Anti-establishment sentiments: realistic and symbolic threat appraisals predict populist attitudes and conspiracy mentality.

Previous research has found that populist attitudes and conspiracy mentality - here summarised as anti-establishment attitudes - increase when people feel threatened. Two types of intergroup threat have been distinguished, namely realistic threats (pertaining to socio-economic resources, climate, or health), and symbolic threats (pertaining to cultural values). However, there is no agreement on which types of threat and corresponding appraisals would be most important in predicting anti-establishment attitudes. We hypothesise that it is the threat itself, irrespective of its cause, that predicts anti-establishment attitudes. In the current paper, we conducted new (multilevel) regression analyses on previously collected data from four high-powered studies with multiple time points (Study 1) or collected in multiple nations (Studies 2-4). All studies included a populist attitudes scale, a conspiracy mentality scale, and different types of threat and emotion measures, reflecting both realistic and symbolic threats. Across studies, both realistic and symbolic threats positively predicted anti-establishment attitudes. The results support an emotional appraisal approach to anti-establishment attitudes, which highlights the importance of anxiety and feeling threatened regardless of what type of event elicits the threat.

Existential threat and responses to emotional displays of ingroup and outgroup members.

The present research investigates how emotional displays shape reactions to ingroup and outgroup members when people are reminded of death. We hypothesized that under mortality salience, emotions that signal social distance promote worldview defense (i.e., increased ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation), whereas emotions that signal affiliation promote affiliation need (i.e., reduced ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation). In three studies, participants viewed emotional displays of ingroup and/or outgroup members after a mortality salience or control manipulation. Results revealed that under mortality salience, anger increased ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation (Study 1), enhanced perceived overlap with the ingroup (Study 3), and increased positive facial behavior to ingroup displays-measured via the Facial Action Coding System (Studies 1 and 2) and electromyography of the zygomaticus major muscle (Study 3). In contrast, happiness decreased ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation (Study 2), and increased positive facial behavior towards outgroup members (Study 3). The findings suggest that, in times of threat, emotional displays can determine whether people move away from unfamiliar others or try to form as many friendly relations as possible.

Emotional mimicry as social regulator: theoretical considerations.

The goal of this article is to discuss theoretical arguments concerning the idea that emotional mimicry is an intrinsic part of our social being and thus can be considered a social act. For this, we will first present the theoretical assumptions underlying the Emotional Mimicry as Social Regulator view. We then provide a brief overview of recent developments in emotional mimicry research and specifically discuss new developments regarding the role of emotional mimicry in actual interactions and relationships, and individual differences in emotional mimicry. We conclude with open questions for future research.

Personal Nonverbal Repertoires in facial displays and their relation to individual differences in social and emotional styles.

ABSTRACTResearch on individual differences in the occurrence of relatively frequent facial displays is scarce. We examined whether (1) individuals' spontaneous facial expressions show a relatively frequent pattern of AUs (referred to as Personal Nonverbal Repertoires or PNRs), and (2) whether these patterns are associated with self-reported social and emotional styles. We videotaped 110 individuals during 10 minutes in 2 different contexts and manually FACS coded 18 AUs. Subsequently, participants completed questionnaires regarding individual differences in social and emotional styles: BIS/BAS, interpersonal orientation, conflict handling style, and emotion regulation (reliably reduced to 4 factors: Yielding, Forcing, Compromising and Extraversion). We found five patterns of PNRs: Smiling (AU6,12), Partial Blinking, Drooping (AU41, 63), Tensed (AU1 + 2, 4, 7, 23), and Eyes widening (AU5). Three PNRs showed weak to moderate correlations with individual differences in social and emotional styles (based on EFA): Smiling is associated with Compromising and Extraversion, Drooping with Yielding, and Partial Blinking is negatively correlated with Extraversion. These findings suggest that some of an individual's frequent facial action patterns are associated with specific styles in social and emotional interactions.

