Divergent and Convergent Creativity Are Different Kinds of Foraging.

According to accounts of neural reuse and embodied cognition, higher-level cognitive abilities recycle evolutionarily ancient mechanisms for perception and action. Here, building on these accounts, we investigate whether creativity builds on our capacity to forage in space ("creativity as strategic foraging"). We report systematic connections between specific forms of creative thinking-divergent and convergent-and corresponding strategies for searching in space. U.S. American adults completed two tasks designed to measure creativity. Before each creativity trial, participants completed an unrelated search of a city map. Between subjects, we manipulated the search pattern, with some participants seeking multiple, dispersed spatial locations and others repeatedly converging on the same location. Participants who searched divergently in space were better at divergent thinking but worse at convergent thinking; this pattern reversed for participants who had converged repeatedly on a single location. These results demonstrate a targeted link between foraging and creativity, thus advancing our understanding of the origins and mechanisms of high-level cognition.

Mills made of grist, and other interesting ideas in need of clarification.

Heyes' book is an important contribution that rightly integrates cognitive development and cultural evolution. However, understanding the cultural evolution of cognitive gadgets requires a deeper appreciation of complexity, feedback, and self-organization than her book exhibits.

Bridgemanian space constancy as a precursor to extended cognition.

A few decades ago, cognitive psychologists generally took for granted that the reason we perceive our visual environment as one contiguous stable whole (i.e., space constancy) is because we have an internal mental representation of the visual environment as one contiguous stable whole. They supposed that the non-contiguous visual images that are gathered during the brief fixations that intervene between pairs of saccadic eye movements (a few times every second) are somehow stitched together to construct this contiguous internal mental representation. Determining how exactly the brain does this proved to be a vexing puzzle for vision researchers. Bruce Bridgeman's research career is the story of how meticulous psychophysical experimentation, and a genius theoretical insight, eventually solved this puzzle. The reason that it was so difficult for researchers to figure out how the brain stitches together these visual snapshots into one accurately-rendered mental representation of the visual environment is that it doesn't do that. Bruce discovered that the brain couldn't do that if it tried. The neural information that codes for saccade amplitude and direction is simply too inaccurate to determine exact relative locations of each fixation. Rather than the perception of space constancy being the result of an internal representation, Bruce determined that it is the result of a brain that simply assumes that external space remains constant, and it rarely checks to verify this assumption. In our extension of Bridgeman's formulation, we suggest that objects in the world often serve as their own representations, and cognitive operations can be performed on those objects themselves, rather than on mental representations of them.

Biasing moral decisions by exploiting the dynamics of eye gaze.

Eye gaze is a window onto cognitive processing in tasks such as spatial memory, linguistic processing, and decision making. We present evidence that information derived from eye gaze can be used to change the course of individuals' decisions, even when they are reasoning about high-level, moral issues. Previous studies have shown that when an experimenter actively controls what an individual sees the experimenter can affect simple decisions with alternatives of almost equal valence. Here we show that if an experimenter passively knows when individuals move their eyes the experimenter can change complex moral decisions. This causal effect is achieved by simply adjusting the timing of the decisions. We monitored participants' eye movements during a two-alternative forced-choice task with moral questions. One option was randomly predetermined as a target. At the moment participants had fixated the target option for a set amount of time we terminated their deliberation and prompted them to choose between the two alternatives. Although participants were unaware of this gaze-contingent manipulation, their choices were systematically biased toward the target option. We conclude that even abstract moral cognition is partly constituted by interactions with the immediate environment and is likely supported by gaze-dependent decision processes. By tracking the interplay between individuals, their sensorimotor systems, and the environment, we can influence the outcome of a decision without directly manipulating the content of the information available to them.

Perception, as you make it.

The main question that Firestone & Scholl (F&S) pose is whether "what and how we see is functionally independent from what and how we think, know, desire, act, and so forth" (sect. 2, para. 1). We synthesize a collection of concerns from an interdisciplinary set of coauthors regarding F&S's assumptions and appeals to intuition, resulting in their treatment of visual perception as context-free.

A potential mechanism for Gibsonian resonance: behavioral entrainment emerges from local homeostasis in an unsupervised reservoir network.

While the cognitivist school of thought holds that the mind is analogous to a computer, performing logical operations over internal representations, the tradition of ecological psychology contends that organisms can directly "resonate" to information for action and perception without the need for a representational intermediary. The concept of resonance has played an important role in ecological psychology, but it remains a metaphor. Supplying a mechanistic account of resonance requires a non-representational account of central nervous system (CNS) dynamics. Towards this, we present a series of simple models in which a reservoir network with homeostatic nodes is used to control a simple agent embedded in an environment. This network spontaneously produces behaviors that are adaptive in each context, including (1) visually tracking a moving object, (2) substantially above-chance performance in the arcade game Pong, (2) and avoiding walls while controlling a mobile agent. Upon analyzing the dynamics of the networks, we find that behavioral stability can be maintained without the formation of stable or recurring patterns of network activity that could be identified as neural representations. These results may represent a useful step towards a mechanistic grounding of resonance and a view of the CNS that is compatible with ecological psychology.

