Reducing Facial Stereotype Bias in Consequential Social Judgments: Intervention Success With White Male Faces.

Initial impressions of others based on facial appearances are often inaccurate yet can lead to dire outcomes. Across four studies, adult participants underwent a counterstereotype training to reduce their reliance on facial appearance in consequential social judgments of White male faces. In Studies 1 and 2, trustworthiness and sentencing judgments among control participants predicted whether real-world inmates were sentenced to death versus life in prison, but these relationships were diminished among trained participants. In Study 3, a sequential priming paradigm demonstrated that the training was able to abolish the relationship between even automatically and implicitly perceived trustworthiness and the inmates' life-or-death sentences. Study 4 extended these results to realistic decision-making, showing that training reduced the impact of facial trustworthiness on sentencing decisions even in the presence of decision-relevant information. Overall, our findings suggest that a counterstereotype intervention can mitigate the potentially harmful effects of relying on facial appearance in consequential social judgments.

Personality Across World Regions Predicts Variability in the Structure of Face Impressions.

Research on face impressions has often focused on a fixed, universal architecture, treating regional variability as noise. Here, we demonstrated a crucial yet neglected role of cultural learning processes in forming face impressions. In Study 1, we found that variability in the structure of adult perceivers' face impressions across 42 world regions (N = 287,178) could be explained by variability in the actual personality structure of people living in those regions. In Study 2, data from 232 world regions (N = 307,136) revealed that adult perceivers use the actual personality structure learned from their local environment to form lay beliefs about personality, and these beliefs in turn support the structure of perceivers' face impressions. Together, these results suggest that people form face impressions on the basis of a conceptual understanding of personality structure that they have come to learn from their regional environment. The findings suggest a need for greater attention to the regional and cultural specificity of face impressions.

The neural representation of facial-emotion categories reflects conceptual structure.

Humans reliably categorize configurations of facial actions into specific emotion categories, leading some to argue that this process is invariant between individuals and cultures. However, growing behavioral evidence suggests that factors such as emotion-concept knowledge may shape the way emotions are visually perceived, leading to variability-rather than universality-in facial-emotion perception. Understanding variability in emotion perception is only emerging, and the neural basis of any impact from the structure of emotion-concept knowledge remains unknown. In a neuroimaging study, we used a representational similarity analysis (RSA) approach to measure the correspondence between the conceptual, perceptual, and neural representational structures of the six emotion categories Anger, Disgust, Fear, Happiness, Sadness, and Surprise. We found that subjects exhibited individual differences in their conceptual structure of emotions, which predicted their own unique perceptual structure. When viewing faces, the representational structure of multivoxel patterns in the right fusiform gyrus was significantly predicted by a subject's unique conceptual structure, even when controlling for potential physical similarity in the faces themselves. Finally, cross-cultural differences in emotion perception were also observed, which could be explained by individual differences in conceptual structure. Our results suggest that the representational structure of emotion expressions in visual face-processing regions may be shaped by idiosyncratic conceptual understanding of emotion categories.

Accuracy in social judgment does not exclude the potential for bias.

Cesario claims that all bias research tells us is that people "end up using the information they have come to learn as being probabilistically accurate in their daily lives" (sect. 5, para. 4). We expose Cesario's flawed assumptions about the relationship between accuracy and bias. Through statistical simulations and empirical work, we show that even probabilistically accurate responses are regularly accompanied by bias.

Facial Impressions Are Predicted by the Structure of Group Stereotypes.

Impressions of other people's faces (e.g., trustworthiness) have long been thought to be evoked by morphological variation (e.g., upturned mouth) in a universal, fixed manner. However, recent research suggests that these impressions vary considerably across perceivers and targets' social-group memberships. Across 4,247 U.S. adults recruited online, we investigated whether racial and gender stereotypes may be a critical factor underlying this variability in facial impressions. In Study 1, we found that not only did facial impressions vary by targets' gender and race, but also the structure of these impressions was associated with the structure of stereotype knowledge. Study 2 extended these findings by demonstrating that individual differences in perceivers' own unique stereotype associations predicted the structure of their own facial impressions. Together, the findings suggest that the structure of people's impressions of others' faces is driven not only by the morphological variation of the face but also by learned stereotypes about social groups.

