SHEA position statement on pandemic preparedness for policymakers: building a strong and resilient healthcare workforce.

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, many areas in the United States experienced healthcare personnel (HCP) shortages tied to a variety of factors. Infection prevention programs, in particular, faced increasing workload demands with little opportunity to delegate tasks to others without specific infectious diseases or infection control expertise. Shortages of clinicians providing inpatient care to critically ill patients during the early phase of the pandemic were multifactorial, largely attributed to increasing demands on hospitals to provide care to patients hospitalized with COVID-19 and furloughs.1 HCP shortages and challenges during later surges, including the Omicron variant-associated surges, were largely attributed to HCP infections and associated work restrictions during isolation periods and the need to care for family members, particularly children, with COVID-19. Additionally, the detrimental physical and mental health impact of COVID-19 on HCP has led to attrition, which further exacerbates shortages.2 Demands increased in post-acute and long-term care (PALTC) settings, which already faced critical staffing challenges difficulty with recruitment, and high rates of turnover. Although individual healthcare organizations and state and federal governments have taken actions to mitigate recurring shortages, additional work and innovation are needed to develop longer-term solutions to improve healthcare workforce resiliency. The critical role of those with specialized training in infection prevention, including healthcare epidemiologists, was well-demonstrated in pandemic preparedness and response. The COVID-19 pandemic underscored the need to support growth in these fields.3 This commentary outlines the need to develop the US healthcare workforce in preparation for future pandemics.

SHEA position statement on pandemic preparedness for policymakers: introduction and overview.

Throughout history, pandemics and their aftereffects have spurred society to make substantial improvements in healthcare. After the Black Death in 14th century Europe, changes were made to elevate standards of care and nutrition that resulted in improved life expectancy.1 The 1918 influenza pandemic spurred a movement that emphasized public health surveillance and detection of future outbreaks and eventually led to the creation of the World Health Organization Global Influenza Surveillance Network.2 In the present, the COVID-19 pandemic exposed many of the pre-existing problems within the US healthcare system, which included (1) a lack of capacity to manage a large influx of contagious patients while simultaneously maintaining routine and emergency care to non-COVID patients; (2) a "just in time" supply network that led to shortages and competition among hospitals, nursing homes, and other care sites for essential supplies; and (3) longstanding inequities in the distribution of healthcare and the healthcare workforce. The decades-long shift from domestic manufacturing to a reliance on global supply chains has compounded ongoing gaps in preparedness for supplies such as personal protective equipment and ventilators. Inequities in racial and socioeconomic outcomes highlighted during the pandemic have accelerated the call to focus on diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) within our communities. The pandemic accelerated cooperation between government entities and the healthcare system, resulting in swift implementation of mitigation measures, new therapies and vaccinations at unprecedented speeds, despite our fragmented healthcare delivery system and political divisions. Still, widespread misinformation or disinformation and political divisions contributed to eroded trust in the public health system and prevented an even uptake of mitigation measures, vaccines and therapeutics, impeding our ability to contain the spread of the virus in this country.3 Ultimately, the lessons of COVID-19 illustrate the need to better prepare for the next pandemic. Rising microbial resistance, emerging and re-emerging pathogens, increased globalization, an aging population, and climate change are all factors that increase the likelihood of another pandemic.4.

Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America position statement on pandemic preparedness for policymakers: mitigating supply shortages.

The COVID-19 has had major direct (e.g., deaths) and indirect (e.g., social inequities) effects in the United States. While the public health response to the epidemic featured some important successes (e.g., universal masking ,and rapid development and approval of vaccines and therapeutics), there were systemic failures (e.g., inadequate public health infrastructure) that overshadowed these successes. Key deficiency in the U.S. response were shortages of personal protective equipment (PPE) and supply chain deficiencies. Recommendations are provided for mitigating supply shortages and supply chain failures in healthcare settings in future pandemics. Some key recommendations for preventing shortages of essential components of infection control and prevention include increasing the stockpile of PPE in the U.S. National Strategic Stockpile, increased transparency of the Stockpile, invoking the Defense Production Act at an early stage, and rapid review and authorization by FDA/EPA/OSHA of non-U.S. approved products. Recommendations are also provided for mitigating shortages of diagnostic testing, medications and medical equipment.

