A unified framework for perceived magnitude and discriminability of sensory stimuli.

The perception of sensory attributes is often quantified through measurements of sensitivity (the ability to detect small stimulus changes), as well as through direct judgments of appearance or intensity. Despite their ubiquity, the relationship between these two measurements remains controversial and unresolved. Here, we propose a framework in which they arise from different aspects of a common representation. Specifically, we assume that judgments of stimulus intensity (e.g., as measured through rating scales) reflect the mean value of an internal representation, and sensitivity reflects a combination of mean value and noise properties, as quantified by the statistical measure of Fisher information. Unique identification of these internal representation properties can be achieved by combining measurements of sensitivity and judgments of intensity. As a central example, we show that Weber's law of perceptual sensitivity can coexist with Stevens' power-law scaling of intensity ratings (for all exponents), when the noise amplitude increases in proportion to the representational mean. We then extend this result beyond the Weber's law range by incorporating a more general and physiology-inspired form of noise and show that the combination of noise properties and sensitivity measurements accurately predicts intensity ratings across a variety of sensory modalities and attributes. Our framework unifies two primary perceptual measurements-thresholds for sensitivity and rating scales for intensity-and provides a neural interpretation for the underlying representation.

Systematic testing of three Language Models reveals low language accuracy, absence of response stability, and a yes-response bias.

Humans are universally good in providing stable and accurate judgments about what forms part of their language and what not. Large Language Models (LMs) are claimed to possess human-like language abilities; hence, they are expected to emulate this behavior by providing both stable and accurate answers, when asked whether a string of words complies with or deviates from their next-word predictions. This work tests whether stability and accuracy are showcased by GPT-3/text-davinci-002, GPT-3/text-davinci-003, and ChatGPT, using a series of judgment tasks that tap on 8 linguistic phenomena: plural attraction, anaphora, center embedding, comparatives, intrusive resumption, negative polarity items, order of adjectives, and order of adverbs. For every phenomenon, 10 sentences (5 grammatical and 5 ungrammatical) are tested, each randomly repeated 10 times, totaling 800 elicited judgments per LM (total n = 2,400). Our results reveal variable above-chance accuracy in the grammatical condition, below-chance accuracy in the ungrammatical condition, a significant instability of answers across phenomena, and a yes-response bias for all the tested LMs. Furthermore, we found no evidence that repetition aids the Models to converge on a processing strategy that culminates in stable answers, either accurate or inaccurate. We demonstrate that the LMs' performance in identifying (un)grammatical word patterns is in stark contrast to what is observed in humans (n = 80, tested on the same tasks) and argue that adopting LMs as theories of human language is not motivated at their current stage of development.

Value Estimation versus Effort Mobilization: A General Dissociation between Ventromedial and Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex.

Deciding on a course of action requires both an accurate estimation of option values and the right amount of effort invested in deliberation to reach sufficient confidence in the final choice. In a previous study, we have provided evidence, across a series of judgment and choice tasks, for a dissociation between the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), which would represent option values, and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), which would represent the duration of deliberation. Here, we first replicate this dissociation and extend it to the case of an instrumental learning task, in which 24 human volunteers (13 women) choose between options associated with probabilistic gains and losses. According to fMRI data recorded during decision-making, vmPFC activity reflects the sum of option values generated by a reinforcement learning model and dmPFC activity the deliberation time. To further generalize the role of the dmPFC in mobilizing effort, we then analyze fMRI data recorded in the same participants while they prepare to perform motor and cognitive tasks (squeezing a handgrip or making numerical comparisons) to maximize gains or minimize losses. In both cases, dmPFC activity is associated with the output of an effort regulation model, and not with response time. Taken together, these results strengthen a general theory of behavioral control that implicates the vmPFC in the estimation of option values and the dmPFC in the energization of relevant motor and cognitive processes.

Adaptive adjustment after conflict with group opinion: evidence from neural electrophysiology.

