Cost-effectiveness of implementing performance-based financing for improving maternal and child health in Ethiopia.

INTRODUCTION: Performance Based Financing (PBF) supports realization of universal health coverage by promoting bargaining between purchasers and health service providers through identifying priority services and monitoring indicators. In PBF, purchasers use health statistics and information to make decisions rather than merely reimbursing invoices. In this respect, PBF shares certain elements of strategic health purchasing. PBF implementation began in Ethiopia in 2015 as a pilot at one hospital and eight health centers. Prior to this the system predominantly followed input-based financing where providers were provided with a predetermined budget for inputs for service provision. The purpose of the study is to determine whether the implementation of PBF is cost-effective in improving maternal and child health in Ethiopia compared to the standard care. METHODS: The current study used cost-effectiveness analysis to assess the effects of PBF on maternal and child health. Two districts implementing PBF and two following standard care were selected for the study. Both groups of selected districts share common grounds before initiating PBF in the selected group. The provider perspective costing approach was used in the study. Data at the district level were gathered retrospectively for the period of July 2018 to June 2021. Data from health service statistics were transformed to population level coverages and the Lives Saved Tool method used to compute the number of lives saved. Additionally for purpose of comparison, lives saved were translated into discounted quality-adjusted life years. RESULTS: The number of lives saved under PBF was 261, whereas number of lives saved under standard care was 194. The identified incremental cost per capita due to PBF was $1.8 while total costs of delivering service at PBF district was 8,816,370 USD per million population per year while the standard care costs 9,780,920 USD per million population per year. QALYs obtained under PBF and standard care were 6,118 and 4,526 per million population per year, respectively. CONCLUSIONS: The conclusion made from this analysis is that, implementing PBF is cost-saving in Ethiopia compared to the standard care. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY: Due to lack of district-level survey-based data, such as prevalence and effects on maternal and child health, national-level estimates were used into the LiST tool.There may be some central-level PBF start-up costs that were not captured, which may have spillover effects on the existing health system performance that this study has not considered.There may be health statistics data accuracy differences between the PBF and non-PBF districts. The researchers considered using data from records as reported by both groups of districts.

Hospital strategies in commercial episode-based reimbursement.

OBJECTIVES: To understand hospitals' approaches to spending reduction in commercial episode-based payment programs and inform incentive design. STUDY DESIGN: Qualitative arm of an explanatory sequential mixed-methods study involving semistructured interviews with hospital leaders participating in a statewide quality improvement collaborative with novel episode-based incentive payments introduced by the state's largest commercial payer. METHODS: We recruited 21 leaders from 8 purposively selected, diverse hospitals with both high and low performance. Video teleconference-based interviews followed a standardized protocol and addressed 4 domains: choice of clinical condition for evaluation, strategies for episode spending reduction, best practices for success in earning incentives, and barriers to achievement. Rapid qualitative analysis with purposeful data reduction was employed to generate a matrix of key themes within the study domains. RESULTS: Strategies were similar between high- and low-performing hospitals. When selecting conditions, some hospitals focused on areas of underperformance, aiming for improvement opportunities, whereas others chose conditions already achieving highest efficiency. Many tried to synergize with other ongoing improvement initiatives and clinical areas with established leaders and champions. Key strategies included data-driven improvement, care standardization, and protocol dissemination. Best practices for success included readmission prevention and postacute care spending containment. CONCLUSIONS: The findings highlighted hospitals' most common strategies and approaches, providing several insights into optimal design of commercial episode-based incentives: They must be lucrative enough to earn attention or consistent with larger federal programs; hospitals need opportunities to succeed through both improved performance and sustained excellence; and programs may incur malalignment between hospitals and credentialed physicians.

Pay-for-performance and low back pain with interaction of overwork: findings from the cross-sectional Korean working conditions survey.

