The Case for Heterogeneity in Metacognitive Appraisals of Biased Beliefs.

ACADEMIC ABSTRACT: Prominent theories of belief and metacognition make different predictions about how people evaluate their biased beliefs. These predictions reflect different assumptions about (a) people's conscious belief regulation goals and (b) the mechanisms and constraints underlying belief change. I argue that people exhibit heterogeneity in how they evaluate their biased beliefs. Sometimes people are blind to their biases, sometimes people acknowledge and condone them, and sometimes people resent them. The observation that people adopt a variety of "metacognitive positions" toward their beliefs provides insight into people's belief regulation goals as well as insight into way that belief formation is free and constrained. The way that people relate to their beliefs illuminates why they hold those beliefs. Identifying how someone thinks about their belief is useful for changing their mind. PUBLIC ABSTRACT: The same belief can be alternatively thought of as rational, careful, unfortunate, or an act of faith. These beliefs about one's beliefs are called "metacognitive positions." I review evidence that people hold at least four different metacognitive positions. For each position, I discuss what kinds of cognitive processes generated belief and what role people's values and preferences played in belief formation. We can learn a lot about someone's belief based on how they relate to that belief. Learning how someone relates to their belief is useful for identifying the best ways to try to change their mind.

Meddling in the 2016 Elections and Satisfaction With Democracy in the US.

In this article, we investigate how external election interventions influence satisfaction with democracy. We expect that mere knowledge about a foreign intervention will not affect system support. Instead, only those who believe that the external influence campaign had a decisive impact on the election outcome should see a reduction in democratic satisfaction. Furthermore, since electoral winners are likely to think that their preferred party provides superior policy outputs, supporters of winning parties should be less affected by their beliefs in the decisiveness of an influence campaign. Finally, we expect that those who place a high value on in-group loyalty will be more likely to engage in motivated reasoning. Thus, in-group loyalty should cause electoral winners to discount the substantive impact of a given electoral intervention, whereas it should have the opposite effect for losers. Our analysis relies on US survey data, and it uncovers broad support for our theoretical expectations.

Susceptibility to poor arguments: The interplay of cognitive sophistication and attitudes.

Despite everyday argumentation being crucial to human communication and decision-making, the cognitive determinants of argument evaluation are poorly known. This study examined how attitudes and aspects of cognitive sophistication, i.e., thinking styles and scientific literacy, relate to people's acceptance of poorly justified arguments (e.g., unwarranted appeals to naturalness) on controversial topics (e.g., genetically modified organisms (GMOs)). The participants were more accepting of poorly justified arguments that aligned with their attitudes compared to those that opposed their attitudes, and this was true regardless of one's thinking styles or level of scientific literacy. Still, most of the examined aspects of cognitive sophistication were also positively related to fallacy detection. The strongest cognitive predictors of correctly recognizing the fallacies were one's scientific reasoning ability and active open-mindedness. The results thus imply that decreasing misleading attitude effects, and increasing certain aspects of analytic and scientific thinking, could improve argumentation.

Exiting after Brexit: public perceptions of future European Union member state departures.

Public opinion scholarship suggests that Europeans broadly interpret Brexit as a cautionary fable rather than an encouraging blueprint to follow. Yet, Brexit singularly demonstrates the possibility of European disintegration, and is but one of multiple recent crises that have brought the potential for member state departures into focus. Drawing on new survey data from 16 countries and using logistic regressions, this article charts Europeans' perceptions of the likelihood future EU exits over the next decade. It finds evidence of asymmetric motivated reasoning: Euroscepticism and pro-Brexit views strongly associate with perceiving exits likely, while among Europhiles this association is only ameliorated, not reversed. This reveals two gaps with repercussions for understanding EU public opinion dynamics. First, between Eurosceptic policy elites' softened policy stances on exit and their supporters' steadfast sense that further departures remain likely. Second, between Europhiles' scepticism of Brexit and a residual lack of confidence in EU cohesion.

Do you really believe that? The effect of economic incentives on the acceptance of real-world data in a polarized context.

