Replacement thinking, status threat, and the endorsement of political violence among non-Hispanic white individuals in the US: A cross-sectional study.

Objective: This study investigates the association between replacement thinking, status threat perceptions, and the endorsement of political violence among non-Hispanic white adults in the United States. It explores how perceived threats to social status can drive support for extreme measures aimed at preserving white hegemony, addressing a gap in research on factors contributing to political violence, a public health concern. Methods: The 2022 Life in America Survey provided data for this cross-sectional study, focusing on status threat and replacement thinking among non-Hispanic white respondents. Status threat was inferred from relative income, education level, and racial segregation in residential census tracts, while replacement thinking was derived through agreement with the statement "in America, native-born white people are being replaced by immigrants." The outcome was the endorsement of political violence. Analysis utilized a survey-weighted robust modified Poisson model. Results: Among 5,976 non-Hispanic white respondents, 18.7 % supported political violence in at least one scenario. A U-shaped relationship was observed between racial segregation and political violence endorsement: respondents from more diverse communities were less likely to support political violence. Those endorsing replacement thinking were 233 %-229 % more likely to endorse political violence than those who did not, dependent on income levels. White respondents without a high school degree were 29 % more likely to endorse political violence. Conclusion: The study found a positive association between replacement thinking, markers of status threat, and political violence endorsements among non-Hispanic white Americans. These findings emphasize the need for research and interventions to mitigate these perceptions and prevent political violence.

Expectations of and perceived need for civil war in the USA: findings from a 2023 nationally representative survey.

BACKGROUND: Surveys have found concerningly high levels of agreement that the United States will experience civil war soon. This study assesses variation in expectation of and perceived need for civil war with respondent sociopolitical characteristics, beliefs, firearm ownership, and willingness to engage in political violence. METHODS: Findings are from Wave 2 of a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey of members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, conducted May 18-June 8, 2023. All respondents to 2022's Wave 1 who remained in KnowledgePanel were invited to participate. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions and adjusted prevalence differences, with p-values adjusted for the false discovery rate and reported as q-values. RESULTS: The completion rate was 84.2%; there were 9385 respondents. After weighting, half the sample was female (50.7%, 95% CI 49.4%, 52.1%); the weighted mean (± standard deviation) age was 48.5 (25.9) years. Approximately 1 respondent in 20 (5.7%, 95% CI 5.1%, 6.4%) agreed strongly or very strongly that "in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States." About 1 in 25 (3.8%, 95% CI 3.2%, 4.4%), and nearly 40% (38.4%, 95% CI 32.3%, 44.5%) of those who strongly or very strongly agreed that civil war was coming, also agreed strongly or very strongly that "the United States needs a civil war to set things right." Expectation of and perceived need for civil war were higher among subsets of respondents who in Wave 1 were more willing than others to commit political violence, including MAGA Republicans, persons in strong agreement with racist beliefs or statements of the potential need for violence to effect social change, persons who strongly approved of specified extreme right-wing political organizations and movements, firearm owners who purchased firearms in 2020 or later, and firearm owners who carried firearms in public all or nearly all the time. CONCLUSIONS: In 2023, the expectation that civil war was likely and the belief that it was needed were uncommon but were higher among subsets of the population that had previously been associated with greater willingness to commit political violence. These findings can help guide prevention efforts.

Single-year change in views of democracy and society and support for political violence in the USA: findings from a 2023 nationally representative survey.