Background: Pay-for-performance (PFP) is a type of incentive system where employees receive monetary rewards for meeting predefined standards. While previous research has investigated the relationship between PFP and health outcomes, the focus has primarily been on mental health. Few studies have explored the impact of PFP on specific physical symptoms like pain. Methods: Data from the Korean Working Conditions Survey (KWCS) was analyzed, encompassing 20,815 subjects with information on PFP and low back pain (LBP). The associations between types of base pay (BP) and PFP with LBP were examined using multivariate logistic regression models, taking into account a directed acyclic graph (DAG). The interaction of overtime work was further explored using stratified logistic regression models and the relative excess risk for interaction. Results: The odds ratio (OR) for individuals receiving both BP and PFP was statistically significant at 1.19 (95% CI 1.04-1.35) compared to those with BP only. However, when the DAG approach was applied and necessary correction variables were adjusted, the statistical significance indicating a relationship between PFP and LBP vanished. In scenarios without PFP and with overtime work, the OR related to LBP was significant at 1.54 (95% CI 1.35-1.75). With the presence of PFP, the OR increased to 2.02 (95% CI 1.66-2.45). Conclusion: Pay-for-performance may influence not just psychological symptoms but also LBP in workers, particularly in conjunction with overtime work. The impact of management practices related to overtime work on health outcomes warrants further emphasis in research.

Can financial incentives improve access to care? Evidence from a French experiment on specialist physicians.

In France, addressing balance billing is essential for equitable healthcare access and reducing physician income disparities. The National Health Insurance (NHI) introduced financial incentive programs, namely the "Contract for Access to Care" (CAS) in 2014 and the "Option for Controlled Pricing" (OPTAM) in 2017, to encourage physicians to reduce extra fees and adhere to regulated prices. This study analyzed the impact of these programs on self-employed physicians using a comprehensive administrative dataset covering specialist physicians from 2005 to 2017. The dataset comprised 9891 surgical specialists (30,972 observations) and 6926 medical specialists (21,650 observations) between 2005 and 2017. Applying a difference-in-differences design with a two-way fixed effect model and matching through the "Coarsened Exact Matching" method, the study examined CAS and/or OPTAM membership effects on physicians' activity and fees. The results indicate that both the CAS and OPTAM successfully enhance access to care. Physicians treat more patients, particularly those with lower incomes who might have previously avoided care because of the extra fees. However, an increased patient load translates to a higher workload for physicians. Despite a fee increase, it was observed to be smaller than the surge in activity. Furthermore, if all physicians are appropriately rewarded for their efforts, this improvement in access comes at a cost to NHI. This study's findings provide crucial insights into the nuanced effects of these financial incentive programs on physicians' behavior, highlighting the tradeoff between improved access and increased NHI costs. Ultimately, these findings underscore the complexity of balancing financial incentives, physician workload, and healthcare accessibility in pursuit of a more equitable healthcare system.

Pay-for-Performance Incentives for Home Dialysis Use and Kidney Transplant.

Importance: The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' mandatory End-Stage Renal Disease Treatment Choices (ETC) model, launched on January 1, 2021, randomly assigned approximately 30% of US dialysis facilities and managing clinicians to financial incentives to increase the use of home dialysis and kidney transplant. Objective: To assess the ETC's association with use of home dialysis and kidney transplant during the model's first 2 years and examine changes in these outcomes by race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status. Design, Setting, and Participants: This retrospective cross-sectional study used claims and enrollment data for traditional Medicare beneficiaries with kidney failure from 2017 to 2022 linked to same-period transplant data from the United Network for Organ Sharing. The study data span 4 years (2017-2020) before the implementation of the ETC model on January 1, 2021, and 2 years (2021-2022) following the model's implementation. Exposure: Receiving dialysis treatment in a region randomly assigned to the ETC model. Main Outcomes and Measures: Primary outcomes were use of home dialysis and kidney transplant. A difference-in-differences (DiD) approach was used to estimate changes in outcomes among patients treated in regions randomly selected for ETC participation compared with concurrent changes among patients treated in control regions. Results: The study population included 724 406 persons with kidney failure (mean [IQR] age, 62.2 [53-72] years; 42.5% female). The proportion of patients receiving home dialysis increased from 12.1% to 14.3% in ETC regions and from 12.9% to 15.1% in control regions, yielding an adjusted DiD estimate of -0.2 percentage points (pp; 95% CI, -0.7 to 0.3 pp). Similar analysis for transplant yielded an adjusted DiD estimate of 0.02 pp (95% CI, -0.01 to 0.04 pp). When further stratified by sociodemographic measures, including age, sex, race and ethnicity, dual Medicare and Medicaid enrollment, and poverty quartile, there was not a statistically significant difference in home dialysis use across joint strata of characteristics and ETC participation. Conclusions and Relevance: In this cross-sectional study, the first 2 years of the ETC model were not associated with increased use of home dialysis or kidney transplant, nor changes in racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic disparities in these outcomes.

