Poxviruses as Agents of Biological Warfare: The Importance of Ensuring Ethical Standards for Research with Viruses.

Historically, biological agents have been used to target various populations. One of the earliest examples could be the catastrophic effect of smallpox in Australia in the eighteenth century (as alleged by some historians). Modern biological techniques can be used to both create or provide protection against various agents of biological warfare. Any microorganism (viruses, bacteria, and fungi) or its toxins can be used as biological agents. Minnesota Department of Health has listed Smallpox (variola major) as a category A bioterrorism agent, even though it has been eradicated in 1980 through an extensive vaccination campaign. Category A agents are considered the highest risk to public health. Laboratory-associated outbreaks of poxviruses could cause unprecedented occupational hazards. Only two WHO-approved BSL-4 facilities in the United States and Russia are allowed to perform research on the variola virus. So, poxviruses present themselves as a classical case of a dual-use dilemma, since research with them can be used for both beneficial and harmful purposes. Although the importance of ethics in scientific research requires no further elaboration, ethical norms assume greater significance during experimentation with poxviruses. In this chapter, we will update the readers on the sensitive nature of conducting research with poxviruses, and how these viruses can be a source of potential biological weapons. Finally, specified ethical guidelines are explored to ensure safe research practices in virology.

Ethical lessons learned and to be learned from mass casualty events by terrorism.

PURPOSE OF REVIEW: The world has seen a major upturn in international terror awareness. Medicine has had to respond. In addition to the unique physical and mental injuries caused by terror which require special clinical attention, so too terror represents a challenge for medicine from an ethics perspective. RECENT FINDINGS: Several responses in the literature over the past few years have attempted to reflect where the battlefront of ethical dilemmas falls. These include issues of resource allocation, triage, bioterror, the therapeutic relationship with terrorists, dual loyalty, and challenges in the role in the promotion of virtuous behavior as a physician under difficult conditions. SUMMARY: Although many challenges exist, physicians need to be prepared for ethical response to terror. With their associated unique status, providing legitimacy and specialized ability in the management and approach to terror situations, physicians are held to a higher standard and need to rise to the occasion. This is required in order to promote ethical behavior under trying conditions and ethical sensitivity of the medical profession by means of being attuned to the reality around.

The art of misunderstanding moral bioenhancement.

In our book Unfit for the Future and a number of papers, we have argued that there is a dangerous mismatch between, on the one hand, the tremendous power of scientific technology, which has created societies with millions of citizens, and, on the other hand, our moral capacities, which have been shaped by evolution for life in small, close-knit societies with primitive technology. To overcome this mismatch before it results in the downfall of human civilization, human beings stand in acute need of moral enhancement, not only by traditional means but also by biomedical means, should this turn out to be possible. After summarizing this argument, we respond to two critics, Michael Hauskeller and Robert Sparrow.

Ethical and regulatory challenges posed by synthetic biology.

Synthetic biology is a relatively new science with tremendous potential to change how we view and know the life sciences, but like many developing technologies, it has provoked ethical concerns from the scientific community and the public and confronts demands for new regulatory measures. The concerns raised involve the danger of "dual use," in which results for improving human well-being and the environment may be misappropriated for bioterror. To counteract these dangers, many governments, but the United States and Israel in particular, have introduced new laws and redoubled measures for biosafety and biosecurity. In the United States, the recent H5N1 results achieved by two groups of NIH-funded investigators highlighted the dilemma of balancing the risk of dual-use research and the freedom of science. In Israel, concern for unconventional terrorism is long-standing, and the country is constantly engaged in improving biosecurity and biodefense measures. In 2008, the Israeli parliament passed the Regulation of Research into Biological Disease Agents Law, a legislative framework for safeguarding research into biological disease agents. This article summarizes and analyzes the current state of affairs in the United States and Israel, ethical attitudes, and regulatory responses to synthetic biology.

On genies and bottles: scientists' moral responsibility and dangerous technology R&D.

