Materiality and practicality: a response to - are clinicians ethically obligated to disclose their use of medical machine learning systems to patients?

In his recent paper Hatherley discusses four reasons given to support mandatory disclosure of the use of machine learning technologies in healthcare, and provides counters to each of these reasons. While I agree with Hatherley's conclusion that such disclosures should not be mandatory (at least not in an upfront fashion), I raise some problems with his counters to the materiality argument. Finally, I raise another potential problem that exists in a democratic society: that even if Hatherley's (and other authors who share his conclusions) arguments are sound, in a democratic society the simple fact that most people might wish for such disclosures to be made might be an enough compelling reason to make such disclosures mandatory.

What does it mean for a clinical AI to be just: conflicts between local fairness and being fit-for-purpose?

There have been repeated calls to ensure that clinical artificial intelligence (AI) is not discriminatory, that is, it provides its intended benefit to all members of society irrespective of the status of any protected characteristics of individuals in whose healthcare the AI might participate. There have also been repeated calls to ensure that any clinical AI is tailored to the local population in which it is being used to ensure that it is fit-for-purpose. Yet, there might be a clash between these two calls since tailoring an AI to a local population might reduce its effectiveness when the AI is used in the care of individuals who have characteristics which are not represented in the local population. Here, I explore the bioethical concept of local fairness as applied to clinical AI. I first introduce the discussion concerning fairness and inequalities in healthcare and how this problem has continued in attempts to develop AI-enhanced healthcare. I then discuss various technical aspects which might affect the implementation of local fairness. Next, I introduce some rule of law considerations into the discussion to contextualise the issue better by drawing key parallels. I then discuss some potential technical solutions which have been proposed to address the issue of local fairness. Finally, I outline which solutions I consider most likely to contribute to a fit-for-purpose and fair AI.

Disclosing the undisclosed: are radiographers and healthcare scientists required to communicate a provisional diagnosis when asked?

Patients need to be given the relevant information to be able to give informed consent, which might require the disclosure of a provisional diagnosis. Yet, there is no duty to give information to a patient if that patient is aware that this information exists but chooses not to request it. Diagnostic radiographers and healthcare scientists are often responsible for ensuring that patients have given informed consent for the investigations they undertake, but which were requested by other clinicians. Here we examine if they have a duty to disclose a patient's provisional diagnosis made by a referring clinician if the patient asks for this information as part of the informed consent process to a diagnostic investigation. We first consider aspects of UK law, professional guidance and salient ethical principles, emphasising that while professional codes of practice highlight the need to act in the patient's best interest, they do not require giving patients information they do not require for the examination or have not requested. We then propose that diagnostic radiographers and healthcare scientists placed in such a position use a 'minimally necessary disclosure' framework. This framework fulfils their commitment to their patient and the principle of veracity, while respecting the boundaries of their professional duties. The framework ensures that enough detail is given to the patient for them to be able to give informed consent, while shouldering the diagnostic professional from making a full disclosure, which is the duty of the referring clinician.

Glioblastoma cell migration is directed by electrical signals.

Electric field (EF) directed cell migration (electrotaxis) is known to occur in glioblastoma multiforme (GBM) and neural stem cells, with key signalling pathways frequently dysregulated in GBM. One such pathway is EGFR/PI3K/Akt, which is down-regulated by peroxisome proliferator activated receptor gamma (PPARγ) agonists. We investigated the effect of electric fields on primary differentiated and glioma stem cell (GSCs) migration, finding opposing preferences for anodal and cathodal migration, respectively. We next sought to determine whether chemically disrupting Akt through PTEN upregulation with the PPARγ agonist, pioglitazone, would modulate electrotaxis of these cells. We found that directed cell migration was significantly inhibited with the addition of pioglitazone in both differentiated GBM and GSCs subtypes. Western blot analysis did not demonstrate any change in PPARγ expression with and without exposure to EF. In summary we demonstrate opposing EF responses in primary GBM differentiated cells and GSCs can be inhibited chemically by pioglitazone, implicating GBM EF modulation as a potential target in preventing tumour recurrence.

Alta Fixsler: Medico-legal Paternalism in UK Paediatric Best Interest Decisions.