Assessing the uptake of incentivised physical health checks for people with serious mental illness: a cohort study in primary care.

BACKGROUND: People with serious mental illness are more likely to experience physical illnesses. The onset of many of these illnesses can be prevented if detected early. Physical health screening for people with serious mental illness is incentivised in primary care in England through the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). GPs are paid to conduct annual physical health checks on patients with serious mental illness, including checks of body mass index (BMI), cholesterol, and alcohol consumption. AIM: To assess the impact of removing and reintroducing QOF financial incentives on uptake of three physical health checks (BMI, cholesterol, and alcohol consumption) for patients with serious mental illness. DESIGN AND SETTING: Cohort study using UK primary care data from the Clinical Practice Research Datalink between April 2011 and March 2020. METHOD: A difference-in-difference analysis was employed to compare differences in the uptake of physical health checks before and after the intervention, accounting for relevant observed and unobserved confounders. RESULTS: An immediate change was found in uptake after physical health checks were removed from, and after they were added back to, the QOF list. For BMI, cholesterol, and alcohol checks, the overall impact of removal was a reduction in uptake of 14.3, 6.8, and 11.9 percentage points, respectively. The reintroduction of BMI screening in the QOF increased the uptake by 10.2 percentage points. CONCLUSION: This analysis supports the hypothesis that QOF incentives lead to better uptake of physical health checks.

How personnel diversity and affective bonds affect performance-based financing: a moderator analysis of a difference-in-difference estimator.

To spur improvement in health-care service quality and quantity, performance-based financing (PBF) is an increasingly common policy tool, especially in low- and middle-income countries. This study examines how personnel diversity and affective bonds in primary care clinics affect their ability to improve care quality in PBF arrangements. Leveraging data from a large-scale matched PBF intervention in Tajikistan including 208 primary care clinics, we examined how measures of personnel diversity (position and tenure variety) and affective bonds (mutual support and group pride) were associated with changes in the level and variability of clinical knowledge (diagnostic accuracy of 878 clinical vignettes) and care processes (completion of checklist items in 2485 instances of direct observations). We interacted the explanatory variables with exposure to PBF in cluster-robust, linear regressions to assess how these explanatory variables moderated the PBF treatment's association with clinical knowledge and care process improvements. Providers and facilities with higher group pride exhibited higher care process improvement (greater checklist item completion and lower variability of items completed). Personnel diversity and mutual support showed little significant associations with the outcomes. Organizational features of clinics exposed to PBF may help explain variation in outcomes and warrant further research and intervention in practice to identify and test opportunities to leverage them. Group pride may strengthen clinics' ability to improve care quality in PBF arrangements. Improving health-care facilities' pride may be an affordable and effective way to enhance health-care organization adaptation.

Is pay for performance promoting inverse inequality in Irish general practice?

BACKGROUND: In 2020, the Chronic Disease Management (CDM) programme was introduced in Ireland. This programme resources GPs to review public (GMS) patients, diagnosed with eight named chronic diseases, twice yearly according to a structured protocol. This pay for performance initiative has been widely adopted by GPs. However, it is hypothesised that private patients (PPs) receive a poorer standard of care, as they may be reluctant to attend due to the cost involved. AIM: To assess whether the management of eight chronic diseases named in the CDM programme is to the same standard among both PPs and GMS patients. METHOD: A retrospective audit of GP practices in the Midwest of Ireland. Data relating to 25 GMS patients and 25 PPs, matched by age, gender, and clinical condition, is collected from each practice. Patients have at least 1 of the eight named chronic diseases. Parameters include vaccination status (influenza, pneumococcal, COVID); body mass index; blood pressure; smoking status; renal function; HbA1c; lipid profile; brain natriuretic peptide (BNP) in patients with heart failure; and lung function tests in patients with COPD or asthma. COVID vaccination status acts as a control because it is freely available for both PPs and GMS patients. RESULTS: Preliminary results from 2 GP practices show large consistent disparities in management between PPs and GMS patients in most parameters. CONCLUSION: Limiting Pay for Performance to the care of GMS patients only, based on age or income, promotes inverse inequality. We argue that CDM care should be offered to all patients.