Attitudes and expectations towards others are major drivers of political polarization. However, there is limited understanding of their relevance when decisions with high stakes are taken. In this study, we compare self-reported attitudes against economically incentivized estimates of data coming from official sources and offer participants financial rewards for accuracy. Our methodology yields three principal findings. (i) Extreme attitudes from a small partisan subgroup primarily account for the observed partisan divide; this subgroup diminishes when incentivized estimates are considered. (ii) There is a weak correlation between economically incentivized and unincentivized measures within individual respondents. (iii) We introduce a novel metric for assessing perceived polarization. This metric allows participants to estimate data points for those with opposing political views, rewarding accurate predictions financially. Interestingly, this measure of perceived polarization correlates with attitudes but not with incentivized data estimates. This is in line with the concept of 'false polarization', attributing polarization more to expectations towards others than to genuine differences. These findings challenge the reliability of standard attitude surveys and suggest avenues for mitigating perceived polarization in contentious issues.

The roots of polarization in the individual reward system.

Polarization raises concerns for democracy and society, which have expanded in the internet era where (mis)information has become ubiquitous, its transmission faster than ever, and the freedom and means of opinion expressions are expanding. The origin of polarization however remains unclear, with multiple social and emotional factors and individual reasoning biases likely to explain its current forms. In the present work, we adopt a principled approach and show that polarization tendencies can take root in biased reward processing of new information in favour of choice confirmatory evidence. Through agent-based simulations, we show that confirmation bias in individual learning is an independent mechanism and could be sufficient for creating polarization at group level independently of any additional assumptions about the opinions themselves, a priori beliefs about them, information transmission mechanisms or the structure of social relationship between individuals. This generative process can interact with polarization mechanisms described elsewhere, but constitutes an entrenched biological tendency that helps explain the extraordinary resilience of polarization against mitigating efforts such as dramatic informational change in the environment.

Calculated Comparisons: Manufacturing Societal Causal Judgments by Implying Different Counterfactual Outcomes.

How do people come to opposite causal judgments about societal problems, such as whether a public health policy reduced COVID-19 cases? The current research tests an understudied cognitive mechanism in which people may agree about what actually happened (e.g., that a public health policy was implemented and COVID-19 cases declined), but can be made to disagree about the counterfactual, or what would have happened otherwise (e.g., whether COVID-19 cases would have declined naturally without intervention) via comparison cases. Across two preregistered studies (total N = 480), participants reasoned about the implementation of a public policy that was followed by an immediate decline in novel virus cases. Study 1 shows that people's judgments about the causal impact of the policy could be pushed in opposite directions by emphasizing comparison cases that imply different counterfactual outcomes. Study 2 finds that people recognize they can use such information to influence others. Specifically, in service of persuading others to support or reject a public health policy, people systematically showed comparison cases implying the counterfactual outcome that aligned with their position. These findings were robust across samples of U.S. college students and politically and socioeconomically diverse U.S. adults. Together, these studies suggest that implied counterfactuals are a powerful tool that individuals can use to manufacture others' causal judgments and warrant further investigation as a mechanism contributing to belief polarization.

Motivational drivers of costly information search.

Acquiring information that aids decision-making is subject to a trade-off of accuracy versus cost, given that time, effort, or money are required to obtain decision-relevant information. Three studies (N = 2010) investigated the motivational dynamics shaping the priorities that govern this trade-off. Motivational orientations related to both the decision-making process and its outcome were examined. Regulatory focus theory describes two broad orientations to goal pursuit: promotion focus, prioritizing eager achievement, versus prevention focus, prioritizing vigilant security. We hypothesized that when the framing of a decision-making task activates a prevention focus rather than a promotion focus, individuals would be more willing to assume the costs of acquiring additional information before making their decisions. To test this hypothesis, participants made incentivized decisions with the option of acquiring additional information before making a final decision; importantly, obtaining this information incurred financial costs. Results consistently confirmed that prevention-focused decision makers were indeed more willing to assume the costs of acquiring additional information than promotion-focused individuals. The first two studies involved a scenario where participants were indifferent to the specific outcome of the decision process; accuracy was their only concern. In the final study, searchable, accuracy-enhancing information was also related to decision makers' partisan political preferences. Regulatory focus and the preference for partisan-congenial information were observed to be co-occurring but functionally orthogonal drivers of costly information search. Thus, prevention-framed messages can motivate the search for decision-relevant information, even when this search is costly and could lead to disagreeable data.

