Optimal capacity sharing for global genomic surveillance.

Recent technological advances and substantial cost reductions have made the genomic surveillance of pathogens during pandemics feasible. Our paper focuses on full genome sequencing as a tool that can serve two goals: the estimation of variant prevalences, and the identification of new variants. Assuming that capacity constraints limit the number of samples that can be sequenced, we solve for the optimal distribution of these capacities among countries. Our results show that if the principal goal of sequencing is prevalence estimation, then the optimal capacity distribution is less than proportional to the weights (e.g., sizes) of countries. If, however, the main aim of sequencing is the detection of new variants, capacities should be allocated to countries or regions that have the most infections. Applying our results to the sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 in 2021, we provide a comparison between the observed and a suggested optimal capacity distribution worldwide and in the EU. We believe that following such quantifiable guidance will increase the efficiency of genomic surveillance for pandemics.

The evolution of universal cooperation.

Humans work together in groups to tackle shared problems and contribute to local club goods that benefit other group members. Whereas benefits from club goods remain group bound, groups are often nested in overarching collectives that face shared problems like pandemics or climate change. Such challenges require individuals to cooperate across group boundaries, raising the question how cooperation can transcend beyond confined groups. Here, we show how frequent intergroup interactions allow groups to transition from group-bound to universal cooperation. With frequent intergroup interactions, reciprocity of cooperative acts permeates group boundaries and enables the evolution of universal cooperation. As soon as intergroup interactions take place frequently, people start to selectively reward cooperation aimed at benefitting everyone, irrespective of their group membership. Simulations further show that it becomes more difficult to overcome group-bound cooperation when populations are fragmented into many small groups. Our findings reveal important prerequisites for the evolution of universal cooperation.

Building the Leviathan--Voluntary centralisation of punishment power sustains cooperation in humans.

The prevalence of cooperation among humans is puzzling because cooperators can be exploited by free riders. Peer punishment has been suggested as a solution to this puzzle, but cumulating evidence questions its robustness in sustaining cooperation. Amongst others, punishment fails when it is not powerful enough, or when it elicits counter-punishment. Existing research, however, has ignored that the distribution of punishment power can be the result of social interactions. We introduce a novel experiment in which individuals can transfer punishment power to others. We find that while decentralised peer punishment fails to overcome free riding, the voluntary transfer of punishment power enables groups to sustain cooperation. This is achieved by non-punishing cooperators empowering those who are willing to punish in the interest of the group. Our results show how voluntary power centralisation can efficiently sustain cooperation, which could explain why hierarchical power structures are widespread among animals and humans.