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Many animal species are susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection and could act as reservoirs; however, transmission in free-living animals has not been documented. White-tailed deer, the predominant cervid in North America, are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection, and experimentally infected fawns can transmit the virus. To test the hypothesis that SARS-CoV-2 is circulating in deer, 283 retropharyngeal lymph node (RPLN) samples collected from 151 free-living and 132 captive deer in Iowa from April 2020 through January of 2021 were assayed for the presence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA. Ninety-four of the 283 (33.2%) deer samples were positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA as assessed by RT-PCR. Notably, following the November 2020 peak of human cases in Iowa, and coinciding with the onset of winter and the peak deer hunting season, SARS-CoV-2 RNA was detected in 80 of 97 (82.5%) RPLN samples collected over a 7-wk period. Whole genome sequencing of all 94 positive RPLN samples identified 12 SARS-CoV-2 lineages, with B.1.2 (n = 51; 54.5%) and B.1.311 (n = 19; 20%) accounting for â¼75% of all samples. The geographic distribution and nesting of clusters of deer and human lineages strongly suggest multiple human-to-deer transmission events followed by subsequent deer-to-deer spread. These discoveries have important implications for the long-term persistence of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Our findings highlight an urgent need for a robust and proactive "One Health" approach to obtain enhanced understanding of the ecology, molecular evolution, and dissemination of SARS-CoV-2.
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COVID-19/transmisión , Ciervos/virología , SARS-CoV-2/aislamiento & purificación , Zoonosis/virología , Animales , COVID-19/virología , Reservorios de Enfermedades/virología , Humanos , SARS-CoV-2/genéticaRESUMEN
BACKGROUND: The UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) COVID-19 Outbreak Surveillance Team (OST) was established in June 2020 to provide Local Authorities (LAs) in England with surveillance intelligence to aid their response to the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic. Reports were produced using standardised metrics in an automated format. Here we evaluate how the SARS-CoV-2 surveillance reports influenced decision making, how resources evolved and how they could be refined to meet the requirements of stakeholders in the future. METHODS: Public health professionals (n = 2,400) involved in the COVID-19 response from the 316 English LAs were invited to take part in an online survey. The questionnaire covered five themes: (i) report use; (ii) influence of surveillance outputs on local intervention strategies; (iii) timeliness; (iv) current and future data requirements; and (v) content development. RESULTS: Of the 366 respondents to the survey, most worked in public health, data science, epidemiology, or business intelligence. Over 70% of respondents used the LA Report and Regional Situational Awareness Report daily or weekly. The information had been used by 88% to inform decision making within their organisations and 68% considered that intervention strategies had been instituted as a result of these decisions. Examples of changes instigated included targeted communications, pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions, and the timing of interventions. Most responders considered that the surveillance content had reacted well to evolving demands. The majority (89%) said that their information requirements would be met if the surveillance reports were incorporated into the COVID-19 Situational Awareness Explorer Portal. Additional information suggested by stakeholders included vaccination and hospitalisation data as well as information on underlying health conditions, infection during pregnancy, school absence and wastewater testing. CONCLUSIONS: The OST surveillance reports were a valuable information resource used by local stakeholders in their response to the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic. Control measures that affect disease epidemiology and monitoring requirements need to be considered in the continuous maintenance of surveillance outputs. We identified areas for further development and, since the evaluation, information on repeat infections and vaccination data have been included in the surveillance reports. Furthermore, timeliness of publications has been improved by updating the data flow pathways.
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COVID-19 , Epidemias , Humanos , SARS-CoV-2 , COVID-19/epidemiología , COVID-19/prevención & control , Brotes de Enfermedades/prevención & control , InglaterraRESUMEN
A canine influenza A(H3N2) virus emerged in the United States in February-March 2015, causing respiratory disease in dogs. The virus had previously been circulating among dogs in Asia, where it originated through the transfer of an avian-origin influenza virus around 2005 and continues to circulate. Sequence analysis suggests the US outbreak was initiated by a single introduction, in Chicago, of an H3N2 canine influenza virus circulating among dogs in South Korea in 2015. Despite local control measures, the virus has continued circulating among dogs in and around Chicago and has spread to several other areas of the country, particularly Georgia and North Carolina, although these secondary outbreaks appear to have ended within a few months. Some genetic variation has accumulated among the US viruses, with the appearance of regional-temporal lineages. The potential for interspecies transmission and zoonotic events involving this newly emerged influenza A virus is currently unknown.
