Without a trace: Why did corona apps fail?

At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, high hopes were put on digital contact tracing, using mobile phone apps to record and immediately notify contacts when a user reports as infected. Such apps can now be downloaded in many countries, but as second waves of COVID-19 are raging, these apps are playing a less important role than anticipated. We argue that this is because most countries have opted for app configurations that cannot provide a means of rapidly informing users of likely infections while avoiding too many false positive reports. Mathematical modelling suggests that differently configured apps have the potential to do this. These require, however, that some pseudonymised data be stored on a central server, which privacy advocates have cautioned against. We contend that their influential arguments are subject to two fallacies. First, they have tended to one-sidedly focus on the risks that centralised data storage entails for privacy, while paying insufficient attention to the fact that inefficient contact tracing involves ethical risks too. Second, while the envisioned system does entail risks of breaches, such risks are also present in decentralised systems, which have been falsely presented as 'privacy preserving by design'. When these points are understood, it becomes clear that we must rethink our approach to digital contact tracing in our fight against COVID-19.

Privacy versus Public Health? A Reassessment of Centralised and Decentralised Digital Contact Tracing.

At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, high hopes were placed on digital contact tracing. Digital contact tracing apps can now be downloaded in many countries, but as further waves of COVID-19 tear through much of the northern hemisphere, these apps are playing a less important role in interrupting chains of infection than anticipated. We argue that one of the reasons for this is that most countries have opted for decentralised apps, which cannot provide a means of rapidly informing users of likely infections while avoiding too many false positive reports. Centralised apps, in contrast, have the potential to do this. But policy making was influenced by public debates about the right app configuration, which have tended to focus heavily on privacy, and are driven by the assumption that decentralised apps are "privacy preserving by design". We show that both types of apps are in fact vulnerable to privacy breaches, and, drawing on principles from safety engineering and risk analysis, compare the risks of centralised and decentralised systems along two dimensions, namely the probability of possible breaches and their severity. We conclude that a centralised app may in fact minimise overall ethical risk, and contend that we must reassess our approach to digital contact tracing, and should, more generally, be cautious about a myopic focus on privacy when conducting ethical assessments of data technologies.

[On the ethics of corona apps]. / Mit Kontaktdaten gegen die Pandemie: Zur Ethik von Corona Warn-Apps.

Definition of the problem: In spring 2020, as much of the world was emerging from widespread "lockdowns" as an emergency measure to combat the spread of SARS-CoV­2, there was sustained discussion about how to lift measures while preventing further waves of the virus and the need for further lockdowns. One strategy that attracted significant attention was the use of digital contact-tracing apps to quickly alert users of possible exposure to the virus, and to direct them into quarantine. The initially high expectations placed upon this strategy were not met-despite the implementation of a digital contact-tracing app in Germany, further restrictions have been placed on the general population in response to further waves of the virus. We consider how digital contact tracing might have been made more effective. Arguments: We argue that there is a conflict between collecting as little data as possible, and more effective epidemic control. In contrast to the "Corona-Warn-App" that was implemented in Germany, an app that stored more information on a central server (a so-called "centralized" app) had the potential to significantly decrease viral spread. We then look at the privacy-based arguments against the centralized storage of information, suggesting that "decentralized" systems have privacy problems of their own. Results: The German debate on digital contact tracing apps was quickly dominated by privacy concerns, to the detriment of other ethical factors such as enhancing potential effectiveness. Furthermore, the potential problems with privacy inherent in decentralized apps were obscured in the discussion. Once we recognize these two aspects, we can see that there is an argument to be made for preferring centralized digital contact-tracing apps.

Anti-alarmin approaches entering clinical trials.

PURPOSE OF REVIEW: The alarmins, thymic stromal lymphopoietin (TSLP), interleukin (IL)-25 and IL-33, are upstream regulators of T2 (type 2) inflammation and found to be expressed at high levels in airway epithelium of patients with T2 asthma. This review will summarize how alarmins regulate the inflamed asthmatic airways through previously described and newly identified mechanisms. RECENT FINDINGS: Alarmins drive allergic and nonallergic asthma through activation of innate lymphoid cell 2 (ILC2), which are a rich source of cytokines such as IL-5 and IL-13, with resulting effects on eosinophilopoeisis and remodelling, respectively. Findings from bronchial allergen challenges have illustrated widespread expression of alarmins and their receptors across many effector cells in airways, and recent studies have emphasized alarmin regulation of CD4 T lymphocytes, eosinophils and basophils, and their progenitors. Furthermore, a link between alarmins and lipid mediators is being uncovered. SUMMARY: Alarmins can drive well defined inflammatory pathways through activation of dendritic cells and polarizing T cells to produce type 2 cytokines, as well as they can directly activate many other effector cells that play a central role in allergic and nonallergic asthma. Clinical trials support a central role for TSLP in driving airway inflammation and asthma exacerbations, while ongoing trials blocking IL-33 and IL-25 will help to define their respective role in asthma.

