Parallel-Serial Memoing: A Novel Approach to Analyzing Qualitative Data.

The mechanisms by which talking therapies exert their beneficial effects are largely unknown. In exploring the process of a talking therapy, motivational interviewing (MI), when used to treat and prevent low mood in stroke survivors, we developed, what we believe to be, a novel approach to analyzing transcripts. We illustrate the method using qualitative data from MI sessions with 10 stroke survivors. The approach, drawing on grounded theory, incorporated processes of parallel and serial memoing among a team of researchers to allow a process of validation. This enabled us to describe session content and to develop theoretical interpretations of what was occurring in and across MI sessions. We found that this process can be used to integrate different perspectives in theory building, allowing for a richer description and more robust theoretical interpretation. Others can use and adapt this approach to develop insights into their own inquiry.

Motivational Interviewing Post-Stroke: An Analysis of Stroke Survivors' Concerns and Adjustment.

Our earlier research demonstrated that participation in four sessions of motivational interviewing (MI) early post-stroke has a positive impact on stroke survivors' mood. However, the theoretical underpinnings of MI in supporting adjustment (rather than its traditional use in supporting behavior change) require clarification. This article describes a content analysis of MI transcripts for 10 participants in our previous study, to identify the focus of discussions (patient "concerns") and potential effective components of our MI approach. Patients' post-stroke concerns were shown in 16 categories, including frustration, family impact, and getting well. There was a pattern of change discourse across sessions: "Sustain talk" (reasons for not changing) reduced from Session 1 onward, "change talk" (intent to change) increased then reduced, and "change expressed" (changes achieved) increased from Sessions 1 to 4. MI facilitates healthy adjustment post-stroke in some patients, in turn affecting mood, but clarification of how this effect is achieved requires further exploration.

On the very idea of a recovery model for mental health.

The recovery model has been put forward as a rival to the biomedical model in mental healthcare. It has also been invoked in debate about public policy for individual and community mental health and the broader goal of social inclusion. But this broader use threatens its status as a genuine model, distinct from others such as the biomedical model. This paper sets out to articulate, although not to defend, a distinct recovery model based on the idea that mental health is an essentially normative or evaluative notion. It also aims to show that, supposing this suggestion were to be followed, the norms informing our notion of recovery would be more appropriately construed as eudaimonic than as hedonic in character.

Narrative rather than idiographic approaches as counterpart to the nomothetic approach to assessment.

As part of its Institutional Program on Psychiatry for the Person, the World Psychiatric Association has called for an idiographic element to be added to psychiatric diagnosis to complement criteriological and dimensional elements. Such a call, however, prompts the question of what kind of additional element this is. Just what is meant by idiographic understanding and how, exactly, does it complement, by being distinct from, other elements within psychiatric diagnostic judgement? The first half of this paper continues discussion from an earlier paper [Thornton: Eur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci 2008;258 (suppl 5):104-109] to consider the idea, inspired by Wilhelm Windelband's rectoral address of 1894, that idiographic judgement is distinct because it is a special kind of 'individualised' judgement about individuals. I argue, however, that the most promising interpretation of this idea falls prey to Wilfrid Sellars argument against the Myth of the Given and thus it cannot be a genuine complement to criteriological diagnosis. In addition to this idea, however, 'idiographic' has also been used to label narrative judgement. The second half of the paper highlights how narrative judgement, shorn of any connection to metaphysical theories of the self, is an essentially normative form of judgement that contrasts with, and can thus complement, criteriological diagnosis.

Understanding, testimony and interpretation in psychiatric diagnosis.

Psychiatric diagnosis depends, centrally, on the transmission of patients' knowledge of their experiences and symptoms to clinicians by testimony. In the case of non-native speakers, the need for linguistic interpretation raises significant practical problems. But determining the best practical approach depends on determining the best underlying model of both testimony and knowledge itself. Internalist models of knowledge have been influential since Descartes. But they cannot account for testimony. Since knowledge by testimony is possible, and forms the basis of psychiatric diagnosis, its very existence is a factor in support of an externalist model of knowledge in general. Internalist and externalist models of knowledge also suggest different ways of responding to the practical challenges of basing psychiatric diagnosis on testimony. Thus the argument in favour of externalism also supports a potentially empirically testable hypothesis about interpretation of non-native speakers for accurate psychiatric diagnosis: interpretation of non-English speakers should be as transparent and unhindered by specialised medical knowledge as possible.

