Cosmopolitan morality trades off in-group for the world, separating benefits and protection.

Global cooperation rests on popular endorsement of cosmopolitan values-putting all humanity equal to or ahead of conationals. Despite being comparative judgments that may trade off, even sacrifice, the in-group's interests for the rest of the world, moral cosmopolitanism finds support in large, nationally representative surveys from Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, China, Japan, the United States, Colombia, and Guatemala. A series of studies probe this trading off of the in-group's interests against the world's interests. Respondents everywhere distinguish preventing harm to foreign citizens, which almost all support, from redistributing resources, which only about half support. These two dimensions of moral cosmopolitanism, equitable security (preventing harm) and equitable benefits (redistributing resources), predict attitudes toward contested international policies, actual charitable donations, and preferences for mask and vaccine allocations in the COVID-19 response. The dimensions do not reflect several demographic variables and only weakly reflect political ideology. Moral cosmopolitanism also differs from related psychological constructs such as group identity. Finally, to understand the underlying thought structures, natural language processing reveals cognitive associations underlying moral cosmopolitanism (e.g., world, both) versus the alternative, parochial moral mindset (e.g., USA, first). Making these global or local terms accessible introduces an effective intervention that at least temporarily leads more people to behave like moral cosmopolitans.

As diversity increases, people paradoxically perceive social groups as more similar.

With globalization and immigration, societal contexts differ in sheer variety of resident social groups. Social diversity challenges individuals to think in new ways about new kinds of people and where their groups all stand, relative to each other. However, psychological science does not yet specify how human minds represent social diversity, in homogeneous or heterogenous contexts. Mental maps of the array of society's groups should differ when individuals inhabit more and less diverse ecologies. Nonetheless, predictions disagree on how they should differ. Confirmation bias suggests more diversity means more stereotype dispersion: With increased exposure, perceivers' mental maps might differentiate more among groups, so their stereotypes would spread out (disperse). In contrast, individuation suggests more diversity means less stereotype dispersion, as perceivers experience within-group variety and between-group overlap. Worldwide, nationwide, individual, and longitudinal datasets (n = 12,011) revealed a diversity paradox: More diversity consistently meant less stereotype dispersion. Both contextual and perceived ethnic diversity correlate with decreased stereotype dispersion. Countries and US states with higher levels of ethnic diversity (e.g., South Africa and Hawaii, versus South Korea and Vermont), online individuals who perceive more ethnic diversity, and students who moved to more ethnically diverse colleges mentally represent ethnic groups as more similar to each other, on warmth and competence stereotypes. Homogeneity shows more-differentiated stereotypes; ironically, those with the least exposure have the most-distinct stereotypes. Diversity means less-differentiated stereotypes, as in the melting pot metaphor. Diversity and reduced dispersion also correlate positively with subjective wellbeing.

Adversarial alignment enables competing models to engage in cooperative theory building toward cumulative science.

Crises in science concern not only methods, statistics, and results but also, theory development. Beyond the indispensable refinement of tools and procedures, resolving crises would also benefit from a deeper understanding of the concepts and processes guiding research. Usually, theories compete, and some lose, incentivizing destruction of seemingly opposing views. This does not necessarily contribute to accumulating insights, and it may incur collateral damage (e.g., impairing cognitive processes and collegial relations). To develop a more constructive model, we built on adversarial collaboration, which integrates incompatible results into agreed-on new empirical research to test competing hypotheses [D. Kahneman, Am. Psychol. 58, 723-730 (2003)]. Applying theory and evidence from the behavioral sciences, we address the group dynamic complexities of adversarial interactions between scientists. We illustrate the added value of considering these in an "adversarial alignment" that addressed competing conceptual frameworks from five different theories of social evaluation. Negotiating a joint framework required two preconditions and several guidelines. First, we reframed our interactions from competitive rivalry to cooperative pursuit of a joint goal, and second, we assumed scientific competence and good intentions, enabling cooperation toward that goal. Then, we applied five rules for successful multiparty negotiations: 1) leveling the playing field, 2) capitalizing on curiosity, 3) producing measurable progress, 4) working toward mutual gain, and 5) being aware of the downside alternative. Together, these guidelines can encourage others to create conditions that allow for theoretical alignments and develop cumulative science.

Globally Inaccurate Stereotypes Can Result From Locally Adaptive Exploration.

