ABSTRACT
Lassa fever (LF) is endemic to Nigeria, where the disease causes substantial rates of illness and death. In this article, we report an analysis of the epidemiologic and clinical aspects of the LF outbreak that occurred in Nigeria during January 1-May 6, 2018. A total of 1,893 cases were reported; 423 were laboratory-confirmed cases, among which 106 deaths were recorded (case-fatality rate 25.1%). Among all confirmed cases, 37 occurred in healthcare workers. The secondary attack rate among 5,001 contacts was 0.56%. Most (80.6%) confirmed cases were reported from 3 states (Edo, Ondo, and Ebonyi). Fatal outcomes were significantly associated with being elderly; no administration of ribavirin; and the presence of a cough, hemorrhaging, and unconsciousness. The findings in this study should lead to further LF research and provide guidance to those preparing to respond to future outbreaks.
Subject(s)
Disease Outbreaks , Lassa Fever/diagnosis , Lassa Fever/epidemiology , Lassa virus , Adolescent , Adult , Aged , Child , Child, Preschool , Female , Geography, Medical , History, 21st Century , Humans , Infant , Infant, Newborn , Lassa Fever/history , Lassa Fever/virology , Male , Middle Aged , Mortality , Nigeria/epidemiology , Odds Ratio , Prevalence , Public Health Surveillance , Seasons , Symptom Assessment , Young AdultABSTRACT
Timely access to emergency funding has been identified as a bottleneck for outbreak response in Nigeria. In February 2019, a new revolving outbreak investigation fund (ROIF) was established by the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC). We abstracted the date of NCDC notification, date of verification, and date of response for 25 events that occurred prior to establishing the fund (April 2017 to August 2019) and for 8 events that occurred after establishing the fund (February to October 2019). The median time to notification (1 day) and to verification (0 days) did not change after establishing the ROIF, but the median time to response significantly decreased, from 6 days to 2 days (P = .003). Response to disease outbreaks was accelerated by access to emergency funding with a clear approval process. We recommend that the ROIF should be financed by the national government through budget allocation. Finally, development partners can provide financial support for the existing fund and technical assistance for protocol development toward financial accountability and sustainability.
Subject(s)
Financial Management , Public Health , Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control , Emergencies , Humans , Nigeria/epidemiologyABSTRACT
Public Health Emergency Operations Centres (PHEOCs) provide a platform for multisectoral coordination and collaboration, to enhance the efficiency of outbreak response activities and enable the control of disease outbreaks. Over the last decade, PHEOCs have been introduced to address the gaps in outbreak response coordination. With its tropical climate, high population density and poor socioeconomic indicators, Nigeria experiences large outbreaks of infectious diseases annually. These outbreaks have led to mortality and negative economic impact as a result of large disparities in healthcare and poor coordination systems. Nigeria is a federal republic with a presidential system of government and a separation of powers among the three tiers of government which are the federal, state and local governments. There are 36 states in Nigeria, and as with other countries with a federal system of governance, each state in Nigeria has its budgets, priorities and constitutional authority for health sector interventions including the response to disease outbreaks. Following the establishment of a National PHEOC in 2017 to improve the coordination of public health emergencies, the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control began the establishment of State PHEOCs. Using a defined process, the establishment of State PHEOCs has led to improved coordination, coherence of thoughts among public health officials, government ownership, commitment and collaboration. This paper aims to share the experience and importance of establishing PHEOCs at national and subnational levels in Nigeria and the lessons learnt which can be used by other countries considering the use of PHEOCs in managing complex emergencies.
Subject(s)
Emergencies , Public Health , Delivery of Health Care , Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control , Humans , NigeriaABSTRACT
Process mapping is a systems thinking approach used to understand, analyse and optimise processes within complex systems. We aim to demonstrate how this methodology can be applied during disease outbreaks to strengthen response and health systems. Process mapping exercises were conducted during three unique emerging disease outbreak contexts with different: mode of transmission, size, and health system infrastructure. System functioning improved considerably in each country. In Sierra Leone, laboratory testing was accelerated from 6 days to within 24 hours. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, time to suspected case notification reduced from 7 to 3 days. In Nigeria, key data reached the national level in 48 hours instead of 5 days. Our research shows that despite the chaos and complexities associated with emerging pathogen outbreaks, the implementation of a process mapping exercise can address immediate response priorities while simultaneously strengthening components of a health system.