Variability in the analysis of a single neuroimaging dataset by many teams.

Data analysis workflows in many scientific domains have become increasingly complex and flexible. Here we assess the effect of this flexibility on the results of functional magnetic resonance imaging by asking 70 independent teams to analyse the same dataset, testing the same 9 ex-ante hypotheses1. The flexibility of analytical approaches is exemplified by the fact that no two teams chose identical workflows to analyse the data. This flexibility resulted in sizeable variation in the results of hypothesis tests, even for teams whose statistical maps were highly correlated at intermediate stages of the analysis pipeline. Variation in reported results was related to several aspects of analysis methodology. Notably, a meta-analytical approach that aggregated information across teams yielded a significant consensus in activated regions. Furthermore, prediction markets of researchers in the field revealed an overestimation of the likelihood of significant findings, even by researchers with direct knowledge of the dataset2-5. Our findings show that analytical flexibility can have substantial effects on scientific conclusions, and identify factors that may be related to variability in the analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging. The results emphasize the importance of validating and sharing complex analysis workflows, and demonstrate the need for performing and reporting multiple analyses of the same data. Potential approaches that could be used to mitigate issues related to analytical variability are discussed.

Encoding and inhibition of arbitrary episodic context with abstract concepts.

Context is critical for conceptual processing, but the mechanism underpinning its encoding and reinstantiation during abstract concept processing is unclear. Context may be especially important for abstract concepts-we investigated whether episodic context is recruited differently when processing abstract compared with concrete concepts. Experiments 1 and 2 presented abstract and concrete words in arbitrary contexts at encoding (Experiment 1: red/green colored frames; Experiment 2: male/female voices). Recognition memory for these contexts was worse for abstract concepts. Again using frame color and voice as arbitrary contexts, respectively, Experiments 3 and 4 presented words from encoding in the same or different context at test to determine whether there was a greater recognition memory benefit for abstract versus concrete concepts when the context was unchanged between encoding and test. Instead, abstract concepts were less likely to be remembered when context was retained. This suggests that at least some types of episodic context-when arbitrary-are attended less, and may even be inhibited, when processing abstract concepts. In Experiment 5, we utilized a context-spatial location-which (as we show) tends to be relevant during real-world processing of abstract concepts. We presented words in different locations, preserving or changing location at test. Location retention conferred a recognition memory advantage for abstract concepts. Thus, episodic context may be encoded with abstract concepts when context is relevant to real-world processing. The systematic contexts necessary for understanding abstract concepts may lead to arbitrary context inhibition, but greater attention to contexts that tend to be more relevant during real-world processing.

Psychology of cleansing through the prism of intersecting object histories.

We link cleansing effects to contemporary cognitive theories via an account of event representation (intersecting object histories) that provides an explicit, neurally plausible mechanism for encoding objects (e.g., the self) and their associations (with other entities) across time. It explains separation as resulting from weakening associations between the self in the present and the self in the past.

Making It Harder to "See" Meaning: The More You See Something, the More Its Conceptual Representation Is Susceptible to Visual Interference.

Does the perceptual system for looking at the world overlap with the conceptual system for thinking about it? We conducted two experiments (N = 403) to investigate this question. Experiment 1 showed that when people make simple semantic judgments on words, interference from a concurrent visual task scales in proportion to how much visual experience they have with the things the words refer to. Experiment 2 showed that when people make the same judgments on the very same words, interference from a concurrent manual task scales in proportion to how much manual (but critically, not visual) experience people have with those same things. These results suggest that the meanings of frequently visually experienced things are represented (in part) in the visual system used for actually seeing them, that this visually represented information is a functional part of conceptual knowledge, and that the extent of these visual representations is influenced by visual experience.

Situational systematicity: A role for schema in understanding the differences between abstract and concrete concepts.

concepts differ from concrete concepts in several ways. Here, we focus on what we refer to as situational systematicity: The objects and relations that constitute an abstract concept (e.g., justice) are more dispersed through space and time than are those that typically constitute a concrete concept (e.g., chair); a larger set of objects and relations constitute an abstract concept than a concrete one; and exactly which objects and relations constitute a concept is more context-dependent for abstract concepts. We thus refer to abstract concepts as having low situational systematicity. We contend that situational systematicity, rather than abstractness per se, is a critical determinant of the cognitive, behavioural, and neural phenomena associated with concepts. Further, viewing concepts as schema provides insight into (i) the situation-based dynamics of concept learning and representation and (ii) the functional significance of the brain regions and their interactions that comprise the schema control network.

Language as a mental travel guide.

Gilead et al.'s approach to human cognition places abstraction and prediction at the heart of "mental travel" under a "representational diversity" perspective that embraces foundational concepts in cognitive science. But, it gives insufficient credit to the possibility that the process of abstraction produces a gradient, and underestimates the importance of a highly influential domain in predictive cognition: language, and related, the emergence of experientially based structure through time.

