The role of national and international veterinary laboratories.

In the field of diagnostic test validation, World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) Reference Laboratories (RLs) have a pivotal role and provide the international community with impartial advice and support in the selection, development and validation of diagnostic tests, which can be applied to the specialist diseases for which they are designated. National RLs provide an invaluable function in supporting the introduction, ongoing validation and application of validated diagnostic tests in line with international standards. Experienced staff with extensive knowledge of such systems and access to specialist facilities for conducting work are available to monitor changes or advancements in technology. They consider their relevance and value to evolving diagnostic test requirements. Reference Laboratories often have a broad mandate of activity linking research or development programmes and surveillance activities to benefit the continual assessment and, if necessary, improvement of diagnostic tools. Reference Laboratories maintain or have access to unique biological archives (known positive and negative sample populations) and produce international reference standards, both of which are vital in establishing the necessary and detailed validation of any diagnostic test. Reference Laboratories act either singularly or in collaborative partnerships with other RLs or science institutes, but also, when required, and with impartiality, with the commercial sector, to ensure new tests are validated according to OIE standards. They promote and apply formal programmes of quality assurance (including proficiency testing programmes) for newly validated tests, ensuring ongoing monitoring and compliance with standards, or as required set out any limitations or uncertainties. Reference Laboratories publish information on test validation in the scientific literature and on relevant websites, as well as disseminating information at workshops and international conferences. Furthermore, they can offer training in the processes and systems underpinning test validation.

Dans le domaine de la validation des tests de diagnostic, les Laboratoires de référence de l'Organisation mondiale de la santé animale (OIE) jouent un rôle central et fournissent à la communauté internationale des conseils impartiaux ainsi qu'un soutien pour la sélection, la mise au point et la validation des tests de diagnostic utilisés pour la détection des maladies correspondant à leur domaine de spécialisation. Les Laboratoires de référence nationaux remplissent une fonction inestimable en facilitant l'introduction, la validation continue et l'application de tests de diagnostic validés conformément aux normes internationales. Ces laboratoires sont dotés de personnels expérimentés possédant une connaissance approfondie de ces systèmes et qui ont accès à des installations spécialisées pour mener à bien leurs opérations et suivre de près les changements ou les avancées technologiques. Ils peuvent ainsi examiner leur pertinence et intérêt au regard de l'évolution des exigences relatives aux tests de diagnostic. Le mandat des Laboratoires de référence recouvre souvent un large éventail d'activités reliant les programmes de recherche ou développement et les activités de surveillance, ce qui permet de réaliser une évaluation continue des outils diagnostiques et, si besoin, de procéder à leur amélioration. Les Laboratoires de référence entretiennent ou ont accès à des banques de matériels biologiques uniques (panels d'échantillons positifs et négatifs connus) et produisent des réactifs de référence internationale, deux catégories de matériels essentielles pour procéder à la validation point par point d'un test diagnostique suivant les critères requis. Les Laboratoires de référence interviennent individuellement ou en partenariat avec d'autres Laboratoires de référence ou instituts scientifiques, mais aussi, lorsque c'est nécessaire et dans le respect des règles d'impartialité, avec le secteur privé, afin de s'assurer que les nouveaux tests sont validés conformément aux normes de l'OIE. Ils soutiennent et appliquent des programmes officiels d'assurance de la qualité (y compris en participant à des programmes d'essais d'aptitude inter-laboratoires) pour les tests nouvellement validés et garantissent leur suivi continu ainsi que leur conformité avec les normes, ou, suivant les cas, définissent les limites ou le niveau d'incertitude à prendre en considération. Les Laboratoires de référence publient les données relatives à la validation des tests dans des journaux scientifique et sur les sites Web pertinents et diffusent également des informations sur le sujet lors d'ateliers et de conférences internationales. En outre, ils peuvent proposer des formations sur les procédures et les systèmes qui sous-tendent la validation des tests.

