Understanding the relationship between self and memory through the IAM task.

In this article we present a review of research on the IAM Task, whereby memories are cued by self-images in the form of "I am … " statements, such as I am a grandfather, I am a Bob Dylan fan, I am from Darlington, I am a Psychologist. Such cues are particularly successful at accessing memories associated with the formation of specific aspects of the self. We describe the conceptual and historical context for the development of our task and review findings from other researchers who have used the same basic design. We present aggregate data and examples from across several experiments, examining how these patterns change in psychological distress and dysfunction. We also discuss research on "I will be" statements and how these have been adopted to examine self-related future cognitions. We conclude that the working self operates to organise memory retrieval and make accessible episodic and semantic material for self-relevant periods across the lifespan. Moreover, accessibility of self-images can be modulated by retrieval of autobiographical memories, highlighting Conway's bidirectional relationship between memory and the self. We provide suggestions for future research and for the first time provide a standardised version of our IAM Task for use by researchers.

Metacognitive processes accompanying the first stages of autobiographical retrieval in the self-memory system.

According to Conway's view, Autobiographical memory (AM) construction is accompanied by control processes. These processes range from filtering out relevant memories according to the current context, to generating or elaborating appropriate retrieval cues. These processes can be conceptualised as metacognition, the ability to control and monitor cognitive processes. Experimentally, little has been carried out to support the idea that metacognition is involved in AM. To assess this, we designed a task, the Feeling of Retrieval. Participants had to predict whether cue words would facilitate AM access (i.e., fluent access cues) or not (i.e., limited access cues) in a limited time (either 1 (Exp. 2) or 2 (Exp. 1) s). Later, they retrieved memories in response to both types of cues. Results show that cues judged as fluent access led to better AM generation, as illustrated by AM retrieval latency and a subjective measure of the ease with which the AMs were retrieved. These rapid predictions may rely on epistemic feelings and / or other mnemonic cues such as a partial retrieval of information. This metacognitive access to the earliest stages of AM retrieval illustrates the ability to monitor AM processes as proposed by Conway (2005).

Further advancing theories of retrieval of the personal past.

In our target article, we presented the idea that involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) and déjà vu may both be based on the same retrieval processes. Our core claim was thus straightforward: Both can be described as "involuntary" or spontaneous cognitions, where IAMs deliver content and déjà vu delivers only the feeling of retrieval. Our proposal resulted in 27 commentaries covering a broad range of perspectives and approaches. The majority of them have not only amplified our key arguments but also pushed our ideas further by offering extensions, refinements, discussing possible implications and providing additional empirical, neuroscientific and clinical support. The discussion launched by the commentaries proves to us the importance of bringing IAMs and déjà vu into mainstream discussions of memory retrieval processes.

Are involuntary autobiographical memory and déjà vu natural products of memory retrieval?

Involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) and déjà vu are phenomena that occur spontaneously in daily life. IAMs are recollections of the personal past, whereas déjà vu is defined as an experience in which the person feels familiarity at the same time as knowing that the familiarity is false. We present and discuss the idea that both IAMs and déjà vu can be explained as natural phenomena resulting from memory processing and, importantly, are both based on the same memory retrieval processes. Briefly, we hypothesise that both can be described as "involuntary" or spontaneous cognitions, where IAMs deliver content and déjà vu delivers only the feeling of retrieval. We map out the similarities and differences between the two, making a theoretical and neuroscientific account for their integration into models of memory retrieval and how the autobiographical memory literature can explain these quirks of daily life and unusual but meaningful phenomena. We explain the emergence of the déjà vu phenomenon by relating it to well-known mechanisms of autobiographical memory retrieval, concluding that IAMs and déjà vu lie on a continuum.

A Multidimensional Assessment of Metacognition Across Domains in Multiple Sclerosis.