SHEA position statement on pandemic preparedness for policymakers: pandemic data collection, maintenance, and release.

The Society for Healthcare Epidemiology in America (SHEA) strongly supports modernization of data collection processes and the creation of publicly available data repositories that include a wide variety of data elements and mechanisms for securely storing both cleaned and uncleaned data sets that can be curated as clinical and research needs arise. These elements can be used for clinical research and quality monitoring and to evaluate the impacts of different policies on different outcomes. Achieving these goals will require dedicated, sustained and long-term funding to support data science teams and the creation of central data repositories that include data sets that can be "linked" via a variety of different mechanisms and also data sets that include institutional and state and local policies and procedures. A team-based approach to data science is strongly encouraged and supported to achieve the goal of a sustainable, adaptable national shared data resource.

Clinical presentation of nipah virus infection in Bangladesh.

BACKGROUND: In Bangladesh, 4 outbreaks of Nipah virus infection were identified during the period 2001-2004. METHODS: We characterized the clinical features of Nipah virus-infected individuals affected by these outbreaks. We classified patients as having confirmed cases of Nipah virus infection if they had antibodies reactive with Nipah virus antigen. Patients were considered to have probable cases of Nipah virus infection if they had symptoms consistent with Nipah virus infection during the same time and in the same community as patients with confirmed cases. RESULTS: We identified 92 patients with Nipah virus infection, 67 (73%) of whom died. Although all age groups were affected, 2 outbreaks principally affected young persons (median age, 12 years); 62% of the affected persons were male. Fever, altered mental status, headache, cough, respiratory difficulty, vomiting, and convulsions were the most common signs and symptoms; clinical and radiographic features of acute respiratory distress syndrome of Nipah illness were identified during the fourth outbreak. Among those who died, death occurred a median of 6 days (range, 2-36 days) after the onset of illness. Patients who died were more likely than survivors to have a temperature >37.8 degrees C, altered mental status, difficulty breathing, and abnormal plantar reflexes. Among patients with Nipah virus infection who had well-defined exposure to another patient infected with Nipah virus, the median incubation period was 9 days (range, 6-11 days). CONCLUSIONS: Nipah virus infection produced rapidly progressive severe illness affecting the central nervous and respiratory systems. Clinical characteristics of Nipah virus infection in Bangladesh, including a severe respiratory component, appear distinct from clinical characteristics reported during earlier outbreaks in other countries.

Use of active surveillance to validate international classification of diseases code estimates of rotavirus hospitalizations in children.

OBJECTIVE: National estimates of hospitalizations for rotavirus, the leading cause of acute gastroenteritis (AGE) in children, have been used to establish the need for rotavirus vaccines. A previous method directly estimated discharges by using the rotavirus-specific International Classification of Diseases (ICD) code, but this method has not been validated. Our study evaluated the sensitivity of the rotavirus ICD code among children hospitalized for AGE by using active surveillance for rotavirus at a tertiary children's hospital. DESIGN: We compared data for rotavirus-coded hospital discharges in 2000-2001 at Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center with data on laboratory-confirmed cases of rotavirus obtained from active surveillance. We estimated additional rotavirus hospitalizations by extrapolating the proportion of rotavirus-positive results from active-surveillance cases to those with an unknown rotavirus status. RESULTS: Of 767 cases of AGE-related discharge codes, 103 (13%) were coded as rotavirus, 91% (94 of 103) of which were laboratory-confirmed diagnoses. Among all children discharged with an AGE-related illness, 260 (34%) were enrolled in active surveillance, of whom 155 (60%) tested positive for rotavirus. An additional 47 laboratory-confirmed rotavirus-case patients not enrolled in active surveillance yielded a total of 202 rotavirus cases and a maximum sensitivity of the rotavirus code of 47%. Extrapolation indicated that an additional 170 untested children might be rotavirus-positive, yielding a total of 372 rotavirus hospitalizations and a minimum sensitivity of the rotavirus code of 25%. CONCLUSIONS: Measurement of rotavirus-coded hospital discharges alone seems to greatly underestimate the true burden of rotavirus-associated hospitalizations. The numbers of national rotavirus hospitalization discharges may be substantially greater than previously estimated.