New Genetic Loci Associated With Chronic Kidney Disease in an Indigenous Australian Population.

The common occurrence of renal disease in Australian Aboriginal populations such as Tiwi Islanders may be determined by environmental and genetic factors. To explore genetic contributions, we performed a genome-wide association study (GWAS) of urinary albumin creatinine ratio (ACR) in a sample of 249 Tiwi individuals with genotype data from a 370K Affymetrix single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) array. A principal component analysis (PCA) of the 249 individual Tiwi cohort and samples from 11 populations included in phase III of the HapMap Project indicated that Tiwi Islanders are a relatively distinct and unique population with no close genetic relationships to the other ethnic groups. After adjusting for age and sex, the proportion of ACR variance explained by the 370K SNPs was estimated to be 37% (using the software GCTA.31; likelihood ratio = 8.06, p-value = 0.002). The GWAS identified eight SNPs that were nominally significantly associated with ACR (p < 0.0005). A replication study of these SNPs was performed in an independent cohort of 497 individuals on the eight SNPs. Four of these SNPs were significantly associated with ACR in the replication sample (p < 0.05), rs4016189 located near the CRIM1 gene (p = 0.000751), rs443816 located in the gene encoding UGT2B11 (p = 0.022), rs6461901 located near the NFE2L3 gene, and rs1535656 located in the RAB14 gene. The SNP rs4016189 was still significant after adjusting for multiple testing. A structural equation model (SEM) demonstrated that the rs4016189 SNP was not associated with other phenotypes such as estimated glomerular filtration rate (eGFR), diabetes, and blood pressure.

Against Explanatory Minimalism in Psychiatry.

The idea that psychiatry contains, in principle, a series of levels of explanation has been criticized not only as empirically false but also, by Campbell, as unintelligible because it presupposes a discredited pre-Humean view of causation. Campbell's criticism is based on an interventionist-inspired denial that mechanisms and rational connections underpin physical and mental causation, respectively, and hence underpin levels of explanation. These claims echo some superficially similar remarks in Wittgenstein's Zettel. But attention to the context of Wittgenstein's remarks suggests a reason to reject explanatory minimalism in psychiatry and reinstate a Wittgensteinian notion of levels of explanation. Only in a context broader than the one provided by interventionism is that the ascription of propositional attitudes, even in the puzzling case of delusions, justified. Such a view, informed by Wittgenstein, can reconcile the idea that the ascription mental phenomena presupposes a particular level of explanation with the rejection of an a priori claim about its connection to a neurological level of explanation.

Jail drug and alcohol treatment program reduces recidivism in nonviolent offenders: a longitudinal study of Monroe County, New York's, Jail Treatment Drug and Alcohol Program.

Substance abuse treatment has become the new fashion for reducing recidivism among inmates. But the question is, does this work? Various studies have been done tracking the same cohort of inmates over time to assess the validity of treatment. This study assesses one treatment program's success over 5 years to determine if drug and alcohol treatment reduces recidivism among nonviolent, short-term (sentence of less than a year) inmates. Monroe County's drug treatment program demonstrates that for 1 year after receiving the treatment, three different cohorts of nonviolent, short-term inmates (1995, 1998, and 2000) were found to be substantially less likely to be recidivists than control group inmates.

Psychopathy: what apology making tells us about moral agency.

Psychopathy is often used to settle disputes about the nature of moral judgment. The "trolley problem" is a familiar scenario in which psychopathy is used as a test case. Where a convergence in response to the trolley problem is registered between psychopathic subjects and non-psychopathic (normal) subjects, it is assumed that this convergence indicates that the capacity for making moral judgments is unimpaired in psychopathy. This, in turn, is taken to have implications for the dispute between motivation internalists and motivation externalists, for instance. In what follows, we want to do two things: firstly, we set out to question the assumption that convergence is informative of the capacity for moral judgment in psychopathy. Next, we consider a distinct feature of psychopathy which we think provides strong grounds for holding that the capacity for moral judgment is seriously impaired in psychopathic subjects. The feature in question is the psychopathic subject's inability to make sincere apologies. Our central claim will be this: convergence in response to trolley problems does not tell us very much about the psychopathic subject's capacity to make moral judgments, but his inability to make sincere apologies does provide us with strong grounds for holding that this capacity is seriously impaired in psychopathy.

Recent developments for naturalizing the mind.