Physician Group Practices Accrued Large Bonuses Under Medicare's Bundled Payment Model, 2018-20.

The Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Advanced Model (BPCI-A), a voluntary Alternative Payment Model for Medicare, incentivizes hospitals and physician group practices to reduce spending for patient care episodes below preset target prices. The experience of physician groups in BPCI-A is not well understood. We found that physician groups earned $421 million in incentive payments during BPCI-A's first four performance periods (2018-20). Target prices were positively associated with bonuses, with a mean reconciliation payment of $139 per episode in the lowest decile of target prices and $2,775 in the highest decile. In the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, mean bonuses increased from $815 per episode to $2,736 per episode. These findings suggest that further policy changes, such as improving target price accuracy and refining participation rules, will be important as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services continues to expand BPCI-A and develop other bundled payment models.

Can performance-based financing improve efficiency of health centers in Ethiopia? A Malmquist Productivity Index analysis.

INTRODUCTION: The Ethiopian government has introduced several healthcare financing reforms intending to improve efficiency. Piloting implementation of performance-based financing is one of these actions. The purpose of this research is to assess the efficiency of healthcare facilities that have implemented performance-based financing compared to those that have not. METHODS: Efficiency was measured using a nonparametric data envelopment analysis and the Malmquist Productivity Index technique. Total factor productivity change, technical change, and technological change are compared across eight sampled healthcare facilities that are implementing performance-based financing and eight that are not in Ethiopia. RESULTS: Health facilities implementing performance-based financing have a mean technical efficiency score of 64%, allowing for a potential 36% reduction in inputs without affecting outputs. Their scale efficiency is 88%, indicating a potential 12% increase in total outputs without expanding facilities. In contrast, facilities not implementing performance-based financing have a mean technical efficiency score of 62%, with a potential for 38% input reduction without affecting outputs. Their scale efficiency is 87%, suggesting a potential 13% increase in total outputs without scaling up facilities. Among the 16 healthcare facilities observed, seven experienced a decline in the mean total productivity, while one remained stagnant. The remaining eight facilities witnessed an increase in productivity. The healthcare facilities implementing performance-based financing showed a 1.3% decrease in mean total productivity during the observed period. Among them, five showed an increase and three showed a decrease in the total factor of productivity. The mean total factor of productivity of all healthcare facilities not implementing performance-based financing remained stagnant over the three-year period (2019-2021), with four showing an increase and four showing a decrease in total productivity. CONCLUSIONS: The study concludes that implementing performance-based financing did not improve productivity levels among healthcare facilities over three years. In fact, productivity decreased among the facilities implementing performance-based financing, while those not implementing it remained stagnant. This shows health facilities that implement performance-based financing tend to utilize more resources for similar outputs, contradicting the anticipated efficiency improvement.

Effect on hospital incentive payments and quality performance of a hospital pay for performance (P4P) programme in Belgium.

BACKGROUND: Belgium initiated a hospital pay for performance (P4P) programme after a decade of fixed bonus budgets for "quality and safety contracts". This study examined the effect of P4P on hospital incentive payments, performance on quality measures, and the association between changes in quality performance and incentive payments over time. METHODS: The Belgian government provided information on fixed bonus budgets in 2013-2017 and hospital incentive payments as well as hospital performance on quality measures for the P4P programmes in 2018-2020. Descriptive analyses were conducted to map the financial repercussion between the two systems. A difference-in-difference analysis evaluated the association between quality indicator performance and received incentive payments over time. RESULTS: Data from 87 acute-care hospitals were analyzed. In the transition to a P4P programme, 29% of hospitals received lower incentive payments per bed. During the P4P years, quality performance scores increased yearly for 55% of hospitals and decreased yearly for 5% of hospitals. There was a significant larger drop in incentive payments for hospitals that scored above median with the start of the P4P programme. CONCLUSIONS: The transition from fixed bonus budgets for quality efforts to a new incentive payment in a P4P programme has led to more hospitals being financially impacted, although the effect is marginal given the small P4P budget. Quality indicators seem to improve over the years, but this does not correlate with an increase in reward per bed for all hospitals due to the closed nature of the budget.

