Asunto(s)
Principios Morales , Humanos , Conducta de Elección , Neurofisiología/ética , Neurociencias/éticaAsunto(s)
Electroencefalografía , Principios Morales , Neurociencias , Humanos , Neurociencias/ética , EncéfaloAsunto(s)
Neurociencias , Humanos , Inteligencia Artificial/tendencias , Encéfalo/citología , Encéfalo/fisiología , Consentimiento Informado/ética , Consentimiento Informado/legislación & jurisprudencia , Consentimiento Informado/normas , Neurociencias/ética , Neurociencias/métodos , Neurociencias/tendenciasRESUMEN
This paper provides a justificatory rationale for recommending the inclusion of imagined future use cases in neurotechnology development processes, specifically for legal and policy ends. Including detailed imaginative engagement with future applications of neurotechnology can serve to connect ethical, legal, and policy issues potentially arising from the translation of brain stimulation research to the public consumer domain. Futurist scholars have for some time recommended approaches that merge creative arts with scientific development in order to theorise possible futures toward which current trends in technology development might be steered. Taking a creative, imaginative approach like this in the neurotechnology context can help move development processes beyond considerations of device functioning, safety, and compliance with existing regulation, and into an active engagement with potential future dynamics brought about by the emergence of the neurotechnology itself. Imagined scenarios can engage with potential consumer uses of devices that might come to challenge legal or policy contexts. An anticipatory, creative approach can imagine what such uses might consist in, and what they might imply. Justifying this approach also prompts a co-responsibility perspective for policymaking in technology contexts. Overall, this furnishes a mode of neurotechnology's emergence that can avoid crises of confidence in terms of ethico-legal issues, and promote policy responses balanced between knowledge, values, protected innovation potential, and regulatory safeguards.
Asunto(s)
Imaginación , Humanos , Formulación de Políticas , Creatividad , Neurociencias/legislación & jurisprudencia , Neurociencias/ética , Tecnología/legislación & jurisprudencia , Tecnología/éticaRESUMEN
Matthew Schrag confronts a mentor after their joint work is flagged on the PubPeer website.
Asunto(s)
Neurociencias , Mala Conducta Científica , Denuncia de Irregularidades , Humanos , Mentores , Neurociencias/ética , Enfermedad de AlzheimerAsunto(s)
Estado de Conciencia , Neurociencias , Humanos , Empatía , Tibet , Estado Vegetativo Persistente , Neurociencias/éticaAsunto(s)
Neurociencias , Humanos , Teoría Fundamentada , Neurociencias/ética , Encéfalo , Investigadores , CabezaRESUMEN
Resumen: 1] La neurociencia de la ética constituye un progreso al aplicar la ciencia empírica en la investigación del fenómeno moral. 2] Resaltar la importancia de afectos y sentimientos representa una compensación a la excesiva importancia dada a la razón en la formación de los juicios morales. 3] Existen graves dificultades metodológicas al no precisar los conceptos de "intuición", "afectos", "deber" y especialmente qué se entiende por "ética". 4] Pero la investigación científica aprehende al hombre como una "entidad" en sí (presente) y no como una "existencia" (futuro), vale decir, ser-en-el-mundo. 5] En lugar de "tener" una moral el ser humano "es" moral y, como tal, es un proyecto lanzado hacia su más auténtica posibilidad que consiste en apropiarse de su ser-para-la-muerte.
Abstract: 1] The Neuroscience of Ethics constitutes a progress when applying empirical science in the investigation of the moral phenomenon. 2] Emphasizing the importance of affects and feelings represents a compensation for the excessive importance given to reason in the formation of moral judgments. 3] There are serious methodological difficulties by not specifying the concepts of intuition, affections, duty and especially what is understood by ethics. 4] But scientific research apprehends man as an "entity" in himself (present) and not as an "existence" (future), that is, being-in-the-world. 5] Instead of "having" a moral, the human being "is" moral and as such is a project thrown towards its most authentic possibility that consists of appropriating its being-for-death.
Resumo: 1] A neurociência da ética constitui um progresso ao aplicar a ciência empírica na investigação do fenômeno moral. 2] Ressaltar a importância de afetos e sentimentos representa uma compensação à excessiva importância dada à razão na formação dos juízos morais. 3] Existem graves dificuldades metodológicas ao não precisar os conceitos de "intuição", "afetos", "dever" e especialmente o que se entende por "ética". 4] Porém a investigação científica apreende o homem como uma "entidade" em si (presente) e não como una "existência" (futuro), vale dizer, ser-no-mundo. 5] Em lugar de "ter" uma moral o ser humano "é" moral e, como tal, é um projeto lançado à sua mais autêntica possibilidade, que consiste em apropriar-se de seu ser-para-a-morte.