The mediating effect of institutional trust in the relationship between precarity and conspiracy beliefs: A conceptual replication of Adam-Troian et al. (2023).

The paper reports the results of registered conceptual replications of the indirect effect of institutional trust in the relationship between precarity and the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs (CB). The original study of Adam-Troian et al. (2023; British Journal of Social Psychology, 62(S1), 136-159) indicated that subjective appraisals of economic hardship are associated with lower trust in governments and institutions, which in turn is associated with stronger endorsement of CB. Our Studies 1 to 3 report a series of replications using Slovak panel data. Study 4 reports a replication of the mediation model using data from the European Social Survey Round 10 collected in 17 countries. To provide a quantitative synthesis of these and previous results, we conducted mini meta-analysis (N = 50,340). Although the strength of the observed relationships differed across the studies to some degree, the original patterns of relations remained robust, supporting the original model. The study corroborates the view that to curb the spread of CB, it is necessary to address structural issues, such as growing financial insecurity, socioeconomic inequalities, and the deficit of institutional trust. Finally, we discuss the role of cultural and political settings in conditioning the mechanisms through which precarity enhances the endorsement of CB.

You get us, so you like us: Feeling understood by an outgroup predicts more positive intergroup relations via perceived positive regard.

Intergroup felt understanding-the belief that outgroup members understand and accept ingroup perspectives-has been found to predict positive intergroup outcomes, but the mechanism through which it has its positive effects is unclear. Across eight studies, we tested the hypothesis that felt positive regard-the perception that outgroup members like and respect ingroup members-mediates the positive effects of felt understanding on outcomes like outgroup trust. Studies 1-6 (total N = 1,366) included cross-sectional and experimental designs and a range of intergroup settings such as Sunni-Shia relations in Lebanon, gender relations, and support for "Brexit" in the United Kingdom. Results of meta-analytic structural equation models across these studies provided evidence of the indirect effect of felt understanding via felt positive regard on outcomes including trust and positive relational emotions. Study 7 (N = 307) then tested the causal effect of felt positive regard through a direct manipulation. Findings confirmed that felt positive (vs. negative) regard did lead to more positive intergroup perceptions. Finally, Study 8 (N = 410) tested the indirect effect as a within-person change process using a year-long, two-wave study of the conflict in Chile between Indigenous Mapuche and Non-Indigenous Chileans: Change over time in felt understanding indirectly predicted change over time in trust via change in felt positive regard. We consider the theoretical implications of the findings for how intergroup relations may be improved and the possibilities presented by felt understanding for intervention development. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Of precarity and conspiracy: Introducing a socio-functional model of conspiracy beliefs.

Conspiracy Beliefs (CB) are a key vector of violent extremism, radicalism and unconventional political events. So far, social-psychological research has extensively documented how cognitive, emotional and intergroup factors can promote CB. Evidence also suggests that adherence to CB moves along social class lines: low-income and low-education are among the most robust predictors of CB. Yet, the potential role of precarity-the subjective experience of permanent insecurity stemming from objective material strain-in shaping CB remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose for the first time a socio-functional model of CB. We test the hypothesis that precarity could foster increased CB because it undermines trust in government and the broader political 'elites'. Data from the World Value Survey (n = 21,650; Study 1, electoral CB) and from representative samples from polls conducted in France (n = 1760, Study 2a, conspiracy mentality) and Italy (n = 2196, Study 2b, COVID-19 CB), corroborate a mediation model whereby precarity is directly and indirectly associated with lower trust in authorities and higher CB. In addition, these links are robust to adjustment on income, self-reported SES and education. Considering precarity allows for a truly social-psychological understanding of CB as the by-product of structural issues (e.g. growing inequalities). Results from our socio-functional model suggest that implementing solutions at the socio-economic level could prove efficient in fighting CB.

Obstacles to Birth Surname Retention Upon Marriage: How Do Hostile Sexism and System Justification Predict Support for Marital Surname Change Among Women?

