Is life going too fast? Exploring the unique and joint contributions of mindfulness, temperament, task load, and metacognitions about time.

BACKGROUND: Previous research has shown that mindfulness is associated with slower passage of time in everyday life, and with lower self-reported time pressure. This study investigates some of the potential mechanisms behind these relationships. METHODS: 318 participants submitted their responses to an online survey which collected data regarding passage of time judgments, time pressure, trait mindfulness, temperament, task load, and metacognitions about time. Using commonality and dominance analyses, we explored how these variables contributed, either alone or jointly, to predicting how fast (or slow) time seems to pass for participants, or how pressed for time they felt. RESULTS: Mindfulness and temperament had some overlaps in their ability to predict passage of time judgments and time pressure for durations at the month and 2-month scales. The temperamental trait of extraversion/surgency, as well as the Non-judging and Non-reacting facets of mindfulness were among the best predictors of passage of time judgments and time pressure. Attention-related variables were mainly related to time perception via their involvement in joint effects with other variables. Results also suggested that metacognitions about time interacted with other variables in predicting passage of time judgments, but only at the month scale. Finally, among all the variables included in this study, task load had the highest degree of involvement in predictions of self-reported time pressure at the week and month scales, but it contributed relatively little to predicting passage of time judgments. CONCLUSIONS: Results suggest that mindfulness relates to passage of time through its involvement in inferential processes. The data also shows how different factors are related to PoTJ at different time scales. Finally, results suggest the existence of both similarities and differences in how passage of time and time pressure relate to the other included variables.

A chain mediation model reveals the association between metacognition and quality of life in hematologic tumor patients.

The study aims to explore the relationship among metacognition (MC), fear of disease of progression (FoP), psychological distress (PD), and quality of life (QoL), and verify whether FoP and PD have a chain mediating effect between MC and QoL. 231 hematologic tumor patients in a large tertiary hospital were investigated by using Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire-30, Fear of Progression Questionnaire-Short Form, Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, and Functional Assessment of Cancer Therapy scale. Data analyses were performed using IBM SPSS (version 25.0) and the PROCESS macro (version 4.1). The results showed that the direct impact of MC on QoL was not statistically significant. However, the indirect influence of MC on QoL manifest through the independent influences of PD and FoP, as well as the chain mediating effect of "PD → FoP." In addition, all four dimensions of QoL (physical, social and family, emotional, and functional) satisfy the chain mediation model, except for the social and family domain. These insights advance our comprehension of the intricate interplay between MC and QoL, underscoring the importance of improving MC to alleviate patients' PD, mitigate FoP, and ultimately improve the QoL of hematologic tumor patients.

Sensorimotor confidence for tracking eye movements.

For successful interactions with the world, we often have to evaluate our own performance. Although eye movements are one of the most frequent actions we perform, we are typically unaware of them. Here, we investigated whether there is any evidence for metacognitive sensitivity for the accuracy of eye movements. Participants tracked a dot cloud as it followed an unpredictable sinusoidal trajectory and then reported if they thought their performance was better or worse than their average tracking performance. Our results show above-chance identification of better tracking behavior across all trials and also for repeated attempts of the same target trajectories. Sensitivity in discriminating performance between better and worse trials was stable across sessions, but judgements within a trial relied more on performance in the final seconds. This behavior matched previous reports when judging the quality of hand movements, although overall metacognitive sensitivity for eye movements was significantly lower.

Consistent metacognitive efficiency and variable response biases in peripheral vision.

Across the visual periphery, perceptual and metacognitive abilities differ depending on the locus of visual attention, the location of peripheral stimulus presentation, the task design, and many other factors. In this investigation, we aimed to illuminate the relationship between attention and eccentricity in the visual periphery by estimating perceptual sensitivity, metacognitive sensitivity, and response biases across the visual field. In a 2AFC detection task, participants were asked to determine whether a signal was present or absent at one of eight peripheral locations (±10°, 20°, 30°, and 40°), using either a valid or invalid attentional cue. As expected, results revealed that perceptual sensitivity declined with eccentricity and was modulated by attention, with higher sensitivity on validly cued trials. Furthermore, a significant main effect of eccentricity on response bias emerged, with variable (but relatively unbiased) c'a values from 10° to 30°, and conservative c'a values at 40°. Regarding metacognitive sensitivity, significant main effects of attention and eccentricity were found, with metacognitive sensitivity decreasing with eccentricity, and decreasing in the invalid cue condition. Interestingly, metacognitive efficiency, as measured by the ratio of meta-d'a/d'a, was not modulated by attention or eccentricity. Overall, these findings demonstrate (1) that in some circumstances, observers have surprisingly robust metacognitive insights into how performance changes across the visual field and (2) that the periphery may be subject to variable detection biases that are contingent on the exact location in peripheral space.