Two facets of affective empathy: concern and distress have opposite relationships to emotion recognition.

Theories on empathy have argued that feeling empathy for others is related to accurate recognition of their emotions. Previous research that tested this assumption, however, has reported inconsistent findings. We suggest that this inconsistency may be due to a lack of consideration of the fact that empathy has two facets: empathic concern, namely the compassion for unfortunate others, and personal distress, the experience of discomfort in response to others' distress. We test the hypothesis that empathic concern is positively related to emotion recognition, whereas personal distress is negatively related to emotion recognition. Individual tendencies to respond with concern or distress were measured with the standard IRI (Interpersonal Reactivity Index) self-report questionnaire. Emotion recognition performance was assessed with three standard tests of nonverbal emotion recognition. Across two studies (total N = 431) anddifferent emotion recognition tests, we found that these two facets of affective empathy have opposite relations to recognition of facial expressions of emotions: empathic concern was positively related, while personal distress was negatively related, to accurate emotion recognition. These findings fit with existing motivational models of empathy, suggesting that empathic concern and personal distress have opposing impacts on the likelihood that empathy makes one a better emotion observer.

Knowing me, knowing you: emotion differentiation in oneself is associated with recognition of others' emotions.

Previous research has found that individuals vary greatly in emotion differentiation, that is, the extent to which they distinguish between different emotions when reporting on their own feelings. Building on previous work that has shown that emotion differentiation is associated with individual differences in intrapersonal functions, the current study asks whether emotion differentiation is also related to interpersonal skills. Specifically, we examined whether individuals who are high in emotion differentiation would be more accurate in recognising others' emotional expressions. We report two studies in which we used an established paradigm tapping negative emotion differentiation and several emotion recognition tasks. In Study 1 (N = 363), we found that individuals high in emotion differentiation were more accurate in recognising others' emotional facial expressions. Study 2 (N = 217), replicated this finding using emotion recognition tasks with varying amounts of emotional information. These findings suggest that the knowledge we use to understand our own emotional experience also helps us understand the emotions of others.

Emotion differentiation dissected: between-category, within-category, and integral emotion differentiation, and their relation to well-being.

Emotion differentiation, the ability to describe and label our own emotions in a differentiated and specific manner, has been repeatedly associated with well-being. However, it is unclear exactly what type of differentiation is most strongly related to well-being: the ability to make fine-grained distinctions between emotions that are relatively closely related (e.g. anger and irritation), the ability to make larger distinctions between very distinct emotions (e.g. anger and sadness), or the combination of both. To determine which type of differentiation is most predictive of well-being, we performed a comprehensive meta-analysis across six datasets. We examined the correlations between these three types of differentiation and several indicators of well-being (depression, emotional clarity, and self-esteem). Results showed that individuals differentiated most between very distinct emotions and least between more related emotions, and that an index computed across emotions from both the same and different emotion categories was most strongly associated with well-being indicators.

Stop crying! The impact of situational demands on interpersonal emotion regulation.

Crying is a common response to emotional distress that elicits support from the environment. People may regulate another's crying in several ways, such as by providing socio-affective support (e.g. comforting) or cognitive support (e.g. reappraisal), or by trying to emotionally disengage the other by suppression or distraction. We examined whether people adapt their interpersonal emotion regulation strategies to the situational context, by manipulating the regulatory demand of the situation in which someone is crying. Participants watched a video of a crying man and provided support by recording a video message. We hypothesised that when immediate down-regulation was required (i.e. high regulatory demand), participants would provide lower levels of socio-affective and cognitive support, and instead distract the crying person or encourage them to suppress their emotions, compared to when there is no such urgency (i.e. low regulatory demand). As predicted, both self-reported and behavioural responses indicated that high (as compared to low) regulatory demand led to a reduction in socio-affective support provision, and a strong increase in suppression and distraction. Cognitive support provision, however, was unaffected by regulatory demand. When the context required more immediate down-regulation, participants thus employed more regulation strategies aimed at disengaging from the emotional experience. This study provides a first step in showing that people take the context into account when attempting to regulate others' emotions.