Individuals inherently seek social consensus when making decisions or judgments. Previous studies have consistently indicated that dissenting group opinions are perceived as social conflict that demands attitude adjustment. However, the neurocognitive processes of attitude adjustment are unclear. In this electrophysiological study, participants were recruited to perform a face attractiveness judgment task. After forming their own judgment of a face, participants were informed of a purported group judgment (either consistent or inconsistent with their judgment), and then, critically, the same face was presented again. The neural responses to the second presented faces were measured. The second presented faces evoked a larger late positive potential after conflict with group opinions than those that did not conflict, suggesting that more motivated attention was allocated to stimulus. Moreover, faces elicited greater midfrontal theta (4-7 Hz) power after conflict with group opinions than after consistency with group opinions, suggesting that cognitive control was initiated to support attitude adjustment. Furthermore, the mixed-effects model revealed that single-trial theta power predicted behavioral change in the Conflict condition, but not in the No-Conflict condition. These findings provide novel insights into the neurocognitive processes underlying attitude adjustment, which is crucial to behavioral change during conformity.

Distinct neural markers of evidence accumulation index metacognitive processing before and after simple visual decisions.

Perceptual decision-making is affected by uncertainty arising from the reliability of incoming sensory evidence (perceptual uncertainty) and the categorization of that evidence relative to a choice boundary (categorical uncertainty). Here, we investigated how these factors impact the temporal dynamics of evidence processing during decision-making and subsequent metacognitive judgments. Participants performed a motion discrimination task while electroencephalography was recorded. We manipulated perceptual uncertainty by varying motion coherence, and categorical uncertainty by varying the angular offset of motion signals relative to a criterion. After each trial, participants rated their desire to change their mind. High uncertainty impaired perceptual and metacognitive judgments and reduced the amplitude of the centro-parietal positivity, a neural marker of evidence accumulation. Coherence and offset affected the centro-parietal positivity at different time points, suggesting that perceptual and categorical uncertainty affect decision-making in sequential stages. Moreover, the centro-parietal positivity predicted participants' metacognitive judgments: larger predecisional centro-parietal positivity amplitude was associated with less desire to change one's mind, whereas larger postdecisional centro-parietal positivity amplitude was associated with greater desire to change one's mind, but only following errors. These findings reveal a dissociation between predecisional and postdecisional evidence processing, suggesting that the CPP tracks potentially distinct cognitive processes before and after a decision.

Atypical neural encoding of faces in individuals with autism spectrum disorder.

Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) experience pervasive difficulties in processing social information from faces. However, the behavioral and neural mechanisms underlying social trait judgments of faces in ASD remain largely unclear. Here, we comprehensively addressed this question by employing functional neuroimaging and parametrically generated faces that vary in facial trustworthiness and dominance. Behaviorally, participants with ASD exhibited reduced specificity but increased inter-rater variability in social trait judgments. Neurally, participants with ASD showed hypo-activation across broad face-processing areas. Multivariate analysis based on trial-by-trial face responses could discriminate participant groups in the majority of the face-processing areas. Encoding social traits in ASD engaged vastly different face-processing areas compared to controls, and encoding different social traits engaged different brain areas. Interestingly, the idiosyncratic brain areas encoding social traits in ASD were still flexible and context-dependent, similar to neurotypicals. Additionally, participants with ASD also showed an altered encoding of facial saliency features in the eyes and mouth. Together, our results provide a comprehensive understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying social trait judgments in ASD.

How we perceive the width of grasped objects: Insights into the central processes that govern proprioceptive judgements.

Low-level proprioceptive judgements involve a single frame of reference, whereas high-level proprioceptive judgements are made across different frames of reference. The present study systematically compared low-level (grasp → $\rightarrow$ grasp) and high-level (vision → $\rightarrow$ grasp, grasp → $\rightarrow$ vision) proprioceptive tasks, and quantified the consistency of grasp → $\rightarrow$ vision and possible reciprocal nature of related high-level proprioceptive tasks. Experiment 1 (n = 30) compared performance across vision → $\rightarrow$ grasp, a grasp → $\rightarrow$ vision and a grasp → $\rightarrow$ grasp tasks. Experiment 2 (n = 30) compared performance on the grasp → $\rightarrow$ vision task between hands and over time. Participants were accurate (mean absolute error 0.27 cm [0.20 to 0.34]; mean [95% CI]) and precise ( R 2 $R^2$ = 0.95 [0.93 to 0.96]) for grasp → $\rightarrow$ grasp judgements, with a strong correlation between outcomes (r = -0.85 [-0.93 to -0.70]). Accuracy and precision decreased in the two high-level tasks ( R 2 $R^2$ = 0.86 and 0.89; mean absolute error = 1.34 and 1.41 cm), with most participants overestimating perceived width for the vision → $\rightarrow$ grasp task and underestimating it for grasp → $\rightarrow$ vision task. There was minimal correlation between accuracy and precision for these two tasks. Converging evidence indicated performance was largely reciprocal (inverse) between the vision → $\rightarrow$ grasp and grasp → $\rightarrow$ vision tasks. Performance on the grasp → $\rightarrow$ vision task was consistent between dominant and non-dominant hands, and across repeated sessions a day or week apart. Overall, there are fundamental differences between low- and high-level proprioceptive judgements that reflect fundamental differences in the cortical processes that underpin these perceptions. Moreover, the central transformations that govern high-level proprioceptive judgements of grasp are personalised, stable and reciprocal for reciprocal tasks. KEY POINTS: Low-level proprioceptive judgements involve a single frame of reference (e.g. indicating the width of a grasped object by selecting from a series of objects of different width), whereas high-level proprioceptive judgements are made across different frames of reference (e.g. indicating the width of a grasped object by selecting from a series of visible lines of different length). We highlight fundamental differences in the precision and accuracy of low- and high-level proprioceptive judgements. We provide converging evidence that the neural transformations between frames of reference that govern high-level proprioceptive judgements of grasp are personalised, stable and reciprocal for reciprocal tasks. This stability is likely key to precise judgements and accurate predictions in high-level proprioception.