OBJECTIVE: In neurological diseases, metacognitive judgements have been widely used in order to assess the degree of disease awareness. However, as yet little research of this type has focused on multiple sclerosis (MS). METHOD: We here focused on an investigation of item-by-item metacognitive predictions (using feeling-of-knowing judgements) in episodic and semantic memory and global metacognitive predictions in standard neuropsychological tests pertinent to MS (processing speed and verbal fluency). Twenty-seven relapsing-remitting MS (RR-MS) patients and 27 comparison participants took part. RESULTS: We found that RR-MS patients were as accurate as the group of comparison participants on our episodic and semantic item-by-item judgements. However, for the global predictions, we found that the MS group initially overestimated their performance (ds = .64), but only on a task on which performance was also impaired (ds = .89; processing speed). We suggest that MS patients, under certain conditions, show inaccurate metacognitive knowledge. However, postdictions and item-by-item predictions indicate that online metacognitive processes are no different from participants without MS. CONCLUSION: We conclude that there is no monitoring deficit in RR-MS and as such these patients should benefit from adaptive strategies and symptom education.

Déjà vu experiences in anxiety.

Déjà vu occurs when a novel event is experienced with an erroneous sense of familiarity. Memory researchers theorise that this arises due to an error in the processes underlying the recognition memory system. Research has indicated that there may be a link between high levels of anxiety and increased frequency and intensity of déjà vu, however, there has been a comparatively little characterisation of déjà vu as experienced by individuals with clinical anxiety. We used an online questionnaire to collect data from individuals self-reporting a clinical diagnosis of anxiety, as well as from age-matched controls. The Anxiety Group reported a significantly higher frequency of déjà vu episodes over the previous month than controls. They also reported experiencing déjà vu more frequently and with higher intensity during periods of high anxiety. In addition, the Anxiety Group reported finding déjà vu episodes significantly more distressing than the Control Group. The findings indicate that there are differences in déjà vu experienced by people reporting high levels of anxiety compared to healthy controls without an anxiety diagnosis. We discuss structural and neural mechanisms thought to underpin déjà vu in relation to these results.

The the the the induction of jamais vu in the laboratory: word alienation and semantic satiation.

Jamais vu is a phenomenon operationalised as the opposite of déjà vu, i.e. finding subjectively unfamiliar something that we know to be familiar. We sought to document that the subjective experience of jamais vu can be produced in word alienation tasks, hypothesising that déjà vu and jamais vu are similar experiential memory phenomena. Participants repeatedly copied words until they felt "peculiar", had completed the task, or had another reason to stop. About two-thirds of all participants (in about one-third of all trials) reported strange subjective experiences during the task. Participants reported feeling peculiar after about thirty repetitions, or one minute. We describe these experiences as jamais vu. This experimentally induced phenomenon was related to real-world experiences of unfamiliarity. Although we replicated known patterns of correlations with déjà vu (age and dissociative experiences), the same pattern was not found for our experimental analogue of jamais vu, suggesting some differences between the two phenomena. However, in daily life, those people who had déjà vu more frequently also had jamais vu more frequently. Findings are discussed with reference to the progress that has been made in déjà vu research in recent years, with a view to fast-tracking our understanding of jamais vu.

Retained ability to extract gist in childhood-acquired amnesia: Insights from a single case.

This paper presents the performance of a young amnesic person (CJ) in the DRM task. CJ was found to be sensitive to the DRM manipulation at a level comparable to controls in recognition and at a level higher than controls in free recall. Detailed analyses of recall intrusions lent further support to the finding that CJ is able to extract gist on the basis of semantic associations. Results are discussed with reference to relevant theory as well as the potential role of an impaired and immature cognitive system in adopting a semantic gist strategy in the absence of episodic memory.

Fractionating controlled memory processes and recall of context in recognition memory: a case report.

Recollection has been described as both a recognition memory judgment requiring cognitive control and the ability to retrieve contextual information about a prior occurrence. At the core of this article is the question whether or not these two subcomponents of recollection are dissociable in amnesia. In three experiments, we explored the influence of exclusion task instructions on performance in a single case (CJ), with the view to understand the relative contributions of control and source memory to recognition memory decisions. First, contrasting findings were obtained between tasks requiring strategic control or source reports. Second, even though CJ displayed some residual source memory relative to the ability to strategically control this information, his source memory capacity was time-limited. Our findings resonate with the novel proposal that recollection draws heavily upon working memory resources, and provide an example of how amnesic patients might utilize residual working memory capacity to solve episodic memory tasks.

The tracks of my years: Personal significance contributes to the reminiscence bump.