Design and evaluation of crowdsourcing platforms based on users' confidence judgments.

Crowdsourcing deals with solving problems by assigning them to a large number of non-experts called crowd using their spare time. In these systems, the final answer to the question is determined by summing up the votes obtained from the community. The popularity of these systems has increased by facilitating access for community members through mobile phones and the Internet. One of the issues raised in crowdsourcing is how to choose people and how to collect answers. Usually, users are separated based on their performance in a pre-test. Designing the pre-test for performance calculation is challenging; The pre-test questions should be selected to assess characteristics in individuals that are relevant to the main questions. One of the ways to increase the accuracy of crowdsourcing systems is by considering individuals' cognitive characteristics and decision-making models to form a crowd and improve the estimation of their answer accuracy to questions. People can estimate the correctness of their responses while making a decision. The accuracy of this estimate is determined by a quantity called metacognition ability. Metacoginition is referred to the case where the confidence level is considered along with the answer to increase the accuracy of the solution. In this paper, by both mathematical and experimental analysis, we would answer the following question: Is it possible to improve the performance of a crowdsourcing system by understanding individuals' metacognition and recording and utilizing users' confidence in their answers?

Pharmacological Elevation of Catecholamine Levels Improves Perceptual Decisions, But Not Metacognitive Insight.

Perceptual decisions are often accompanied by a feeling of decision confidence. Where the parietal cortex is known for its crucial role in shaping such perceptual decisions, metacognitive evaluations are thought to additionally rely on the (pre)frontal cortex. Because of this supposed neural differentiation between these processes, perceptual and metacognitive decisions may be divergently affected by changes in internal (e.g., attention, arousal) and external (e.g., task and environmental demands) factors. Although intriguing, causal evidence for this hypothesis remains scarce. Here, we investigated the causal effect of two neuromodulatory systems on behavioral and neural measures of perceptual and metacognitive decision-making. Specifically, we pharmacologically elevated levels of catecholamines (with atomoxetine) and acetylcholine (with donepezil) in healthy adult human participants performing a visual discrimination task in which we gauged decision confidence, while electroencephalography was measured. Where cholinergic effects were not robust, catecholaminergic enhancement improved perceptual sensitivity, while at the same time leaving metacognitive sensitivity unaffected. Neurally, catecholaminergic elevation did not affect sensory representations of task-relevant visual stimuli but instead enhanced well-known decision signals measured over the centroparietal cortex, reflecting the accumulation of sensory evidence over time. Crucially, catecholaminergic enhancement concurrently impoverished neural markers measured over the frontal cortex linked to the formation of metacognitive evaluations. Enhanced catecholaminergic neuromodulation thus improves perceptual but not metacognitive decision-making.

Behavioral and neural measures of confidence using a novel auditory pitch identification task.

Observers can discriminate between correct versus incorrect perceptual decisions with feelings of confidence. The centro-parietal positivity build-up rate (CPP slope) has been suggested as a likely neural signature of accumulated evidence, which may guide both perceptual performance and confidence. However, CPP slope also covaries with reaction time, which also covaries with confidence in previous studies, and performance and confidence typically covary; thus, CPP slope may index signatures of perceptual performance rather than confidence per se. Moreover, perceptual metacognition-including neural correlates-has largely been studied in vision, with few exceptions. Thus, we lack understanding of domain-general neural signatures of perceptual metacognition outside vision. Here we designed a novel auditory pitch identification task and collected behavior with simultaneous 32-channel EEG in healthy adults. Participants saw two tone labels which varied in tonal distance on each trial (e.g., C vs D, C vs F), then heard a single auditory tone; they identified which label was correct and rated confidence. We found that pitch identification confidence varied with tonal distance, but performance, metacognitive sensitivity (trial-by-trial covariation of confidence with accuracy), and reaction time did not. Interestingly, however, while CPP slope covaried with performance and reaction time, it did not significantly covary with confidence. We interpret these results to mean that CPP slope is likely a signature of first-order perceptual processing and not confidence-specific signals or computations in auditory tasks. Our novel pitch identification task offers a valuable method to examine the neural correlates of auditory and domain-general perceptual confidence.

