Individual differences in categorization development: The mediation of executive functions and factual knowledge, the case of food.

Cognitive mechanisms underpinning categorization development are still debated, either resulting from knowledge accretion or an increase in cognitive control. To disentangle the respective influence of accumulated factual knowledge and executive functions (inhibition, working memory, and cognitive flexibility) on (a) the development of categorization abilities in the food domain and (b) differences in this development by child characteristics (i.e., food neophobia), we conducted two experiments. The first experiment assessed 4-6-year-old children's (n = 122) ability to taxonomically categorize food at the superordinate level of categorization. The second experiment tested 3-6-year-old children's (n = 100) ability to cross-categorize the same food according to two different relationships alternatively (i.e., taxonomic and thematic). Results indicate that accumulated factual knowledge and executive functions mediated both the effect of age and the effect of food neophobia on categorization performance. Notably, the specific executive functions involved may vary depending on the categorization abilities tested, whereas world knowledge was always a prerequisite. Overall, this research highlights the complex interplay between accumulated factual knowledge, executive functions, and child characteristics in shaping the development of categorization abilities. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Children (and many adults) use perceptual similarity to assess relative impossibility.

People see some impossible events as more impossible than others. For example, walking through a solid wall seems more impossible if it is made of stone rather than wood. Across four experiments, we investigated how children and adults assess the relative impossibility of events, contrasting two kinds of information they may use: perceptual information and causal knowledge. In each experiment, participants were told about a wizard who could magically transform target objects into other things. Participants then assessed which of the two transformation spells would be easier or harder, a spell transforming a target object into a perceptual match (i.e., a similar-looking thing) or one transforming it into a causal match (e.g., an item made of similar materials). In Experiments 1-3, children aged 4-7 mainly thought that transformations into the perceptual match would be easier, though this tendency varied with age. Adults were overall split when choosing which spell would be easier. In Experiment 1, this was because of variations in their judgments across different pairs of spells; in Experiments 2 and 4, the split resulted because different subsets of adults preferred either the perceptual or causal match. Overall, these findings show that children, and many adults, use perceptual reasoning to assess relative impossibility. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Why concepts are (probably) vectors.

For decades, cognitive scientists have debated what kind of representation might characterize human concepts. Whatever the format of the representation, it must allow for the computation of varied properties, including similarities, features, categories, definitions, and relations. It must also support the development of theories, ad hoc categories, and knowledge of procedures. Here, we discuss why vector-based representations provide a compelling account that can meet all these needs while being plausibly encoded into neural architectures. This view has become especially promising with recent advances in both large language models and vector symbolic architectures. These innovations show how vectors can handle many properties traditionally thought to be out of reach for neural models, including compositionality, definitions, structures, and symbolic computational processes.

Emotional concepts shape the perceptual representation of body expressions.

Emotion perception interacts with how we think and speak, including our concept of emotions. Body expression is an important way of emotion communication, but it is unknown whether and how its perception is modulated by conceptual knowledge. In this study, we employed representational similarity analysis and conducted three experiments combining semantic similarity, mouse-tracking task, and one-back behavioral task with electroencephalography and functional magnetic resonance imaging techniques, the results of which show that conceptual knowledge predicted the perceptual representation of body expressions. Further, this prediction effect occurred at approximately 170 ms post-stimulus. The neural encoding of body expressions in the fusiform gyrus and lingual gyrus was impacted by emotion concept knowledge. Taken together, our results indicate that conceptual knowledge of emotion categories shapes the configural representation of body expressions in the ventral visual cortex, which offers compelling evidence for the constructed emotion theory.

Early-emerging combinatorial thought: Human infants flexibly combine kind and quantity concepts.

Combinatorial thought, or the ability to combine a finite set of concepts into a myriad of complex ideas and knowledge structures, is the key to the productivity of the human mind and underlies communication, science, technology, and art. Despite the importance of combinatorial thought for human cognition and culture, its developmental origins remain unknown. To address this, we tested whether 12-mo-old infants (N = 60), who cannot yet speak and only understand a handful of words, can combine quantity and kind concepts activated by verbal input. We proceeded in two steps: first, we taught infants two novel labels denoting quantity (e.g., "mize" for 1 item; "padu" for 2 items, Experiment 1). Then, we assessed whether they could combine quantity and kind concepts upon hearing complex expressions comprising their labels (e.g., "padu duck", Experiments 2-3). At test, infants viewed four different sets of objects (e.g., 1 duck, 2 ducks, 1 ball, 2 balls) while being presented with the target phrase (e.g., "padu duck") naming one of them (e.g., 2 ducks). They successfully retrieved and combined on-line the labeled concepts, as evidenced by increased looking to the named sets but not to distractor sets. Our results suggest that combinatorial processes for building complex representations are available by the end of the first year of life. The infant mind seems geared to integrate concepts in novel productive ways. This ability may be a precondition for deciphering the ambient language(s) and building abstract models of experience that enable fast and flexible learning.