BACKGROUND: A 2022 survey in the USA found concerningly high prevalences of support for and personal willingness to engage in political violence, of beliefs associated with such violence, and of belief that civil war was likely in the near future. It is important to determine the durability of those findings. METHODS: Wave 2 of a nationally representative cohort survey was conducted May 18-June 8, 2023; the sample comprised all respondents to 2022's Wave 1. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions; changes from 2022 to 2023 are for respondents who participated in both surveys, based on aggregated individual change scores. RESULTS: The completion rate was 84.2%; there were 9385 respondents. After weighting, 50.7% (95% confidence interval (CI) 49.4%, 52.1%) were female; weighted mean (SD) age was 48.5 (25.9) years. About 1 in 20 respondents (5.7%, 95% CI 5.1%, 6.4%) agreed strongly/very strongly that "in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States," a 7.7% decrease. In 2023, fewer respondents considered violence to be usually/always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives [25.3% (95% CI 24.7%, 26.5%), a 6.8% decrease]. However, more respondents thought it very/extremely likely that within the next few years, in a situation where they consider political violence justified, "I will be armed with a gun" [9.0% (95% CI 8.3%, 9.8%), a 2.2% increase] and "I will shoot someone with a gun" [1.8% (95% CI 1.4%, 2.2%), a 0.6% increase]. Among respondents who considered violence usually/always justified to advance at least 1 political objective, about 1 in 20 also thought it very/extremely likely that they would threaten someone with a gun (5.4%, 95% CI 4.0%, 7.0%) or shoot someone (5.7%, 95% CI 4.3%, 7.1%) to advance such an objective. CONCLUSIONS: In this cohort, support for political violence declined from 2022 to 2023, but predictions of firearm use in political violence increased. These findings can help guide prevention efforts, which are urgently needed.

Firearm Ownership and Support for Political Violence in the United States.

Importance: Little is known about support for and willingness to engage in political violence in the United States. Such violence would likely involve firearms. Objective: To evaluate whether firearm owners' and nonowners' support for political violence differs and whether support among owners varies by type of firearms owned, recency of purchase, and frequency of carrying a loaded firearm in public. Design, Setting, and Participants: This cross-sectional nationally representative survey study was conducted from May 13 to June 2, 2022, among US adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, including an oversample of firearm owners. Exposure: Firearm ownership vs nonownership. Main Outcomes and Measures: Main outcomes concern (1) support for political violence, in general and to advance specific political objectives; (2) personal willingness to engage in political violence, by severity of violence and target population; and (3) perceived likelihood of firearm use in political violence. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions and adjusted prevalence differences, with P values adjusted for the false-discovery rate and reported as q values. Results: The analytic sample comprised 12 851 respondents: 5820 (45.3%) firearm owners, 6132 (47.7%) nonowners without firearms at home, and 899 (7.0%) nonowners with firearms at home. After weighting, 51.0% (95% CI, 49.9%-52.1%) were female, 8.5% (95% CI, 7.5%-9.5%) Hispanic, 9.1% (95% CI, 8.1%-10.2%) non-Hispanic Black, and 62.6% (95% CI, 61.5%-63.8%) non-Hispanic White; the mean (SD) age was 48.5 (18.0) years. Owners were more likely than nonowners without firearms at home to consider violence usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives (owners: 38.8%; 95% CI, 37.3%-40.4%; nonowners: 29.8%; 95% CI, 28.5%-31.2%; adjusted difference, 6.5 percentage points; 95% CI, 4.5-9.3 percentage points; q < .001) but were not more willing to engage in political violence. Recent purchasers, owners who always or nearly always carry loaded firearms in public, and to a lesser extent, owners of assault-type rifles were more supportive of and willing to engage in political violence than other subgroups of firearm owners. Conclusions and Relevance: In this study of support for political violence in the United States, differences between firearm owners and nonowners without firearms at home were small to moderate when present. Differences were greater among subsets of owners than between owners and nonowners. These findings can guide risk-based prevention efforts.

MAGA Republicans' views of American democracy and society and support for political violence in the United States: Findings from a nationwide population-representative survey.