Cultural Theory, Wildfire Information Source, and Agency Public Trust: A Central Oregon Case Study.

With the increasing occurrence and severity of wildfires in the U.S., and especially in the forests and rangelands of the western U.S., it is important to know which wildfire information sources are trusted by households and the amount of trust placed on natural resources agencies to manage for wildfire. The Theory of Motivated Reasoning suggests that people will trust and use those information sources that conform to their own value and ideological orientations. Similarly, trust in natural resource agencies' ability to manage wildfire may also be the result of cultural traits. This study uses Cultural Theory as a theoretical perspective to determine those value systems, and how cultural traits motivate people to use and trust various wildfire information sources and the agencies tasked with managing wildfire. Using random sample surveys of Wildland-Urban-Interface (WUI) households in fire-prone Deschutes County in central Oregon, the study finds that egalitarians are significantly more likely than those with other cultural traits to use and trust natural resource agency information sources, while individualists are more likely to use and trust family members and neighbors for their information. Similarly, egalitarians are trusting of natural resource managers to use prescribed fire, manage naturally ignited fires, and to thin forests to reduce fuels. Individualists are less trusting of government agencies to use the same approaches to reduce fuels. The study concludes with some suggestions for how wildfire policy makers and managers can use these findings to communicate more effectively important wildfire information to audiences with differing cultural traits and differing levels of natural resource agency trust.

Evaluation of misinformation among pro-Ukrainian Latvians - the role of prior attitude, analytical thinking, and emotions.

In this exploratory study with a community sample (N = 115), we look at the perception of pro-Russia and pro-Ukraine misinformation, mimicking content shared by naive Facebook users, and the factors related to it among pro-Ukraine Latvians. Our results support the integrative model in the perception of misinformation-we found strong evidence of myside bias, as pro-Russia misinformation was judged to be significantly less accurate than pro-Ukraine misinformation. Analytical thinking, measured with the seven-item cognitive reflection test, was associated with lower levels of pro-Ukraine misinformation accuracy judgments and lower overall misinformation accuracy judgments; however, there was no correlation between analytical thinking and pro-Russian misinformation accuracy judgments. Pro-Ukrainian misinformation accuracy judgments were positively related to positive emotions elicited by misinformation, the level of support for Ukraine, and the participant's age. In addition, participants indicated a higher likelihood of engaging with misinformation if they came across it online, trusted the information, and if it elicited positive emotions. Thus, our findings emphasize the role of one's attitude, analytical thinking, and emotions in one's perception, evaluation, and engagement with congruent and incongruent misinformation.

Information Avoidance: Past Perspectives and Future Directions.

In the present age of unprecedented access to information, it is important to understand how and why people avoid information. Multiple definitions of "information avoidance" exist, and key aspects of these definitions deserve attention, such as distinguishing information avoidance from (lack of) information seeking, considering the intentionality and temporal nature of information avoidance, and considering the personal relevance of the information. In this review, we provide a cross-disciplinary historical account of theories and empirical research on information avoidance and seeking, drawing from research in multiple fields. We provide a framework of antecedents of information avoidance, categorized into beliefs about the information (e.g., risk perceptions), beliefs about oneself (e.g., coping resources), and social and situational factors (e.g., social norms), noting that constructs across categories overlap and are intertwined. We suggest that research is needed on both positive and negative consequences of information avoidance and on interventions to reduce information avoidance (when appropriate). Research is also needed to better understand temporal dynamics of information avoidance and how it manifests in everyday life. Finally, comprehensive theoretical models are needed that differentiate avoidance from seeking. Research on information avoidance is quickly expanding, and the topic will only grow in importance.

Asymmetric Causal Attributions to Environmental Influences for Prosocial Versus Antisocial Behavior.

Several recent studies have explored how people may favor different explanations for others' behavior depending on the moral or evaluative valence of the behavior in question. This research tested whether people would be less willing to believe that a person's environment played a role in causing her to exhibit antisocial (as compared to prosocial) behavior. In three experiments, participants read a description of a person engaging in either antisocial or prosocial behavior. Participants were less willing to endorse environmental causes of antisocial (versus prosocial) behavior when the environmental influence in question was witnessing others behaving similarly, either during childhood (Experiment 1) or recently (Experiment 2), or being directly encouraged by others to engage in the behavior described (Experiment 3). These results could be relevant to understanding why people resist attributing wrongdoing to causes outside of individual control in some cases.