Does responsibility for potential harm attenuate the effects of repeated checking on metamemory and automatization?

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: Repeated checking results in large reductions in metamemory variables (confidence, details, and vividness). It has been suggested that the underlying mechanism is gradual automatization. At the same time, individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) are reluctant to automatize routine processes. The aim was to investigate whether high responsibility for potential harm, typical of OCD, would attenuate the effects of repeated checking on metamemory variables and automatization. METHODS: One hundred seventy-five participants were initially provided with a cover story that put the subsequent virtual checking task in a context of potential harm for not checking properly. Participants were randomly allocated to four experimental groups (varying high and low responsibility, relevant and irrelevant checking) and performed a virtual checking task repeatedly, using either identical stimuli (relevant checking) or different stimuli (irrelevant checking) between the first and final checking trial. Metamemory variables were rated on visual analogue scales, and response latencies were assessed to establish automatization. RESULTS: Larger reductions in metamemory variables following relevant checking compared to irrelevant checking replicated previous findings. High responsibility did not affect these results. Large reductions in response latencies across the checking trials (automatization) were also independent of the perceived responsibility. LIMITATIONS: We did not include individuals with OCD. CONCLUSIONS: Since responsibility did not influence the effects of repeated checking on metamemory variables, findings are consistent with the idea that automatization remains a plausible explanation of the effects of repeated checking on metamemory variables in individuals with OCD.

The precision test of metacognitive sensitivity and confidence criteria.

Humans experience feelings of confidence in their decisions. In perception, these feelings are typically accurate - we tend to feel more confident about correct decisions. The degree of insight people have into the accuracy of their decisions is known as metacognitive sensitivity. Currently popular methods of estimating metacognitive sensitivity are subject to interpretive ambiguities because they assume people have normally shaped distributions of different experiences when they are repeatedly exposed to a single input. If this normality assumption is violated, calculations can erroneously underestimate metacognitive sensitivity. Here, we describe a means of estimating metacognitive sensitivity that is more robust to violations of the normality assumption. This improved method can easily be added to standard behavioral experiments, and the authors provide Matlab code to help researchers implement these analyses and experimental procedures.

Emotion dysregulation in participants with substance use disorders: A metacognitive perspective.

BACKGROUND: Using the metacognitive model of emotion dysregulation as a basis, this study explored whether, among participants with substance use disorders (SUDs), metacognitive beliefs and repetitive negative thinking were associated with emotion dysregulation. METHODS: 127 participants with SUDs and 127 controls without SUDs were recruited. Emotion dysregulation, metacognitive beliefs, rumination, worry, anxiety, and depression were assessed. t-tests, Mann-Whitney tests, logistic regression, correlation, and hierarchal regression analyses were run. RESULTS: Participants with SUDs reported significantly higher levels of emotion dysregulation, positive beliefs about worry, beliefs about the need to control thoughts, rumination, and worry, compared to controls without SUDs. Among participants with SUDs negative beliefs about thoughts concerning uncontrollability and danger, cognitive confidence, beliefs about the need to control thoughts, rumination, and worry were significantly associated with an increase of emotion dysregulation. LIMITATIONS: The cross-sectional design. CONCLUSION: Emotion dysregulation, metacognitive beliefs, and repetitive negative thinking may contribute to increase the risk of substance use. Among participants with SUDs emotion dysregulation is associated with the tendency to endorse dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs and report repetitive negative thinking. Metacognitive beliefs and repetitive negative thinking could be a suitable therapeutic target to reduce emotion dysregulation among participants with SUDs.

Flexible information-seeking in chimpanzees.