Lesion-symptom Mapping of Acceptability Judgments in Chronic Poststroke Aphasia Reveals the Neurobiological Underpinnings of Receptive Syntax.

Disagreements persist regarding the neural basis of syntactic processing, which has been linked both to inferior frontal and posterior temporal regions of the brain. One focal point of the debate concerns the role of inferior frontal areas in receptive syntactic ability, which is mostly assessed using sentence comprehension involving complex syntactic structures, a task that is potentially confounded with working memory. Syntactic acceptability judgments may provide a better measure of receptive syntax by reducing the need to use high working memory load and complex sentences and by enabling assessment of various types of syntactic violations. We therefore tested the perception of grammatical violations by people with poststroke aphasia (n = 25), along with matched controls (n = 16), using English sentences involving errors in word order, agreement, or subcategorization. Lesion data were also collected. Control participants performed near ceiling in accuracy with higher discriminability of agreement and subcategorization violations than word order; aphasia participants were less able to discriminate violations, but, on average, paralleled control participants discriminability of types of violations. Lesion-symptom mapping showed a correlation between discriminability and posterior temporal regions, but not inferior frontal regions. We argue that these results diverge from models holding that frontal areas are amodal core regions in syntactic structure building and favor models that posit a core hierarchical system in posterior temporal regions.

The brain dynamics of visuospatial perspective-taking captured by intracranial EEG.

Visuospatial perspective-taking (VPT) is the ability to imagine a scene from a position different from the one used in self-perspective judgments (SPJ). We typically use VPT to understand how others see the environment. VPT requires overcoming the self-perspective, and impairments in this process are implicated in various brain disorders, such as schizophrenia and autism. However, the underlying brain areas of VPT are not well distinguished from SPJ-related ones and from domain-general responses to both perspectives. In addition, hierarchical processing theory suggests that domain-specific processes emerge over time from domain-general ones. It mainly focuses on the sensory system, but outside of it, support for this hypothesis is lacking. Therefore, we aimed to spatiotemporally distinguish brain responses domain-specific to VPT from the specific ones to self-perspective, and domain-general responses to both perspectives. In particular, we intended to test whether VPT- and SPJ specific responses begin later than the general ones. We recorded intracranial EEG data from 30 patients with epilepsy who performed a task requiring laterality judgments during VPT and SPJ, and analyzed the spatiotemporal features of responses in the broad gamma band (50-150 Hz). We found VPT-specific processing in a more extensive brain network than SPJ-specific processing. Their dynamics were similar, but both differed from the general responses, which began earlier and lasted longer. Our results anatomically distinguish VPT-specific from SPJ-specific processing. Furthermore, we temporally differentiate between domain-specific and domain-general processes both inside and outside the sensory system, which serves as a novel example of hierarchical processing.

Neural mechanisms underpinning metacognitive shifts driven by non-informative predictions.