No association between numerical ability and politically motivated reasoning in a large US probability sample.

The highly influential theory of "Motivated System 2 Reasoning" argues that analytical, deliberative ("System 2") reasoning is hijacked by identity when considering ideologically charged issues-leading people who are more likely to engage in such reasoning to be more polarized, rather than more accurate. Here, we fail to replicate the key empirical support for this theory across five contentious issues, using a large gold-standard nationally representative probability sample of Americans. While participants were more accurate in evaluating a contingency table when the outcome aligned with their politics (even when controlling for prior beliefs), we find that participants with higher numeracy were more accurate in evaluating the contingency table, regardless of whether or not the table's outcome aligned with their politics. These findings call for a reconsideration of the effect of identity on analytical reasoning.

For Better and For Worse: Frequent Gamblers Use Dual Counterfactuals to Justify Continued Gambling.

How might frequent gamblers convince themselves to keep playing despite persistent losses or after a win that should be savored? The purpose of this research is to examine the unexplored question of how frequent gamblers' use counterfactual thinking to motivate their desire to continue gambling. Using a sample of n = 69 high and n = 69 low frequency gamblers in a field setting, we found that infrequent gamblers tended to consider how the perceived outcome of losing "could have been better" (i.e., upward counterfactual thinking), and how a winning outcome "could have been worse" (i.e., downward counterfactual thinking). This pattern of counterfactual thinking is considered typical in many settings and may, in a gambling context, support a potentially more responsible approach by helping infrequent gamblers to learn from past mistakes to avoid significant future losses and to savor wins to protect returns gained. Alternatively, we found that frequent gamblers were more likely to generate 'dual counterfactuals' which include both upward and downward counterfactuals in response to losses and wins. We argue that this dual pattern of counterfactual thinking may allow frequent gamblers to more easily justify their desire to continue gambling. Findings suggest that challenging gamblers counterfactual thinking patterns could assist clinicians in moderating the potential for high-risk behaviors.

Information avoidance: Self-image concerns, inattention, and ideology.

We report the results of an experiment on willful information avoidance regarding measures to address Covid-19. In the experiment, participants choose between two options, each associated with a contribution to the Corona Fund of the Red Cross USA and a payment to the participant. Depending on the treatment, either the participants' payoff, the donation, both or none of these pieces of information were hidden, but revealable. With this design, we can separate motivated reasons for ignorance from non-motivated reasons, both of which are present in our data. Furthermore, we find evidence of both self-serving and pro-social information avoidance. These behavioral patterns correlate with the subjects' political attitudes: while voters of the Democratic Party are prone to exhibit pro-social information avoidance, Republican voters rather engage in self-serving information avoidance.

Liberal-democratic values and philosophers' beliefs about moral expertise.

In recent decades, the discipline of bioethics has grown rapidly, as has the practice of ethical consultation. Interestingly, this new recognition of the relevance of moral philosophy to our daily life has been accompanied by skepticism among philosophers regarding the existence of moral expertise or the benefits of philosophical training. In his recent article in Bioethics, William R. Smith suggested that this skepticism is rooted in philosophers' belief that moral expertise is inconsistent with liberal-democratic values, when in fact they are compatible. In this paper, we provide a unique opportunity to empirically examine Smith's observation by utilizing and extending global data on philosophers' beliefs about moral expertise, involving 4087 philosophers from 96 countries. Our findings support Smith's theoretical observation and show that societal levels of support for liberal-democratic values are associated with greater skepticism about moral expertise. We suggest that these findings might be explained by the cognitive process of motivated reasoning and an invalid inference of "is" from "ought." Consequently, the potential tension between moral expertise and liberal-democratic values is invalidly used for rejecting the existence of moral expertise, while its main and valid implication is for how moral expertise should be applied in liberal-democratic settings.

Endorsement of scientific inquiry promotes better evaluation of climate policy evidence.

