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1.
Health Promot Pract ; 20(3): 338-343, 2019 05.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-30773046

ABSTRACT

Emergence of a novel infectious disease, such as pandemic influenza, is the one global crisis most likely to affect the greatest number of people worldwide. Because of the potentially severe and contagious nature of influenza, a rapid multifaceted pandemic response, which includes nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) and effective strategies for communication with the public are essential for a timely response and mitigating the spread of disease. A web-based questionnaire was administered via email in July 2015 to 62 Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) directors across jurisdictions that receive funding through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention PHEP cooperative agreement. This report focuses on two modules: Public Information and Communication and Community Mitigation. Consistent and targeted communication are critical for the acceptability and success of NPIs. All 62 jurisdictions have developed or are in the process of developing a communications plan. Community-level NPIs such as home isolation, school closures, and respiratory etiquette play a critical role in mitigating the spread of disease. Effective, ongoing communication with the public is essential to ensuring wide spread compliance of NPI's, especially among non-English-speaking populations. Planning should also include reaching vulnerable populations and identifying the correct legal authorities for closing schools and canceling mass gatherings.


Subject(s)
Civil Defense/organization & administration , Communicable Disease Control/organization & administration , Influenza, Human/prevention & control , Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. , Communication , Humans , Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype , Pandemics , Public Health , Quarantine/statistics & numerical data , Surveys and Questionnaires , United States
2.
Am J Public Health ; 107(10): 1643-1645, 2017 10.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-28817330

ABSTRACT

OBJECTIVES: To assess the readiness to vaccinate critical infrastructure personnel (CIP) involved in managing public works, emergency services, transportation, or any other system or asset that would have an immediate debilitating impact on the community if not maintained. METHODS: We analyzed self-reported planning to vaccinate CIP during an influenza pandemic with data from 2 surveys: (1) the Program Annual Progress Assessment of immunization programs and (2) the Pandemic Influenza Readiness Assessment of public health emergency preparedness programs. Both surveys were conducted in 2015. RESULTS: Twenty-six (43.3%) of 60 responding public health emergency preparedness programs reported having an operational plan to identify and vaccinate CIP, and 16 (26.2%) of 61 responding immunization programs reported knowing the number of CIP in their program's jurisdictions. CONCLUSIONS: Many programs may not be ready to identify and vaccinate CIP during an influenza pandemic. Additional efforts are needed to ensure operational readiness to vaccinate CIP during the next influenza pandemic.


Subject(s)
Attitude of Health Personnel , Influenza Vaccines/administration & dosage , Influenza, Human/epidemiology , Influenza, Human/prevention & control , Pandemics/prevention & control , Disaster Planning , Humans , United States
3.
Am J Public Health ; 107(S2): S177-S179, 2017 09.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-28892450

ABSTRACT

OBJECTIVES: To assess how US Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) awardees plan to respond to an influenza pandemic with vaccination. METHODS: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention developed the Pandemic Influenza Readiness Assessment, an online survey sent to PHEP directors, to analyze, in part, the readiness of PHEP awardees to vaccinate 80% of the populations of their jurisdictions with 2 doses of pandemic influenza vaccine, separated by 21 days, within 16 weeks of vaccine availability. RESULTS: Thirty-eight of 60 (63.3%) awardees reported being able to vaccinate their populations within 16 weeks; 38 (63.3%) planned to allocate more than 20% of their pandemic vaccine supply to points of dispensing (PODs). Thirty-four of 58 (58.6%) reported staffing as a challenge to vaccinating 80% of their populations; 28 of 60 (46.7%) reported preparedness workforce decreases, and 22 (36.7%) reported immunization workforce decreases between January 2012 and July 2015. CONCLUSIONS: Awardees relied on PODs to vaccinate segments of their jurisdictions despite workforce decreases. Planners must ensure readiness for POD sites to vaccinate, but should also leverage complementary sites and providers to augment public health response.


Subject(s)
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S./organization & administration , Civil Defense/organization & administration , Disaster Planning/organization & administration , Emergency Medical Services/organization & administration , Influenza, Human/prevention & control , Mass Vaccination/organization & administration , Pandemics/prevention & control , Humans , Surveys and Questionnaires , United States
4.
Health Promot Pract ; 18(3): 327-331, 2017 05.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-28125904

ABSTRACT

Mentoring is commonly used to facilitate professional growth and workforce development in a variety of settings. Organizations can use mentoring to help achieve broader personnel goals including leadership development and succession planning. While mentorship can be incorporated into training programs in public health, there are other examples of structured mentoring, with time commitments ranging from minutes to months or longer. Based on a review of the literature in public health and aggregated personal subject matter expertise of existing programs at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, we summarize selected mentoring models that vary primarily by time commitments and meeting frequency and identify specific work situations to which they may be applicable, primarily from the federal job experience point of view. We also suggest specific tasks that mentor-mentee pairs can undertake, including review of writing samples, practice interviews, and development of the mentee's social media presence. The mentor-mentee relationship should be viewed as a reciprocally beneficial one that can be a source of learning and personal growth for individuals at all levels of professional achievement and across the span of their careers.


