Public health and environmental response to the first case of naturally acquired inhalational anthrax in the United States in 30 years: infection of a new york city resident who worked with dried animal hides.

In Pennsylvania on February 16, 2006, a New York City resident collapsed with rigors and was hospitalized. On February 21, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene were notified that Bacillus anthracis had been identified in the patient's blood. Although the patient's history of working with dried animal hides to make African drums indicated the likelihood of a natural exposure to aerosolized anthrax spores, bioterrorism had to be ruled out first. Ultimately, this case proved to be the first case of naturally occurring inhalational anthrax in 30 years. This article describes the epidemiologic and environmental investigation to identify other cases and persons at risk and to determine the source of exposure and scope of contamination. Because stricter regulation of the importation of animal hides from areas where anthrax is enzootic is difficult, public healthcare officials should consider the possibility of future naturally occurring anthrax cases caused by contaminated hides. Federal protocols are needed to assist in the local response, which should be tempered by our growing understanding of the epidemiology of naturally acquired anthrax. These protocols should include recommended methods for reliable and efficient environmental sample collection and laboratory testing, and environmental risk assessments and remediation.

Antigenic and genetic characteristics of swine-origin 2009 A(H1N1) influenza viruses circulating in humans.

Since its identification in April 2009, an A(H1N1) virus containing a unique combination of gene segments from both North American and Eurasian swine lineages has continued to circulate in humans. The lack of similarity between the 2009 A(H1N1) virus and its nearest relatives indicates that its gene segments have been circulating undetected for an extended period. Its low genetic diversity suggests that the introduction into humans was a single event or multiple events of similar viruses. Molecular markers predictive of adaptation to humans are not currently present in 2009 A(H1N1) viruses, suggesting that previously unrecognized molecular determinants could be responsible for the transmission among humans. Antigenically the viruses are homogeneous and similar to North American swine A(H1N1) viruses but distinct from seasonal human A(H1N1).

Isolated case of bioterrorism-related inhalational anthrax, New York City, 2001.

On October 31, 2001, in New York City, a 61-year-old female hospital employee who had acquired inhalational anthrax died after a 6-day illness. To determine sources of exposure and identify additional persons at risk, the New York City Department of Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and law enforcement authorities conducted an extensive investigation, which included interviewing contacts, examining personal effects, summarizing patient's use of mass transit, conducting active case finding and surveillance near her residence and at her workplace, and collecting samples from co-workers and the environment. We cultured all specimens for Bacillus anthracis. We found no additional cases of cutaneous or inhalational anthrax. The route of exposure remains unknown. All environmental samples were negative for B. anthracis. This first case of inhalational anthrax during the 2001 outbreak with no apparent direct link to contaminated mail emphasizes the need for close coordination between public health and law enforcement agencies during bioterrorism-related investigations.

Laboratory response to anthrax bioterrorism, New York City, 2001.

In October 2001, the greater New York City Metropolitan Area was the scene of a bioterrorism attack. The scale of the public response to this attack was not foreseen and threatened to overwhelm the Bioterrorism Response Laboratory's (BTRL) ability to process and test environmental samples. In a joint effort with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the cooperation of the Department of Defense, a massive effort was launched to maintain and sustain the laboratory response and return test results in a timely fashion. This effort was largely successful. The development and expansion of the facility are described, as are the special needs of a BTRL. The establishment of a Laboratory Bioterrorism Command Center and protocols for sample intake, processing, reporting, security, testing, staffing, and and quality control are also described.