Two studies investigated the role of the self in the reminiscence bump (heightened retrieval for events from young adulthood). Participants over the age of 40 years were presented with top-grossing films and songs, and were asked to select the five that were most personally significant. Study 1 produced reminiscence bumps for personally significant songs, when measured by both participants' age at release (AaR) and age when songs were reported as most important (AaI). This effect was not shown for films. In Study 2, participants again selected their personally significant songs but also rated all songs for whether they were known, remembered (e.g., associated with an episodic memory), or not known. Personally significant songs were significantly more likely to be associated with episodic memories, compared to personally non-significant songs. Again, only personally significant songs formed a reminiscence bump. Findings underline a critical role of personal significance in the reminiscence bump, which we argue is consistent with the formation of identity in this lifetime period.

Who am I? Autobiographical retrieval improves access to self-concepts.

It is considered that an individual's current self-concept plays a crucial role in guiding the retrieval of autobiographical memory. Using a novel fluency paradigm, the present research examined whether or not the reverse is also true, that is, does memory retrieval influence the description of the conceptual self? Specifically, this study examined the effect of prior autobiographical reverie on the subsequent retrieval of stored self-concepts. Participants wrote a description of a personally relevant memory or a control topic (of no relevance to the self), following which they had 60 seconds to generate as many self-defining statements as possible, each beginning with I am. Participants engaging in autobiographical retrieval generated significantly more statements than those in the control condition, suggesting that autobiographical retrieval increased access to self-concepts. Type of statement also varied according to group. Participants in the autobiographical memory condition were more likely to conceptualise themselves in relation to their psychological traits, and this was replicated in a second experiment conducted online. Findings support the idea that self and episodic memory are highly related constructs, and are discussed in relation to implications for individuals with autobiographical memory deficits.

Third International Congress on Epilepsy, Brain and Mind: Part 1.

Epilepsy is both a disease of the brain and the mind. Here, we present the first of two papers with extended summaries of selected presentations of the Third International Congress on Epilepsy, Brain and Mind (April 3-5, 2014; Brno, Czech Republic). Epilepsy in history and the arts and its relationships with religion were discussed, as were overviews of epilepsy and relevant aspects of social cognition, handedness, accelerated forgetting and autobiographical amnesia, and large-scale brain networks.

What is French for déjà vu? Descriptions of déjà vu in native French and English speakers.

Little is known about how people characterise and classify the experience of déjà vu. The term déjà vu might capture a range of different phenomena and people may use it differently. We examined the description of déjà vu in two languages: French and English, hypothesising that the use of déjà vu would vary between the two languages. In French, the phrase déjà vu can be used to indicate a veridical experience of recognition - as in "I have already seen this face before". However, the same is not true in English. In an online questionnaire, we found equal rates of déjà vu amongst French and English speakers, and key differences in how the experience was described. As expected, the French group described the experience as being more frequent, but there was the unexpected finding that they found it to be more troubling.

Know versus Familiar: Differentiating states of awareness in others' subjective reports of recognition.

In the Remember-Know paradigm whether a Know response is defined as a high-confidence state of certainty or a low-confidence state based on familiarity varies across researchers and can influence participants' responses. The current experiment was designed to explore differences between the states of Know and Familiar. Participants studied others' justification statements to "Know" recognition decisions and separated them into two types. Crucially, participants were not provided definitions of Know and Familiar on which to sort the items--their judgements were based solely on the phenomenology described in the justifications. Participants' sorting decisions were shown to reliably map onto expert classification of Know and Familiar. Post-task questionnaire responses demonstrated that both the level of memory detail and confidence expressed in the justifications were central to how participants categorised the items. In sum, given no instructions to do so, participants classify Familiar and Know according to two dimensions: confidence and amount of information retrieved.

Remembering and knowing: using another's subjective report to make inferences about memory strength and subjective experience.

The Remember-Know paradigm is commonly used to examine experiential states during recognition. In this paradigm, whether a Know response is defined as a high-confidence state of certainty or a low-confidence state based on familiarity varies across researchers, and differences in definitions and instructions have been shown to influence participants' responding. Using a novel approach, in three internet-based questionnaires participants were placed in the role of 'memory expert' and classified others' justifications of recognition decisions. Results demonstrated that participants reliably differentiated between others' memory experiences--both in terms of confidence and other inherent differences in the justifications. Furthermore, under certain conditions, manipulations of confidence were found to shift how items were assigned to subjective experience categories (Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess). Findings are discussed in relation to the relationship between subjective experience and confidence, and the separation of Know and Familiar response categories within the Remember-Know paradigm.