I hear you (not): sharers' expressions and listeners' inferences of the need for support in response to negative emotions.

When in emotional distress, people often turn to others for support. Paradoxically, even when people perceive social support to be beneficial, it often does not result in emotional recovery. This paradox may be explained by the fact that the sharing process disproportionately centres on support that is not helpful in the long run. A distinction has been made between two types of support that are differentially effective: Whereas socio-affective support alleviates momentary emotional distress, cognitive support fosters long-term recovery. But can listeners tell what support the sharer needs? The present study examines the hypothesis that sharers communicate their support goals by sharing in such a way that it allows listeners to infer the sharer's needs. In Experiment 1, we manipulated participants' support goals, and showed that socio-affective support goals led participants to express more emotions, whereas cognitive support goals resulted in greater use of appraisals. In Experiments 2 and 3, we tested whether these differential expressions would affect the support goals that listeners inferred. We found no evidence for such an effect: Listeners consistently perceived the sharer to predominantly want socio-affective support. These findings help explain why many social sharing instances revolve around socio-affective support, leading to subjectively experienced benefits, but not to genuine recovery.

Can perceivers recognise emotions from spontaneous expressions?

Posed stimuli dominate the study of nonverbal communication of emotion, but concerns have been raised that the use of posed stimuli may inflate recognition accuracy relative to spontaneous expressions. Here, we compare recognition of emotions from spontaneous expressions with that of matched posed stimuli. Participants made forced-choice judgments about the expressed emotion and whether the expression was spontaneous, and rated expressions on intensity (Experiments 1 and 2) and prototypicality (Experiment 2). Listeners were able to accurately infer emotions from both posed and spontaneous expressions, from auditory, visual, and audiovisual cues. Furthermore, perceived intensity and prototypicality were found to play a role in the accurate recognition of emotion, particularly from spontaneous expressions. Our findings demonstrate that perceivers can reliably recognise emotions from spontaneous expressions, and that depending on the comparison set, recognition levels can even be equivalent to that of posed stimulus sets.

Recognition of facial expressions is moderated by Islamic cues.

Recognising emotions from faces that are partly covered is more difficult than from fully visible faces. The focus of the present study is on the role of an Islamic versus non-Islamic context, i.e. Islamic versus non-Islamic headdress in perceiving emotions. We report an experiment that investigates whether briefly presented (40 ms) facial expressions of anger, fear, happiness and sadness are perceived differently when covered by a niqab or turban, compared to a cap and shawl. In addition, we examined whether oxytocin, a neuropeptide regulating affection, bonding and cooperation between ingroup members and fostering outgroup vigilance and derogation, would differentially impact on emotion recognition from wearers of Islamic versus non-Islamic headdresses. The results first of all show that the recognition of happiness was more accurate when the face was covered by a Western compared to Islamic headdress. Second, participants more often incorrectly assigned sadness to a face covered by an Islamic headdress compared to a cap and shawl. Third, when correctly recognising sadness, they did so faster when the face was covered by an Islamic compared to Western headdress. Fourth, oxytocin did not modulate any of these effects. Implications for theorising about the role of group membership on emotion perception are discussed.

Sense or sensibility? Social sharers' evaluations of socio-affective vs. cognitive support in response to negative emotions.

When in emotional distress, people often turn to others for social support. A general distinction has been made between two types of support that are differentially effective: Whereas socio-affective support temporarily alleviates emotional distress, cognitive support may contribute to better long-term recovery. In the current studies, we examine what type of support individuals seek. We first confirmed in a pilot study that these two types of support can be reliably distinguished. Then, in Study 1, we experimentally tested participants' support evaluations in response to different emotional situations using a vignette methodology. Findings showed that individuals perceived any type of reaction that included socio-affective support as preferable. The evaluation of cognitive support, however, was dependent on the specific emotion: Unlike worry and regret, anger and sadness were characterised by a strong dislike for purely cognitive support. Using different materials, Study 2 replicated these findings. Taken together, the findings suggest that individuals evaluate different types of support in a way that is unlikely to benefit emotional recovery in the long run.