En el terreno de la validación de pruebas de diagnóstico, los Laboratorios de Referencia de la Organización Mundial de Sanidad Animal (OIE) cumplen una función central y proporcionan a la comunidad internacional servicios de apoyo y asesoramiento imparcial para la selección, el desarrollo y la validación de pruebas de diagnóstico, que pueden aplicarse a la enfermedad para la que cada laboratorio esté designado. Los laboratorios de referencia nacionales cumplen una inestimable función de apoyo a la implantación, la continua validación y la utilización de pruebas de diagnóstico validadas con arreglo a las normas internacionales. Disponen de personal experimentado y muy buen conocedor de estos sistemas y de acceso a instalaciones especializadas de trabajo, lo que les permite seguir de cerca los cambios o adelantos tecnológicos y estudiar su utilidad o interés en relación con la evolución de los requisitos de las pruebas de diagnóstico. Los Laboratorios de Referencia suelen tener un mandato amplio, que a los programas de investigación y desarrollo aúna actividades de vigilancia, en aras de la continua evaluación y, en caso necesario, mejora de las herramientas de diagnóstico. Estos laboratorios poseen (o tienen acceso a) archivos biológicos únicos (conjuntos de muestras probadamente positivas y negativas) y elaboran patrones de referencia internacional, elementos ambos indispensables para llevar a buen fin la necesaria validación detallada de toda prueba de diagnóstico. Los Laboratorios de Referencia pueden trabajar en solitario o en colaboración con otros Laboratorios de Referencia, con institutos científicos e incluso, cuando hace falta, y procediendo con imparcialidad, con entidades del sector privado, a fin de garantizar que toda nueva prueba sea validada con arreglo a las normas de la OIE. También promueven y llevan adelante programas oficiales de garantía de la calidad de pruebas recién validadas (incluidos programas de pruebas de competencia), lo que asegura un seguimiento continuo y el cumplimiento de la normativa en todo momento, o fijan, cuando es necesario, limitaciones o niveles de incertidumbre. Asimismo, estos laboratorios publican datos sobre la validación de pruebas en revistas científicas y sitios web conexos y difunden información al respecto en talleres y conferencias internacionales. Además, pueden impartir formación sobre los procesos y sistemas que fundamentan la validación de pruebas de diagnóstico.

Evaluation of ELISA and haemagglutination inhibition as screening tests in serosurveillance for H5/H7 avian influenza in commercial chicken flocks.

Avian influenza virus (AIV) subtypes H5 and H7 can infect poultry causing low pathogenicity (LP) AI, but these LPAIVs may mutate to highly pathogenic AIV in chickens or turkeys causing high mortality, hence H5/H7 subtypes demand statutory intervention. Serological surveillance in the European Union provides evidence of H5/H7 AIV exposure in apparently healthy poultry. To identify the most sensitive screening method as the first step in an algorithm to provide evidence of H5/H7 AIV infection, the standard approach of H5/H7 antibody testing by haemagglutination inhibition (HI) was compared with an ELISA, which detects antibodies to all subtypes. Sera (n = 1055) from 74 commercial chicken flocks were tested by both methods. A Bayesian approach served to estimate diagnostic test sensitivities and specificities, without assuming any 'gold standard'. Sensitivity and specificity of the ELISA was 97% and 99.8%, and for H5/H7 HI 43% and 99.8%, respectively, although H5/H7 HI sensitivity varied considerably between infected flocks. ELISA therefore provides superior sensitivity for the screening of chicken flocks as part of an algorithm, which subsequently utilises H5/H7 HI to identify infection by these two subtypes. With the calculated sensitivity and specificity, testing nine sera per flock is sufficient to detect a flock seroprevalence of 30% with 95% probability.

Antigenic and genetic analyses of isolate APMV/wigeon/Italy/3920-1/2005 indicate that it represents a new avian paramyxovirus (APMV-12).

Isolate wigeon/Italy/3920-1/2005 (3920-1) was obtained during surveillance of wild birds in November 2005 in the Rovigo province of Northern Italy and shown to be a paramyxovirus. Analysis of cross-haemagglutination-inhibition tests between 3920-1 and representative avian paramyxoviruses showed only a low-level relationship to APMV-1. Phylogenetic analysis of the whole genome and each of the six genes indicated that while 3920-1 grouped with APMV-1 and APMV-9 viruses, it was quite distinct from these two. In the whole-genome analysis, 3920-1 had 52.1 % nucleotide sequence identity to the closest APMV-1 virus, 50.1 % identity to the APMV-9 genome, and less than 42 % identity to representatives of the other avian paramyxovirus groups. We propose isolate wigeon/Italy/3920-1/2005 as the prototype strain of a further APMV group, APMV-12.