PURPOSE OF REVIEW: To examine recent philosophical work which impacts on fitting mental content into a satisfactory picture of nature. RECENT FINDINGS: Both reductionist and nonreductionist forms of naturalism about mental content have sustained criticism. SUMMARY: The connection between having a mind and fitting a rational pattern remains an important insight.

Clinical judgement, expertise and skilled coping.

Medicine involves specific practical expertise as well as more general context-independent medical knowledge. This raises the question, what is the nature of the expertise involved? Is there a model of clinical judgement or understanding that can accommodate both elements? This paper begins with a summary of a published account of the kinds of situation-specific skill found in anaesthesia. It authors claim that such skills are often neglected because of a prejudice in favour of the 'technical rationality' exemplified in evidence-based medicine but they do not themselves offer a general account of the relation of practical expertise and general medical knowledge. The philosopher Hubert Dreyfus provides one model of the relation of general knowledge to situation-specific skilled coping. He claims that the former logically depends on the latter and provides two arguments, which I articulate in the second section, for this. But he mars those arguments by building in the further assumption that such situation-specific responses must be understood as concept-free and thus mindless. That assumption is held in place by three arguments all of which I criticize in the next section to give a unified account of clinical judgement as both practical and conceptually structured and thus justified in the face of a prejudice in favour of 'technical rationality'.

The Myth of Mental Illness: 50 years after publication: What does it mean today?

In 1960, Thomas Szasz published The Myth of Mental Illness, arguing that mental illness was a harmful myth without a demonstrated basis in biological pathology and with the potential to damage current conceptions of human responsibility. Szasz's arguments have provoked considerable controversy over the past five decades. This paper marks the 50th anniversary of The Myth of Mental Illness by providing commentaries on its contemporary relevance from the perspectives of a range of stakeholders, including a consultant psychiatrist, psychiatric patient, professor of philosophy and mental health, a specialist registrar in psychiatry, and a lecturer in psychiatry. This paper also includes responses by Professor Thomas Szasz. Szasz's arguments contain echoes of positivism, Cartesian dualism, and Enlightenment philosophy, and point to a genuine complexity at the heart of contemporary psychiatric taxonomy: how is 'mental illness' to be defined? And by whom? The basis of Szasz's doubts about the similarities between mental and physical illnesses remain apparent today, but it remains equally apparent that a failure to describe a biological basis for mental illness does not mean there is none (eg. consider the position of epilepsy, prior to the electroencephalogram). Psychiatry would probably be different today if The Myth of Mental Illness had not been written, but possibly not in the ways that Szasz might imagine: does the relentless incarceration of individuals with 'mental illness' in the world's prisons represent the logical culmination of Szaszian thought? In response, Professor Szasz emphasises his views that "mental illness" differs fundamentally from physical illness, and that the principal habits the term 'mental illness' involves are stigmatisation, deprivation of liberty (civil commitment) and deprivation of the right to trial for alleged criminal conduct (the insanity defence). He links the incarceration of the mentally ill with the policy of de-institutionalisation (which he opposes) and states that, in his view, the only limitation his work imposes on human activities are limitations on practices which are conventionally and conveniently labelled 'psychiatric abuses'. Clearly, there remains a diversity of views about the merits of Szasz's arguments, but there is little diminution in his ability to provoke an argument.

Does understanding individuals require idiographic judgement?

Idiographic understanding has been proposed as a response to concern that criteriological diagnosis cannot capture the nature of human individuality. It can seem that understanding individuals requires, instead, a distinct form of 'individualised' judgement and this claim receives endorsement by the inventor of the term 'idiographic', Wilhelm Windelband. I argue, however, that none of the options for specifying a model of individualised judgement, to explain what idiographic judgement might be, will work. I suggest, at the end, that narrative, rather than idiographic, understanding is a more promising response to the limitations of criteriological diagnosis.

Should comprehensive diagnosis include idiographic understanding?

The World Psychiatric Association has emphasised the importance of idiographic understanding as a distinct component of comprehensive assessment but in introductions to the idea it is often assimilated to the notion of narrative judgement. This paper aims to distinguish between supposed idiographic and narrative judgement. Taking the former to mean a kind of individualised judgement, I argue that it has no place in psychiatry in part because it threatens psychiatric validity. Narrative judgement, by contrast, is a genuinely distinct complement to criteriological diagnosis but it is, nevertheless, a special kind of general judgement and thus can possess validity. To argue this I first examine the origin of the distinction between idiographic and nomothetic in Windelband's 1894 rectorial address. I argue that none of three ways of understanding that distinction is tenable. Windelband's description of historical methods, as a practical example, does not articulate a genuine form of understanding. A metaphysical distinction between particulars and general kinds is guilty of subscribing to the Myth of the Given. A distinction based on an abstraction of essentially combined aspects of empirical judgement cannot underpin a distinct empirical method. Furthermore, idiographic elements understood as individualised judgements threaten the validity of psychiatric diagnosis. In the final part I briefly describe some aspects of the logic of narrative judgements and argue that in the call for comprehensive diagnosis, narrative rather than idiographic elements have an important role. Importantly, however, whilst directed towards individual subjects, narratives are framed in intrinsically general concepts and thus can aspire to validity.