Estimates of the burden of rotavirus disease in Malaysia.

BACKGROUND: Accurate national estimates of the disease burden associated with rotavirus diarrhea are essential when considering implementation of a rotavirus vaccination program. We sought to estimate rotavirus disease-associated morbidity and mortality in Malaysia, using available sources of information. METHODS: We analyzed national data from the Ministry of Health (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia) to derive rates of hospitalization, clinic visits, and deaths related to acute gastroenteritis (AG) among children <5 years of age. The number of events attributable to rotavirus infection was estimated by multiplying age-stratified rates of detection of rotavirus from 2 hospital surveillance sites by national data. RESULTS: In 1999 and 2000, an average of 13,936 children (1 in 187 children) were hospitalized annually for AG. Surveillance of visits to outpatient clinics for AG identified an average of 60,342 such visits/year between 1998 and 2000. The AG-associated mortality rate was 2.5 deaths/100,000 children. On the basis of the finding that 50% of children were hospitalized for rotavirus diarrhea, we estimated that 1 in 61 children will be hospitalized for rotavirus disease and that 1 in 37 children will seek treatment as an outpatient. CONCLUSIONS: Among Malaysian children, there is a significant burden associated with AG- and rotavirus disease-related hospitalizations and outpatient visits, and this burden potentially could be prevented by the use of rotavirus vaccines.

Nipah virus encephalitis reemergence, Bangladesh.

We retrospectively investigated two outbreaks of encephalitis in Meherpur and Naogaon, Bangladesh, which occurred in 2001 and 2003. We collected serum samples from persons who were ill, their household contacts, randomly selected residents, hospital workers, and various animals. Cases were classified as laboratory confirmed or probable. We identified 13 cases (4 confirmed, 9 probable) in Meherpur; 7 were in persons in two households. Patients were more likely than nonpatients to have close contact with other patients or have contact with a sick cow. In Naogaon, we identified 12 cases (4 confirmed, 8 probable); 7 were in persons clustered in 2 households. Two Pteropus bats had antibodies for Nipah virus. Samples from hospital workers were negative for Nipah virus antibodies. These outbreaks, the first since 1999, suggest that transmission may occur through close contact with other patients or from exposure to a common source. Surveillance and enhancement of diagnostic capacity to detect Nipah virus infection are recommended.

Opening a bacillus anthracis-containing envelope, Capitol Hill, Washington, D.C.: the public health response.

On October 15, 2001, a U.S. Senate staff member opened an envelope containing Bacillus anthracis spores. Chemoprophylaxis was promptly initiated and nasal swabs obtained for all persons in the immediate area. An epidemiologic investigation was conducted to define exposure areas and identify persons who should receive prolonged chemoprophylaxis, based on their exposure risk. Persons immediately exposed to B. anthracis spores were interviewed; records were reviewed to identify additional persons in this area. Persons with positive nasal swabs had repeat swabs and serial serologic evaluation to measure antibodies to B. anthracis protective antigen (anti-PA). A total of 625 persons were identified as requiring prolonged chemoprophylaxis; 28 had positive nasal swabs. Repeat nasal swabs were negative at 7 days; none had developed anti-PA antibodies by 42 days after exposure. Early nasal swab testing is a useful epidemiologic tool to assess risk of exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis. Early, wide chemoprophylaxis may have averted an outbreak of anthrax in this population.