Cognitive Science Progresses Toward Interactive Frameworks.

Despite its many twists and turns, the arc of cognitive science generally bends toward progress, thanks to its interdisciplinary nature. By glancing at the last few decades of experimental and computational advances, it can be argued that-far from failing to converge on a shared set of conceptual assumptions-the field is indeed making steady consensual progress toward what can broadly be referred to as interactive frameworks. This inclination is apparent in the subfields of psycholinguistics, visual perception, embodied cognition, extended cognition, neural networks, dynamical systems theory, and more. This pictorial essay briefly documents this steady progress both from a bird's eye view and from the trenches. The conclusion is one of optimism that cognitive science is getting there, albeit slowly and arduously, like any good science should.

Concepts in Space: Enhancing Lexical Search With a Spatial Diversity Prime.

Informed by theories of embodied cognition, in the present study, we designed a novel priming technique to investigate the impact of spatial diversity and script direction on searching through concepts in both English and Persian (i.e., two languages with opposite script directions). First, participants connected a target dot either to one other dot (linear condition) or to multiple other dots (diverse condition) and either from left to right (rightward condition) or from right to left (leftward condition) on a computer touchscreen using their dominant hand's forefinger. Following the spatial prime, they were asked to generate as many words as possible using two-letter cues (e.g., "lo" → "love," "lobster") in 20 s. We hypothesized that greater spatial diversity, and consistency with script direction, should facilitate conceptual search and result in a higher number of word productions. In both languages, word production performance was superior for the diverse prime relative to the linear prime, suggesting that searching through lexical memory is facilitated by spatial diversity. Although some effects were observed for the directionality of the spatial prime, they were not consistent across experiments and did not correlate with script direction. This pattern of results suggests that a spatial prime that promotes diverse paths can improve word retrieval from lexical memory and lends empirical support to the embodied cognition framework, in which spatial relations play a crucial role in the conceptual system.

The spatial intersection of minds.

Spatial formats of information are ubiquitous in the cognitive and neural sciences. There are neural uses of space in the topographic maps found throughout cortex. There are metaphorical uses of space in cognitive linguistics, physical uses of space in ecological psychology, and mathematical uses of space in dynamical systems theory. These varied informational uses of space each provide a single contiguous medium through which cognitive processes can be shared across subsystems. As we further develop our understanding of how the human mind processes information in real time, the continuous sharing and cascading of information patterns between brain areas can be extended to a sharing and cascading of information between multiple brains and bodies to produce coordinated behavior. Essentially, the way you and the people around you negotiate your shared space affects the way you think, because space is a fundamental part of how you think. It is via space that the mental processes of one mind can form an intersection with the mental processes of another mind.

Is prediction nothing more than multi-scale pattern completion of the future?

While the notion of the brain as a prediction machine has been extremely influential and productive in cognitive science, there are competing accounts of how best to model and understand the predictive capabilities of brains. One prominent framework is of a "Bayesian brain" that explicitly generates predictions and uses resultant errors to guide adaptation. We suggest that the prediction-generation component of this framework may involve little more than a pattern completion process. We first describe pattern completion in the domain of visual perception, highlighting its temporal extension, and show how this can entail a form of prediction in time. Next, we describe the forward momentum of entrained dynamical systems as a model for the emergence of predictive processing in non-predictive systems. Then, we apply this reasoning to the domain of language, where explicitly predictive models are perhaps most popular. Here, we demonstrate how a connectionist model, TRACE, exhibits hallmarks of predictive processing without any representations of predictions or errors. Finally, we present a novel neural network model, inspired by reservoir computing models, that is entirely unsupervised and memoryless, but nonetheless exhibits prediction-like behavior in its pursuit of homeostasis. These explorations demonstrate that brain-like systems can get prediction "for free," without the need to posit formal logical representations with Bayesian probabilities or an inference machine that holds them in working memory.

Overheard cell-phone conversations: when less speech is more distracting.