Evaluation of the pooling of swabs for real-time PCR detection of low titre shedding of low pathogenicity avian influenza in turkeys.

The purpose of this study was to determine whether pooling avian influenza (AI)-positive swabs with negative swabs has a detrimental effect on the sensitivity of AI real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reactions (rRT-PCRs). Cloacal and buccal swabs were sampled daily from 12 turkeys infected with A/goose/England/07(H2N2). For half the turkeys, each swab was mixed with four swabs from known AI-negative turkeys, and for the other half the swabs were tested individually. Bayesian modelling was used to (i) determine whether pooling the positive swabs compromised the cycle threshold (C(t)) value obtained from the rRT-PCRs, and (ii) estimate the likelihood of detection of an H2N2 infected turkey flock via rRT-PCR for pooled and individually tested swabs (cloacal and buccal) vs. the number of days post-infection of the flock. Results indicated that there was no significant effect of compromising AI rRT-PCR sensitivity by pooling a weak positive swab with negative swabs on the Ct values which were obtained. Pooled sampling was able to widen the detection window compared to individual sampling, for the same number of rRT-PCR tests. This indicates that pooled sampling would be an effective method of reducing the number of tests to be performed to determine flock status during an AI outbreak and for surveillance.

Estimating reassortment rates in co-circulating Eurasian swine influenza viruses.

Swine have often been considered as a mixing vessel for different influenza strains. In order to assess their role in more detail, we undertook a retrospective sequencing study to detect and characterize the reassortants present in European swine and to estimate the rate of reassortment between H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 subtypes with Eurasian (avian-like) internal protein-coding segments. We analysed 69 newly obtained whole genome sequences of subtypes H1N1-H3N2 from swine influenza viruses sampled between 1982 and 2008, using Illumina and 454 platforms. Analyses of these genomes, together with previously published genomes, revealed a large monophyletic clade of Eurasian swine-lineage polymerase segments containing H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 subtypes. We subsequently examined reassortments between the haemagglutinin and neuraminidase segments and estimated the reassortment rates between lineages using a recently developed evolutionary analysis method. High rates of reassortment between H1N2 and H1N1 Eurasian swine lineages were detected in European strains, with an average of one reassortment every 2-3 years. This rapid reassortment results from co-circulating lineages in swine, and in consequence we should expect further reassortments between currently circulating swine strains and the recent swine-origin H1N1v pandemic strain.

The ecology and age structure of a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus outbreak in wild mute swans.

The first UK epizootic of highly pathogenic (HP) H5N1 influenza in wild birds occurred in 2008, in a population of mute swans that had been the subject of ornithological study for decades. Here we use an innovative combination of ornithological, phylogenetic and immunological approaches to investigate the ecology and age structure of HP H5N1 in nature. We screened samples from swans and waterbirds using PCR and sequenced HP H5N1-positive samples. The outbreak's origin was investigated by linking bird count data with a molecular clock analysis of sampled virus sequences. We used ringing records to reconstruct the age-structure of outbreak mortality, and we estimated the age distribution of prior exposure to avian influenza. Outbreak mortality was low and all HP H5N1-positive mute swans in the affected population were <3 years old. Only the youngest age classes contained an appreciable number of individuals with no detectable antibody responses to viral nucleoprotein. Phylogenetic analysis indicated that the outbreak strain circulated locally for ~1 month before detection and arrived when the immigration rate of migrant waterbirds was highest. Our data are consistent with the hypothesis that HP H5N1 epizootics in wild swans exhibit limited mortality due to immune protection arising from previous exposure. Our study population may represent a valuable resource for investigating the natural ecology and epidemiology of avian influenza.