The conceptual structure of face impressions.

Humans seamlessly infer the expanse of personality traits from others' facial appearance. These facial impressions are highly intercorrelated within a structure known as "face trait space." Research has extensively documented the facial features that underlie face impressions, thus outlining a bottom-up fixed architecture of face impressions, which cannot account for important ways impressions vary across perceivers. Classic theory in impression formation emphasized that perceivers use their lay conceptual beliefs about how personality traits correlate to form initial trait impressions, for instance, where trustworthiness of a target may inform impressions of their intelligence to the extent one believes the two traits are related. This considered, we explore the possibility that this lay "conceptual trait space"-how perceivers believe personality traits correlate in others-plays a role in face impressions, tethering face impressions to one another, thus shaping face trait space. In study 1, we found that conceptual and face trait space explain considerable variance in each other. In study 2, we found that participants with stronger conceptual associations between two traits judged those traits more similarly in faces. Importantly, using a face image classification task, we found in study 3 that participants with stronger conceptual associations between two traits used more similar facial features to make those two face trait impressions. Together, these findings suggest lay beliefs of how personality traits correlate may underlie trait impressions, and thus face trait space. This implies face impressions are not only derived bottom up from facial features, but also shaped by our conceptual beliefs.

The dynamic process of ambiguous emotion perception.

Everyday social interactions hinge on our ability to resolve uncertainty in nonverbal cues. For example, although some facial expressions (e.g. happy, angry) convey a clear affective meaning, others (e.g. surprise) are ambiguous, in that their meaning is determined by the context. Here, we used mouse-tracking to examine the underlying process of resolving uncertainty. Previous work has suggested an initial negativity, in part via faster response times for negative than positive ratings of surprise. We examined valence categorizations of filtered images in order to compare faster (low spatial frequencies; LSF) versus more deliberate processing (high spatial frequencies; HSF). When participants categorised faces as "positive", they first exhibited a partial attraction toward the competing ("negative") response option, and this effect was exacerbated for HSF than LSF faces. Thus, the effect of response conflict due to an initial negativity bias was exaggerated for HSF faces, likely because these images allow for greater deliberation than the LSFs. These results are consistent with the notion that more positive categorizations are characterised by an initial attraction to a default, negative response.

Are mental illnesses stigmatized for the same reasons? Identifying the stigma-related beliefs underlying common mental illnesses.

BACKGROUND: Although mental health stigmatization has myriad pernicious consequences, it remains unknown whether mental disorders are stigmatized for the same reasons. AIMS: This study identified the stigma-related beliefs that were associated with several common mental illnesses (Study 1), and the extent to which those beliefs predicted stigmatization (Study 2). METHODS: In Study 1, we used multidimensional scaling to identify the stigma-related beliefs attributed to nine common mental disorders (e.g. depression, schizophrenia). Study 2 explored whether beliefs commonly associated with depression predicted its stigmatization. RESULTS: In Study 1, we found that the nine mental illnesses differed from each other on two dimensions: social desirability and controllability. In Study 2, we found that regardless of participants' own depression status, their perceptions that depression is controllable predicted depression-related stigmatization. CONCLUSIONS: Our results suggest that stigmatization toward different mental illnesses stem from combinations of different stigmatized beliefs.

A Neural Mechanism of Social Categorization.