The case of Alta Fixsler, where a judge ruled that withdrawing life sustaining care was in her best interest rather than transferring her to Israel, as her parents wanted, is the latest in a series of controversial paediatric best interest decisions. Using this case, as well as some other recent cases, I argue that the UK exhibits a high degree of medico-legal paternalism in best interest decisions, even though paternalism seems to be ubiquitously negatively perceived in medical ethics. Firstly, I explain what I mean by medico-legal paternalism and defend my claim that this phenomenon is present in the UK. I then argue that at least philosophically (rather than legally) such a situation is impossible to justify in a secular state and that how we treat paediatric best interest decisions is very different from other areas of medical law. Lastly, I discuss proposals that aim to rectify this situation.

To die, to sleep, perchance to dream? A response to DeMichelis, Shaul and Rapoport.

In developing their policy on paediatric medical assistance in dying (MAID), DeMichelis, Shaul and Rapoport decide to treat euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide as ethically and practically equivalent to other end-of-life interventions, particularly palliative sedation and withdrawal of care (WOC). We highlight several flaws in the authors' reasoning. Their argument depends on too cursory a dismissal of intention, which remains fundamental to medical ethics and law. Furthermore, they have not fairly presented the ethical analyses justifying other end-of-life decisions, analyses and decisions that were generally accepted long before MAID was legal or considered ethical. Forgetting or misunderstanding the analyses would naturally lead one to think MAID and other end-of-life decisions are morally equivalent. Yet as we recall these well-developed analyses, it becomes clear that approving of some forms of sedation and WOC does not commit one to MAID. Paediatric patients and their families can rationally and coherently reject MAID while choosing palliative care and WOC. Finally, the authors do not substantiate their claim that MAID is like palliative care in that it alleviates suffering. It is thus unreasonable to use this supposition as a warrant for their proposed policy.

Reasonable Parental and Medical Obligations in Pediatric Extraordinary Therapy.

The English cases of Charlie Gard and Alfie Evans involved a conflict between the desires of their parents to preserve their children's lives and judgments of their medical teams in pursuit of clinically appropriate therapy. The treatment the children required was clearly extraordinary, including a wide array of advanced life-sustaining technological support. The cases exemplify a clash of worldviews rooted in different philosophies of life and medical care. The article highlights the differing perspectives on parental authority in medical care in England, Canada, and the United States. Furthermore, it proposes a solution that accommodates for both reasonable parental desires and professional medical opinion. This is achieved by looking at concepts of extraordinary therapy, best interest, reasonable parenthood and medical objections. Summary: In cases where a child's treatment involves extraordinary therapy, there is often a conflict of opinion between the medical team and the parents with regard to the best course of action. The assumption should be that responsible, caring parents make reasonable and acceptable decisions for the good of their children. Rather than focusing on making a hypothetical best interest judgment, courts should in the first instance side with the parents. Only when parents act unreasonably or malevolently should their wishes be overridden. This should not affect the medics' right to conscientiously object towards carrying out procedures that they deem to be medically unnecessary or harmful.

Experience adjusted life years and critical medical allocations within the British context: which patient should live?

Medical resource allocation is a controversial topic, because in the end it prioritises some peoples' medical problems over those of others. This is less controversial when there is a clear clinical reason for such a prioritisation, but when such a reason is not available people might perceive it as deeming certain individuals more important than others. This article looks at the role of social utility in medical resource allocation, in a situation where the clinical outcome would be identical if either person received the treatment. This situation is explored with a focus on the United Kingdom, but its conclusions have wider applications to any system where healthcare is tax-payer funded. The article proposes an experience adjusted life years system, and discusses its strengths and weaknesses.

Sedaconda ACD-S for Sedation with Volatile Anaesthetics in Intensive Care: A NICE Medical Technologies Guidance.