Transatlantic spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 by wild birds from Europe to North America in 2021.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of the A/Goose/Guangdong/1/1996 lineage (GsGd), which threaten the health of poultry, wildlife and humans, are spreading across Asia, Europe, Africa and North America but are currently absent from South America and Oceania. In December 2021, H5N1 HPAI viruses were detected in poultry and a free-living gull in St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada. Our phylogenetic analysis showed that these viruses were most closely related to HPAI GsGd viruses circulating in northwestern Europe in spring 2021. Our analysis of wild bird migration suggested that these viruses may have been carried across the Atlantic via Iceland, Greenland/Arctic or pelagic routes. The here documented incursion of HPAI GsGd viruses into North America raises concern for further virus spread across the Americas by wild bird migration.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N6 (clade 2.3.4.4b) has a preferable host tropism for waterfowl reflected in its inefficient transmission to terrestrial poultry.

Highly-pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N6 (clade 2.3.4.4b) incurred into Europe in late 2017 and was predominantly detected in wild birds, with very few terrestrial poultry cases. Pekin ducks directly-infected with a UK virus (H5N6-2017) were donors of infection to investigate contact transmission to three recipient species: Ducks, chickens and turkeys. H5N6-2017 transmission to ducks was 100% efficient, but transmission to in-contact galliforme species was infrequent and unpredictable, thereby reflecting the European 2017-2018 H5N6 epidemiology. Although only two of 28 (7%) infected ducks died, the six turkeys and one chicken which became infected all died and displayed systemic H5N6-2017 dissemination, while pathogenesis in ducks was generally milder. Analysis of H5N6-2017 progeny in the contacts revealed no emergent polymorphisms in an infected duck, but the galliforme species included changes in the polymerase (PB2 A199T, PA D347A), matrix (M1 T218A) and neuraminidase genes (T88I). H5N6-2017 environmental contamination was associated with duck shedding.

A molecular epidemiological investigation of avian paramyxovirus type 1 viruses isolated from game birds of the order Galliformes.

The partial (370 nucleotides) fusion gene sequences of 55 avian paramyxovirus type 1 (APMV-1) isolates were obtained. Included were 41 published sequences, of which 16 were from strains of APMV-1 of previously determined lineages included as markers for the data analysed and 25 were from APMV-1 viruses isolated from game birds of the order Galliformes. In addition, we sequenced a further 14 game bird isolates obtained from the repository at the Veterinary Laboratories Agency. The game bird isolates had been obtained from 17 countries, and spanned four decades. Earlier studies have shown that class II APMV-1 viruses can be divided into at least 15 lineages and sub-lineages. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that the 39 game bird isolates were distributed across 12 of these sub-lineages. We conclude that no single lineage of Newcastle disease viruses appears to be prevalent in game birds, and the isolates obtained from these hosts reflected the prevailing, both geographically and temporally, viruses in poultry, pigeons or wild birds.

Infection dynamics of highly pathogenic avian influenza and virulent avian paramyxovirus type 1 viruses in chickens, turkeys and ducks.

A range of virus doses were used to infect 3-week-old chickens, turkeys and ducks intranasally/intraocularly, and infection was confirmed by the detection of virus shedding from the buccal or cloacal route by analysis of swabs collected using real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction assays. The median infectious dose (ID(50)) and the median lethal dose (LD(50)) values for two highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of H5N1 and H7N1 subtypes and one virulent Newcastle disease virus (NDV) were determined for each virus and host combination. For both HPAI viruses, turkeys were >100-fold more susceptible to infection than chickens, while both these hosts were >10-fold more susceptible to H5N1 virus than the H7N1 virus. All infected chickens and turkeys died. Ducks were also much more readily infected with the H5N1 virus (ID(50)< or =10(1) median embryo infective dose [EID(50)]) than the H7N1 virus (ID(50)=10(4.2) EID(50)). However, the most notable difference between the two viruses was their virulence for ducks, with a LD(50) of 10(3) EID(50) for the H5N1 virus, but no deaths in ducks being attributed to infection with H7N1 virus even at the highest dose (10(6) EID(50)). For both HPAI virus infections of ducks, the ID(50) was lower than the LD(50), indicating that infected birds were able to survive and thus excrete virus over a longer period than chickens and turkeys. The NDV strain used did not appear to establish infection in ducks even at the highest dose used (10(6) EID(50)). Some turkeys challenged with 10(6) EID(50), but not other doses, of NDV excreted virus for a number of days (ID(50)=10(4.6) EID(50)), but none died. In marked contrast, chickens were shown to be extremely susceptible to infection and all infected chickens died (ID(50)/LD(50)=10(1.9) EID(50)).

