ABSTRACT
Unit 731, a biological warfare research organisation that operated under the authority of the Imperial Japanese Army in the 1930s and 1940s, conducted brutal experiments on thousands of unconsenting subjects. Because of the US interest in the data from these experiments, the perpetrators were not prosecuted and the atrocities are still relatively undiscussed. What counts as meaningful moral repair in this case-what should perpetrators and collaborator communities do decades later? We argue for three non-ideal but realistic forms of moral repair: (1) a national policy in Japan against human experimentation without appropriate informed and voluntary consent; (2) the establishment of a memorial to the victims of Unit 731; and (3) US disclosure about its use of Unit 731 data and an apology for failing to hold the perpetrators accountable.
Subject(s)
Biological Warfare , Complicity , Human Rights Abuses , Military Medicine , Nontherapeutic Human Experimentation , War Crimes , Biological Warfare/ethics , Biological Warfare/history , Biological Warfare/legislation & jurisprudence , Codes of Ethics , Ethics, Medical , Federal Government/history , History, 20th Century , Human Rights Abuses/ethics , Human Rights Abuses/history , Human Rights Abuses/legislation & jurisprudence , Humans , Informed Consent , Japan , Military Medicine/history , Moral Obligations , Nontherapeutic Human Experimentation/ethics , Nontherapeutic Human Experimentation/history , Nontherapeutic Human Experimentation/legislation & jurisprudence , Politics , Social Responsibility , United States , War Crimes/ethics , War Crimes/history , War Crimes/legislation & jurisprudenceSubject(s)
Biological Warfare/prevention & control , Biomedical Research/legislation & jurisprudence , Communicable Disease Control/legislation & jurisprudence , Communicable Diseases/virology , European Union , Virology/legislation & jurisprudence , Animals , Biological Warfare/legislation & jurisprudence , Communicable Diseases/transmission , European Union/organization & administration , Humans , Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype/genetics , Influenza A Virus, H5N1 Subtype/pathogenicity , Orthomyxoviridae Infections/prevention & control , Orthomyxoviridae Infections/transmission , Orthomyxoviridae Infections/virology , Publishing/legislation & jurisprudence , Zoonoses/prevention & control , Zoonoses/transmission , Zoonoses/virologySubject(s)
Biological Warfare/prevention & control , Research Personnel/legislation & jurisprudence , Research Personnel/psychology , Rickettsia prowazekii , Animals , Bacterial Vaccines , Biological Warfare/legislation & jurisprudence , Chick Embryo , France , Russia , Travel , Typhus, Epidemic Louse-Borne/microbiologyABSTRACT
Chemical and biological warfare agents constitute a low-probability, but high-impact risk both to the military and to the civilian population. The use of hazardous materials of chemical or biological origin as weapons and for homicide has been documented since ancient times. The first use of chemicals in terms of weapons of mass destruction goes back to World War I, when on April 22, 1915 large amounts of chlorine were released by German military forces at Ypres, Belgium. Until around the 1970s of the 20th century, the awareness of the threat by chemical and biological agents had been mainly confined to the military sector. In the following time, the development of increasing range delivery systems by chemical and biological agents possessors sensitised public attention to the threat emanating from these agents. Their proliferation to the terrorists field during the 1990s with the expanding scale and globalisation of terrorist attacks suggested that these agents are becoming an increasing threat to the whole world community. The following article gives a condensed overview on the history of use and development of the more prominent chemical and biological warfare agents.
Subject(s)
Biological Warfare/history , Chemical Warfare Agents/history , Chemical Warfare/history , Antidotes/history , Antidotes/therapeutic use , Biological Warfare/classification , Biological Warfare/legislation & jurisprudence , Chemical Warfare/classification , Chemical Warfare/legislation & jurisprudence , Chemical Warfare Agents/classification , History, 15th Century , History, 16th Century , History, 17th Century , History, 18th Century , History, 19th Century , History, 20th Century , History, 21st Century , History, Ancient , History, Medieval , Respiratory Protective Devices/history , Social Control, Formal , WarfareSubject(s)
Genes, Synthetic , Security Measures/legislation & jurisprudence , Synthetic Biology/legislation & jurisprudence , Animals , Biological Warfare/legislation & jurisprudence , Biological Warfare/prevention & control , Bioterrorism/prevention & control , California , Chickens , Security Measures/standards , Synthetic Biology/standardsABSTRACT
This review article examines the growing concern about the threat posed by the use of biological weapons by States or terrorist groups. The article analyzes the nature of the perceived risk from bioweapons, the historical attempts to control them, and the emerging policy and legal framework designed to deal with the bioweapon threat.