Inaccurate stereotypes-perceived differences among groups that do not actually differ-are prevalent and consequential. Past research explains stereotypes as emerging from a range of factors, including motivational biases, cognitive limitations, and information deficits. Considering the minimal forces required to produce inaccurate assumptions about group differences, we found that locally adaptive exploration is sufficient: An initial arbitrary interaction, if rewarding enough, may discourage people from investigating alternatives that would be equal or better. Historical accidents can snowball into globally inaccurate generalizations, and inaccurate stereotypes can emerge in the absence of real group differences. Using multiarmed-bandit models, we found that the mere act of choosing among groups with the goal of maximizing the long-term benefit of interactions is enough to produce inaccurate assessments of different groups. This phenomenon was reproduced in two large online experiments with English-speaking adults (N = 2,404), which demonstrated a minimal process that suffices to produce biased impressions.

Interview with Shelley E. Taylor.

Shelley Taylor's autobiographical interview (conducted by Annual Review of Psychology Editor and long-time collaborator Susan Fiske) touches on some of her favorite ideas. For example, positive illusions: "The traditional textbook definition of mental health included the stipulation that people see the world accurately, and what we were suggesting is that actually, a lot of times, people don't see the world accurately. They see it with a positive spin on it." She also discusses how to found fields (social cognition, health psychology, and social neuroscience) and the challenges of boundary crossing (from social to biological). Her practical comments describe the joy of teaching methods, running a lab, and being a solo female. The interview ends with her advice to follow your instincts about the next big idea: "Trusting your own ideas is a very important way of coming up with a research program that is novel and exciting, and that ultimately wins people over."

Ambivalent stereotypes link to peace, conflict, and inequality across 38 nations.

A cross-national study, 49 samples in 38 nations (n = 4,344), investigates whether national peace and conflict reflect ambivalent warmth and competence stereotypes: High-conflict societies (Pakistan) may need clearcut, unambivalent group images distinguishing friends from foes. Highly peaceful countries (Denmark) also may need less ambivalence because most groups occupy the shared national identity, with only a few outcasts. Finally, nations with intermediate conflict (United States) may need ambivalence to justify more complex intergroup-system stability. Using the Global Peace Index to measure conflict, a curvilinear (quadratic) relationship between ambivalence and conflict highlights how both extremely peaceful and extremely conflictual countries display lower stereotype ambivalence, whereas countries intermediate on peace-conflict present higher ambivalence. These data also replicated a linear inequality-ambivalence relationship.

Perceived intent motivates people to magnify observed harms.

Existing moral psychology research commonly explains certain phenomena in terms of a motivation to blame. However, this motivation is not measured directly, but rather is inferred from other measures, such as participants' judgments of an agent's blameworthiness. The present paper introduces new methods for assessing this theoretically important motivation, using tools drawn from animal-model research. We test these methods in the context of recent "harm-magnification" research, which shows that people often overestimate the damage caused by intentional (versus unintentional) harms. A preliminary experiment exemplifies this work and also rules out an alternative explanation for earlier harm-magnification results. Exp. 1 asks whether intended harm motivates blame or merely demonstrates the actor's intrinsic blameworthiness. Consistent with a motivational interpretation, participants freely chose blaming, condemning, and punishing over other appealing tasks in an intentional-harm condition, compared with an unintentional-harm condition. Exp. 2 also measures motivation but with converging indicators of persistence (effort, rate, and duration) in blaming. In addition to their methodological contribution, these studies also illuminate people's motivational responses to intentional harms. Perceived intent emerges as catalyzing a motivated social cognitive process related to social prediction and control.

Gaining trust as well as respect in communicating to motivated audiences about science topics.

Expertise is a prerequisite for communicator credibility, entailing the knowledge and ability to be accurate. Trust also is essential to communicator credibility. Audiences view trustworthiness as the motivation to be truthful. Identifying whom to trust follows systematic principles. People decide quickly another's apparent intent: Who is friend or foe, on their side or not, or a cooperator or competitor. Those seemingly on their side are deemed warm (friendly, trustworthy). People then decide whether the other is competent to enact those intents. Perception of scientists, like other social perceptions, involves inferring both their apparent intent (warmth) and capability (competence). To illustrate, we polled adults online about typical American jobs, rated as American society views them, on warmth and competence dimensions, as well as relevant emotions. Ambivalently perceived high-competence but low-warmth, "envied" professions included lawyers, chief executive officers, engineers, accountants, scientists, and researchers. Being seen as competent but cold might not seem problematic until one recalls that communicator credibility requires not just status and expertise but also trustworthiness (warmth). Other research indicates the risk from being enviable. Turning to a case study of scientific communication, another online sample of adults described public attitudes toward climate scientists specifically. Although distrust is low, the apparent motive to gain research money is distrusted. The literature on climate science communicators agrees that the public trusts impartiality, not persuasive agendas. Overall, communicator credibility needs to address both expertise and trustworthiness. Scientists have earned audiences' respect, but not necessarily their trust. Discussing, teaching, and sharing information can earn trust to show scientists' trustworthy intentions.