Subject(s)
Mentoring/organization & administration , Public Health/education , Staff Development/organization & administration , Humans , Interpersonal Relations , Professional Role , RNA, Catalytic , Time Factors
5.
Health Promot Pract ; 16(6): 792-5, 2015 Nov.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-26386256

ABSTRACT

The first Ebola cases in West Africa were reported by the Guinea Ministry of Health on March 23, 2014, and by June it became the largest recorded Ebola outbreak. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention field teams were deployed to West Africa, including in-country logistics staff who were critical for ensuring the movement of staff, equipment, and supplies to locations where public health knowledge and experience were applied to meet mission-related requirements. The logistics role was critical to creating the support for epidemiologists, medical doctors, laboratory staff, and health communicators involved in health promotion activities to successfully respond to the epidemic, both in the capital cities and in remote villages. Logistics personnel worked to procure equipment, such as portable video projectors, and have health promotion materials printed. Logistics staff also coordinated delivery of communication and health promotion materials to the embassy and provided assistance with distribution to various partners.


Subject(s)
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S./organization & administration , Disaster Planning/organization & administration , Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola/epidemiology , Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola/therapy , Public Health Administration , Communication , Epidemics , Guinea , Health Promotion/organization & administration , Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola/prevention & control , Humans , International Cooperation , Liberia , Sierra Leone , United States
7.
Health Secur ; 16(4): 239-243, 2018.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-30096246

ABSTRACT

Laboratory and epidemiologic data are vital to identify a novel influenza A virus and inform the public health response, whether it be to a localized outbreak or pandemic. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) developed the Pandemic Influenza Readiness Assessment (PIRA) to evaluate the state of the nation's preparedness for the next influenza pandemic. Representatives from all 62 Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) awardee jurisdictions were requested to complete the web-based questionnaire in July 2015. The PIRA consists of 7 modules covering key components of pandemic preparedness; this article summarizes results from the laboratory and epidemiology modules. Many of the jurisdictions reported they had the capacity to fulfill most of the laboratory and epidemiology tasks, including the ability to differentiate novel influenza A viruses from seasonal influenza viruses and electronically transfer laboratory, surveillance, and case investigation data. Pandemic preparedness includes transfer of electronic death records and conducting surveillance for influenza-associated mortality in adults. Although most jurisdictions self-reported that they had the epidemiologic and laboratory capabilities that were assessed, additional planning and technical assistance are needed to ensure all states and territories have and maintain all critical capacities. The results from this PIRA can inform how CDC and federal partners focus future training and outreach.


Subject(s)
Influenza, Human/prevention & control , Laboratories/standards , Pandemics/prevention & control , Civil Defense/organization & administration , Civil Defense/standards , Death Certificates , Electronic Health Records , Epidemiological Monitoring , Humans , Influenza A virus/isolation & purification , Influenza, Human/mortality , Surveys and Questionnaires , United States
8.
J Health Care Poor Underserved ; 27(4): 1632-1637, 2016.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-27818427

ABSTRACT

The public health emergency of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus resulted in supplemental funding provided by Congress to the 62 states and territories. The CDC's response included deployment of personnel to the U.S. Pacific territories, who provided technical assistance on laboratory capacity, information technology, surveillance, planning, and continuity of operations.


Subject(s)
Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype , Influenza, Human , Public Health , Capacity Building , Humans , Micronesia , United States
9.
Biosecur Bioterror ; 7(1): 55-60, 2009 Mar.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-19379104

ABSTRACT

The Early Warning Infectious Disease Surveillance program (EWIDS) is part of the Cooperative Agreement on Public Health Preparedness and Response for Bioterrorism administered by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The purpose of EWIDS is to develop and implement a program to collaborate with states or provinces across international borders, to provide rapid and effective laboratory confirmation, and to expand surveillance capabilities. Prior to September 11, 2001, funds were not allocated to states for improving cross-border epidemiologic and laboratory surveillance activities that would increase cross-border preparedness. States were required through the Cooperative Agreement to self-report data twice a year in progress reports to the Division of State and Local Readiness Management Information System (MIS). An analysis of self-reported activities was conducted to determine the activities that states most frequently chose to implement based on existing public health infrastructure along the U.S. borders, since analysis of preparedness activities on the border has not previously been conducted. This article discusses how states chose to address expanding infrastructure capacity with the EWIDS supplemental funding, the challenges that have prevented U.S. border states from addressing all suggested activities, and the importance of sustained funding for the investment of continued capacity building and collaboration with international partners.


Subject(s)
Communicable Diseases/epidemiology , Disease Outbreaks , Population Surveillance/methods , Disaster Planning , Humans , Information Systems , United States/epidemiology
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