Contempt, like any other social affect, can be an emotion as well as a sentiment.

Gervais & Fessler assert that contempt is (a) not an emotion (or an attitude) but (b) a sentiment. Here, we challenge the validity and empirical basis of these two assertions, arguing that contempt, like many other emotions, can be both an emotion and a sentiment.

Emotional collectives: How groups shape emotions and emotions shape groups.

Group settings are epicentres of emotional activity. Yet, the role of emotions in groups is poorly understood. How do group-level phenomena shape group members' emotional experience and expression? How are emotional expressions recognised, interpreted and shared in group settings? And how do such expressions influence the emotions, cognitions and behaviours of fellow group members and outside observers? To answer these and other questions, we draw on relevant theoretical perspectives (e.g., intergroup emotions theory, social appraisal theory and emotions as social information theory) and recent empirical findings regarding the role of emotions in groups. We organise our review according to two overarching themes: how groups shape emotions and how emotions shape groups. We show how novel empirical approaches break important new ground in uncovering the role of emotions in groups. Research on emotional collectives is thriving and constitutes a key to understanding the social nature of emotions.

Withdraw or affiliate? The role of humiliation during initiation rituals.

Initiation rituals can take different forms and empirical evidence is inconsistent as to whether these rituals promote affiliation among novices. We argue that experienced humiliation during initiations leads to less affiliation among novices, in particular when one is initiated as sole group member rather than as part of the group. We examined this hypothesis in three studies, using different paradigms. In Study 1 (N = 123), perceived severity of an initiation in the past was associated with lower affiliation with other novices; this relationship was mediated by experienced humiliation. Study 2 (N = 64) showed that public derogation in the lab led to more humiliation when participants were the only victim than when they were derogated as a group. Study 3 (N = 248), a vignette study, showed that a similar effect of social context was mediated by expected support from other novices. We conclude that severe initiations may, due to experienced humiliation, result in less rather than more affiliation with fellow novices.

Social anxiety is associated with personal distress and disrupted recognition of negative emotions.

Past research investigating the relation between social anxiety (SA), empathy and emotion recognition is marked by conceptual and methodological issues. In the present study, we aim to overcome these limitations by examining whether individuals with high (n = 40) vs. low (n = 43) social anxiety differed across these two facets of empathy and whether this could be related to their recognition of emotions. We employed a naturalistic emotion recognition paradigm in which participants watched short videos of individuals (targets) sharing authentic emotional experiences. After each video, we measured self-reported empathic concern and distress, as well as their ability to recognize the emotions expressed by the targets in the videos. Our results show that individuals with high social anxiety recognized the targets' emotions less accurately. Furthermore, high socially anxious individuals reported more personal distress than low socially anxious individuals, whereas no significant difference was found for empathic concern. The findings suggest that reduced recognition of emotions among SA individuals can be better explained by the negative effects of social stress than by a general deficit in empathy.

The dynamics of interpersonal emotion regulation: How sharers elicit desired (but not necessarily helpful) support.