Intensive care unit (ICU) patients receive highly complex care and often require sedation as part of their management. ICU sedation has traditionally been delivered using intravenous (IV) agents due to the impractical use of anaesthetic machines in this setting, which are used to deliver volatile sedation. Sedaconda anaesthetic conserving device (ACD)-S (previously known as AnaConDa-S) is a device which allows for the delivery of volatile sedation via the majority of mechanical ventilators by being inserted in the breathing circuit where the heat and moisture exchanger is normally placed. The National Institute of Health and Care Excellence (NICE), as part of the Medical Technologies Evaluation Programme, considered the potential benefits of using Sedaconda ACD-S compared to standard IV sedation in ICU patients. Here we describe the evidence evaluation undertaken by NICE on this technology, supported by CEDAR. CEDAR considered the evidence present in 21 publications that compared the clinical outcomes of patients receiving Sedaconda ACD-S-delivered sedation and IV sedation, and critiqued the economic model provided by the manufacturer. Clinical expert input during the evaluation process was used extensively to ensure that the relevant clinical evidence was captured and that the economic model was suitable for the UK setting. Due to the uncertainty of the evidence, sensitivity analysis was carried out on the key economic inputs to ensure the reliability of the results. Economic modelling has shown that Sedaconda ACD-S-delivered isoflurane sedation is cost saving on a 30-day horizon compared to IV sedation by £3833.76 per adult patient and by £2837.41 per paediatric patient. Clinical evidence indicated that Sedaconda ACD-S-delivered isoflurane sedation is associated with faster patient wake-up times than standard of care. Consequently, NICE recommended Sedaconda ACD-S as an option for delivering sedation in the ICU setting, but noted that further research should inform whether Sedaconda ACD-S-delivered sedation is of benefit to any particular subgroup of patients.

The right to choose to abort an abortion: should pro-choice advocates support abortion pill reversal?

Abortion pill reversal (APR) treatment aims to halt an initiated medical abortion, wherein a pregnant woman takes progesterone after having taken the first of the two consecutive abortion pills, typically because she has changed her mind and no longer wants to abort the pregnancy. It is a controversial intervention, generally supported by those identifying as pro-life and opposed by those identifying as pro-choice. This paper examines whether, in principle, those identifying with the pro-choice view should support APR. We firstly examine the commitments of the pro-choice stance. We then briefly outline the evidence supporting the APR. Following this, we discuss potential consequences of APR on women's mental health and its safety. We conclude that those espousing the pro-choice standpoint should be, in principle, committed to supporting the availability of APR, while recognising that data on its efficacy may be difficult to obtain.

Friendship as a framework for resolving dilemmas in clinical ethics.

Healthcare professionals often need to make clinical decisions that carry profound ethical implications. As such, they require a tool that will make decision-making intuitive. While the discussion about the principles that should guide clinical ethics has been going on for over two thousand years, it does not seem that making such decisions is becoming any more straight forward. With an abundance of competing ethical systems and frameworks for their application in real life, the clinician is still often not sure how to proceed in the face of ethical dilemmas, either due to a lack of background ethical knowledge or experience in applying it. This paper will discuss whether considering what one would expect one's friend to do if one was the patient, or what would one think they would do for a friend if they were the patient, can be a helpful, more intuitive, tool for clinical decision-making that can produce outcomes that are congruent with major ethical systems.

Conscience and Vaccines: Lessons from Babylon 5 and COVID-19.

Babylon 5, like other great sci-fi franchises, touched on important ethical questions. Two ethical conundrums relating to the series' main characters included providing life-saving treatment to a child against their parents' wishes and potential involvement with a highly beneficial but morally dubious medication. I use these cases to discuss some aspects of the COVID-19 vaccines' development and roll-out, demonstrating that people (be it patients or clinicians) might object to some vaccines due to reasonable ethics and safety-based concerns rather than due to an anti-vaxxer mind-set. I highlight that it would be disingenuous to lump these two groups of objections together for not all objections to specific vaccines are objections to vaccination in general. Rather, governments and pharmaceutical companies should seriously engage with the concerns of reasonable objectors to provide citizens with the appropriate products and ensure large vaccination uptake - in the case of COVID-19 this should include giving patients the choice of the product they will be inoculated with.

Reply to: Beyond Money: Conscientious Objection in Medicine as a Conflict of Interests.

Giubilini and Savulescu in their recent Journal of Bioethical Inquiry symposium article presented an account of conscientious objection that argues for its recognition as a non-financial conflict of interest. In this short commentary, I highlight some problems with their account. First, I discuss their solicitor analogy. Second, I discuss some problems surrounding their objectivity claim about standards of medical care. Next, I discuss some issues arising from consistently applying their approach. Finally, I highlight that conscientious objection should be viewed not as a conflict of interest but as something that society has an interest in preserving. I conclude by arguing that clinicians who have a conscientious objection can be treated in the same way as those who decide to subspecialize and do not need to give up work in their specialty. While Giubilini and Savulescu present an interesting argument about conscientious objection, theirs is not a compelling view. Indeed, the way we approach conscientious objection has more to teach us about conflicts of interest than the other way around.

Should parents be asked to consent for life-saving paediatric interventions?