Humans can flexibly use metacognition to monitor their own knowledge and strategically acquire new information when needed. While humans can deploy these skills across a variety of contexts, most evidence for metacognition in animals has focused on simple situations, such as seeking out information about the location of food. Here, we examine the flexibility, breadth, and limits of this skill in chimpanzees. We tested semi-free-ranging chimpanzees on a novel task where they could seek information by standing up to peer into different containers. In Study 1, we tested n = 47 chimpanzees to assess if chimpanzees would spontaneously engage in information-seeking without prior experience, as well as to characterize individual variation in this propensity. We found that many chimpanzees engaged in information-seeking with minimal experience, and that younger chimpanzees and females were more likely to do so. In two subsequent studies, we then further tested chimpanzees who initially showed robust information-seeking on new variations of this task, to disentangle the cognitive processing shaping their behaviors. In Study 2, we examined how a subset of n = 12 chimpanzees applied these skills to seek information about the location versus the identity of rewards, and found that chimpanzees were equally adept at seeking out location and identity information. In Study 3, we examined whether a subset of n = 6 chimpanzees could apply these skills to make more efficacious decisions when faced with uncertainty about reward payoffs. Chimpanzees were able to use information-seeking to resolve risk and choose more optimally when faced with uncertain payoffs, although they often also engaged in information-seeking when it was not strictly necessary. These results identify core features of flexible metacognition that chimpanzees share with humans, as well as constraints that may represent key evolutionary shifts in human cognition.

Children's confidence on mathematical equivalence and fraction problems.

Metacognition is how people think about their own thinking, and it includes children's confidence in their problem-solving solutions. We assessed children's metacognition in two areas of mathematics that are often plagued by misconceptions and often studied separately-mathematical equivalence (e.g., 3 + 4 = 5 +__) and fraction magnitude (e.g., 1/3 = 2/__). Specifically, we quantified children's metacognitive skills across these topics, examined whether these skills are topic-specific, and determined how these skills covary with domain-general executive functioning. A total of 80 elementary school children (Mage = 7.70 years, SD = 0.69) provided trial-by-trial performance data and confidence judgments on equivalence and fraction problems as well as assessments of executive function. Children's metacognitive skills were especially impaired when using incorrect strategies based on misconceptions, and we did not find robust evidence for cross-topic associations. We found modest associations between children's metacognitive skills and their working memory and inhibitory control. Findings have theoretical and practical implications for understanding which children struggle with these important mathematics concepts and why.

Predictors of clinical insight in first-episode psychosis: Different patterns in men and women.

BACKGROUND: We aimed to explore gender-related differences in the associations of insight impairment with clinical symptoms, metacognition, and social cognition in psychosis. METHODS: Regression analysis of several clinical insight dimensions was conducted on the data from 116 men and 56 women with first-episode psychosis. Various clinical symptoms and measures of metacognition and social cognition were entered as predictors. RESULTS: In both men and women, delusions emerged as a strong predictor of all insight dimensions, and verbal hallucinations as a strong predictor of symptom relabelling. In men, certain negative symptoms as well as self-certainty, lack of self-reflectiveness, impaired theory of mind, attributional biases, and a jumping-to-conclusions bias were additional predictors of poor insight, while good insight was associated with depression, anxiety, avolition, blunted affect, and impaired emotional recognition. In women, poor insight was associated with a self-serving/externalising bias, impaired emotional recognition, and attention disorders. CONCLUSIONS: Poor insight in first-episode psychosis is strongly linked to deficits in metacognition and social cognition, with marked differences between men and women with respect to the specific skills involved in the impairment. Meanwhile, good insight is linked to a variety of affective manifestations in men. These findings suggest new avenues for more targeted cognitive interventions to improve clinical insight in psychosis.

Brain Network Interconnectivity Dynamics Explain Metacognitive Differences in Listening Behavior.

Complex auditory scenes pose a challenge to attentive listening, rendering listeners slower and more uncertain in their perceptual decisions. How can we explain such behaviors from the dynamics of cortical networks that pertain to the control of listening behavior? We here follow up on the hypothesis that human adaptive perception in challenging listening situations is supported by modular reconfiguration of auditory-control networks in a sample of N = 40 participants (13 males) who underwent resting-state and task functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Individual titration of a spatial selective auditory attention task maintained an average accuracy of ∼70% but yielded considerable interindividual differences in listeners' response speed and reported confidence in their own perceptual decisions. Whole-brain network modularity increased from rest to task by reconfiguring auditory, cinguloopercular, and dorsal attention networks. Specifically, interconnectivity between the auditory network and cinguloopercular network decreased during the task relative to the resting state. Additionally, interconnectivity between the dorsal attention network and cinguloopercular network increased. These interconnectivity dynamics were predictive of individual differences in response confidence, the degree of which was more pronounced after incorrect judgments. Our findings uncover the behavioral relevance of functional cross talk between auditory and attentional-control networks during metacognitive assessment of one's own perception in challenging listening situations and suggest two functionally dissociable cortical networked systems that shape the considerable metacognitive differences between individuals in adaptive listening behavior.

