ABSTRACT
Israel has a long history of concern with chemical and biological threats, since several hostile states in the Middle East are likely to possess such weapons. The Twin-Tower terrorist attacks and Anthrax envelope scares of 2001 were a watershed for public perceptions of the threat of unconventional terror in general and of biological terror in particular. New advances in biotechnology will only increase the ability of terrorists to exploit the burgeoning availability of related information to develop ever-more destructive bioweapons. Many areas of modern biological research are unavoidably dual-use by nature. They thus have a great potential for both help and harm; and facilitating the former while preventing the latter remains a serious challenge to researchers and governments alike. This article addresses how Israel might best (1) prevent hostile elements from obtaining, from Israel's biological research system, materials, information and technologies that might facilitate their carrying out a biological attack, while (2) continuing to promote academic openness, excellence and other hallmarks of that system. This important and sensitive issue was assessed by a special national committee, and their recommendations are presented and discussed. One particularly innovative element is the restructuring and use of Israel's extensive biosafety system to also address biosecurity goals, with minimal disruption or delay.
Subject(s)
Biomedical Research/ethics , Biotechnology/ethics , Bioterrorism , Double Effect Principle , Health Planning Guidelines , Advisory Committees , Biomedical Research/organization & administration , Biotechnology/organization & administration , Bioterrorism/ethics , Bioterrorism/prevention & control , Civil Defense/ethics , Civil Defense/organization & administration , Government Regulation , Humans , Information Dissemination/ethics , Israel , Safety Management/ethics , Safety Management/organization & administration , Security Measures/ethics , Security Measures/organization & administration , Technology Assessment, Biomedical/ethics , Technology Assessment, Biomedical/organization & administrationABSTRACT
In Bacillus subtilis there is evidence that the replication origin of the DNA molecule is attached to the cytoplasmic membrane, and that this attachment is essential for the initiation of replication. We have previously shown that attachment of DNA to the membrane is cyclic and that DNA becomes attached to the cytoplasmic membrane at the beginning of replication and is subsequently released. We have also shown that membrane protein phosphorylation is associated with the initiation of DNA replication in B. subtilis. We now report that cantharidin, an inhibitor of eukaryotic serine/threonine protein phosphatases type 1 and 2A, stimulated membrane binding of DNA and caused premature initiation of DNA replication in B. subtilis cells. The membrane of B. subtilis cells had cell cycle dependent phosphatase activity against a standard substrate in vitro. Cloning of the B. subtilis protein PrpE and production of antibodies allowed us to identify the protein in the cytoplasmic membrane. Its presence was cell cycle dependent, and appeared to contribute to the observed phosphatase activity.