Does pay-for-performance design matter? Evidence from Brazil.

Pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes have been shown to have mixed effects on health care outcomes. A challenge in interpreting this evidence is that P4P is often considered a homogenous intervention, when in practice schemes vary widely in their design. Our study contributes to this literature by providing a detailed depiction of incentive design across municipalities within a national P4P scheme in Brazil [Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ)] and exploring the association of alternative design typologies with the performance of primary health care providers. We carried out a nation-wide survey of municipal health managers to characterize the scheme design, based on the size of the bonus, the providers incentivized and the frequency of payment. Using OLS regressions and controlling for municipality characteristics, we examined whether each design feature was associated with better family health team (FHT) performance. To capture potential interactions between design features, we used cluster analysis to group municipalities into five design typologies and then examined associations with quality of care. A majority of the municipalities included in our study used some of the PMAQ funds to provide bonuses to FHT workers, while the remaining municipalities spent the funds in the traditional way using input-based budgets. Frequent bonus payments (monthly) and higher size bonus allocations (share of 20-80%) were strongly associated with better team performance, while who within a team was eligible to receive bonuses did not in isolation appear to influence performance. The cluster analysis showed what combinations of design features were associated with better performance. The PMAQ score in the 'large bonus/many workers/high-frequency' cluster was 8.44 points higher than the 'no bonus' cluster, equivalent to a difference of 21.7% in the mean PMAQ score. Evidence from our study shows how design features can potentially influence health provider performance, informing the design of more effective P4P schemes.

Effects of Performance-Based Financing on Availability, Quality, and Use of Family Planning Services in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Impact Evaluation.

Access to high-quality family planning services remains limited in many low- and middle-income countries, resulting in a high burden of unintended pregnancies and adverse health outcomes. We used data from a large randomized controlled trial in the Democratic Republic of Congo to test whether performance-based financing (PBF) can increase the availability, quality, and use of family planning services. Starting at the end of 2016, 30 health zones were randomly assigned to a PBF program, in which health facilities received financing conditional on the quantity and quality of offered services. Twenty-eight health zones were assigned to a control group in which health facilities received unconditional financing of a similar magnitude. Follow-up data collection took place in 2021-2022 and included 346 health facility assessments, 476 direct clinical observations of family planning consultations, and 9,585 household surveys. Findings from multivariable regression models show that the PBF program had strong positive impacts on the availability and quality of family planning services. Specifically, the program increased the likelihood that health facilities offered any family planning services by 20 percentage points and increased the likelihood that health facilities had contraceptive pills, injectables, and implants available by 23, 24, and 20 percentage points, respectively. The program also improved the process quality of family planning consultations by 0.59 standard deviations. Despite these improvements, and in addition to reductions in service fees, the program had a modest impact on contraceptive use, increasing the modern method use among sexually active women of reproductive age by 4 percentage points (equivalent to a 37 percent increase), with no significant impact on adolescent contraceptive use. These results suggest that although PBF can be an effective approach for improving the supply of family planning services, complementary demand-side interventions are likely needed in a setting with very low baseline utilization.

Radiologists' 2021 Quality Reporting and Performance in Medicare's Merit-Based Incentive Payment System: Analysis by Practice Type.

This study of national CMS data shows differences in quality reporting and performance of Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS)-participating radiologists by practice specialty mix. For certain practice types, radiologist-reported quality measures were commonly not radiology measures. The results support a need to expand radiology measures and to better align measure reporting with clinician specialty.

Impact of government-issued financial incentive to medical facilities on management of secondary dysmenorrhea.

