ABSTRACT
BACKGROUND: Incidence of invasive disease due to Haemophilus influenzae serotype a (Hia) increased an average of 13% annually from 2002 through 2015. We describe clinical characteristics and adverse clinical outcomes of US invasive Hia cases detected through multistate surveillance during 2011-2015. METHODS: Medical record data were abstracted for cases reported in 8 jurisdictions conducting active population- and laboratory-based surveillance for invasive Hia disease across the United States. Isolates from sterile sites were serotyped using real-time polymerase chain reaction. Adverse clinical outcomes were defined as any possible complication of meningitis, bacteremic pneumonia, or bacteremia (including hearing loss and developmental delay, but excluding death) and were assessed at hospital discharge and one-year post-disease onset. RESULTS: During 2011-2015, 190 Hia cases were reported to the 8 participating sites; 169 (88.9%) had data abstracted. Many patients were aged <5 years (42.6%). Meningitis was the most common clinical presentation among those aged <1 year (71.4%); bacteremic pneumonia was the most common presentation among persons aged ≥50 years (78.7%). Overall, 95.9% of patients were hospitalized. Among those hospitalized, 47.5% were admitted to an intensive care unit and 6.2% died during hospitalization. At hospital discharge and one-year post-disease onset, adverse outcomes were identified in 17.7% and 17.8% of patients overall and in 43.9% and 48.5% of patients with meningitis (primarily children). CONCLUSIONS: Hia infection can cause severe disease that requires hospitalization and may also cause short- and long-term adverse clinical outcomes, especially among children. Novel vaccines could prevent morbidity and mortality.
Subject(s)
Bacteremia , Haemophilus Infections , Haemophilus Vaccines , Aged , Bacteremia/epidemiology , Child , Child, Preschool , Haemophilus Infections/epidemiology , Haemophilus Infections/prevention & control , Haemophilus influenzae , Humans , Incidence , Infant , Middle Aged , Serogroup , United States/epidemiologyABSTRACT
On February 26, 2020, the first U.S. case of community-acquired coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was confirmed in a patient hospitalized in Solano County, California (1). The patient was initially evaluated at hospital A on February 15; at that time, COVID-19 was not suspected, as the patient denied travel or contact with symptomatic persons. During a 4-day hospitalization, the patient was managed with standard precautions and underwent multiple aerosol-generating procedures (AGPs), including nebulizer treatments, bilevel positive airway pressure (BiPAP) ventilation, endotracheal intubation, and bronchoscopy. Several days after the patient's transfer to hospital B, a real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (real-time RT-PCR) test for SARS-CoV-2 returned positive. Among 121 hospital A health care personnel (HCP) who were exposed to the patient, 43 (35.5%) developed symptoms during the 14 days after exposure and were tested for SARS-CoV-2; three had positive test results and were among the first known cases of probable occupational transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to HCP in the United States. Little is known about specific risk factors for SARS-CoV-2 transmission in health care settings. To better characterize and compare exposures among HCP who did and did not develop COVID-19, standardized interviews were conducted with 37 hospital A HCP who were tested for SARS-CoV-2, including the three who had positive test results. Performing physical examinations and exposure to the patient during nebulizer treatments were more common among HCP with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 than among those without COVID-19; HCP with COVID-19 also had exposures of longer duration to the patient. Because transmission-based precautions were not in use, no HCP wore personal protective equipment (PPE) recommended for COVID-19 patient care during contact with the index patient. Health care facilities should emphasize early recognition and isolation of patients with possible COVID-19 and use of recommended PPE to minimize unprotected, high-risk HCP exposures and protect the health care workforce.
Subject(s)
Betacoronavirus/isolation & purification , Coronavirus Infections/diagnosis , Coronavirus Infections/transmission , Infectious Disease Transmission, Patient-to-Professional , Personnel, Hospital , Pneumonia, Viral/diagnosis , Pneumonia, Viral/transmission , Adult , COVID-19 , California/epidemiology , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Female , Hospitalization , Humans , Male , Middle Aged , Occupational Exposure , Pandemics , Personal Protective Equipment/statistics & numerical data , Personnel, Hospital/statistics & numerical data , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Risk Assessment , SARS-CoV-2ABSTRACT
An estimated 30 million passengers are transported on 272 cruise ships worldwide each year* (1). Cruise ships bring diverse populations into proximity for many days, facilitating transmission of respiratory illness (2). SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease (COVID-19) was first identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 and has since spread worldwide to at least 187 countries and territories. Widespread COVID-19 transmission on cruise ships has been reported as well (3). Passengers on certain cruise ship voyages might be aged ≥65 years, which places them at greater risk for severe consequences of SARS-CoV-2 infection (4). During February-March 2020, COVID-19 outbreaks associated with three cruise ship voyages have caused more than 800 laboratory-confirmed cases among passengers and crew, including 10 deaths. Transmission occurred across multiple voyages of several ships. This report describes public health responses to COVID-19 outbreaks on these ships. COVID-19 on cruise ships poses a risk for rapid spread of disease, causing outbreaks in a vulnerable population, and aggressive efforts are required to contain spread. All persons should defer all cruise travel worldwide during the COVID-19 pandemic.