Subject(s)
Biological Warfare , Biological Warfare/history , Biological Warfare/legislation & jurisprudence , Biological Warfare/prevention & control , History, 20th Century , Humans , Public Health , Risk Factors , Violence/prevention & controlABSTRACT
Responding to a terrorist biological weapon attack poses new challenges not only for the public health response community but also to the very construct of public health police powers as we know them today. States are debating the merits of revising and updating these powers in order to ensure an effective and legally appropriate response. This article covers three aspects of the policy debate: the experience in one state from a legislative perspective, a discussion from an academic viewpoint, and one example of the role of enhanced powers from the response perspective.
Subject(s)
Bioterrorism/legislation & jurisprudence , Disaster Planning/legislation & jurisprudence , Public Health Administration/legislation & jurisprudence , Public Health/legislation & jurisprudence , Biological Warfare/legislation & jurisprudence , Biological Warfare/prevention & control , Bioterrorism/prevention & control , Civil Defense/organization & administration , Communicable Disease Control/legislation & jurisprudence , Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control , Government Agencies/organization & administration , Humans , Interinstitutional Relations , Maine , National Health Programs/organization & administration , United StatesABSTRACT
The article provides an overview of current work toward identifying core competencies for public health emergency and bio-terrorism response, including law-related competencies. It demonstrates how competency sets are interrelated and how they provide a framework for developing preparedness training for public health leaders, public health and health care professionals, law enforcement, public health attorneys, and others. The health and safety of America's communities hinge on the nation's public health workforce--the estimated 448,254 public health professionals and 3 million related workforce professionals who form the expanded public health system that protects us during times of national crisis and in our daily lives. The response capacity of our health agencies and communities and their ability to respond effectively will be unpredictable without adequate training. Education in the core competencies in emergency preparedness and bio-terrorism response is essential. Preparedness at the front-line means that public health leaders and administrators must be able to communicate information, roles, capacities, and legal authorities to all emergency response partners during planning, drills, and actual emergencies. Each public health worker must be able to describe his or her communication role in emergency response within the agency, with the media, and with the general public. Law enforcement and state government representatives must understand the legal powers of their agencies and of public health agencies for coordinated response, mitigation, and recovery efforts in a public health emergency event.
Subject(s)
Bioterrorism/legislation & jurisprudence , Disaster Planning/legislation & jurisprudence , Professional Competence , Public Health/education , Public Health/legislation & jurisprudence , Biological Warfare/legislation & jurisprudence , Biological Warfare/prevention & control , Bioterrorism/prevention & control , Communicable Disease Control/legislation & jurisprudence , Communication , Competency-Based Education , Disease Outbreaks/legislation & jurisprudence , Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control , Emergencies , Health Planning Guidelines , Humans , Inservice Training , Interinstitutional Relations , Public Health Administration/legislation & jurisprudence , Public Health Administration/standards , United StatesABSTRACT
Biological weapons have been used in war from the start of recorded history. This article reviews the history of the subject, including the outbreak of the Black Death and the use of smallpox against American Indians. The new science of microbiology was misused from soon after its start and, despite the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Japanese experimented extensively on prisoners in China. The Allies carried out extensive research during the Second World War, notably the United Kingdom into anthrax on Gruinard Island and the United States into a variety of agents. Despite the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), a major programme continued in the former Soviet Union (leading to an accidental outbreak of anthrax). Most recently Iraq was revealed as having an extensive programme, with weaponization of large amounts of various agents, and several terrorists groups have attempted to use biological agents as weapons. Modern developments in biotechnology could lead to even more serious developments, and effective preventive measures, including strengthening of the BWC, are imperative.
Subject(s)
Biological Warfare/history , Biological Warfare/legislation & jurisprudence , History, 17th Century , History, 18th Century , History, 19th Century , History, 20th Century , History, Ancient , History, MedievalABSTRACT
Details about the US biological programme have largely been based on information in the open literature. More revealing aspects of the programme are now available through documents released under the Freedom of Information Act. Annual reports of the activities of the US Army Chemical Corps from 1945 to 1959 have revealed significant increases in activity in biological warfare research. The Corps research activity progressed from work on anthrax in 1941, through anti-crop agents in the mid-1940s, to a wider range of animal, plant and human diseases by 1960. A number of disease organisms were investigated sufficiently to permit some standardisation and manufacture of munitions.