How to overcome lockdown: selective isolation versus contact tracing.

At this stage of the COVID-19 pandemic, two policy aims are imperative: avoiding the need for a general lockdown of the population, with all its economic, social and health costs, and preventing the healthcare system from being overwhelmed by the unchecked spread of infection. Achieving these two aims requires the consideration of unpalatable measures. Julian Savulescu and James Cameron argue that mandatory isolation of the elderly is justified under these circumstances, as they are at increased risk of becoming severely ill from COVID-19, and are thus likely to put disproportionate strain on limited healthcare resources. However, their arguments for this strategy are contingent on the lack of viable alternatives. We suggest that there is a possible alternative: a mandatory, centralised contact-tracing app. We argue that this strategy is ethically preferable to the selective isolation of the elderly, because it does not target members of a certain group, relying instead on the movements of each individual, and because it avoids the extended isolation of certain members of the society. Although this type of contact-tracing app has its drawbacks, we contend that this measure warrants serious consideration.

Ethical arguments concerning human-animal chimera research: a systematic review.

BACKGROUND: The burgeoning field of biomedical research involving the mixture of human and animal materials has attracted significant ethical controversy. Due to the many dimensions of potential ethical conflict involved in this type of research, and the wide variety of research projects under discussion, it is difficult to obtain an overview of the ethical debate. This paper attempts to remedy this by providing a systematic review of ethical reasons in academic publications on human-animal chimera research. METHODS: We conducted a systematic review of the ethical literature concerning human-animal chimeras based on the research question: "What ethical reasons have been given for or against conducting human-animal chimera research, and how have these reasons been treated in the ongoing debate?" Our search extends until the end of the year 2017, including MEDLINE, Embase, PhilPapers and EthxWeb databases, restricted to peer-reviewed journal publications in English. Papers containing ethical reasons were analyzed, and the reasons were coded according to whether they were endorsed, mentioned or rejected. RESULTS: Four hundred thirty-one articles were retrieved by our search, and 88 were ultimately included and analyzed. Within these articles, we found 464 passages containing reasons for and against conducting human-animal chimera research. We classified these reasons into five categories and, within these, identified 12 broad and 31 narrow reason types. 15% of the retrieved passages contained reasons in favor of conducting chimera research (Category P), while 85% of the passages contained reasons against it. The reasons against conducting chimera research fell into four further categories: reasons concerning the creation of a chimera (Category A), its treatment (Category B), reasons referring to metaphysical or social issues resulting from its existence (Category C) and to potential downstream effects of chimera research (Category D). A significant proportion of identified passages (46%) fell under Category C. CONCLUSIONS: We hope that our results, in revealing the conceptual and argumentative structure of the debate and highlighting some its most notable tendencies and prominent positions, will facilitate continued discussion and provide a basis for the development of relevant policy and legislation.

The Need for Authenticity-Based Autonomy in Medical Ethics.

The notion of respect for autonomy dominates bioethical discussion, though what qualifies precisely as autonomous action is notoriously elusive. In recent decades, the notion of autonomy in medical contexts has often been defined in opposition to the notion of autonomy favoured by theoretical philosophers. Where many contemporary theoretical accounts of autonomy place emphasis on a condition of "authenticity", the special relation a desire must have to the self, bioethicists often regard such a focus as irrelevant to the concerns of medical ethics, and too stringent for use in practical contexts. I argue, however, that the very condition of authenticity that forms a focus in theoretical philosophy is also essential to autonomy and competence in medical ethics. After tracing the contours of contemporary authenticity-based theories of autonomy, I consider and respond to objections against the incorporation of a notion of authenticity into accounts of autonomy designed for use in medical contexts. By looking at the typical problems that arise when making judgments concerning autonomy or competence in a medical setting, I reveal the need for a condition of authenticity-as a means of protecting choices, particularly high-stakes choices, from being restricted or overridden on the basis of intersubjective disagreement. I then turn to the treatment of false and contestable beliefs, arguing that it is only through reference to authenticity that we can make important distinctions in this domain. Finally, I consider a potential problem with my proposed approach; its ability to deal with anorexic and depressive desires.