Boundedness supports children's event representations.

Natural languages distinguish between telic predicates that denote events leading to an inherent endpoint (e.g., draw a balloon) and atelic predicates that denote events with no inherent endpoint (e.g., draw balloons). Telicity distinctions in many languages are already partly available to 4-5-year-olds. Here, using exclusively nonlinguistic tasks and a sample of English-speaking children, we ask whether young learners use corresponding temporal notions to characterize event structure-that is, whether children represent events in cognition as bounded temporal entities with a specified endpoint or unbounded temporal units that could in principle extend indefinitely. We find that 4-5-year-old children in our sample compute boundedness during an event categorization task (Experiment 1) and distinguish event boundedness from event completion (Experiment 2). Furthermore, 4-5-year-olds in our sample evaluate interruptions at event endpoints versus midpoints differently-but only for events that are construed as bounded, presumably because in such construals, events truly culminate (Experiment 3). We conclude that young children represent events in terms of foundational and abstract temporal properties. These properties could support the acquisition of linguistic aspectual distinctions and further scaffold the way children conceptualize and process their dynamic experiences. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The neural representation of body part concepts.

Neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies provide evidence for a degree of category-related organization of conceptual knowledge in the brain. Some of this evidence indicates that body part concepts are distinctly represented from other categories; yet, the neural correlates and mechanisms underlying these dissociations are unclear. We expand on the limited prior data by measuring functional magnetic resonance imaging responses induced by body part words and performing a series of analyses investigating the cortical representation of this semantic category. Across voxel-level contrasts, pattern classification, representational similarity analysis, and vertex-wise encoding analyses, we find converging evidence that the posterior middle temporal gyrus, the supramarginal gyrus, and the ventral premotor cortex in the left hemisphere play important roles in the preferential representation of this category compared to other concrete objects.

Rational adaptation in word production: Strong conceptual ability reduces the effect of lexical impairments on verb retrieval in aphasia.

Language users rely on both linguistic and conceptual processing abilities to efficiently comprehend or produce language. According to the principle of rational adaptation, the degree to which a cognitive system relies on one process vs. another can change under different conditions or disease states with the goal of optimizing behavior. In this study, we investigated rational adaptation in reliance on linguistic versus conceptual processing in aphasia, an acquired disorder of language. In individuals living with aphasia, verb-retrieval impairments are a pervasive deficit that negatively impacts communicative function. As such, we examined evidence of adaptation in verb production, using parallel measures to index impairment in two of verb naming's critical subcomponents: conceptual and linguistic processing. These component processes were evaluated using a standardized assessment battery designed to contrast non-linguistic (picture input) and linguistic (word input) tasks of conceptual action knowledge. The results indicate that non-linguistic conceptual action processing can be impaired in people with aphasia and contributes to verb-retrieval impairments. Furthermore, relatively unimpaired conceptual action processing can ameliorate the influence of linguistic processing deficits on verb-retrieval impairments. These findings are consistent with rational adaptation accounts, indicating that conceptual processing plays a key role in language function and can be leveraged in rehabilitation to improve verb retrieval in adults with chronic aphasia.

How important is it to learn language rather than create it?

I focus here on concepts that are not part of core knowledge - the ability to treat people as social agents with shareable mental states. Spelke proposes that learning language from another might account for the development of these concepts. I suggest that homesigners, who create language rather than learn it, may be a potential counterexample to this hypothesis.

The role of language in transcending core knowledge.

What Babies Know (WBK) argues that core knowledge has a unique place in cognitive architecture, between fully perceptual and fully conceptual systems of representation. Here I argue that WBK's core knowledge is on the perception side of the perception/cognition divide. I discuss some implications of this conclusion for the roles language learning might play in transcending core knowledge.

Developmental origin of a language-cognition interface in infants: Gateway to advancing core knowledge?

Spelke's sweeping proposal requires greater precision in specifying the place of language in early cognition. We now know by 3 months of age, infants have already begun to forge a link between language and core cognition. This precocious link, which unfolds dynamically over development, may indeed offer an entry point for acquiring higher-order, abstract conceptual and representational capacities.