BACKGROUND: Identifying groups at increased risk for political violence can support prevention efforts. We determine whether "Make America Great Again" (MAGA) Republicans, as defined, are potentially such a group. METHODS: Nationwide survey conducted May 13-June 2, 2022 of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. MAGA Republicans are defined as Republicans who voted for Donald Trump in the 2020 presidential election and deny the results of that election. Principal outcomes are weighted proportions of respondents who endorse political violence, are willing to engage in it, and consider it likely to occur. FINDINGS: The analytic sample (n = 7,255) included 1,128 (15.0%) MAGA Republicans, 640 (8.3%) strong Republicans, 1,571 (21.3%) other Republicans, and 3,916 (55.3%) non-Republicans. MAGA Republicans were substantially more likely than others to agree strongly/very strongly that "in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States" (MAGA Republicans, 30.3%, 95% CI 27.2%, 33.4%; strong Republicans, 7.5%, 95% CI 5.1%, 9.9%; other Republicans, 10.8%, 95% CI 9.0%, 12.6%; non-Republicans, 11.2%, 95% CI 10.0%, 12.3%; p < 0.001) and to consider violence usually/always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives (MAGA Republicans, 58.2%, 95% CI 55.0%, 61.4%; strong Republicans, 38.3%, 95% CI 34.2%, 42.4%; other Republicans, 31.5%, 95% CI 28.9%, 34.0%; non-Republicans, 25.1%, 95% CI 23.6%, 26.7%; p < 0.001). They were not more willing to engage personally in political violence. INTERPRETATION: MAGA Republicans, as defined, are more likely than others to endorse political violence. They are not more willing to engage in such violence themselves; their endorsement may increase the risk that it will occur.

Views of democracy and society and support for political violence in the USA: findings from a nationally representative survey.

BACKGROUND: Current conditions in the USA suggest an increasing risk for political violence. Little is known about the prevalence of beliefs that might lead to political violence, about support for and personal willingness to engage in political violence, and about how those measures vary with individual characteristics, lethality of violence, political objectives that violence might advance, or specific populations as targets. METHODS: This cross-sectional US nationally representative survey was conducted on May 13 to June 2, 2022, of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Outcomes are weighted, population-representative proportions of respondents endorsing selected beliefs about American democracy and society and violence to advance political objectives. RESULTS: The analytic sample included 8620 respondents; 50.5% (95% confidence interval (CI) 49.3%, 51.7%) were female; and weighted mean (± standard deviation) age was 48.4 (± 18.0) years. Nearly 1 in 5 (18.9%, 95% CI 18.0%, 19.9%) agreed strongly or very strongly that "having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy"; 16.2% (95% CI 15.3%, 17.1%) agreed strongly or very strongly that "in America, native-born white people are being replaced by immigrants," and 13.7% (95% CI 12.9%, 14.6%) agreed strongly or very strongly that "in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States." One-third of respondents (32.8%, 95% CI 31.7%, 33.9%) considered violence to be usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives. Among all respondents, 7.7% (95% CI 7.0%, 8.4%) thought it very or extremely likely that within the next few years, in a situation where they believe political violence is justified, "I will be armed with a gun"; 1.1% (95% CI 0.9%, 1.4%) thought it very or extremely likely that "I will shoot someone with a gun." Support for political violence and for the use of firearms in such violence frequently declined with increasing age, education, and income. CONCLUSIONS: Small but concerning proportions of the population consider violence, including lethal violence, to be usually or always justified to advance political objectives. Prevention efforts should proceed urgently based on the best evidence available.

The origins of California's gun violence restraining order law: a case study using Kingdon's multiple streams framework.

BACKGROUND: Firearm violence is a major public health problem in the United States, yet most states lack a mechanism to temporarily remove firearms from individuals who are at high and imminent risk of harming themselves or others and are not otherwise prohibited. Extreme risk protection order (ERPO) laws are intended to close this gap. The current study examines the passage of California's gun violence restraining order (GVRO) bill using Kingdon's multiple streams framework. METHODS: This study was based on an analysis of interview data from six key informants involved in the passage of the GVRO legislation. RESULTS: Findings indicate policy entrepreneurs framed the problem and designed the policy to target individuals at behavioral risk of imminent firearm violence. Policy entrepreneurs comprised an integrated policy network that engaged in a lengthy period of collaboration and bargained with interest groups to yield a bill that satisfied diverse concerns. CONCLUSIONS: This case study may inform efforts in other states to pass ERPO policies and other firearm safety laws.

Prior Drug-Related Criminal Charges and Risk for Intimate Partner Violence Perpetration Among Authorized Purchasers of Handguns in California.