When in distress, people often seek help in regulating their emotions by sharing them with others. Paradoxically, although people perceive such social sharing as beneficial, it often fails to promote emotional recovery. This may be explained by people seeking-and eliciting-emotional support, which offers only momentary relief. We hypothesized that (1) the type of support sharers seek shapes corresponding support provided by listeners, (2) the intensity of sharers' emotions increases their desire for emotional support and decreases their desire for cognitive support, and (3) listeners' empathic accuracy promotes support provision that matches sharers' desires. In 8-min interactions, participants (N = 208; data collected in 2016-2017) were randomly assigned to the role of sharer (asked to discuss an upsetting situation) or listener (instructed to respond naturally). Next, participants watched their video-recorded interaction in 20-s fragments. Sharers rated their emotional intensity and support desires, and listeners rated the sharer's emotional intensity and their own support provision. First, we found that the desire for support predicted corresponding support provision. Second, the intensity of sharers' emotions was associated with an increased desire for emotional and cognitive support. Third, the more accurately listeners judged sharers' emotional intensity, the more they fulfilled sharers' emotional (but not cognitive) support desire. These findings suggest that people have partial control over the success of their social sharing in bringing about effective interpersonal emotion regulation. People elicit the support they desire at that moment, explaining why they perceive sharing as beneficial even though it may not engender emotional recovery. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Treatment Approaches for Altered Facial Expression: A Systematic Review in Facioscapulohumeral Muscular Dystrophy and Other Neurological Diseases.

Background: Facial weakness is a key feature of facioscapulohumeral muscular dystrophy (FSHD) and may lead to altered facial expression and subsequent psychosocial impairment. There is no cure and supportive treatments focus on optimizing physical fitness and compensation of functional disabilities. Objective: We hypothesize that symptomatic treatment options and psychosocial interventions for other neurological diseases with altered facial expression could be applicable to FSHD. Therefore, the aim of this review is to collect symptomatic treatment approaches that target facial muscle function and psychosocial interventions in various neurological diseases with altered facial expression in order to discuss the applicability to FSHD. Methods: A systematic search was performed. Selected studies had to include FSHD, Bell's palsy, Moebius syndrome, myotonic dystrophy type 1, or Parkinson's disease and treatment options which target altered facial expression. Data was extracted for study and patients' characteristics, outcome assessment tools, treatment, outcome of facial expression and or psychosocial functioning. Results: Forty studies met the inclusion criteria, of which only three studies included FSHD patients exclusively. Most, twenty-one, studies were performed in patients with Bell's palsy. Studies included twelve different therapy categories and results were assessed with different outcomes measures. Conclusions: Five therapy categories were considered applicable to FSHD: training of (non-verbal) communication compensation strategies, speech training, physical therapy, conference attendance, and smile restoration surgery. Further research is needed to establish the effect of these therapies in FSHD. We recommend to include outcome measures in these studies that cover at least cosmetic, functional, communication, and quality of life domains.

Emotional mimicry as social regulation.

Emotional mimicry is the imitation of the emotional expressions of others. According to the classic view on emotional mimicry (the Matched Motor Hypothesis), people mimic the specific facial movements that comprise a discrete emotional expression. However, little evidence exists for the mimicry of discrete emotions; rather, the extant evidence supports only valence-based mimicry. We propose an alternative Emotion Mimicry in Context view according to which emotional mimicry is not based on mere perception but rather on the interpretation of signals as emotional intentions in a specific context. We present evidence for the idea that people mimic contextualized emotions rather than simply expressive muscle movements. Our model postulates that (implicit or explicit) contextual information is needed for emotional mimicry to take place. It takes into account the relationship between observer and expresser, and suggests that emotional mimicry depends on this relationship and functions as a social regulator.

Social identity salience shapes group-based emotions through group-based appraisals.

Group-based emotions have been conceptualised as being rooted in perceivers' social identity. Consistent with this idea, previous research has shown that social identity salience affects group-based emotions, but no research to date has directly examined the role of group-based appraisals in comparison with individual appraisals. In the present studies, we measured group-based appraisals through a thought-listing procedure. In Experiment 1, we explicitly reminded people of their group identity, which led to the predicted change in group-based anger. This effect was mediated by group-based appraisals. In Experiment 2, participants either discussed a group-relevant scenario in small groups or a related topic irrelevant to the group. The group-relevant condition not only led to stronger indignation but the perceived presence of group-based appraisals was also related to participants' reports of indignation. These results provide further evidence for the importance of group-based appraisals as components of group-based emotions.