Humans readily sort one another into multiple social categories from mere facial features. However, the facial features used to do so are not always clear-cut because they can be associated with opponent categories (e.g., feminine male face). Recently, computational models and behavioral studies have provided indirect evidence that categorizing such faces is accomplished through dynamic competition between parallel, coactivated social categories that resolve into a stable categorical percept. Using a novel paradigm combining fMRI with real-time hand tracking, the present study examined how the brain translates diverse social cues into categorical percepts. Participants (male and female) categorized faces varying in gender and racial typicality. When categorizing atypical faces, participants' hand movements were simultaneously attracted toward the unselected category response, indexing the degree to which such faces activated the opposite category in parallel. Multivoxel pattern analyses (MVPAs) provided evidence that such social category coactivation manifested in neural patterns of the right fusiform cortex. The extent to which the hand was simultaneously attracted to the opposite gender or race category response option corresponded to increased neural pattern similarity with the average pattern associated with that category, which in turn associated with stronger engagement of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. The findings point to a model of social categorization in which occasionally conflicting facial features are resolved through competition between coactivated ventral-temporal cortical representations with the assistance of conflict-monitoring regions. More broadly, the results offer a promising multimodal paradigm to investigate the neural basis of "hidden", temporarily active representations in the service of a broad range of cognitive processes.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Individuals readily sort one another into social categories (e.g., sex, race), which have important consequences for a variety of interpersonal behaviors. However, individuals routinely encounter faces that contain diverse features associated with multiple categories (e.g., feminine male face). Using a novel paradigm combining neuroimaging with hand tracking, the present research sought to address how the brain comes to arrive at stable social categorizations from multiple social cues. The results provide evidence that opponent social categories coactivate in face-processing regions, which compete and may resolve into an eventual stable categorization with the assistance of conflict-monitoring regions. Therefore, the findings provide a neural mechanism through which the brain may translate inherently diverse social cues into coherent categorizations of other people.

A Perceptual Pathway to Bias: Interracial Exposure Reduces Abrupt Shifts in Real-Time Race Perception That Predict Mixed-Race Bias.

In two national samples, we examined the influence of interracial exposure in one's local environment on the dynamic process underlying race perception and its evaluative consequences. Using a mouse-tracking paradigm, we found in Study 1 that White individuals with low interracial exposure exhibited a unique effect of abrupt, unstable White-Black category shifting during real-time perception of mixed-race faces, consistent with predictions from a neural-dynamic model of social categorization and computational simulations. In Study 2, this shifting effect was replicated and shown to predict a trust bias against mixed-race individuals and to mediate the effect of low interracial exposure on that trust bias. Taken together, the findings demonstrate that interracial exposure shapes the dynamics through which racial categories activate and resolve during real-time perceptions, and these initial perceptual dynamics, in turn, may help drive evaluative biases against mixed-race individuals. Thus, lower-level perceptual aspects of encounters with racial ambiguity may serve as a foundation for mixed-race prejudice.

The neural basis of contextual influences on face categorization.

From only brief exposure to a face, individuals spontaneously categorize another's race. Recent behavioral evidence suggests that visual context may affect such categorizations. We used fMRI to examine the neural basis of contextual influences on the race categorization of faces. Participants categorized the race of faces that varied along a White-Asian morph continuum and were surrounded by American, neutral, or Chinese scene contexts. As expected, the context systematically influenced categorization responses and their efficiency (response times). Neuroimaging results indicated that the retrosplenial cortex (RSC) and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) exhibited highly sensitive, graded responses to the compatibility of facial and contextual cues. These regions showed linearly increasing responses as a face became more White when in an American context, and linearly increasing responses as a face became more Asian when in a Chinese context. Further, RSC activity partially mediated the effect of this face-context compatibility on the efficiency of categorization responses. Together, the findings suggest a critical role of the RSC and OFC in driving contextual influences on face categorization, and highlight the impact of extraneous cues beyond the face in categorizing other people.

Perception, as you make it.

The main question that Firestone & Scholl (F&S) pose is whether "what and how we see is functionally independent from what and how we think, know, desire, act, and so forth" (sect. 2, para. 1). We synthesize a collection of concerns from an interdisciplinary set of coauthors regarding F&S's assumptions and appeals to intuition, resulting in their treatment of visual perception as context-free.

Amygdala responsivity to high-level social information from unseen faces.