Intimate partner violence (IPV) is a considerable public health problem in the US, and evidence suggests that both drugs and firearms contribute to the risk of IPV and its severity. This study uses a retrospective, longitudinal cohort design to explore the association between past arrests, charges incurred in the legal process, and convictions for drug-related crimes, and risk of future arrest for IPV among legal handgun purchasers. The cohort included all legal purchasers of handguns in California in 2001 between the ages of 21 and 49 (n = 79,678), 156 of whom had pre-purchase drug charges and post-purchase IPV charges. We used Cox proportional hazards regression with age at time of handgun purchase, sex, and race/ethnicity, and an array of community characteristics as covariates. Over the study period (2001-2013), in comparison to handgun purchasers who had no charges or convictions prior to their index purchase, risk for future IPV arrest was increased for purchasers whose only prior charges were drug-related (aHR = 3.4 [95% CI: 2.4-4.9]) and purchasers who had both prior drug- and non-drug related charges (aHR = 4.9 [95% CI: 4.1-6.0]). The magnitude of the risk ratio was greater when multiple drug types were involved and when the person had been charged with both the use and sale of drugs. Our findings suggest that, among legal handgun purchasers, prior drug charges are associated with future risk of IPV arrests or convictions. Given the established link between firearm access and IPV severity and fatality, these findings may inform the development and enforcement of policies that reduce firearm access for those at elevated risk of perpetrating intimate partner violence.

Intimate Partner Violence and Subsequent Violent Offending Among Handgun Purchasers.

Perpetrators of intimate partner violence (IPV) often reoffend, and firearm access increases risk of severe injury or fatality. Prior research identifies an association between a history of violent misdemeanor convictions among handgun purchasers and increased risk of subsequent arrest for a violent crime; the risk associated specifically with an IPV criminal history remains largely unexplored. The current study examined a cohort of 76,311 California adults who legally purchased a handgun in 2001 and followed them through 2013. Compared with purchasers who had no criminal history at the time of purchase, those with a history of only IPV (n = 178) charges were at increased risk of subsequent arrest for a violent Crime Index crime (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault; adjusted hazard ratio [AHR], 2.6; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.4-5.1), any violent crime (AHR, 3.2; 95% CI: 2.0-5.1), and an IPV crime (AHR, 5.2; 95% CI: 3.0-9.0). Purchasers with both IPV and non-IPV charges demonstrated the greatest risk of re-arrest relative to those with no criminal history. Despite the strength of the relationship between IPV and subsequent arrest, a small proportion of handgun purchasers with an IPV criminal history were re-arrested for firearm violence crimes, limiting application for risk assessment purposes. Results affirm prior research identifying IPV as a risk factor for future offending.

Physical Distancing, Violence, and Crime in US Cities during the Coronavirus Pandemic.

Violent crime increased and most property crime decreased in many United States (US) cities during the coronavirus pandemic. Using negative binomial regressions, we examined the association between physical distancing (a central coronavirus containment strategy) and crime within 16 large cities (in 12 US states and the District of Columbia) through July 2020. Physical distancing was measured with aggregated smartphone data and defined as the average change in the percentage of the population staying completely at home. Outcome data were obtained from the Gun Violence Archive and city open data portals. In multivariable models, increases in the percentage of the population staying home were associated with decreases in reported incidents of aggravated assault, interpersonal firearm violence, theft, rape, and robbery, and increases in arson, burglary, and motor vehicle theft. Results suggest that changes in the frequency of interpersonal interactions affected crime during the coronavirus pandemic. More research is needed on the specificity of these assocations and their underlying mechanisms.

Extreme Risk Protection Orders Intended to Prevent Mass Shootings: A Case Series.

Urgent, individualized interventions to reduce firearm access, such as extreme risk protection orders (ERPOs, colloquially known as "red flag" orders), provide a rapid, focused response when risk for imminent firearm violence is high. Studies to date suggest such interventions are most commonly used to prevent suicide and are effective. Authorizing legislation has often been enacted after public mass shootings but, to our knowledge, there have been only 2 reported cases of ERPO use in efforts to prevent mass shootings. California enacted the nation's first ERPO statute, which took effect in January 2016. The authors are evaluating that statute's implementation and effectiveness and are seeking to obtain court records for all 414 cases occurring in 2016 to 2018. Based on 159 records received thus far, this article presents an aggregate summary and individual histories for a preliminary series of 21 cases in which ERPOs were used in efforts to prevent mass shootings. Most subjects were male and non-Hispanic white; the mean age was 35 years. Most subjects made explicit threats and owned firearms. Four cases arose primarily in relation to medical or mental health conditions, and such conditions were noted in 4 others. Fifty-two firearms were recovered. As of early August 2019, none of the threatened shootings had occurred, and no other homicides or suicides by persons subject to the orders were identified. It is impossible to know whether violence would have occurred had ERPOs not been issued, and the authors make no claim of a causal relationship. Nonetheless, the cases suggest that this urgent, individualized intervention can play a role in efforts to prevent mass shootings, in health care settings and elsewhere. Further evaluation would be helpful.