Does Remuneration for Plasma Compromise Autonomy?

In accordance with a recent statement released by the World Health Organization, the Canadian province of Ontario is moving to ban payment for plasma donation. This is partially based on contentions that remuneration for blood and blood products undermines autonomy and personal dignity. This paper is dedicated to evaluating this claim. I suggest that traditional autonomy-based arguments against commodification of human body parts and substances are less compelling in the context of plasma donation in Canada, but that there is another autonomy-based objection to paid plasma donation that has not received sufficient attention. Namely, the stigma that surrounds exchanging plasma for payment makes it difficult to make an autonomous decision to engage in this activity. I suggest that this problem can be overcome in one of two ways; by banning payment for plasma, or by reducing the stigma surrounding this practice. I provide an indication of how we might work to achieve the latter, contending that this possibility should be taken seriously, due to the difficulties in achieving a sufficient supply of plasma without remuneration.

Justification for coercion in a public health crisis: not just a matter of individual harm.

The COVID pandemic was an exceptional public health situation - which brought with it unprecedented restrictions across the global populace. But what was it about this pandemic which caused us to implement such drastic restrictions on liberty? Much of the ethical debate on restrictive measures such as lockdowns and vaccine requirements focused on the potential harm that individuals cause to other individuals by the risk of infection. I will suggest that this may come from a reliance on J.S. Mill's harm principle as providing the ultimate justification for coercion - i.e., the well-accepted principle that state coercion is justified in order to prevent the imposition of unacceptable risk of harm to others. Though there have been attempts, in the wider public health ethics literature, to use the harm principle as a basis for restricting contribution to collective harms, I will suggest that these attempts cannot rely on the harm principle alone. I will then turn to the ways in which an individual-based line of reasoning does not capture a distinctive sort of harm posed by the COVID pandemic (and others like it): the potential failure of healthcare systems. I will draw out three ways in which a focus on the harm that an individual poses to another individual fails to capture the full scope of harm wrought by the collapse of healthcare systems. First, it can't adequately capture the cumulative and "looping effects" of the harm caused by strained healthcare systems. Second, it fails to capture the widespread ripple effects the failure of a central societal institution can have on other institutions. And third, the failure of a healthcare system can impose "psychic costs", affecting the moral character of all members of society, reducing trust in institutions, and potentially posing an existential threat to the fabric of society. Finally, I will sketch some implications of the recognition of this distinctive sort of harm for the justification of coercive public health measures.

Were lockdowns justified? A return to the facts and evidence.

Were governments justified in imposing lockdowns to contain the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic? We argue that a convincing answer to this question is to date wanting, by critically analyzing the factual basis of a recent paper, "How Government Leaders Violated Their Epistemic Duties During the SARS-CoV-2 Crisis" (Winsberg, Brennan, and Suprenant 2020). In their paper, Winsberg, Brennan, and Suprenant argue that government leaders did not, at the beginning of the pandemic, meet the epistemic requirements necessitated to impose lockdowns. We focus on Winsberg, Brennan, and Suprenant's contentions that knowledge about COVID-19 resultant projections were inadequate; that epidemiologists were biased in their estimates of relevant figures; that there was insufficient evidence supporting the efficacy of lockdowns; and that lockdowns cause more harm than good. We argue that none of these claims are sufficiently supported by evidence, thus impairing their case against lockdowns, and leaving open the question of whether lockdowns were justified.

The Epistemic Duties of Philosophers: An Addendum.

In "Were Lockdowns Justified? A Return to the Facts and Evidence", we argue that Eric Winsberg, Jason Brennan and Chris Surprenant fail to make their case that initial COVID-19 lockdowns were unjustified, due to the fact their argument rests on erroneous factual claims. As is made clear by a response in this volume, the authors mistakenly take us to have been defending the imposition of lockdowns. Here, we clarify the aims of our original paper, and emphasise the importance of getting the facts right when making philosophical arguments in such a contentious domain.