Humans constantly make predictions and such predictions allow us to prepare for future events. Yet, such benefits may come with drawbacks as premature predictions may potentially bias subsequent judgments. Here we examined how prediction influences our perceptual decisions and subsequent confidence judgments, on scenarios where the predictions were arbitrary and independent of the identity of the upcoming stimuli. We defined them as invalid and non-informative predictions. Behavioral results showed that, such non-informative predictions biased perceptual decisions in favor of the predicted choice, and such prediction-induced perceptual bias further increased the metacognitive efficiency. The functional MRI results showed that activities in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC) encoded the response consistency between predictions and perceptual decisions. Activity in mPFC predicted the strength of this congruency bias across individuals. Moreover, the parametric encoding of confidence in putamen was modulated by prediction-choice consistency, such that activity in putamen was negatively correlated with confidence rating after inconsistent responses. These findings suggest that predictions, while made arbitrarily, orchestrate the neural representations of choice and confidence judgment.

Multisensory perception depends on the reliability of the type of judgment.

The brain engages the processes of multisensory integration and recalibration to deal with discrepant multisensory signals. These processes consider the reliability of each sensory input, with the more reliable modality receiving the stronger weight. Sensory reliability is typically assessed via the variability of participants' judgments, yet these can be shaped by factors both external and internal to the nervous system. For example, motor noise and participant's dexterity with the specific response method contribute to judgment variability, and different response methods applied to the same stimuli can result in different estimates of sensory reliabilities. Here we ask how such variations in reliability induced by variations in the response method affect multisensory integration and sensory recalibration, as well as motor adaptation, in a visuomotor paradigm. Participants performed center-out hand movements and were asked to judge the position of the hand or rotated visual feedback at the movement end points. We manipulated the variability, and thus the reliability, of repeated judgments by asking participants to respond using either a visual or a proprioceptive matching procedure. We find that the relative weights of visual and proprioceptive signals, and thus the asymmetry of multisensory integration and recalibration, depend on the reliability modulated by the judgment method. Motor adaptation, in contrast, was insensitive to this manipulation. Hence, the outcome of multisensory binding is shaped by the noise introduced by sensorimotor processing, in line with perception and action being intertwined.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Our brain tends to combine multisensory signals based on their respective reliability. This reliability depends on sensory noise in the environment, noise in the nervous system, and, as we show here, variability induced by the specific judgment procedure.

The neural representation of metacognition in preferential decision-making.

Humans regularly assess the quality of their judgements, which helps them adjust their behaviours. Metacognition is the ability to accurately evaluate one's own judgements, and it is assessed by comparing objective task performance with subjective confidence report in perceptual decisions. However, for preferential decisions, assessing metacognition in preference-based decisions is difficult because it depends on subjective goals rather than the objective criterion. Here, we develop a new index that integrates choice, reaction time, and confidence report to quantify trial-by-trial metacognitive sensitivity in preference judgements. We found that the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and the right anterior insular were more activated when participants made bad metacognitive evaluations. Our study suggests a crucial role of the dmPFC-insula network in representing online metacognitive sensitivity in preferential decisions.

Neural correlates of metacognition: Disentangling the brain circuits underlying prospective and retrospective second-order judgments through noninvasive brain stimulation.

Metacognition encompasses the capability to monitor and control one's cognitive processes, with metamemory and metadecision configuring among the most studied higher order functions. Although imaging experiments evaluated the role of disparate brain regions, neural substrates of metacognitive judgments remain undetermined. The aim of this systematic review is to summarize and discuss the available evidence concerning the neural bases of metacognition which has been collected by assessing the effects of noninvasive brain stimulation (NIBS) on human subjects' metacognitive capacities. Based on such literature analysis, our goal is, at first, to verify whether prospective and retrospective second-order judgments are localized within separate brain circuits and, subsequently, to provide compelling clues useful for identifying new targets for future NIBS studies. The search was conducted following the preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses guidelines among PubMed, PsycINFO, PsycARTICLES, PSYNDEX, MEDLINE, and ERIC databases. Overall, 25 studies met the eligibility criteria, yielding a total of 36 experiments employing transcranial magnetic stimulation and 16 ones making use of transcranial electrical stimulation techniques, including transcranial direct current stimulation and transcranial alternating current stimulation. Importantly, we found that both perspective and retrospective judgments about both memory and perceptual decision-making performances depend on the activation of the anterior and lateral portions of the prefrontal cortex, as well as on the activity of more caudal regions such as the premotor cortex and the precuneus. Combining this evidence with results from previous imaging and lesion studies, we advance ventromedial prefrontal cortex as a promising target for future NIBS studies.

Sparsity in an artificial neural network predicts beauty: Towards a model of processing-based aesthetics.

