Tripartite evolutionary game and simulation analysis of agricultural non-point source pollution control.

ABSTRACT

Agricultural non-point source pollution control (ANSPC) is a complex, long-term and dynamic environmental protection process. In order to motivate multiple subjects to participate in ANSPC, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of local government, village collectives and farmers, which explores the strategic choices and influencing factors of different subjects through simulation analysis. The results indicate that There are five stable strategy points in the ANSPC game system, which can be divided into four stages based on subject interactions. Village collectives should play an intermediary role in ANSPC and try to coordinate the behaviour of different subjects. The ideal and stable evolution state is "weak supervise, positive response, and active participate", but it cannot be realized at present. The strategy selection of subjects is determined by relative net income. Providing penalties requires considering the heterogeneity of subjects, but incentives are beneficial for achieving tripartite governance. This study provides new evidence for understanding the role of multi-agency participation in agricultural non-point source pollution control, and provides theoretical guidance for the government to formulate differentiated intervention mechanisms, which is an important reference for achieving sustainable development goals.