Evidence for a metacognitive awareness of autobiographical memory organisation.

Models of autobiographical memory (AM) recall posit some form of control process, but the extent to which we can reflect on this form of retrieval is under-researched. Here we propose a method for measuring such metacognitive awareness in AM. Since the verification of personal facts is difficult, we based our design on AM organisation. AMs are proposed to be organised into a coherent life story, that is, a subjective chronology reflecting the goals of the individual over time. We investigated the metacognitive awareness of this coherence. Eighty-three participants generated AMs and made two judgements of order for pairs of memories and gave a confidence rating. We found that participants were indeed able to distinguish pairs of memories that were coherent with their life story chronology from pairs which were not. We also found a significant effect of response time and task difficulty on confidence, suggesting that judgement of order fluency was determinant for metacognitive evaluation. This suggests common properties between metacognitive abilities related to autobiographical memory and those related to other forms of memory.

The phenomenology of autobiographical retrieval.

In this article we review the literature on the phenomenology of retrieval from the personal past, and propose a framework for understanding how epistemic feelings and metacognitive reflections guide the retrieval of representations of past events in the Self Memory System. Our focus is on an overlooked aspect of autobiographical memory, the phenomenology of the retrieval process, as opposed to the products of retrieval themselves. As we argue in the present paper, this is not some magical collection of phenomena, but centers on the feeling of familiarity derived from retrieval fluency during the process of retrieval. The relationship between retrieval fluency and retrieved content, interpreted metacognitively is what gives autobiographical retrieval its particular phenomenological "flavor." To illustrate our point, we focus on two phenomena that only recently were considered alongside each other: the déjà vu experience and involuntary autobiographical memories. Our proposal is that the feeling of familiarity (i.e., this reminds me of something) for the personal past acts to guide deliberate, conscious memory search. We argue that the critical concept in the phenomenology of retrieval is fluency-how readily information comes to mind. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Memory Philosophy > Consciousness Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief.

Retrospective judgments of confidence in a complex span task.

Although the study of metamemory monitoring originated in predictions for simple span tasks, the study of metacognition for working memory (WM) has been somewhat neglected in comparison with long-term memory. We aimed to fill this gap by exploring the ability to self-assess WM operations. Thirty-four participants performed 16 series of complex span tasks and rated their confidence in a verbal recall paradigm. We manipulated the cognitive load based on the TBRS model in order to analyze the role of attentional resources on both WM and metacognitive evaluations. As expected, we found that recall is affected by cognitive load and we found standard serial position effects. Interestingly, metacognitive evaluations followed the same pattern, and measures of metacognitive sensitivity suggest that participants are able to make item-by-item retrospective judgments reflective of their performance. We discuss how these results contribute to our understanding of metacognitive access to newly-formed WM contents.

Confidence in visual detection, familiarity and recollection judgments is preserved in schizophrenia spectrum disorder.

An effective way to quantify metacognitive performance is to ask participants to estimate their confidence in the accuracy of their response during a cognitive task. A recent meta-analysis1 raised the issue that most assessments of metacognitive performance in schizophrenia spectrum disorders may be confounded with cognitive deficits, which are known to be present in this population. Therefore, it remains unclear whether the reported metacognitive deficits are metacognitive in nature or rather inherited from cognitive deficits. Arbitrating between these two possibilities requires equating task performance between experimental groups. Here, we aimed to characterize metacognitive performance among individuals with schizophrenia across three tasks (visual detection, familiarity, recollection) using a within-subject design while controlling experimentally for intra-individual task performance and statistically for between-subject task performance. In line with our hypotheses, we found no metacognitive deficit for visual detection and familiarity judgments. While we expected metacognition for recollection to be specifically impaired among individuals with schizophrenia, we found evidence in favor of an absence of a deficit in that domain also. We found no specific metacognitive deficit in schizophrenia spectrum disorder in the visual or memory domain. The clinical relevance of our findings is discussed in light of a hierarchical framework of metacognition.