Tacit knowledge as the unifying factor in evidence based medicine and clinical judgement.

The paper outlines the role that tacit knowledge plays in what might seem to be an area of knowledge that can be made fully explicit or codified and which forms a central element of Evidence Based Medicine. Appeal to the role the role of tacit knowledge in science provides a way to unify the tripartite definition of Evidence Based Medicine given by Sackett et al: the integration of best research evidence with clinical expertise and patient values. Each of these three elements, crucially including research evidence, rests on an ineliminable and irreducible notion of uncodified good judgement. The paper focuses on research evidence, drawing first on the work of Kuhn to suggest that tacit knowledge contributes, as a matter of fact, to puzzle solving within what he calls normal science. A stronger argument that it must play a role in research is first motivated by looking to Collins' first hand account of replication in applied physics and then broader considerations of replication in justifying knowledge claims in scientific research. Finally, consideration of an argument from Wittgenstein shows that whatever explicit guidelines can be drawn up to guide judgement the specification of what counts as correctly following them has to remain implicit.Overall, the paper sets out arguments for the claim that even though explicit guidelines and codifications can play a practical role in informing clinical practice, they rest on a body of tacit or implicit skill that is in principle ineliminable. It forms the bedrock of good judgement and unites the integration of research, expertise and values.

Looking with both eyes open: fact and value in psychiatric diagnosis?

IN THIS ARTICLE WE ARGUE THE CASE FOR A PROPOSAL: that psychiatry should recognise, embrace and take seriously the role of values, alongside facts, in diagnosis. We present a three-step argument in support of our proposal; we raise a number of key questions from the perspectives of different stakeholders in mental health; and we conclude with a note on the significance of our proposal for building a more equal relationship between patients and professionals.

Wittgenstein and the limits of empathic understanding in psychopathology.

The aim of this paper is three-fold. Firstly, to briefly set out how strategic choices made about theorising about intentionality or content have actions at a distance for accounting for delusion. Secondly, to investigate how successfully a general difficulty facing a broadly interpretative approach to delusions might be eased by the application of any of three Wittgensteinian interpretative tools. Thirdly, to draw a general moral about how the later Wittgenstein gives more reason to be pessimistic than optimistic about the prospects of a philosophical psychopathology aimed at empathic understanding of delusions.

Thought insertion, cognitivism, and inner space.

INTRODUCTION: Whatever its underlying causes, even the description of the phenomenon of thought insertion, of the content of the delusion, presents difficulty. It may seem that the best hope of a description comes from a broadly cognitivist approach to the mind which construes content-laden mental states as internal mental representations within what is literally an inner space: the space of the brain or nervous system. Such an approach objectifies thoughts in a way which might seem to hold out the prospect of describing the ''alienated'' relation to one's own thoughts that seems to be present in thought insertion.1 METHOD: Firstly, I examine the general structure of cognitivist accounts of intentional or content-laden mental states. I raise the general difficulty of explaining how free-standing, and thus world-independent, inner states can still have bearing on the outer world. Secondly, I briefly examine Frith's model for explaining thought insertion and other passivity phenomena by postulating a failure of an internal monitoring mechanism of inner states. I question what account can be given of non-pathological cases and raise two specific objects. RESULTS: Cognitivist accounts of the mind face a general, and possibly insuperable, challenge: explaining the intentionality of mental states in non-intentional, nonquestion-begging terms. There have so far been no satisfactory solutions. Cognitivist accounts of passivity phenomena in terms of a failure of internal monitoring face two objections. Firstly, accounting for non-pathological cases generates an infinite regress. Secondly, no account can be given of the paradoxical nature of utterances of the form of Moore's paradox: ''it is raining but I do not believe it''. CONCLUSIONS: A cognitivist approach presents an alienated account of thought in normal, non-pathological cases and is no help in accounting for thought insertion.