Emergence of Covid-19 as a Novel Concept Shifts Existing Semantic Spaces.

Conceptual knowledge is dynamic, fluid, and flexible, changing as a function of contextual factors at multiple scales. The Covid-19 pandemic can be considered a large-scale, global context that has fundamentally altered most people's experiences with the world. It has also introduced a new concept, COVID (or COVID-19), into our collective knowledgebase. What are the implications of this introduction for how existing conceptual knowledge is structured? Our collective emotional and social experiences with the world have been profoundly impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic, and experience-based perspectives on concept representation suggest that emotional and social experiences are critical components of conceptual knowledge. Such changes in collective experience should, then, have downstream consequences on knowledge of emotion- and social-related concepts. Using a naturally occurring dataset derived from the social media platform Twitter, we show that semantic spaces for concepts related to our emotional experiences with Covid-19 (i.e., emotional concepts like FEAR)-but not for unrelated concepts (i.e., animals like CAT)-show quantifiable shifts as a function of the emergence of COVID-19 as a concept and its associated emotional and social experiences, shifts which persist 6 months after the onset of the pandemic. The findings support a dynamic view of conceptual knowledge wherein shared experiences affect conceptual structure.

Is time an embodied property of concepts?

A haircut usually lasts under an hour. But how long does it take to recognize that something is an instance of a haircut? And is this "time-to-perceive" a part of the representation of concepts like haircut? Across three experiments testing lexical decision, word recognition, and semantic decision, we show that the amount of time people say it takes to perceive a concept in the world (e.g., haircut, dandelion, or merit) predicts how long it takes for them to respond to a word referring to that thing, over and above the effects of other lexical-semantic variables (e.g., word frequency, concreteness) and other variables related to conceptual complexity (e.g., how confusable a concept is with other, similar concepts, or the diversity of the contexts in which a concept appears). These results suggest that our experience of how long it takes to recognize an instance of a concept can become a part of its representation, and that we simulate this information when reading words. Consequently, we suggest that time may be an embodied property of concepts.

A context-sensitive and non-linguistic approach to abstract concepts.

Despite the recent upsurge in research on abstract concepts, there remain puzzles at the foundation of their empirical study. These are most evident when we consider what is required to assess a person's abstract conceptual abilities without using language as a prompt or requiring it as a response-as in classic non-verbal categorization tasks, which are standardly considered tests of conceptual understanding. After distinguishing two divergent strands in the most common conception of what it is for a concept to be abstract, we argue that neither reliably captures the kind of abstraction required to successfully categorize in non-verbal tasks. We then present a new conception of concept abstractness-termed 'trial concreteness'-that is keyed to individual categorization trials. It has advantages in capturing the context-relativity of the degree of abstraction required for the application of a concept and fittingly correlates with participant success in recent experiments. This article is part of the theme issue 'Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences'.

Emergency department visits: we are not prepared.

Emergency department (ED) staff comments frequently about how patients are poorly prepared to answer important medical questions. To determine if the impression that patients were or were not prepared, a total of 309 patients were all asked a series of important medical questions and were graded as positive (or prepared) if they answered the question completely or negative (unprepared) if they partially answered, did not answer, or changed their answer during the ED stay. The patient population was older (mean age, 60 years) and was seen at 1 specialty hospital. Results indicated that many people were not prepared with information about their allergies, medications, medical and surgical histories, and some, even their physician's names. Patients were least prepared to know about an advance directive (79%) or to know their complete medical history (70%). Results indicated that most patients (99%) were not prepared to answer at least 1 or more important medical questions. The discussion considers why patients and others are not prepared for an ED visit and provides examples of ways to help people better prepare for such a visit.

Autism-spectrum traits in neurotypicals predict the embodiment of manipulation knowledge about object concepts: Evidence from eyetracking.

Sensorimotor-based theories of cognition predict that even subtle developmental motor differences, such as those characterizing autism spectrum disorder (ASD), impact how we represent the meaning of manipulable objects (e.g., faucet). Here, we test 85 neurotypical participants, who varied widely on the Adult Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ), a measure intended to capture variability in ASD characteristics in the general adult population (participant scores were all below the clinical threshold for autism). Participants completed a visual world eyetracking task designed to assess the activation of conceptual representations of manipulable objects. Participants heard words referring to manually manipulable objects (e.g., faucet) while we recorded their eye movements to arrays of four objects: the named object, a related object typically manipulated similarly (e.g., jar), and two unrelated objects. Consistent with prior work, we observed more looks to the related object than to the unrelated ones (i.e., a manipulation-relatedness effect). This effect likely reflects the overlapping conceptual representations of objects sharing manipulation characteristics (e.g., faucet and jar), due to embodied sensorimotor properties being part of their representations. Critically, we observed-among typically developed young adults-that as AQ scores increased, manipulation-relatedness effects decreased. In contrast, in a visual control condition, in which a target object was paired with related objects of a similar shape (e.g., snake and rope), relatedness effects increased with AQ scores. The results show that AQ scores can predict variation in how object-concept representations are activated for typically developed individuals. More speculatively, they are consistent with the hypothesis that in individuals with ASD, differences in object-concept representations emerge at least in part via differences in sensorimotor experience.