The Implementation of State-Mandated Standards for Batterer Intervention Programs: The Colorado Experience.

The current research examines Colorado's experience implementing evidence-based mandated treatment Standards, which use a uniform risk assessment, differentiated treatment levels, offender competencies, and a multidisciplinary treatment team (MTT) composed of a victim advocate, probation officer, and treatment provider to manage offender treatment. Using data from MTT member surveys (n = 107) and follow-up interviews (n = 14), the study investigates perceptions of implementation and treatment fidelity, MTT decision making and communication, and the process of successful treatment completion. Results demonstrate that full implementation of Colorado's standards for domestic violence treatment has not yet been achieved and that many MTT members report challenges to communication and decision making regarding offender treatment plans and successful achievement of competencies. Recommendations for further improvements in Colorado's domestic violence treatment model are made and directions for future research are discussed.

A longitudinal examination of offending and specialization among a sample of Massachusetts domestic violence offenders.

A paucity of existing research focuses on longitudinal examinations of criminal trajectories among reoffenses committed by domestic violence offenders. Specifically, few studies have longitudinally assessed whether domestic violence offenders specialize, recidivating in domestic violence assault, or generalize, committing a range of personal and property crimes. Acknowledging these research deficiencies, the current study uses longitudinal data from a cohort of 317 batterers who were processed in a domestic violence court to investigate the trajectories of domestic violence arrests and nondomestic violence arrests over a 10-year period. The degree of overlap between domestic and nondomestic violence arrest trajectory groups is examined through a cross-tabulation and chi-square analysis. Logistic and multinomial regression models are applied to identify risk factors that distinguish trajectory groups. A PROC TRAJ procedure identifies two trajectory groups for domestic violence arrests (low and high rate) and three trajectory groups for nondomestic violence arrests (very low, low, and high rate). Results indicate that specialization among domestic violence offenders is rare-prior alcohol and drug crimes predict membership in the high-rate domestic violence arrest trajectory group and prior domestic violence arrests predict membership in both the low-rate and high-rate nondomestic violence arrest trajectories. Implications for future research and policy are discussed in this article.

The influence of childhood maltreatment and self-control on dating violence: a comparison of college students in the United States and South Korea.

Various aspects of social learning and self-control theories have been applied to partner violence among multiple samples in the United States, but these theoretical approaches have been less commonly studied cross-culturally. Consequently, childhood maltreatment and low self-control have been identified as risk factors for various outcomes in primarily American samples. This study examined the relationships between childhood maltreatment, low self-control, and dating violence among college students in South Korea and the United States. Findings indicated that experiencing childhood maltreatment and having low self-control were key predictors of perpetration and victimization for both psychological and physical relationship violence. Witnessing interparental violence during childhood was less consistently predictive of one's involvement in a violent dating relationship. Implications for theory and policy are discussed.

Dating violence perpetration and victimization among South Korean college students: a focus on gender and childhood maltreatment.

Unlike the attention given to intimate partner violence among adolescents and young adults in western societies, dating violence is not currently recognized in South Korea as a social phenomenon in terms of research, prevention, and intervention. Childhood maltreatment has been identified in previous research as a risk factor for violence in a later dating relationship. This study examines the relationship between childhood maltreatment and physical and psychological dating violence perpetration and victimization among 1,399 college students in South Korea, with a specific focus on gender. Poisson regression models and tests of equivalent parameters were conducted to determine whether the observed relationships were invariant across gender. Findings indicated that childhood maltreatment is a consistent predictor of involvement in dating relationships characterized by violence for males and females. The implications of the current research within a cultural context are discussed.