual stigma resistance is associated with emotion regulation. These findings may help to understand better stigma resistance and thereby aid the development of patient interventions that add to the public anti-stigma work in reducing devastating effects of stigma.

Is it just a brick wall or a sign from the universe? An fMRI study of supernatural believers and skeptics.

We examined with functional magnetic resonance imaging the brain activity of 12 supernatural believers and 11 skeptics who first imagined themselves in critical life situations (e.g. problems in intimate relationships) and then watched emotionally charged pictures of lifeless objects and scenery (e.g. two red cherries bound together). Supernatural believers reported seeing signs of how the situations were going to turn out in the pictures more often than skeptics did. Viewing the pictures activated the same brain regions among all participants (e.g. the left inferior frontal gyrus, IFG). However, the right IFG, previously associated with cognitive inhibition, was activated more strongly in skeptics than in supernatural believers, and its activation was negatively correlated to sign seeing in both participant groups. We discuss the implications of these findings for research on the universal processes that may underlie supernatural beliefs and the role of cognitive inhibition in explaining individual differences in such beliefs.

Conceptions about the mind-body problem and their relations to afterlife beliefs, paranormal beliefs, religiosity, and ontological confusions.

We examined lay people's conceptions about the relationship between mind and body and their correlates. In Study 1, a web survey (N = 850) of reflective dualistic, emergentistic, and monistic perceptions of the mind-body relationship, afterlife beliefs (i.e., common sense dualism), religiosity, paranormal beliefs, and ontological confusions about physical, biological, and psychological phenomena was conducted. In Study 2 (N = 73), we examined implicit ontological confusions and their relations to afterlife beliefs, paranormal beliefs, and religiosity. Correlation and regression analyses showed that reflective dualism, afterlife beliefs, paranormal beliefs, and religiosity were strongly and positively related and that reflective dualism and afterlife beliefs mediated the relationship between ontological confusions and religious and paranormal beliefs. The results elucidate the contention that dualism is a manifestation of universal cognitive processes related to intuitions about physical, biological, and psychological phenomena by showing that especially individuals who confuse the distinctive attributes of these phenomena tend to set the mind apart from the body.

Association of poor insight in schizophrenia with structure and function of cortical midline structures and frontopolar cortex.

BACKGROUND: Poor insight is a central characteristic of psychosis and schizophrenia. Accumulating evidence indicates that cortical midline structures (CMS) and frontopolar cortex (FPC), both of which are associated with insight-related processing in healthy subjects, are among the most affected brain structures in schizophrenia. However, the hypothesis that direct associations between function of these brain regions and poor insight in schizophrenia exist has not been tested previously. METHODS: We studied 21 patients with schizophrenia and 17 healthy control subjects with structural and functional magnetic resonance imaging during a clinical insight task and a comparable control task. We assessed the level of insight, depression, positive and negative symptoms, and neurocognitive function, then adjusted correlation between insight and insight-task-related brain activation for potential confounders. Voxel-based morphometry was used to compare brain volumes between groups. RESULTS: Insight correlated strongly with the activation of the CMS and the FPC during the clinical insight tasks, independently of potential confounders. The CMS activation was stronger during the insight task than during the control task in patients. The functional correlates of insight matched the distribution of cortical volume reduction in the patient group. CONCLUSIONS: These findings suggest a link between known regional brain abnormalities and the manifestation of poor insight in schizophrenia. The contribution of CMS to insight may be related to self-referential processing and that of FPC to the integration of multiple cognitive processes that are necessary for accurate evaluation of one's mental illness.

Poor supplementary motor area activation differentiates auditory verbal hallucination from imagining the hallucination.

Neuronal underpinnings of auditory verbal hallucination remain poorly understood. One suggested mechanism is brain activation that is similar to verbal imagery but occurs without the proper activation of the neuronal systems that are required to tag the origins of verbal imagery in one's mind. Such neuronal systems involve the supplementary motor area. The supplementary motor area has been associated with awareness of intention to make a hand movement, but whether this region is related to the sense of ownership of one's verbal thought remains poorly known. We hypothesized that the supplementary motor area is related to the distinction between one's own mental processing (auditory verbal imagery) and similar processing that is attributed to non-self author (auditory verbal hallucination). To test this hypothesis, we asked patients to signal the onset and offset of their auditory verbal hallucinations during functional magnetic resonance imaging. During non-hallucination periods, we asked the same patients to imagine the hallucination they had previously experienced. In addition, healthy control subjects signaled the onset and offset of self-paced imagery of similar voices. Both hallucinations and the imagery of hallucinations were associated with similar activation strengths of the fronto-temporal language-related circuitries, but the supplementary motor area was activated more strongly during the imagery than during hallucination. These findings suggest that auditory verbal hallucination resembles verbal imagery in language processing, but without the involvement of the supplementary motor area, which may subserve the sense of ownership of one's own verbal imagery.

Sentences with core knowledge violations increase the size of N400 among paranormal believers.

A major problem in research on paranormal beliefs is that the concept of "paranormality" remains to be adequately defined. The aim of this study was to empirically justify the following definition: paranormal beliefs are beliefs in physical, biological, or psychological phenomena that contain core ontological attributes of one of the other two categories [e.g., a stone (physical) having thoughts (psychological)]. We hypothesized that individuals who believe in paranormal phenomena are slower in understanding whether sentences with core knowledge violations are literally true than skeptics, and that this difference would be reflected by a more negative N400. Ten believers and 10 skeptics (six men, age range 23-49) participated in the study. Event-related potentials (N400) were recorded as the participants read 210 three-word Finnish sentences, of which 70 were normal ("The house has a history"), 70 were anomalies ("The house writes its history") and 70 included violations of core knowledge ("The house knows its history"). The participants were presented with a question that contextualized the sentences: "Is this sentence literally true?" While the N400 effects were similar for normal and anomalous sentences among the believers and the skeptics, a more negative N400 effect was found among the believers than among the skeptics for sentences with core knowledge violations. The results support the new definition of "paranormality", because participants who believed in paranormal phenomena appeared to find it more difficult to construct a reasonable interpretation of the sentences with core knowledge violations than the skeptics did as indicated by the N400.