Previous research shows that the amygdala automatically responds to a face's trustworthiness when a face is clearly visible. However, it is unclear whether the amygdala could evaluate such high-level facial information without a face being consciously perceived. Using a backward masking paradigm, we demonstrate in two functional neuroimaging experiments that the human amygdala is sensitive to subliminal variation in facial trustworthiness. Regions in the amygdala tracked how untrustworthy a face appeared (i.e., negative-linear responses) as well as the overall strength of a face's trustworthiness signal (i.e., nonlinear responses), despite faces not being subjectively seen. This tracking was robust across blocked and event-related designs and both real and computer-generated faces. The findings demonstrate that the amygdala can be influenced by even high-level facial information before that information is consciously perceived, suggesting that the amygdala's processing of social cues in the absence of awareness may be more extensive than previously described.

The neural basis of stereotypic impact on multiple social categorization.

Perceivers extract multiple social dimensions from another's face (e.g., race, emotion), and these dimensions can become linked due to stereotypes (e.g., Black individuals → angry). The current research examined the neural basis of detecting and resolving conflicts between top-down stereotypes and bottom-up visual information in person perception. Participants viewed faces congruent and incongruent with stereotypes, via variations in race and emotion, while neural activity was measured using fMRI. Hand movements en route to race/emotion responses were recorded using mouse-tracking to behaviorally index individual differences in stereotypical associations during categorization. The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) showed stronger activation to faces that violated stereotypical expectancies at the intersection of multiple social categories (i.e., race and emotion). These regions were highly sensitive to the degree of incongruency, exhibiting linearly increasing responses as race and emotion became stereotypically more incongruent. Further, the ACC exhibited greater functional connectivity with the lateral fusiform cortex, a region implicated in face processing, when viewing stereotypically incongruent (relative to congruent) targets. Finally, participants with stronger behavioral tendencies to link race and emotion stereotypically during categorization showed greater dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation to stereotypically incongruent targets. Together, the findings provide insight into how conflicting stereotypes at the nexus of multiple social dimensions are resolved at the neural level to accurately perceive other people.

Social connection modulates perceptions of animacy.

Human survival depends on identifying targets potentially capable of engaging in meaningful social connection. Using sets of morphed images created from animate (human) and inanimate (doll) faces, we found converging evidence across two studies showing that the motivation to connect with other people systematically alters the interpretation of the physical features that signal that a face is alive. Specifically, in their efforts to find and connect with other social agents, individuals who feel socially disconnected actually decrease their thresholds for what it means to be alive, consistently observing animacy when fewer definitively human cues are present. From an evolutionary perspective, overattributing animacy may be an adaptive strategy that allows people to cast a wide net when identifying possible sources of social connection and maximize their opportunities to renew social relationships.

Assessing bimodality to detect the presence of a dual cognitive process.

Researchers have long sought to distinguish between single-process and dual-process cognitive phenomena, using responses such as reaction times and, more recently, hand movements. Analysis of a response distribution's modality has been crucial in detecting the presence of dual processes, because they tend to introduce bimodal features. Rarely, however, have bimodality measures been systematically evaluated. We carried out tests of readily available bimodality measures that any researcher may easily employ: the bimodality coefficient (BC), Hartigan's dip statistic (HDS), and the difference in Akaike's information criterion between one-component and two-component distribution models (AIC(diff)). We simulated distributions containing two response populations and examined the influences of (1) the distances between populations, (2) proportions of responses, (3) the amount of positive skew present, and (4) sample size. Distance always had a stronger effect than did proportion, and the effects of proportion greatly differed across the measures. Skew biased the measures by increasing bimodality detection, in some cases leading to anomalous interactive effects. BC and HDS were generally convergent, but a number of important discrepancies were found. AIC(diff) was extremely sensitive to bimodality and identified nearly all distributions as bimodal. However, all measures served to detect the presence of bimodality in comparison to unimodal simulations. We provide a validation with experimental data, discuss methodological and theoretical implications, and make recommendations regarding the choice of analysis.