The age-old maxim of scientists whose work has resulted in deadly or dangerous technologies is: scientists are not to blame, but rather technologists and politicians must be morally culpable for the uses of science. As new technologies threaten not just populations but species and biospheres, scientists should reassess their moral culpability when researching fields whose impact may be catastrophic. Looking at real-world examples such as smallpox research and the Australian "mousepox trick", and considering fictional or future technologies like Kurt Vonnegut's "ice-nine" from Cat's Cradle, and the "grey goo" scenario in nanotechnology, this paper suggests how ethical principles developed in biomedicine can be adjusted for science in general. An "extended moral horizon" may require looking not just to the effects of research on individual human subjects, but also to effects on humanity as a whole. Moreover, a crude utilitarian calculus can help scientists make moral decisions about which technologies to pursue and disseminate when catastrophes may result. Finally, institutions should be devised to teach these moral principles to scientists, and require moral education for future funding.

Liberty to decide on dual use biomedical research: an acknowledged necessity.

Humanity entered the twenty-first century with revolutionary achievements in biomedical research. At the same time multiple "dual-use" results have been published. The battle against infectious diseases is meeting new challenges, with newly emerging and re-emerging infections. Both natural disaster epidemics, such as SARS, avian influenza, haemorrhagic fevers, XDR and MDR tuberculosis and many others, and the possibility of intentional mis-use, such as letters containing anthrax spores in USA, 2001, have raised awareness of the real threats. Many great men, including Goethe, Spinoza, J.B. Shaw, Fr. Engels, J.F. Kennedy and others, have recognized that liberty is also a responsibility. That is why the liberty to decide now represents an acknowledged necessity: biomedical research should be supported, conducted and published with appropriate measures to prevent potential "dual use". Biomedical scientists should work according to the ethical principles of their Code of Conduct, an analogue of Hippocrates Oath of doctors; and they should inform government, society and their juniors about the problem. National science consulting boards of experts should be created to prepare guidelines and control the problem at state level. An international board should develop minimum standards to be applicable by each country. Bio-preparedness is considered another key-measure.

The bioterrorism threat and dual-use biotechnological research: an Israeli perspective.

Israel has a long history of concern with chemical and biological threats, since several hostile states in the Middle East are likely to possess such weapons. The Twin-Tower terrorist attacks and Anthrax envelope scares of 2001 were a watershed for public perceptions of the threat of unconventional terror in general and of biological terror in particular. New advances in biotechnology will only increase the ability of terrorists to exploit the burgeoning availability of related information to develop ever-more destructive bioweapons. Many areas of modern biological research are unavoidably dual-use by nature. They thus have a great potential for both help and harm; and facilitating the former while preventing the latter remains a serious challenge to researchers and governments alike. This article addresses how Israel might best (1) prevent hostile elements from obtaining, from Israel's biological research system, materials, information and technologies that might facilitate their carrying out a biological attack, while (2) continuing to promote academic openness, excellence and other hallmarks of that system. This important and sensitive issue was assessed by a special national committee, and their recommendations are presented and discussed. One particularly innovative element is the restructuring and use of Israel's extensive biosafety system to also address biosecurity goals, with minimal disruption or delay.

Is all fair in biological warfare? The controversy over genetically engineered biological weapons.

Advances in genetics may soon make possible the development of ethnic bioweapons that target specific ethnic or racial groups based upon genetic markers. While occasional published reports of such research generate public outrage, little has been written about the ethical distinction (if any) between the development of such weapons and ethnically neutral bioweapons. The purpose of this paper is to launch a debate on the subject of ethnic bioweapons before they become a scientific reality.

Responsible conduct by life scientists in an age of terrorism.

The potential for dual use of research in the life sciences to be misused for harm raises a range of problems for the scientific community and policy makers. Various legal and ethical strategies are being implemented to reduce the threat of the misuse of research and knowledge in the life sciences by establishing a culture of responsible conduct.

Biodefense research: an emerging conundrum.

Biodefense research creates a conundrum for the scientific community--what are the permissible limits of biodefense research and how can knowledge in the life sciences be protected against misuse? As biodefense research expands to counter the threat of bioterrorism, so does suspicion and the need for guidance to respond to these concerns.