Infants' representations of michottean triggering events.

The classic Michottean 'launching' event is consistent with a real-world Newtonian elastic collision. Previous research has shown that adult humans distinguish launching events that obey some of the physical constraints on Newtonian elastic collisions from events that do not do so early in visual processing, and that infants do so early in development (< 9 months of age). These include that in a launching event, the speed of the agent can be 3 times faster (or more) than that of the patient but the speed of the patient cannot be detectably greater than the speed of the agent. Experiment 1 shows that 7-8-month-old infants also distinguish canonical launching events from events in which the motion of the patient is rotated 90° from the trajectory of the motion of the agent (another outcome ruled out by the physics of elastic collisions). Violations of both the relative speed and the angle constraints create Michottean 'triggering' events, in which adults describe the motion of the patient as autonomous but not spontaneous, i.e., still initiated by contact with the causal agent. Experiments 2 and 3 begin to explore whether infants of this age construe Michottean triggering events as causal. We find that infants of this age are not sensitive to a reversal of the agent and patient in triggering events, thus failing to exhibit one of the signatures of representing an event as causal. We argue that there are likely several independent events schemas with causal content represented by young infants, and the literature on the origins of causal cognition in infancy would benefit from systematic investigations of event schemas other than launching events.

Children's representation of coincidence.

People relish thinking about coincidences-we puzzle over their meanings and delight in conveying our experiences of them to others. But whereas some research has begun to explore how coincidences are represented by adults, little is known about the early development of these representations. Here we explored factors influencing coincidence representations in both adults and children. Across two experiments, participants read stories describing co-occurring events and then judged whether these constituted coincidences. In Experiment 1 we found that adults' coincidence judgments were highly sensitive to the presence or absence of plausible explanations: as expected, adults were more likely to judge co-occurrences as a coincidence when no explanation was available. Importantly, their coincidence judgments were also modulated by the number of events that co-occurred. Adults tended to reject scenarios involving too many co-occurring events as coincidences regardless of whether an explanation was present, suggesting that observing suspiciously many co-occurrences triggered them to infer their own underlying explanation (and thus blocking the events' interpretation as a coincidence). In Experiment 2 we found that 4- to 10-year-old children also represent coincidences, and identify them via the absence of plausible explanations. Older children, like adults, rejected suspiciously large numbers of co-occurring events as coincidental, whereas younger children did not exhibit this sensitivity. Overall, these results suggest that representation of coincidence is available from early in life, but undergoes developmental change during the early school-age years.

Concept mapping - increased potential as a retrieval-based task.

Concept mapping is a practical task for enhancing learning performance. Learners usually construct concept maps while studying the learning material or after studying. In the first case, the learning material is available during construction, and learners are less involved in retrieval practice from memory (study-based concept mapping; SCM). In the second case, the learning material is absent during construction, and the learners rely on retrieving information from memory (retrieval-based concept mapping, RCM). RCM is assumed to be associated with lower concept map quality and higher cognitive load but better elaboration and learning performance than SCM. This study investigated how the availability of the learning material influenced these variables in biology classrooms. Unlike other studies, this study provided learners with an authentic learning environment and prior concept mapping training. After the concept mapping training, n = 129 secondary school students were assigned to an SCM or RCM condition in a quasi-experimental design. As expected, students in the RCM condition constructed concept maps of lower quality but outperformed SCM students concerning elaboration activities and learning performance. The perceived intrinsic cognitive load was higher in the RCM condition. The results indicate that using concept mapping as a retrieval practice could support students' learning in biology.

The importance of conceptual knowledge when becoming familiar with faces during naturalistic viewing.

Although the ability to recognise familiar faces is a critical part of everyday life, the process by which a face becomes familiar in the real world is not fully understood. Previous research has focussed on the importance of perceptual experience. However, in natural viewing, perceptual experience with faces is accompanied by increased knowledge about the person and the context in which they are encountered. Although conceptual information is known to be crucial for the formation of new episodic memories, it requires a period of consolidation. It is unclear, however, whether a similar process occurs when we learn new faces. Using a natural viewing paradigm, we investigated how the context in which events are presented influences our understanding of those events and whether, after a period of consolidation, this has a subsequent effect on face recognition. The context was manipulated by presenting events in 1) the original sequence, or 2) a scrambled sequence. Although this manipulation was predicted to have a significant effect on conceptual understanding of events, it had no effect on overall visual experience with the faces. Our prediction was that this contextual manipulation would affect face recognition after the information has been consolidated into memory. We found that understanding of the narrative was greater for participants who viewed the movie in the original sequence compared to those that viewed the movie in a scrambled order. To determine if the context in which the movie was viewed had an effect on face recognition, we compared recognition in the original and scrambled condition. We found an overall effect of conceptual knowledge on face recognition. That is, participants who viewed the original sequence had higher face recognition compared to participants who viewed the scrambled sequence. However, our planned comparisons did not reveal a greater effect of conceptual knowledge on face recognition after consolidation. In an exploratory analysis, we found that overlap in conceptual knowledge between participants was significantly correlated with the overlap in face recognition. We also found that this relationship was greater after a period of consolidation. Together, these findings provide new insights into the role of non-visual, conceptual knowledge for face recognition during natural viewing.