Witnessing-condition information differentially affects evaluations of high- and moderate-confidence eyewitness identifications.

Recent research on the eyewitness confidence-accuracy relationship reveals that confidence can be highly diagnostic of accuracy when the identification evidence is collected using pristine procedures (Wixted & Wells, 2017) and in the absence of suspect bias (Smalarz, 2021). Some researchers have further argued that eyewitnesses who make high-confidence suspect identifications are highly likely to be accurate even if they experienced suboptimal witnessing conditions (Semmler et al., 2018). The current research examined evaluations of eyewitness identification evidence in cases involving suboptimal witnessing conditions. Students (Experiments 1 & 2) and community members (Experiment 3) read eight crime vignettes involving an eyewitness's identification. We manipulated information about poor witnessing conditions (present vs. absent), the eyewitness's confidence level (high vs. moderate), and the format of the confidence statement (verbal vs. numeric) and measured evaluations of eyewitness-identification accuracy. Across all three experiments, information about suboptimal witnessing conditions disproportionately reduced evaluators' belief of highly confident compared to moderately confident eyewitnesses. This differential-discrediting pattern occurred for both numeric and verbal confidence-statement formats. Expert testimony describing the imperviousness of high-confidence suspect-identification accuracy to suboptimal witnessing conditions reduced, but did not eliminate, the differential-discrediting effect. Given that crime eyewitnesses frequently experience suboptimal witnessing conditions (e.g., Behrman & Davey, 2001; Wright & McDaid, 1996), the current findings have widespread implications for the capacity of the legal system to correctly classify suspects as guilty or innocent based on eyewitness identification testimony.

Neural mechanisms underpinning metacognitive shifts driven by non-informative predictions.

Humans constantly make predictions and such predictions allow us to prepare for future events. Yet, such benefits may come with drawbacks as premature predictions may potentially bias subsequent judgments. Here we examined how prediction influences our perceptual decisions and subsequent confidence judgments, on scenarios where the predictions were arbitrary and independent of the identity of the upcoming stimuli. We defined them as invalid and non-informative predictions. Behavioral results showed that, such non-informative predictions biased perceptual decisions in favor of the predicted choice, and such prediction-induced perceptual bias further increased the metacognitive efficiency. The functional MRI results showed that activities in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC) encoded the response consistency between predictions and perceptual decisions. Activity in mPFC predicted the strength of this congruency bias across individuals. Moreover, the parametric encoding of confidence in putamen was modulated by prediction-choice consistency, such that activity in putamen was negatively correlated with confidence rating after inconsistent responses. These findings suggest that predictions, while made arbitrarily, orchestrate the neural representations of choice and confidence judgment.

Metacognition as a window into subjective affective experience.

When patients seek professional help for mental disorders, they often do so because of troubling subjective affective experiences. While these subjective states are at the center of the patient's symptomatology, scientific tools for studying them and their cognitive antecedents are limited. Here, we explore the use of concepts and analytic tools from the science of consciousness, a field of research that has faced similar challenges in having to develop robust empirical methods for addressing a phenomenon that has been considered difficult to pin down experimentally. One important strand is the operationalization of some relevant processes in terms of metacognition and confidence ratings, which can be rigorously studied in both humans and animals. By assessing subjective experience with similar approaches, we hope to develop new scientific approaches for studying affective processes and promoting psychological resilience in the face of debilitating emotional experiences.

Reliable, rapid, and remote measurement of metacognitive bias.

Metacognitive biases have been repeatedly associated with transdiagnostic psychiatric dimensions of 'anxious-depression' and 'compulsivity and intrusive thought', cross-sectionally. To progress our understanding of the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms, new methods are required to measure metacognition remotely, within individuals over time. We developed a gamified smartphone task designed to measure visuo-perceptual metacognitive (confidence) bias and investigated its psychometric properties across two studies (N = 3410 unpaid citizen scientists, N = 52 paid participants). We assessed convergent validity, split-half and test-retest reliability, and identified the minimum number of trials required to capture its clinical correlates. Convergent validity of metacognitive bias was moderate (r(50) = 0.64, p < 0.001) and it demonstrated excellent split-half reliability (r(50) = 0.91, p < 0.001). Anxious-depression was associated with decreased confidence (ß = - 0.23, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001), while compulsivity and intrusive thought was associated with greater confidence (ß = 0.07, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001). The associations between metacognitive biases and transdiagnostic psychiatry dimensions are evident in as few as 40 trials. Metacognitive biases in decision-making are stable within and across sessions, exhibiting very high test-retest reliability for the 100-trial (ICC = 0.86, N = 110) and 40-trial (ICC = 0.86, N = 120) versions of Meta Mind. Hybrid 'self-report cognition' tasks may be one way to bridge the recently discussed reliability gap in computational psychiatry.