Despite the ongoing shift in societal norms and gender-discriminatory practices toward more equality, many heterosexual women worldwide, including in many Western societies, choose to replace their birth surname with the family name of their spouse upon marriage. Previous research has demonstrated that the adherence to sexist ideologies (i.e., a system of discriminatory gender-based beliefs) among women is associated with their greater endorsement of practices and policies that maintain gender inequality. By integrating the ideas from the system justification theory and the ambivalent sexism theory, we proposed that the more women adhere to hostile and benevolent sexist beliefs, the more likely they would be to justify existing gender relations in society, which in turn, would positively predict their support for traditional, husband-centered marital surname change. We further argued that hostile (as compared to benevolent) sexism could act as a particularly strong direct predictor of the support for marital surname change among women. We tested these possibilities across three cross-sectional studies conducted among women in Turkey (Study 1, N=118, self-identified feminist women; Study 2, N=131, female students) and the United States (Study 3, N=140, female students). Results of Studies 1 and 3 revealed that higher adherence to hostile (but not benevolent) sexism was associated with higher support for marital surname change indirectly through higher gender-based system justification. In Study 2, the hypothesized full mediation was not observed. Consistent with our predictions, in all three studies, hostile (but not benevolent) sexism was found to be a direct positive predictor of the support for marital surname change among women. We discuss the role of dominant ideologies surrounding marriage and inegalitarian naming conventions in different cultures as obstacles to women's birth surname retention upon marriage.

Resistance in repressive contexts: A comprehensive test of psychological predictors.

Empirical research on the social psychological antecedents of collective action has been conducted almost exclusively in democratic societies, where activism is relatively safe. The present research examines the psychological predictors of collective action intentions in contexts where resistance is met with significant repression by the authorities. Combining recent advancements in the collective action literature, our model examines the unique predictive roles of emotion (anger and fear), political identity consolidation and participative efficacies, politicized identification, and moral obligation, over and above past participation. It further investigates how these variables are shaped by perceptions of risks attributable to repression. Four survey studies test this model among protesters in Russia (N = 305), Ukraine (N = 136), Hong Kong (N = 115), and Turkey (N = 296). Meta-analytic integration of the findings highlights that, unlike in most current accounts of collective action, protesters in these contexts are not primarily driven by political efficacy. Rather, their involvement is contingent upon beliefs in the ability of protest to build a movement (identity consolidation and participative efficacies) and motivated by outrage at state repression, identification with the social movement, and a sense of moral obligation to act on their behalf. Results also confirm that risks attributable to state repression spur rather than quell resistance by increasing outrage, politicized identification, identity consolidation and participative efficacies, and moral obligation. The implications of these findings for models of collective action and our understanding of the motives underlying engagement in repressive contexts are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

'We fight for a better future for our country': Understanding the Ukrainian Euromaidan movement as the emergence of a social competition strategy.

The current research seeks to develop an analysis of Ukraine's Euromaidan social movement in psychological terms. Building on the classic understanding of social competition strategies, we argue that Euromaidan protests can be conceived as an attempt of pro-European Union (EU) Ukrainians to realign the boundaries of the Ukrainian national identity by defeating the alternative pro-Russia integration project championed by the government. In particular, building on the encapsulated model of social identity in collective action, we suggest that Euromaidan is an emergent opinion-based group identity, formed in response to injustice through two self-categorical processes - group-level self-investment into the shared entity (i.e., Ukrainian national category) and disidentification from the alternative Russia-led Customs Union. Using a sample of 3,096 participants surveyed during the protests, we tested our hypotheses with structural equation modelling, where the model accounting for the direct and indirect paths of the self-categorical processes was expected to explain collective action intentions to a great extent than models applying the social identity and encapsulation models of collective action. We found evidence consistent with the proposal that Euromaidan was a pro-EU opinion-based group, formed in response to the government's decision to suspend the EU-Ukraine agreement and around individuals' general perception of unfair government authorities.

'The More We Stand For - The More We Fight For': Compatibility and Legitimacy in the Effects of Multiple Social Identities.

This paper explores the expression of multiple social identities through coordinated collective action. We propose that perceived compatibility between potentially contrasting identities and perceived legitimacy of protest serve as catalysts for collective action. The present paper maps the context of the "Euromaidan" anti-regime protests in Ukraine and reports data (N = 996) collected through an online survey following legislation to ban protests (March-May, 2014). We measured participants' identification with three different groups (the Ukrainian nation, the online protest community, and the street movement), perception of compatibility between online protest and the street movement, perception of the legitimacy of protest, and intentions to take persuasive and confrontational collective action. We found evidence that the more social groups people "stood for," the more they "fought" for their cause and that identifications predicted both forms of collective action to the degree that people saw the protest and the online movement as compatible with each other and believed protest to be legitimate. Collective action can be interpreted as the congruent expression of multiple identities that are rendered ideologically compatible both in online settings and on the street.