Mindfulness-based stress reduction triggers a long-term shift toward more positive appraisals of emotional ambiguity.

Reducing negative impacts of stress, for example through mindfulness training, benefits physical and psychological well-being and is becoming ever more crucial owing to large-scale societal uncertainties (e.g., COVID-19). Whereas extensive research has focused on mindfulness-related reductions in self-reported negativity, essentially no research has targeted task-based behavioral outcomes throughout long-term mindfulness trainings. Responses to emotionally ambiguous signals (e.g., surprised expressions), which might be appraised as either positive or negative, provide a nuanced assessment of one's emotional bias across diverse contexts, offering unique leverage for assessing the effects of mindfulness. Here, we compared the effects of short- and long-term training via Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction on ratings of faces with a relatively clear (angry, happy) and ambiguous (surprised) valence. Ratings became more positive for ambiguity from the start (Week 1) to end of training (Week 8; p < .001), but there were no short-term effects (from a single class session). This shift toward positivity continued through an additional 8-week follow-up (Week 16; p < .001). Notably, posttraining valence bias (Week 8) was uniquely predicted by the nonreactivity facet of mindfulness (p = .01). Together, mindfulness promotes a relatively long-lasting shift toward positivity bias, which is uniquely supported by reduced emotional reactivity. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Face value: amygdala response reflects the validity of first impressions.

The human amygdala responds to first impressions of people as judged from their faces, such as normative judgments about the trustworthiness of strangers. It is unknown, however, whether amygdala responses to first impressions can be validated by objective criteria. Here, we examined amygdala responses to faces of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) where real-world outcomes could be measured objectively by the amounts of profits made by each CEO's company. During fMRI scanning, participants made incidental judgments about the symmetry of each CEO's face. After scanning, participants rated each CEO's face on leadership ability. Parametric analyses showed that greater left amygdala response to the CEOs' faces was associated with higher post-scan ratings of the CEOs' leadership ability. In addition, greater left amygdala response was also associated with greater profits made by the CEOs' companies and this relationship was statistically mediated by external raters' perceptions of arousal. Thus, amygdala response reflected both subjective judgments and objective measures of leadership ability based on first impressions.

The neural basis of categorical face perception: graded representations of face gender in fusiform and orbitofrontal cortices.

Face gender, like many other things, is perceived categorically: Subjective perceptions are distorted toward the categories, male or female, and the objective gradiency inherent across faces is partially lost. The neural basis of such categorical face perception remains virtually unknown. Participants passively viewed faces whose sexually dimorphic content was morphed monotonically from male to female while neural activity was measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Subjective perceptions revealed strong nonlinearity despite monotonic linear changes in face gender, consistent with categorical perception. Neuroimaging results indicated that the lateral fusiform gyrus, bilaterally, and the fusiform face area linearly encoded graded parameters of objective face gender, but these regions correlated substantially less with subjective perceptions (which were nonlinear and affected by categorical perception effects). Such subjective perceptions, however, were represented in the orbitofrontal cortex, but this region correlated substantially less with objective parameters. The attention-independent graded representations of face gender in fusiform and orbitofrontal cortices reveal how objective face parameters are encoded and transformed into subjective categorically warped perceptions in the human brain.

Person knowledge shapes face identity perception.

Recognition of others' identity through facial features is essential in life. Using both correlational and experimental approaches, we examined how person knowledge biases the perception of others' facial identity. When a participant believed any two individuals were more similar in personality, their faces were perceived to be correspondingly more similar (assessed via mousetracking, Study 1). Further, participants' facial representations of target individuals that were believed to have a more similar personality were found to have a greater physical resemblance (assessed via reverse-correlation, Studies 2 and 3). Finally, when participants learned about novel individuals who had a more similar personality, their faces were visually represented more similarly (Study 4). Together, the findings show that the perception of facial identity is driven not only by facial features but also the person knowledge we have learned about others, biasing it toward alternate identities despite the fact that those identities lack any physical resemblance.