Role of real-time RT-PCR platform technology in the diagnosis and management of notifiable avian influenza outbreaks: experiences in Great Britain.

Diagnosis and management of avian influenza outbreaks now include the use of validated real-time reverse transcription PCR (RRT-PCR) methods in many countries, including all member states of the European Union. Two outbreaks in poultry of notifiable avian influenza (H5 and H7 subtypes) that occurred in Great Britain during 2007 will serve as examples in which RRT-PCR demonstrated its value in 1) rapid diagnosis and confirmation of disease by sensitive and specific laboratory testing of samples derived from the index cases and 2) high-volume, rapid testing of surveillance samples. The two poultry outbreaks followed the incursion of a H7N2 low-pathogenicity notifiable avian influenza (LPNAI) virus (May-June 2007) and a Eurasian lineage H5N1 highly pathogenic notifiable avian influenza (HPNAI) virus (November 2007). Coupled with the use of high-throughput, robotic RNA extraction methods, a total of approximately 9300 and 20,300 field samples were tested by appropriate, validated RRT-PCR assays during the 4- and 5-wk duration of the H7N2 LPNAI and H5N1 HPNAI outbreaks, respectively. Fundamental features of the validated RRT-PCR assays used included their high degree of sensitivity, specificity, and rapidity, attributes that were invaluable in providing timely and accurate information for notifiable AI outbreak management.

History of highly pathogenic avian influenza.

The most widely quoted date for the beginning of the recorded history of avian influenza (AI) is 1878, when researchers first differentiated a disease of poultry (initially known as fowl plague but later renamed highly pathogenic avian influenza) from other diseases with high mortality rates. Current evidence indicates that highly pathogenic AI (HPAI) viruses arise through mutation after low pathogenicity AI viruses of H5 or H7 subtype are introduced into poultry. Between 1877 and 1958, a number of epizootics of HPAI occurred in most parts of the world. From 1959 to 1995, the emergence of HPAI viruses was recorded on 15 occasions, but losses were minimal. In contrast, between 1996 and 2008, HPAI viruses emerged at least 11 times and four of these outbreaks involved many millions of birds. Events during this recent period are overshadowed by the current epizootic of HPAI due to an H5N1 virus that has spread throughout Asia and into Europe and Africa, affecting over 60 countries and causing the loss of hundreds of millions of birds. All sectors of the poultry population have been affected, but free-range commercial ducks, village poultry, live bird markets and fighting cocks seem especially significant in the spread of the virus. The role of wild birds has been extensively debated but it is likely that both wild birds and domestic poultry are responsible for its spread. Even without these H5N1 outbreaks, the period 1995 to 2008 will be considered significant in the history of HPAI because of the vast numbers of birds that died or were culled in three of the other ten epizootics during this time.

Novel H1N1 influenza in people: global spread from an animal source?

Richard Irvine and Ian Brown of the Veterinary Laboratories Agency discuss some epidemiological features of the novel H1N1 influenza virus that is currently causing concern among health authorities worldwide.

Outbreak of Newcastle disease due to pigeon paramyxovirus type 1 in grey partridges (Perdix perdix) in Scotland in October 2006.

In October 2006, following an initially non-statutory disease investigation affecting 12-week-old grey partridges (Perdix perdix), an outbreak of Newcastle disease due to infection with the avian paramyxovirus type 1 virus responsible for the current panzootic in pigeons (PPMV-1) was confirmed in Scotland. Two pens of partridges were affected by signs including loss of condition, diarrhoea, progressive neurological signs and mortality totalling approximately 24 per cent, and laboratory evidence of the infection was obtained only in these groups. The premises had approximately 17,000 poultry including a collection of 375 birds of rare breeds, containing endangered breeds of significant conservation value, which were not culled but subjected to a health monitoring and testing programme. Investigations suggested that a population of feral pigeons living above the affected pens of partridges was the likely source of the outbreak. Laboratory and genetic analyses confirmed that the isolate recovered from the clinically affected partridges was PPMV-1, belonging to genetic lineage 4b. However, the virus could not be isolated from or detected in dead pigeons collected from the affected buildings.