Generations of scientists have pursued the goal of defining beauty. While early scientists initially focused on objective criteria of beauty ('feature-based aesthetics'), philosophers and artists alike have since proposed that beauty arises from the interaction between the object and the individual who perceives it. The aesthetic theory of fluency formalizes this idea of interaction by proposing that beauty is determined by the efficiency of information processing in the perceiver's brain ('processing-based aesthetics'), and that efficient processing induces a positive aesthetic experience. The theory is supported by numerous psychological results, however, to date there is no quantitative predictive model to test it on a large scale. In this work, we propose to leverage the capacity of deep convolutional neural networks (DCNN) to model the processing of information in the brain by studying the link between beauty and neuronal sparsity, a measure of information processing efficiency. Whether analyzing pictures of faces, figurative or abstract art paintings, neuronal sparsity explains up to 28% of variance in beauty scores, and up to 47% when combined with a feature-based metric. However, we also found that sparsity is either positively or negatively correlated with beauty across the multiple layers of the DCNN. Our quantitative model stresses the importance of considering how information is processed, in addition to the content of that information, when predicting beauty, but also suggests an unexpectedly complex relationship between fluency and beauty.

Metamemory and executive function mediate the age-related decline in memory.

OBJECTIVE: Although the effect of aging on episodic memory is relatively well studied, little is known about how aging influences metamemory. In addition, while executive function (EF) is known to mediate the age-related decline in episodic memory, the role of metamemory in aging-related memory differences beyond EF remains unknown. This study aimed to elucidate the effect of aging on metamemory and to clarify the role of metamemory in the age-related decline in memory. METHOD: One hundred and four adults aged 18-79 years (50 M, 54 F) performed several EF tasks, as well as a face-scene paired-associate learning task that required them to make judgments of learning, feeling-of-knowing judgments, and retrospective confidence judgments. RESULTS: Aging was significantly associated with poor metamemory accuracy and increased confidence across metamemory judgment types, even after controlling for EF and memory performance. A parallel mediation analysis indicated that both confidence of learning and EF performance had significant partial mediation effects on the relationship between aging and memory, albeit in different ways. Specifically, poor EF explained the age-related decline in memory, whereas increased confidence of learning served to compensate for this memory decline. CONCLUSIONS: Aging is associated with general changes (i.e., poor inferences from cues) rather than specific changes (i.e., declined activation or utilization of certain cues) in metamemory monitoring. Also, changes in confidence of learning and in EF ability contribute to the preservation and decline of memory during aging, respectively. Therefore, boosting confidence during encoding and enhancing EF skills might be complementary memory intervention strategies for older adults.

The development of visual cognition: The emergence of spatial congruency bias.

In adults, spatial location plays a special role in visual object processing. People are more likely to judge two sequentially presented objects as being identical when they appear in the same location compared to in different locations (a phenomenon referred to as Spatial Congruency Bias [SCB]). However, no comparable Identity Congruency Bias (ICB) is found, suggesting an asymmetric location-identity relationship in object binding. What gives rise to this asymmetric congruency bias? This paper considered two possible hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 suggests that the asymmetric congruency bias results from an inherently special role of location in the visual system. In contrast, Hypothesis 2 suggests that the asymmetric congruency bias is a product of development, reflecting people's experience with the world. To distinguish the two hypotheses, we tested both adults' and 5-year-old children's SCB and ICB by Identity Judgment Experiments and Spatial Judgment Experiments, respectively. The study found that adults only exhibited a SCB, but no ICB. However, young children exhibited both SCB and ICB, suggesting a symmetric congruency bias and reciprocal influences between location and identity in early development. The results indicate that the asymmetric location-identity relationship develops as object identity's influence on location gets pruned away, while location's influence on identity is preserved, possibly due to people's gained experiences with regularities of the world. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Adults exhibit Spatial Congruency Bias-an asymmetric location-identity relationship with location biasing their judgment of object identities, but not vice versa. Asymmetric congruency bias may result from an inherently special role of location in visual system (Hypothesis 1) or accumulated experiences with the world (Hypothesis 2). To distinguish the two hypotheses, the study investigated the Spatial Congruency Bias and Identity Congruency Bias in both adults and 5-year-old children. Unlike adults who exhibited only Spatial Congruency Bias, 5-year-old children exhibited both Spatial Congruency Bias and Identity Congruency Bias.

Activating words without language: beta and theta oscillations reflect lexical access and control processes during verbal and non-verbal object recognition tasks.