Informed consent, when given by proxy, has limitations: chiefly, it must be made in the interest of the patient. Here we critique the standard approach to parental consent, as present in Canada and the UK. Parents are often asked for consent, but are not given the authority to refuse medically beneficial treatment in many situations. This prompts the question of whether it is possible for someone to consent if they cannot refuse. We present two alternative and philosophically more consistent frameworks for paediatric proxy consent. The first allows meaningful consent (parents may say 'yes' or 'no' to treatment), provided that parents are medically informed/competent and intend the health and well-being of their child. In the second solution, medical practitioners or the state consent for treatment, with parents only being consulted to help give insight to the child's circumstances. While we contend that either of these two options is superior to the insincerity of the present paradigm, we suggest that the first solution is preferable.

The rule of right vs might: a reply to Wischik's 'Nazis, teleology, and the freedom of conscience'.

Wischik presents an extensive reply to our paper on conscientious objection, which explores the implications of distinguishing 'medical acts' from 'socioclinical acts'. He provides an extensive legal analysis of the issues surrounding conscientious objection, drawing on the concepts of professional practice and consequentialism. Invoking some of these concepts, we respond and demonstrate that Wischik does not seriously engage with our argument. Instead, he merely proffers his preference for legal positivism, which - when viewed as the fount of justice (as Wischik seems to hold) instead of a tool in its service - necessarily bases rightness on might rather than truth. We also argue that in several important areas, Wischik is factually mistaken.

Critical care scientists: Role, training and future directions.

Critical care scientists are a little known but increasingly prominent group of professionals, included in both the government-run Modernising Scientific Careers initiative and 2019 Guidelines for the Provision of Intensive Care Services. This article outlines the role of critical care scientists, their training programme and potential future directions for the role. A wider appreciation and acknowledgement of the critical care scientist's role within the multi-disciplinary team will allow critical care units to fully understand the potential benefits that may be brought to patient care and service delivery.

What Demarks the Metamorphosis of Human Individuals to Posthuman Entities?

Humans often seek to improve themselves, whether through self-discipline or through the use of science and technology. At some point in the future, techniques might become available that will change humans to such a degree that they might have to be regarded as something other than human: posthuman. This essay tries to define the point at which such a human-to-posthuman metamorphosis may occur. This is achieved by discerning what is it that makes human substance distinct, i.e. what is the human essence. This is accomplished by examining the features of the human body, looking at the mode of human existence in society and trying to grasp the importance of the body-soul relationship. Throughout the process, humans are compared to animals as well as entities from literature, film, and the gaming world. These are used as case studies to shape and test the ideas developed throughout the essay. This essay's conclusions might become useful when decisions will have to be made as to the legal status of posthumans, by providing a tool for discerning when metamorphosis has occurred. Moreover, insights from this essay might also inform debates surrounding the ethical status of certain modalities of human enhancement.

Medical Acts and Conscientious Objection: What Can a Physician be Compelled to Do?

A key question has been underexplored in the literature on conscientious objection: if a physician is required to perform 'medical activities,' what is a medical activity? This paper explores the question by employing a teleological evaluation of medicine and examining the analogy of military conscripts, commonly cited in the conscientious objection debate. It argues that physicians (and other healthcare professionals) can only be expected to perform and support medical acts - acts directed towards their patients' health. That is, physicians cannot be forced to provide or support services that are not medical in nature, even if such activities support other socially desirable pursuits. This does not necessarily mean that medical professionals cannot or should not provide non-medical services, but only that they are under no obligation to provide them.

Primary Cilia-An Underexplored Topic in Major Mental Illness.

Though much progress has been made in recent years towards understanding the function and physiology of primary cilia, they remain a somewhat elusive organelle. Some studies have explored the role of primary cilia in the developing nervous system, and their dysfunction has been linked with several neurosensory deficits. Yet, very little has been written on their potential role in psychiatric disorders. This article provides an overview of some of the functions of primary cilia in signalling pathways, and demonstrates that they are a worthy candidate in psychiatric research. The links between primary cilia and major mental illness have been demonstrated to exist at several levels, spanning genetics, signalling pathways, and pharmacology as well as cell division and migration. The primary focus of this review is on the sensory role of the primary cilium and the neurodevelopmental hypothesis of psychiatric disease. As such, the primary cilium is demonstrated to be a key link between the cellular environment and cell behaviour, and hence of key importance in the considerations of the nature and nurture debate in psychiatric research.