Direct evidence of H7N7 avian influenza virus mutation from low to high virulence on a single poultry premises during an outbreak in free range chickens in the UK, 2008.

H5 and H7 subtypes of low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (LPAIVs) have the potential to evolve into highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs), causing high mortality in galliforme poultry with substantial economic losses for the poultry industry. This study provides direct evidence of H7N7 LPAIV mutation to HPAIV on a single poultry premises during an outbreak that occurred in June 2008 in free range laying hens in Oxfordshire, UK. We report the first detection of a rare di-basic cleavage site (CS) motif (PEIPKKRGLF), unique to galliformes, that has previously been associated with a LPAIV phenotype. Three distinct HPAIV CS sequences (PEIPKRKKRGLF, PEIPKKKKRGLF and PEIPKKKKKKRGLF) were identified in the infected sheds suggesting molecular evolution at the outbreak premises. Further evidence for H7N7 LPAIV preceding mutation to HPAIV was derived by examining clinical signs, epidemiological descriptions and analysing laboratory results on the timing and proportions of seroconversion and virus shedding at each infected shed on the premises. In addition to describing how the outbreak was diagnosed and managed via statutory laboratory testing, phylogenetic analysis revealed reassortant events during 2006-2008 that suggested likely incursion of a wild bird origin LPAIV precursor to the H7N7 HPAIV outbreak. Identifying a precursor LPAIV is important for understanding the molecular changes and mechanisms involved in the emergence of HPAIV. This information can lead to understanding how and why only some H7 LPAIVs appear to readily mutate to HPAIV.

Validated H5 Eurasian real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction and its application in H5N1 outbreaks in 2005-2006.

Real time reverse transcriptase (RRT)-polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for the detection of Eurasian H5 avian influenza virus (AIV) isolates was adapted from an existing protocol, optimized, and validated using a number of genetically diverse H5 isolates (n = 51). These included 34 "Asian lineage" H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses (2004-2006), plus 12 other H5 isolates from poultry outbreaks and wild birds in the Eastern Hemisphere (1996-2005). All 51 were positive by H5 Eurasian RRT-PCR. Specificity was assessed by testing representative isolates from all other AL virus subtypes (n = 52), non-AI avian pathogens (n = 8), plus a negative population of clinical specimens derived from AI-uninfected wild birds and poultry (n = 604); all were negative by H5 Eurasian RRT-PCR. RNA was directly extracted from suspect HPAI H5N1 clinical specimens (Africa, Asia, and Europe; 2005-2006; n = 58) from dead poultry and wild birds, and 55 recorded as positive by H5 Eurasian RRT-PCR: Fifty-one of these 55 were in agreement with positive AIV isolation in embryonated chickens' eggs. H5 Eurasian RRT-PCR was invaluable in H5 outbreak diagnosis and management by virtue of its rapidity and high degree of sensitivity and specificity. This method provides a platform for automation that can be applied for large-scale intensive investigations, including surveillance.

Induced increase in virulence of low virulence highly [corrected] pathogenic avian influenza by serial intracerebral passage in chickens.

Two highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus clones that met the criteria for high-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses, by possessing a multibasic hemagglutinin (HA) cleavage site, were isolated from an H5N1 outbreak in Norfolk, England, in 1991-92. These two isolates, A/turkey/England/50-92/91 (50-92) and A/turkey/England/87-92/91 (87-92), displayed differences in virulence as determined by intravenous pathogenicity index-3 and -0, respectively. DNA sequencing of these two isolates identified 10 amino acid differences throughout the genome: three in HA and polymerase B2 (PB2) and two in polymerase B1 (PB1) and single mutations in nucleoprotein (NP) and polymerase A (PA). Serial intracerebral passages were performed in 1- or 2-day-old specific pathogen free (SPF) chicks with 87-92. Viruses reisolated from each bird passage displayed increases in intracerebral pathogenicity index values (from 0 to 1.9) and therefore virulence. Reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction and DNA sequencing on viruses isolated at each passage displayed nine out of the 10 mutations associated with the higher pathogenic genotype of 50-92, except for the mutation found in NP, which retained the amino acid residue associated with 87-92. Serial passage through 9-day-old SPF embryonated chicken eggs and serial intravenous passage in 6-wk-old birds could not reproduce these results. These results further highlight that nucleotide changes in the genome other than at the HA cleavage site can attenuate the virulence of HPAI viruses.