Metacognitive beliefs, mood symptoms, and fatigue four years after stroke: An explorative study.

OBJECTIVE: This cross-sectional study investigated the relationship between metacognition and mood symptoms four years post-stroke and examined fatigue as a potential moderator for this relationship. METHODS: A number of 143 participants completed a survey that included the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS), the Metacognition Questionnaire-30 (MCQ-30), the Fatigue Severity Scale (FSS), and the modified Rankin Scale (mRS) (functional status) four years after stroke. Multiple regression analyses adjusting for demographic and stroke-specific covariates were performed with anxiety and depression as dependent variables and fatigue as a moderator. RESULTS: The proportions of participants satisfying the caseness criteria for anxiety and depression were 20% and 19%, respectively, and 35% reported severe fatigue. Analysed separately, all MCQ-30 subscales contributed significantly to anxiety, whereas only three MCQ-30 subscales contributed significantly to depression. In the adjusted analyses, the MCQ-30 subscales 'positive beliefs' (p < 0.05) and 'uncontrollability and danger' (p < 0.001), as well as fatigue (p < 0.001) and functional status at four years (p < 0.05) were significantly associated with anxiety symptoms. Similarly, the MCQ-30 subscales 'cognitive confidence' (p < 0.05) and 'self-consciousness' (p < 0.05), as well as fatigue (p < 0.001), stroke severity at baseline (p < 0.01), and functional status at four years (p < 0.01) were significantly associated with depression symptoms. Fatigue did not significantly moderate the relationship between any MCQ-30 subscale and HADS scores. CONCLUSION: Maladaptive metacognitions were associated with the mood symptoms of anxiety and depression, independent of fatigue, even after controlling for demographic and stroke-specific factors. Future studies should implement longitudinal designs to determine whether metacognitions precede anxiety or depression after a stroke, and more strongly indicate the potential of metacognitive therapy for improving the mental health of individuals after a stroke.

Confidence biases in problem gambling.

Background and aims: Subjective confidence plays an important role in guiding behaviour, especially when objective feedback is unavailable. Systematic misjudgements in confidence can foster maladaptive behaviours and have been linked to various psychiatric disorders. In this study, we adopted a transdiagnostic approach to examine confidence biases in problem gamblers across three levels: local decision confidence, global task performance confidence, and overall self-esteem. The importance of taking a transdiagnostic perspective is increasingly recognised, as it captures the dimensional nature of psychiatric symptoms that often cut across diagnostic boundaries. Accordingly, we investigated if any observed confidence biases could be explained by transdiagnostic symptom dimensions of Anxiety-Depression and Compulsive Behaviour and Intrusive Thought. This approach allows us to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the role of metacognitive processes in problem gambling, beyond the constraints of traditional diagnostic categories. Methods: Thirty-eight problem gamblers and 38 demographically matched control participants engaged in a gamified metacognition task and completed self-report questionnaires assessing transdiagnostic symptom dimensions. Results: Compared to controls, problem gamblers displayed significantly elevated confidence at the local decision and global task levels, independent of their actual task performance. This elevated confidence was observed even after controlling for the heightened symptom levels of Anxiety-Depression and Compulsive Behaviour and Intrusive Thought among the problem gamblers. Discussion: The results reveal a notable disparity in confidence levels between problem gamblers and control participants, not fully accounted for by the symptom dimensions Anxiety-Depression and Compulsive Behaviour and Intrusive Thought. This suggests the contribution of other factors, perhaps linked to gambling-specific cognitive distortions, to the observed confidence biases. Conclusion: The findings highlight the intricate link between metacognitive confidence and psychiatric symptoms in the context of problem gambling. It underscores the need for further research into metacognitive biases, which could enhance therapeutic approaches for individuals with psychiatric conditions.