The relational bottleneck as an inductive bias for efficient abstraction.

A central challenge for cognitive science is to explain how abstract concepts are acquired from limited experience. This has often been framed in terms of a dichotomy between connectionist and symbolic cognitive models. Here, we highlight a recently emerging line of work that suggests a novel reconciliation of these approaches, by exploiting an inductive bias that we term the relational bottleneck. In that approach, neural networks are constrained via their architecture to focus on relations between perceptual inputs, rather than the attributes of individual inputs. We review a family of models that employ this approach to induce abstractions in a data-efficient manner, emphasizing their potential as candidate models for the acquisition of abstract concepts in the human mind and brain.

Mechanisms of Concept Verbalization in the Ethnolinguistic Context.

This article investigates the verbalization mechanisms of the 'family' concept within the Kazakh, Russian, and English linguistic cultures. The research aims to examine the verbal representation mechanisms of the 'family' concept within the linguistic worldviews of the aforementioned cultures. The research material comprises dictionary definitions of the primary lexemes as presented in explanatory dictionaries and synonym dictionaries, proverbs and sayings, phraseological units, and data derived from an associative experiment. The employed analysis methods include component analysis, the descriptive method, the experimental method (psycholinguistic experiment), and the statistical method. This article furnishes a thorough analysis of the linguistic representation methods of the 'family' concept, illuminating its intricate and multidimensional nature. The authors endeavored to identify the concept's structure and describe linguistic units via the interpretation of semantic components. Based on the data procured from the psycholinguistic experiment, the components and layers of the 'family' concept, identified during the analysis, substantiate the theory that this concept plays a fundamental role in the shaping of society and individuals.

The Effects of Linear Order in Category Learning: Some Replications of Ramscar et al. (2010) and Their Implications for Replicating Training Studies.

Ramscar, Yarlett, Dye, Denny, and Thorpe (2010) showed how, consistent with the predictions of error-driven learning models, the order in which stimuli are presented in training can affect category learning. Specifically, learners exposed to artificial language input where objects preceded their labels learned the discriminating features of categories better than learners exposed to input where labels preceded objects. We sought to replicate this finding in two online experiments employing the same tests used originally: A four pictures test (match a label to one of four pictures) and a four labels test (match a picture to one of four labels). In our study, only findings from the four pictures test were consistent with the original result. Additionally, the effect sizes observed were smaller, and participants over-generalized high-frequency category labels more than in the original study. We suggest that although Ramscar, Yarlett, Dye, Denny, and Thorpe (2010) feature-label order predictions were derived from error-driven learning, they failed to consider that this mechanism also predicts that performance in any training paradigm must inevitably be influenced by participant prior experience. We consider our findings in light of these factors, and discuss implications for the generalizability and replication of training studies.

The tail of the caudate is sensitive to both gain and loss feedback during information integration categorization.

Although most category learning studies use feedback for training, little attention has been paid to how individuals utilize feedback implemented as gains or losses during categorization. We compared skilled categorization under three different conditions: Gain (earn points for correct answers), Gain and Loss (earn points for correct answers and lose points for wrong answers) and Correct or Wrong (accuracy feedback only). We also manipulated difficulty and point value, with near boundary stimuli having the highest number of points to win or lose, and stimuli far from the boundary having the lowest point value. We found that the tail of the caudate was sensitive to feedback condition, with highest activity when both Gain and Loss feedback were present and least activity when only Gain or accuracy feedback was present. We also found that activity across the caudate was affected by distance from the decision bound, with greatest activity for the near boundary high value stimuli, and lowest for far low value stimuli. Overall these results indicate that the tail of the caudate is sensitive not only to positive rewards but also to loss and punishment, consistent with recent animal research finding tail of the caudate activity in aversive learning.