Structure and content of Native American stereotypic subgroups: Not just (ig)noble.

OBJECTIVES: Prejudice against Native Americans as an overall group generally polarizes into positive and negative stereotypic extremes, but distinct subgroups may explain this variability. METHOD: Using college student samples (Study 1), a preliminary study identified common Native American subgroups and then a main study (N = 153, 74% women, 73% White, mean age = 19 years) had participants rate these subgroups on basic dimensions of stereotype content (i.e., warmth and competence), elicited emotions (e.g., admiration, contempt), and elicited behaviors (e.g., facilitation, harm). In Study 2, these preliminary study and main study procedures were replicated using nationwide samples (main study: N = 139, 51% women, 78% White, mean age = 35 years). RESULTS: For the most part, similar Native American subgroups emerged in both samples. Using the stereotype content model (SCM; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), the subgroups were found to vary along a competence-by-warmth space. The majority of subgroups (e.g., alcoholics, lazy) were judged low in both competence and warmth. Additional subgroups (e.g., casino operators, warriors) were ambivalently judged as high on competence but low on warmth. Subgroups perceived as high in both competence and warmth elicited more admiration, those low in both competence and warmth elicited more contempt, those high in competence elicited more passive facilitation and less passive harm, and those high in warmth elicited more active facilitation and less active harm. CONCLUSIONS: Native American stereotypes are apparently characterized by both noble and ignoble subgroups, highlighting the importance of studying stereotypes at the subgroup level. (PsycINFO Database Record

Neural substrates of social status inference: roles of medial prefrontal cortex and superior temporal sulcus.

The negotiation of social order is intimately connected to the capacity to infer and track status relationships. Despite the foundational role of status in social cognition, we know little about how the brain constructs status from social interactions that display it. Although emerging cognitive neuroscience reveals that status judgments depend on the intraparietal sulcus, a brain region that supports the comparison of targets along a quantitative continuum, we present evidence that status judgments do not necessarily reduce to ranking targets along a quantitative continuum. The process of judging status also fits a social interdependence analysis. Consistent with third-party perceivers judging status by inferring whose goals are dictating the terms of the interaction and who is subordinating their desires to whom, status judgments were associated with increased recruitment of medial pFC and STS, brain regions implicated in mental state inference.

Outcome dependency alters the neural substrates of impression formation.

How do people maintain consistent impressions of other people when other people are often inconsistent? The present research addresses this question by combining recent neuroscientific insights with ecologically meaningful behavioral methods. Participants formed impressions of real people whom they met in a personally involving situation. fMRI and supporting behavioral data revealed that outcome dependency (i.e., depending on another person for a desired outcome) alters previously identified neural dynamics of impression formation. Consistent with past research, a functional localizer identified a region of dorsomedial PFC previously linked to social impression formation. In the main task, this ROI revealed the predicted patterns of activity across outcome dependency conditions: greater BOLD response when information confirmed (vs. violated) social expectations if participants were outcome-independent, and the reverse pattern if participants were outcome-dependent. We suggest that, although social perceivers often discount expectancy-disconfirming information as noise, being dependent on another person for a desired outcome focuses impression-formation processing on the most diagnostic information, rather than on the most tractable information.

Intentional harms are worse, even when they're not.

People and societies seek to combat harmful events. However, because resources are limited, every wrong righted leaves another wrong left unchecked. Responses must therefore be calibrated to the magnitude of the harm. One underappreciated factor that affects this calibration may be people's oversensitivity to intent. Across a series of studies, people saw intended harms as worse than unintended harms, even though the two harms were identical. This harm-magnification effect occurred for both subjective and monetary estimates of harm, and it remained when participants were given incentives to be accurate. The effect was fully mediated by blame motivation. People may therefore focus on intentional harms to the neglect of unintentional (but equally damaging) harms.