Building semantic memory from embodied and distributional language experience.

Humans seamlessly make sense of a rapidly changing environment, using a seemingly limitless knowledgebase to recognize and adapt to most situations we encounter. This knowledgebase is called semantic memory. Embodied cognition theories suggest that we represent this knowledge through simulation: understanding the meaning of coffee entails reinstantiating the neural states involved in touching, smelling, seeing, and drinking coffee. Distributional semantic theories suggest that we are sensitive to statistical regularities in natural language, and that a cognitive mechanism picks up on these regularities and transforms them into usable semantic representations reflecting the contextual usage of language. These appear to present contrasting views on semantic memory, but do they? Recent years have seen a push toward combining these approaches under a common framework. These hybrid approaches augment our understanding of semantic memory in important ways, but current versions remain unsatisfactory in part because they treat sensory-perceptual and distributional-linguistic data as interacting but distinct types of data that must be combined. We synthesize several approaches which, taken together, suggest that linguistic and embodied experience should instead be considered as inseparably entangled: just as sensory and perceptual systems are reactivated to understand meaning, so are experience-based representations endemic to linguistic processing; further, sensory-perceptual experience is susceptible to the same distributional principles as language experience. This conclusion produces a characterization of semantic memory that accounts for the interdependencies between linguistic and embodied data that arise across multiple timescales, giving rise to concept representations that reflect our shared and unique experiences. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Language Neuroscience > Cognition Linguistics > Language in Mind and Brain.

What Does a Horgous Look Like? Nonsense Words Elicit Meaningful Drawings.

To what extent do people attribute meanings to "nonsense" words? How general is such attribution of meaning? We used a set of words lacking conventional meanings to elicit drawings of made-up creatures. Separate groups of participants rated the nonsense words and the drawings on several semantic dimensions and selected what name best corresponded to each creature. Despite lacking conventional meanings, "nonsense" words elicited a high level of consistency in the produced drawings. Meaning attributions made to nonsense words corresponded with meaning attributions made by separate people to drawings that were inspired by the name. Naïve participants were able to recover the name that inspired the drawing with greater-than-chance accuracy. These results suggest that people make liberal and consistent use of non-arbitrary relationships between forms and meanings. OPEN RESEARCH BADGES: This article has been awarded Open Materials and Open Data badges. All materials and data are publicly accessible via the Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/8juyc/. Learn more about the Open Practices badges from the Center for Open Science: https://osf.io/tvyxz/wiki.

Compounding matters: Event-related potential evidence for early semantic access to compound words.

Reading words in a native language triggers a largely obligatory cognitive process that we accept as leading to comprehension of the word - we cannot suppress our understanding of word meaning. In this study, we investigated the early stages of this comprehension process by means of event-related potentials (ERPs) to identify when this processing of meaning - that is, semantic processing - first occurs. We report that, when processing visually presented compound words, semantic access at some level occurs as early as the P100 and persists through to the N400. Specifically, we focused on the P100 ERP component, and utilized the unique features of compound words (i.e. variation in the transparency of meaning) to investigate the speed with which we gain access to information about meaning (i.e. semantic access). Twenty-two participants performed a lexical decision task including 40 English compounds, which varied with respect to their constituent semantic transparency. Compounds ranged from full constituent semantic transparency (e.g. grapeseed) to partial transparency (e.g. grapefruit) to full opacity (e.g. hogwash). Regression analyses predicted ERP components from compound constituent transparency, adjusting for word frequency. Word frequency and transparency of both the first and second constituents each uniquely predicted P100 amplitude. Transparency of the second constituent, but not word frequency, predicted later component amplitudes, including that of the N400. The findings suggest that some level of semantic access occurs as early as the P100. Overall, these results support models which emphasize simultaneous processing of form and meaning as opposed to serial or hierarchical approaches.

Neck pain: common complaint, uncommon diagnosis--symptomatic clival chordoma.

Patients presenting with neck complaints, such as pain or stiffness, are not uncommon in the Emergency Department. Complaints of neck instability, however, are unusual. We report the case of a 30-year-old woman who presented with multiple neck complaints that included having a "wobbly" sensation of her neck on flexion, feeling as if it were unstable. Our patient indeed had atlanto-occipital instability secondary to a locally destructive tumor of the cranial base, known as a clival chordoma. Chordomas are rare and unique bony tumors that arise along the neural axis and are thought to originate from the nucleus pulposus. The tumors are slow growing; locally invasive; and cause a variety of neurologic, musculoskeletal, cranial, and neck complaints. We describe this unique case and its presentations in an attempt to increase the sensitivity of physicians in early detection of this rare and lethal tumor.