RESUMEN
We evaluate quartile rankings of countries during the Covid-19 pandemic using both official (confirmed) and excess mortality data. By December 2021, the quartile rankings of three-fifths of the countries differ when ranked by excess vs. official mortality. Countries that are 'doing substantially better' in the excess mortality are characterized by higher urban population shares; higher GDP/Capita; and higher scores on institutional and policy variables. We perform two regressions in which the ratio of Cumulative Excess to Official Covid-19 mortalities (E/O ratio) is regressed on covariates. In a narrow study, controlling for GDP/Capita and vaccination rates, by December 2021 the E/O ratio was smaller in countries with higher vaccination rates. In a broad study, adding institutional and policy variables, the E/O ratio was smaller in countries with higher degree of voice and accountability. The arrival of vaccines in 2021 and voice and accountability had a discernible association on the E/O ratio.
RESUMEN
Prior to the appearance of the Omicron variant, observations on countries like the UK that have accumulated a large fraction of inoculated individuals suggest that, although initially, vaccines have little effect on new infections, they strongly reduce the share of mortality out of a given pool of infections. This paper examines the extent to which this phenomenon is more general by testing the hypothesis that the ratio of lagged mortality to current infections is decreasing in the total number of vaccines per one hundred individuals in the pre-Omicron period, in a pooled time-series, cross-section sample with weekly observations for up to 208 countries. The main finding is that vaccines moderate the share of mortality from a given pool of lagged infections at sufficiently high levels of vaccination rates, which is essentially a favorable shift in the tradeoff between life preservation and economic performance. The practical lesson is that, in the presence of a sufficiently high share of inoculated individuals, governments can shade down containment measures, even as infections are still rampant, without significant adverse effects on mortality.
RESUMEN
The huge fiscal expansions triggered by the corona crisis raised debt/GDP ratios to very high levels. This led some economists to reconsider the taboo on seignorage. Following a brief documentation of the crisis impact and aggregate demand policies responses the paper discusses views of academics and policymakers on seignorage. Optimal taxation considerations imply that the decision on allocating deficit financing between debt and seignorage falls within the realm of fiscal authorities-a fact that infringes on central bank (CB) autonomy. The paper explores ideas aimed at improving the tradeoff between those two principles. Implication of cross-country variations in the need to use seignorage is discussed. Comparison of the indirect contribution of quantitative easing (QE) to deficit financing with the direct contribution of seignorage implies that QE is a substitute to seignorage that preserves central bank dominance without much change in existing monetary institutions. Comparison of empirical evidence from the USA during the global financial crisis with the post-WWI German inflation supports the view that for countries experiencing deflationary pressure seignorage is more potent in moving inflation toward its target than QE. Given the current outlook temporary use of seignorage does not appear to involve a substantial risk of inflation.