Subject(s)
Biological Warfare , Biological Warfare/legislation & jurisprudence , History, 20th Century , Humans , Insect Vectors , Korea , Public Policy , Tularemia , United States , Warfare , Yellow FeverABSTRACT
In the context of intensified international concern about biological weapons (BW), this article looks at the pioneering British research in this field during the Second World War, which caused the long-term contamination of Gruinard Island in north-west Scotland. Public Record Office documents have been examined to show how scientists reported on the experiments at the time and what they thought about their (top secret) work, as well as how politicians directed their efforts and used their results, leading to continued BW research post-war. In the 1960s the contamination became known and discussed in the media and was eventually the subject of a public announcement. Decontamination was not regarded as a practical proposition until the 1980s and was undertaken in 1986 in two areas of the island, which was declared safe in 1990. Some doubts remain locally about the extent and effectiveness of the clean-up process, along with a legacy of bitterness.
Subject(s)
Anthrax/history , Biological Warfare/history , Animals , Anthrax/veterinary , Biological Warfare/legislation & jurisprudence , Environmental Health , Government Programs/history , History, 20th Century , Humans , Sheep , Sheep Diseases/history , United KingdomABSTRACT
Biological weapons are an important part of the level of international threat. Technological development has made biological weapon production relatively simple and cheap, and although a UN convention from 1972 bans biological weapons, governments as well as non-governmental organisations or individuals have developed biological weapons for offensive use in war or terrorism. This article reviews the publically available literature, and clinical and therapeutic possibilities are described. The possibilities for protection of military and civilian groups are discussed and the need for a national contingency plan is emphasized.
Subject(s)
Bacterial Infections , Biological Warfare , Virus Diseases/etiology , Bacterial Infections/diagnosis , Bacterial Infections/drug therapy , Bacterial Infections/etiology , Biological Warfare/legislation & jurisprudence , Biological Warfare/methods , Biological Warfare/prevention & control , Civil Defense , Disaster Planning , Humans , International Cooperation , Military Medicine , Toxins, Biological/adverse effects , Virus Diseases/diagnosis , Virus Diseases/drug therapyABSTRACT
Toxins, chemical substances produced by practically all forms of life, represent a chemically broad group of compounds. Many of them are very toxic for human and represent a serious jeopardy because they may be misused through chemical warfare or terrorist attacks. This danger has been increasing recently because toxins are more and more available due to modern synthetic methods and application of genetic engineering. Therefore the international community adopted multilateral conventions and control regimes, which regulate handling with toxins. These fundamentals are implemented into the Czech system of law too.
Subject(s)
Biological Warfare/legislation & jurisprudence , Chemical Warfare/legislation & jurisprudence , Internationality/legislation & jurisprudence , Toxins, Biological/classification , HumansABSTRACT
A review is made on Biosecurity at both local and global level in relationship with Bioterrorism as a real threat and its control and prevention. The function of the network of High Security Laboratories around the world able to make immediate diagnosis, research on vaccines, fundamental and urgent epidemiological studies, conform a steady basis to control natural infections and also the possible bioterrorism attacks.
Subject(s)
Biological Warfare/prevention & control , Bioterrorism/prevention & control , Animals , Anthrax , Biological Warfare/classification , Biological Warfare/legislation & jurisprudence , Bioterrorism/classification , Bioterrorism/legislation & jurisprudence , Communicable Diseases/diagnosis , Communicable Diseases/epidemiology , Communicable Diseases/etiology , Containment of Biohazards/classification , Disease Outbreaks/classification , Disease Outbreaks/legislation & jurisprudence , Humans , Laboratories/classification , Laboratories/legislation & jurisprudence , Smallpox , World Health OrganizationSubject(s)
Biological Warfare/legislation & jurisprudence , Biological Warfare/prevention & control , Guidelines as Topic , International Cooperation , Research/legislation & jurisprudence , Science/legislation & jurisprudence , Science/organization & administration , Congresses as Topic/organization & administration , Guideline Adherence/legislation & jurisprudenceABSTRACT
El uso de agentes biológicos con fines terroristas constituye una amenaza singular. Aunque poco probable, su materialización puede ser difícilmente evitable en el futuro. Este artículo revisa el fenómeno del bioterrorismo, examinando los posibles riesgos y vulnerabilidades, los mecanismos de respuesta y las nuevas amenazas para la bioseguridad. (AU)
The use of biological agents for terrorist purposes is a unique threat. Although unlikely, it may be difficult to prevent in the future. This article provides an overview of the phenomenon of bioterrorism, examining potential risks and vulnerabilities, response mechanisms and emerging threats to biosecurity. (AU)