Public and scientific consensus about climate change do not align. Problematically, higher scientific knowledge has been associated with lower acceptance of climate information among those with more conservative socio-political ideologies. Positive attitudes towards science can attenuate this effect. We investigated the association between endorsement of scientific inquiry (ESI) and decision-making with scientific evidence about climate policies. Participants rated support for 16 climate policies accompanied by weaker or stronger evidence. In study 1 (N = 503), higher ESI was associated with greater discernment between strongly and weakly evidenced climate policies, irrespective of worldview. In studies 2 (N = 402) and 3 (N = 600), an ESI intervention improved discrimination, and, in study 3, increased ESI specifically for hierarchical/individualistic participants. Unlike ESI, the link between scientific knowledge and evaluation of evidence was influenced by worldview. Increasing ESI might improve the evaluation of scientific evidence and increase public support for evidence-based climate policies. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10584-023-03535-y.

Testing Explanations for Skepticism of Personalized Risk Information.

BACKGROUND: The promise of precision medicine could be stymied if people do not accept the legitimacy of personalized risk information. We tested 4 explanations for skepticism of personalized diabetes risk information. METHOD: We recruited participants (N = 356; Mage = 48.6 [s = 9.8], 85.1% women, 59.0% non-Hispanic white) from community locations (e.g., barbershops, churches) for a risk communication intervention. Participants received personalized information about their risk of developing diabetes and heart disease, stroke, colon cancer, and/or breast cancer (women). Then they completed survey items. We combined 2 items (recalled risk, perceived risk) to create a trichotomous risk skepticism variable (acceptance, overestimation, underestimation). Additional items assessed possible explanations for risk skepticism: 1) information evaluation skills (education, graph literacy, numeracy), 2) motivated reasoning (negative affect toward the information, spontaneous self-affirmation, information avoidance); 3) Bayesian updating (surprise), and 4) personal relevance (racial/ethnic identity). We used multinomial logistic regression for data analysis. RESULTS: Of the participants, 18% believed that their diabetes risk was lower than the information provided, 40% believed their risk was higher, and 42% accepted the information. Information evaluation skills were not supported as a risk skepticism explanation. Motivated reasoning received some support; higher diabetes risk and more negative affect toward the information were associated with risk underestimation, but spontaneous self-affirmation and information avoidance were not moderators. For Bayesian updating, more surprise was associated with overestimation. For personal relevance, belonging to a marginalized racial/ethnic group was associated with underestimation. CONCLUSION: There are likely multiple cognitive, affective, and motivational explanations for risk skepticism. Understanding these explanations and developing interventions that address them will increase the effectiveness of precision medicine and facilitate its widespread implementation.

People recognize and condone their own morally motivated reasoning.

People often engage in biased reasoning, favoring some beliefs over others even when the result is a departure from impartial or evidence-based reasoning. Psychologists have long assumed that people are unaware of these biases and operate under an "illusion of objectivity." We identify an important domain of life in which people harbor little illusion about their biases - when they are biased for moral reasons. For instance, people endorse and feel justified believing morally desirable propositions even when they think they lack evidence for them (Study 1a/1b). Moreover, when people engage in morally desirable motivated reasoning, they recognize the influence of moral biases on their judgment, but nevertheless evaluate their reasoning as ideal (Studies 2-4). These findings overturn longstanding assumptions about motivated reasoning and identify a boundary condition on Naïve Realism and the Bias Blind Spot. People's tendency to be aware and proud of their biases provides both new opportunities, and new challenges, for resolving ideological conflict and improving reasoning.

The Contagion of Unethical Behavior and Social Learning: An Experimental Study.

Unethical behavior is discovered that is more contagious than ethical behavior. This article attempts to propose one of the possible underlying mechanisms-people may have underconfidence bias in information updating due to motivated reasoning, and such bias exhibits in a different direction compared to the overconfident bias documented in the literature on ethical environment, which generate the asymmetric pattern in contagion. This study designs an experiment which relates the unethical behavior to social learning, where a series of subjects with private information about penalty decide sequentially whether to conduct unethical behavior publicly. This study adopts a quantal response equilibrium to construct a structural model for estimation of the bias. In total, 162 university students participated in our experiment and the results confirm the asymmetric patterns that people rely more on others' precedent decisions rather than their private signal; therefore, the bias facilitates the contagion. This study also tests two punishment systems in the experiment and the results suggest a policy: slightly increasing penalties for the "followers" in the early stages would effectively suppress the contagion.