Bioterrorismo y armas biológicas: caracterización y respuesta frente a las amenazas actuales / Bioterrorism and biological weapons: characterization and response to current threats

El uso de agentes biológicos con fines terroristas constituye una amenaza singular. Aunque poco probable, su materialización puede ser difícilmente evitable en el futuro. Este artículo revisa el fenómeno del bioterrorismo, examinando los posibles riesgos y vulnerabilidades, los mecanismos de respuesta y las nuevas amenazas para la bioseguridad. (AU)

The use of biological agents for terrorist purposes is a unique threat. Although unlikely, it may be difficult to prevent in the future. This article provides an overview of the phenomenon of bioterrorism, examining potential risks and vulnerabilities, response mechanisms and emerging threats to biosecurity. (AU)

Bioethics, bioweapons and the microbiologist.

The analysis of behavior of man in the field of biology is carried out through bioethics, considered the science of the survival. In the microbiology, there are numerous discoveries related with pathogenic microorganisms, including those that can be used as weapons in a biological war or in an attack considered bioterrorism. The scientist involved in microbiology can participate with his knowledge in the development and improvement of bioweapons, however from the point of view of bioethics it is not acceptable that he works in an investigation related with these topics, because the defense research can evolve in offensive one. The war is an antisurvival activity, therefore it is not acceptable. In the same way, the biological weapons composed with virus, fungi or alive bacteria, or with toxins from them, neither they are morally accepted. After the terrorist attacks with anthrax in the United States in 2001, the world scientific community in the field of microbiology should show against the use of the microorganisms like bioweapons, at the time of promoting the idea that the responsible use for the microorganisms is a moral imperative for all microbiologists around the world, since the biological weapons are a threat for the human life.

Coding ethical behaviour: the challenges of biological weapons.

Since 11 September 2001 and the anthrax attacks that followed in the US, public and policy concerns about the security threats posed by biological weapons have increased significantly. With this has come an expansion of those activities in civil society deemed as potential sites for applying security controls. This paper examines the assumptions and implications of national and international efforts in one such area: how a balance or integration can take place between security and openness in civilian biomedical research through devising professional codes of conduct for scientists. Future attempts to establish such codes must find a way of reconciling or at least addressing dilemmatic and tension-ridden issues about the appropriateness of research; a topic that raises fundamental questions about the position of science within society.

Synthetic biology and biosecurity

This article discusses the conflict fields and legal questions of synthetic biology, esp. concerning biosecurity. A respective jurisprudential discussion has not taken place yet in Germany apart trom few statements and recommendations. But in Germany, Europe and the USA, it is generally accepted that a broad discussion is necessary. This is esp. true for the question of biosecurity and the possible dangers arising from Synthetic Biology (AU)

Este artículo aborda las campos de conflicto y las cuestiones legales de la biología sintética, especialmente lo relativo a la bioseguridad. La pertinente discusión jurisprudencial no ha tenido lugar aún en Alemania, al margen de algunas declaraciones y recomendaciones. Pero en Alemania, en Europa y en los Estados Unidos, es generalmente aceptada la necesidad de un debate respecto de este asunto. Esto es especialmente válido para la cuestión de la bioseguridad y de los posibles peligros derivados de la biología sintética (AU)

Ethical challenges in preparing for bioterrorism: barriers within the health care system.

Preparedness for bioterrorism poses significant ethical challenges. Although public health ethics and preparedness have received attention recently, health care ethics must also be considered. In epidemics, the health care system assists public health in 3 tasks: detection, containment, and treatment. Detection might fail if all patients do not have access to care, or if physicians do not understand their obligation to report infectious diseases to public health authorities. Containment might fail if physicians view themselves only as advocates for individual patients, ignoring their social obligations as health professionals. Treatment might fail if physicians do not accept their professional duty to treat patients during epidemics. Each of these potential ethical barriers to preparedness must be addressed by physicians and society.