CDC Deployments to State, Tribal, Local, and Territorial Health Departments for COVID-19 Emergency Public Health Response - United States, January 21-July 25, 2020.

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is a viral respiratory illness caused by SARS-CoV-2. During January 21-July 25, 2020, in response to official requests for assistance with COVID-19 emergency public health response activities, CDC deployed 208 teams to assist 55 state, tribal, local, and territorial health departments. CDC deployment data were analyzed to summarize activities by deployed CDC teams in assisting state, tribal, local, and territorial health departments to identify and implement measures to contain SARS-CoV-2 transmission (1). Deployed teams assisted with the investigation of transmission in high-risk congregate settings, such as long-term care facilities (53 deployments; 26% of total), food processing facilities (24; 12%), correctional facilities (12; 6%), and settings that provide services to persons experiencing homelessness (10; 5%). Among the 208 deployed teams, 178 (85%) provided assistance to state health departments, 12 (6%) to tribal health departments, 10 (5%) to local health departments, and eight (4%) to territorial health departments. CDC collaborations with health departments have strengthened local capacity and provided outbreak response support. Collaborations focused attention on health equity issues among disproportionately affected populations (e.g., racial and ethnic minority populations, essential frontline workers, and persons experiencing homelessness) and through a place-based focus (e.g., persons living in rural or frontier areas). These collaborations also facilitated enhanced characterization of COVID-19 epidemiology, directly contributing to CDC data-informed guidance, including guidance for serial testing as a containment strategy in high-risk congregate settings, targeted interventions and prevention efforts among workers at food processing facilities, and social distancing.

Progress in Public Health Emergency Preparedness-United States, 2001-2016.

OBJECTIVES: To evaluate the Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) program's progress toward meeting public health preparedness capability standards in state, local, and territorial health departments. METHODS: All 62 PHEP awardees completed the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's self-administered PHEP Impact Assessment as part of program review measuring public health preparedness capability before September 11, 2001 (9/11), and in 2014. We collected additional self-reported capability self-assessments from 2016. We analyzed trends in congressional funding for public health preparedness from 2001 to 2016. RESULTS: Before 9/11, most PHEP awardees reported limited preparedness capabilities, but considerable progress was reported by 2016. The number of jurisdictions reporting established capability functions within the countermeasures and mitigation domain had the largest increase, almost 200%, by 2014. However, more than 20% of jurisdictions still reported underdeveloped coordination between the health system and public health agencies in 2016. Challenges and barriers to building PHEP capabilities included lack of trained personnel, plans, and sustained resources. CONCLUSIONS: Considerable progress in public health preparedness capability was observed from before 9/11 to 2016. Support, sustainment, and advancement of public health preparedness capability is critical to ensure a strong public health infrastructure.

Primary Care Emergency Preparedness Network, New York City, 2015: Comparison of Member and Nonmember Sites.

OBJECTIVES: To assess whether Primary Care Emergency Preparedness Network member sites reported indicators of preparedness for public health emergencies compared with nonmember sites. The network-a collaboration between government and New York City primary care associations-offers technical assistance to primary care sites to improve disaster preparedness and response. METHODS: In 2015, we administered an online questionnaire to sites regarding facility characteristics and preparedness indicators. We estimated differences between members and nonmembers with natural logarithm-linked binomial models. Open-ended assessments identified preparedness gaps. RESULTS: One hundred seven sites completed the survey (23.3% response rate); 47 (43.9%) were nonmembers and 60 (56.1%) were members. Members were more likely to have completed hazard vulnerability analysis (risk ratio [RR] = 1.94; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.28, 2.93), to have identified essential services for continuity of operations (RR = 1.39; 95% CI = 1.03, 1.86), to have memoranda of understanding with external partners (RR = 2.49; 95% CI = 1.42, 4.36), and to have completed point-of-dispensing training (RR = 4.23; 95% CI = 1.76, 10.14). Identified preparedness gaps were improved communication, resource availability, and train-the-trainer programs. Public Health Implications. Primary Care Emergency Preparedness Network membership is associated with improved public health emergency preparedness among primary care sites.