AIM: In April 2020, the Japanese government introduced a Specific Medical Fee for managing secondary dysmenorrhea (SD). This initiative provided financial incentives to medical facilities that provide appropriate management of SD with hormonal therapies. We aimed to assess how this policy affects the management processes and outcomes of patients with SD. METHODS: Using a large Japanese administrative claims database, we identified outpatient visits of patients diagnosed with SD from April 2018 to March 2022. We used an interrupted time-series analysis and defined before April 2020 as the pre-introduction period and after April 2020 as the post-introduction period. Outcomes were the monthly proportions of outpatient visits due to SD and hormonal therapy among women in the database and the proportions of outpatient visits for hormonal therapy and continuous outpatient visits among patients with SD. RESULTS: We identified 815 477 outpatient visits of patients diagnosed with SD during the pre-introduction period and 920 183 outpatient visits during the post-introduction period. There were significant upward slope changes after the introduction of financial incentives in the outpatient visits due to SD (+0.29% yearly; 95% confidence interval, +0.20% to +0.38%) and hormonal therapies (+0.038% yearly; 95% confidence interval, +0.030% to +0.045%) among the women in the database. Similarly, a significant level change was observed after the introduction of continuous outpatient visits among patients with SD (+2.68% monthly; 95% confidence interval, +0.87% to +4.49%). CONCLUSIONS: Government-issued financial incentives were associated with an increase in the number of patients diagnosed with SD, hormonal therapies, and continuous outpatient visits.

Pay-for-performance and patient safety in acute care: A systematic review.

Pay-for-performance (p4p) has been tried in all healthcare settings to address ongoing deficiencies in the quality and outcomes of care. The evidence for the effect of these policies has been inconclusive, especially in acute care. This systematic review focused on patient safety p4p in the hospital setting. Using the PRISMA guidelines, we searched five biomedical databases for quantitative studies using at least one outcome metric from database inception to March 2023, supplemented by reference tracking and internet searches. We identified 6,122 potential titles of which 53 were included: 39 original investigations, eight literature reviews and six grey literature reports. Only five system-wide p4p policies have been implemented, and the quality of evidence was low overall. Just over half of the studies (52 %) included failed to observe improvement in outcomes, with positive findings heavily skewed towards poor quality evaluations. The exception was the Fragility Hip Fracture Best Practice Tariff (BPT) in England, where sustained improvement was observed across various evaluations. All policies had a miniscule impact on total hospital revenue. Our findings underscore the importance of simple and transparent design, involvement of the clinical community, explicit links to other quality improvement initiatives, and gradual implementation of p4p initatives. We also propose a research agenda to lift the quality of evidence in this field.

Primary care providers' preferences for pay-for-performance programs: a discrete choice experiment study in Shandong China.

BACKGROUND: Pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes are commonly used to incentivize primary healthcare (PHC) providers to improve the quality of care they deliver. However, the effectiveness of P4P schemes can vary depending on their design. In this study, we aimed to investigate the preferences of PHC providers for participating in P4P programs in a city in Shandong province, China. METHOD: We conducted a discrete choice experiment (DCE) with 882 PHC providers, using six attributes: type of incentive, whom to incentivize, frequency of incentive, size of incentive, the domain of performance measurement, and release of performance results. Mixed logit models and latent class models were used for the statistical analyses. RESULTS: Our results showed that PHC providers had a strong negative preference for fines compared to bonuses (- 1.91; 95%CI - 2.13 to - 1.69) and for annual incentive payments compared to monthly (- 1.37; 95%CI - 1.59 to - 1.14). Providers also showed negative preferences for incentive size of 60% of monthly income, group incentives, and non-release of performance results. On the other hand, an incentive size of 20% of monthly income and including quality of care in performance measures were preferred. We identified four distinct classes of providers with different preferences for P4P schemes. Class 2 and Class 3 valued most of the attributes differently, while Class 1 and Class 4 had a relatively small influence from most attributes. CONCLUSION: P4P schemes that offer bonuses rather than fines, monthly rather than annual payments, incentive size of 20% of monthly income, paid to individuals, including quality of care in performance measures, and release of performance results are likely to be more effective in improving PHC performance. Our findings also highlight the importance of considering preference heterogeneity when designing P4P schemes.