Identification of sensitive and specific avian influenza polymerase chain reaction methods through blind ring trials organized in the European Union.

Many different polymerase chain reaction (PCR) protocols have been used for detection and characterization of avian influenza (AI) virus isolates, mainly in research settings. Blind ring trials were conducted to determine the most sensitive and specific AI PCR protocols from a group of six European Union (EU) laboratories. In part 1 of the ring trial the laboratories used their own methods to test a panel of 10 reconstituted anonymized clinical specimens, and the best methods were selected as recommended protocols for part 2, in which 16 RNA specimens were tested. Both panels contained H5, H7, other AI subtypes, and non-AI avian pathogens. Outcomes included verification of 1) generic AI identification by highly sensitive and specific M-gene real-time PCR, and 2) conventional PCRs that were effective for detection and identification of H5 and H7 viruses. The latter included virus pathotyping by amplicon sequencing. The use of recommended protocols resulted in improved results among all six laboratories in part 2, reflecting increased sensitivity and specificity. This included improved H5/H7 identification and pathotyping observed among all laboratories in part 2. Details of these PCR methods are provided. In summary, this study has contributed to the harmonization of AI PCR protocols in EU laboratories and influenced AI laboratory contingency planning following the first European reports of H5N1 highly pathogenic AI during autumn 2005.

Experiences in control of avian influenza in Europe, the Russian Federation and the Middle East.

An unprecedented global epidemic of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 has and continues to present enormous challenges to the international community for control in the animal reservoir. Enhanced biosecurity, good surveillance, both passive and active, supplemented by strong veterinary services, can reduce the risk for incursion and subsequent spread in free countries. Surveillance of mortality and laboratory testing among wild birds are useful early indicators of incursion of the virus into areas in which domestic poultry are not infected. Conventional control methods used widely in Europe and the Middle Eastern region involve stamping-out, zoning, quarantine, movement restrictions, enhanced surveillance and disinfection. Use of preventive vaccination is increasing in the region. In the Russian Federation, all backyard poultry considered to be at high risk for infection have been vaccinated since 2006. Several countries in the Middle East permit the use of vaccine, although rarely as part of a formal statutory programme. In the European Union, conventional approaches for control have proved effective, but both emergency and preventive vaccination could be used. Application of such programmes would have to be preceded by an evaluation of the risks for introduction and spread and might be restricted.

Advances in molecular diagnostics for avian influenza.

Recent outbreaks of avian influenza (AI) have highlighted the necessity to improve existing tests and to develop new methods, in order to detect spread or new outbreaks more quickly, which is vital for the early and successful implementation of control strategies. Conventionally, the time between clinical suspicion and laboratory confirmation of AI can be relatively long because of the logistics of sending samples to laboratories and their capacity for providing high throughput of sensitive and specific assays. Increasingly, new-generation assays based on molecular diagnostics have become available and applied successfully to disease investigation or active surveillance programmes. There has been widespread application of techniques based on the amplification of specific nucleic acid sequences by polymerase chain reaction (PCR), ligase chain reaction and nucleic acid sequence-based amplification (NASBA). The approaches generally offer high specificity and sensitivity. One of the most promising technologies is real-time PCR, which enables amplification of nucleic acids and detection of the amplified products through specific probes at the same time. A rapid diagnosis can be achieved, together with potential for high throughput resulting from process automation. Currently, microarray technology is developing rapidly and has been applied to diagnosis of influenza A virus but generally lacks the necessary sensitivity for direct application to clinical specimens. In addition, these new technologies have been increasingly applied to rapid and reliable subtyping of AI viruses. The application of molecular technologies to the "field" is now potentially an option, through the availability of portable machines for conducting such tests, with prospects for radically changing diagnostic approaches for AI in the future.