Why are people more irritated by nearby cell-phone conversations than by conversations between two people who are physically present? Overhearing someone on a cell phone means hearing only half of a conversation--a "halfalogue." We show that merely overhearing a halfalogue results in decreased performance on cognitive tasks designed to reflect the attentional demands of daily activities. By contrast, overhearing both sides of a cell-phone conversation or a monologue does not result in decreased performance. This may be because the content of a halfalogue is less predictable than both sides of a conversation. In a second experiment, we controlled for differences in acoustic factors between these types of overheard speech, establishing that it is the unpredictable informational content of halfalogues that results in distraction. Thus, we provide a cognitive explanation for why overheard cell-phone conversations are especially irritating: Less-predictable speech results in more distraction for a listener engaged in other tasks.

The self-organization of explicit attitudes.

How do minds produce explicit attitudes over several hundred milliseconds? Speeded evaluative measures have revealed implicit biases beyond cognitive control and subjective awareness, yet mental processing may culminate in an explicit attitude that feels personally endorsed and corroborates voluntary intentions. We argue that self-reported explicit attitudes derive from a continuous, temporally dynamic process, whereby multiple simultaneously conflicting sources of information self-organize into a meaningful mental representation. While our participants reported their explicit (like vs. dislike) attitudes toward White versus Black people by moving a cursor to a "like" or "dislike" response box, we recorded streaming x- and y-coordinates from their hand-movement trajectories. We found that participants' hand-movement paths exhibited greater curvature toward the "dislike" response when they reported positive explicit attitudes toward Black people than when they reported positive explicit attitudes toward White people. Moreover, these trajectories were characterized by movement disorder and competitive velocity profiles that were predicted under the assumption that the deliberate attitudes emerged from continuous interactions between multiple simultaneously conflicting constraints.

Gradient sensitivity to within-category variation in words and syllables.

Five experiments monitored eye movements in phoneme and lexical identification tasks to examine the effect of within-category subphonetic variation on the perception of stop consonants. Experiment 1 demonstrated gradient effects along voice-onset time (VOT) continua made from natural speech, replicating results with synthetic speech (B. McMurray, M. K. Tanenhaus, & R. N. Aslin, 2002). Experiments 2-5 used synthetic VOT continua to examine effects of response alternatives (2 vs. 4), task (lexical vs. phoneme decision), and type of token (word vs. consonant-vowel). A gradient effect of VOT in at least one half of the continuum was observed in all conditions. These results suggest that during online spoken word recognition, lexical competitors are activated in proportion to their continuous distance from a category boundary. This gradient processing may allow listeners to anticipate upcoming acoustic-phonetic information in the speech signal and dynamically compensate for acoustic variability.

Tracking the continuity of language comprehension: computer mouse trajectories suggest parallel syntactic processing.

Although several theories of online syntactic processing assume the parallel activation of multiple syntactic representations, evidence supporting simultaneous activation has been inconclusive. Here, the continuous and non-ballistic properties of computer mouse movements are exploited, by recording their streaming x, y coordinates to procure evidence regarding parallel versus serial processing. Participants heard structurally ambiguous sentences while viewing scenes with properties either supporting or not supporting the difficult modifier interpretation. The curvatures of the elicited trajectories revealed both an effect of visual context and graded competition between simultaneously active syntactic representations. The results are discussed in the context of 3 major groups of theories within the domain of sentence processing.

Corticospinal excitability during the processing of handwritten and typed words and non-words.

A number of studies have suggested that perception of actions is accompanied by motor simulation of those actions. To further explore this proposal, we applied Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the left primary motor cortex during the observation of handwritten and typed language stimuli, including words and non-word consonant clusters. We recorded motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) from the right first dorsal interosseous (FDI) muscle to measure cortico-spinal excitability during written text perception. We observed a facilitation in MEPs for handwritten stimuli, regardless of whether the stimuli were words or non-words, suggesting potential motor simulation during observation. We did not observe a similar facilitation for the typed stimuli, suggesting that motor simulation was not occurring during observation of typed text. By demonstrating potential simulation of written language text during observation, these findings add to a growing literature suggesting that the motor system plays a strong role in the perception of written language.

Shaping relations: Exploiting relational features for visuospatial priming.

Although relational reasoning has been described as a process at the heart of human cognition, the exact character of relational representations remains an open debate. Symbolic-connectionist models of relational cognition suggest that relations are structured representations, but that they are ultimately grounded in feature sets; thus, they predict that activating those features can affect the trajectory of the relational reasoning process. The present work points out that such models do not necessarily specify what those features are though, and endeavors to show that spatial information is likely a part of it. To this end, it presents 2 experiments that used visuospatial priming to affect the course of relational reasoning. The first is a relational category-learning experiment in which this type of priming was shown to affect which spatial relation was learned when multiple were possible. The second used crossmapping analogy problems, paired with this same type of priming, to show that visuospatial cues can make participants more likely to map analogs based on relational roles, even with short presentation times. (PsycINFO Database Record