The epistemic integrity of scientific research.

We live in a world in which scientific expertise and its epistemic authority become more important. On the other hand, the financial interests in research, which could potentially corrupt science, are increasing. Due to these two tendencies, a concern for the integrity of scientific research becomes increasingly vital. This concern is, however, hollow if we do not have a clear account of research integrity. Therefore, it is important that we explicate this concept. Following Rudolf Carnap's characterization of the task of explication, this means that we should develop a concept that is (1) similar to our common sense notion of research integrity, (2) exact, (3) fruitful, and (4) as simple as possible. Since existing concepts do not meet these four requirements, we develop a new concept in this article. We describe a concept of epistemic integrity that is based on the property of deceptiveness, and argue that this concept does meet Carnap's four requirements of explication. To illustrate and support our claims we use several examples from scientific practice, mainly from biomedical research.

The epistemic integrity of NASA practices in the Space Shuttle Program.

This article presents an account of epistemic integrity and uses it to demonstrate that the epistemic integrity of different kinds of practices in NASA's Space Shuttle Program was limited. We focus on the following kinds of practices: (1) research by working engineers, (2) review by middle-level managers, and (3) communication with the public. We argue that the epistemic integrity of these practices was undermined by production pressure at NASA, i.e., the pressure to launch an unreasonable amount of flights per year. Finally, our findings are used to develop some potential strategies to protect epistemic integrity in aerospace science.