The intention to name an object modulates neural responses during object recognition tasks. However, the nature of this modulation is still unclear. We established whether a core operation in language, i.e. lexical access, can be observed even when the task does not require language (size-judgment task), and whether response selection in verbal versus non-verbal semantic tasks relies on similar neuronal processes. We measured and compared neuronal oscillatory activities and behavioral responses to the same set of pictures of meaningful objects, while the type of task participants had to perform (picture-naming versus size-judgment) and the type of stimuli to measure lexical access (cognate versus non-cognate) were manipulated. Despite activation of words was facilitated when the task required explicit word-retrieval (picture-naming task), lexical access occurred even without the intention to name the object (non-verbal size-judgment task). Activation of words and response selection were accompanied by beta (25-35 Hz) desynchronization and theta (3-7 Hz) synchronization, respectively. These effects were observed in both picture-naming and size-judgment tasks, suggesting that words became activated via similar mechanisms, irrespective of whether the task involves language explicitly. This finding has important implications to understand the link between core linguistic operations and performance in verbal and non-verbal semantic tasks.

The characteristics of audiovisual temporal integration in streaming-bouncing bistable motion perception: considering both implicit and explicit processing perspectives.

This study explored the behavioral and neural activity characteristics of audiovisual temporal integration in motion perception from both implicit and explicit perspectives. The streaming-bouncing bistable paradigm (SB task) was employed to investigate implicit temporal integration, while the corresponding simultaneity judgment task (SJ task) was used to examine explicit temporal integration. The behavioral results revealed a negative correlation between implicit and explicit temporal processing. In the ERP results of both tasks, three neural phases (PD100, ND180, and PD290) in the fronto-central region were identified as reflecting integration effects and the auditory-evoked multisensory N1 component may serve as a primary component responsible for cross-modal temporal processing. However, there were significant differences between the VA ERPs in the SB and SJ tasks and the influence of speed on implicit and explicit integration effects also varied. The aforementioned results, building upon the validation of previous temporal renormalization theory, suggest that implicit and explicit temporal integration operate under distinct processing modes within a shared neural network. This underscores the brain's flexibility and adaptability in cross-modal temporal processing.

A shared brain system forming confidence judgment across cognitive domains.

Confidence is typically defined as a subjective judgment about whether a decision is right. Decisions are based on sources of information that come from various cognitive domains and are processed in different brain systems. An unsettled question is whether the brain computes confidence in a similar manner whatever the domain or in a manner that would be idiosyncratic to each domain. To address this issue, human participants performed two tasks probing confidence in decisions made about the same material (history and geography statements), but based on different cognitive processes: semantic memory for deciding whether the statement was true or false, and duration perception for deciding whether the statement display was long or short. At the behavioral level, we found that the same factors (difficulty, accuracy, response time, and confidence in the preceding decision) predicted confidence judgments in both tasks. At the neural level, we observed using functional magnetic resonance imaging that confidence judgments in both tasks were associated to activity in the same brain regions: positively in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and negatively in a prefronto-parietal network. Together, these findings suggest the existence of a shared brain system that generates confidence judgments in a similar manner across cognitive domains.

The illusory certainty: Information repetition and impressions of truth enhance subjective confidence in validity judgments independently of the factual truth.

People not only judge repeatedly perceived information as more likely being true (the so-called truth effect) they also tend to be more confident after judging the validity of repeated information. These phenomena are assumed to be caused by a higher subjective feeling of ease (i.e., fluency) when processing repeated (vs. new) information. Based on the suggestion that a higher number of coherent mental activations is promoting a fluency experience, we argue that besides repetition an already existing information network, that is (nonspecific) prior knowledge, can enhance fluency. Following this argumentation, information repetition as well as the act of judging incoming information as being true (vs. false) should feed into subjective confidence - independently of the factual truth (when judging under uncertainty). To test this, we reanalyzed two published data sets and conducted a new study. In total, participants (N = 247) gave 29,490 truth judgments and corresponding ratings of subjective confidence while attending two judgement phases (i.e., 10 min and 1 week after the exposure phase in each experiment). Results showed that (a) repetition (in 3 of 3 data sets) and (b) impressions of truth (in 2 of 3 data sets) were systematically related to higher subjective confidence. Moreover, we found (c) a significant positive interaction between repetition and impressions of truth after both intervals in all data sets. Our analyses further underline the moderating effect of time: Influences of repetition significantly decreased with increasing time interval. Notably, the factual truth did not systematically affect any of the above reported effects.