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Brotes de Enfermedades , Enfermedades de los Perros/epidemiología , Genoma Viral , Subtipo H3N2 del Virus de la Influenza A/genética , Infecciones por Orthomyxoviridae/epidemiología , Infecciones por Orthomyxoviridae/veterinaria , Animales , Chicago/epidemiología , Enfermedades de los Perros/transmisión , Enfermedades de los Perros/virología , Perros , Georgia/epidemiología , Secuenciación de Nucleótidos de Alto Rendimiento , Vivienda para Animales , Humanos , Incidencia , Subtipo H3N2 del Virus de la Influenza A/clasificación , Subtipo H3N2 del Virus de la Influenza A/aislamiento & purificación , North Carolina/epidemiología , Infecciones por Orthomyxoviridae/transmisión , Infecciones por Orthomyxoviridae/virología , Filogenia , República de Corea/epidemiologíaRESUMEN
Avian influenza viruses (AIV) remain prevalent among wild bird populations in the European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA), leading to significant illness in and death of birds. Transmission between bird and mammal species has been observed, particularly in fur animal farms, where outbreaks have been reported. While transmission from infected birds to humans is rare, there have been instances of exposure to these viruses since 2020 without any symptomatic infections reported in the EU/EEA. However, these viruses continue to evolve globally, and with the migration of wild birds, new strains carrying potential mutations for mammalian adaptation could be selected. If avian A(H5N1) influenza viruses acquire the ability to spread efficiently among humans, large-scale transmission could occur due to the lack of immune defences against H5 viruses in humans. The emergence of AIV capable of infecting mammals, including humans, can be facilitated by various drivers. Some intrinsic drivers are related to virus characteristics or host susceptibility. Other drivers are extrinsic and may increase exposure of mammals and humans to AIV thereby stimulating mutation and adaptation to mammals. Extrinsic drivers include the ecology of host species, such as including wildlife, human activities like farming practices and the use of natural resources, climatic and environmental factors. One Health measures to mitigate the risk of AIV adapting to mammals and humans focus on limiting exposure and preventing spread. Key options for actions include enhancing surveillance targeting humans and animals, ensuring access to rapid diagnostics, promoting collaboration between animal and human sectors, and implementing preventive measures such as vaccination. Effective communication to different involved target audiences should be emphasised, as well as strengthening veterinary infrastructure, enforcing biosecurity measures at farms, and reducing wildlife contact with domestic animals. Careful planning of poultry and fur animal farming, especially in areas with high waterfowl density, is highlighted for effective risk reduction.
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Between 16 March and 14 June 2024, 42 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) virus detections were reported in domestic (15) and wild (27) birds across 13 countries in Europe. Although the overall number of detections in Europe has not been this low since the 2019-2020 epidemiological year, HPAI viruses continue to circulate at a very low level. Most detections in poultry were due to indirect contact with wild birds, but there was also secondary spread. Outside Europe, the HPAI situation intensified particularly in the USA, where a new A(H5N1) virus genotype (B3.13) has been identified in >130 dairy herds in 12 states. Infection in cattle appears to be centred on the udder, with milk from infected animals showing high viral loads and representing a new vehicle of transmission. Apart from cattle, HPAI viruses were identified in two other mammal species (alpaca and walrus) for the first time. Between 13 March and 20 June 2024, 14 new human cases with avian influenza virus infection were reported from Vietnam (one A(H5N1), one A(H9N2)), Australia (with travel history to India, one A(H5N1)), USA (three A(H5N1)), China (two A(H5N6), three A(H9N2), one A(H10N3)), India (one A(H9N2)), and Mexico (one fatal A(H5N2) case). The latter case was the first laboratory-confirmed human infection with avian influenza virus subtype A(H5N2). Most of the human cases had reported exposure to poultry, live poultry markets, or dairy cattle prior to avian influenza virus detection or onset of illness. Human infections with avian influenza viruses remain rare and no human-to-human transmission has been observed. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian A(H5) influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general public in the EU/EEA. The risk of infection remains low-to-moderate for those occupationally or otherwise exposed to infected animals or contaminated environments.
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Between 2 December 2023 and 15 March 2024, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) outbreaks were reported in domestic (227) and wild (414) birds across 26 countries in Europe. Compared to previous years, although still widespread, the overall number of HPAI virus detections in birds was significantly lower, among other reasons, possibly due to some level of flock immunity in previously affected wild bird species, resulting in reduced contamination of the environment, and a different composition of circulating A(H5N1) genotypes. Most HPAI outbreaks reported in poultry were primary outbreaks following the introduction of the virus by wild birds. Outside Europe, the majority of outbreaks in poultry were still clustered in North America, while the spread of A(H5) to more naïve wild bird populations on mainland Antarctica is of particular concern. For mammals, A(H5N5) was reported for the first time in Europe, while goat kids in the United States of America represented the first natural A(H5N1) infection in ruminants. Since the last report and as of 12 March 2024, five human avian influenza A(H5N1) infections, including one death, three of which were clade 2.3.2.1c viruses, have been reported by Cambodia. China has reported two human infections, including one fatal case, with avian influenza A(H5N6), four human infections with avian influenza A(H9N2) and one fatal case with co-infection of seasonal influenza A(H3N2) and avian influenza A(H10N5). The latter case was the first documented human infection with avian influenza A(H10N5). Human infections with avian influenza remain rare and no sustained human-to-human infection has been observed. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general population in the EU/EEA. The risk of infection remains low to moderate for those occupationally or otherwise exposed to infected animals.
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Bacillus Calmette-Guérin (BCG) is a routinely used vaccine for protecting children against Mycobacterium tuberculosis that comprises attenuated Mycobacterium bovis. BCG can also be used to protect livestock against M. bovis; however, its effectiveness has not been quantified for this use. We performed a natural transmission experiment to directly estimate the rate of transmission to and from vaccinated and unvaccinated calves over a 1-year exposure period. The results show a higher indirect efficacy of BCG to reduce transmission from vaccinated animals that subsequently become infected [74%; 95% credible interval (CrI): 46 to 98%] compared with direct protection against infection (58%; 95% CrI: 34 to 73%) and an estimated total efficacy of 89% (95% CrI: 74 to 96%). A mechanistic transmission model of bovine tuberculosis (bTB) spread within the Ethiopian dairy sector was developed and showed how the prospects for elimination may be enabled by routine BCG vaccination of cattle.
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Vacuna BCG , Erradicación de la Enfermedad , Mycobacterium bovis , Tuberculosis Bovina , Vacunación , Eficacia de las Vacunas , Animales , Bovinos , Vacuna BCG/administración & dosificación , Mycobacterium bovis/inmunología , Tuberculosis Bovina/prevención & control , Tuberculosis Bovina/transmisión , Vacunación/métodos , Vacunación/veterinaria , Erradicación de la Enfermedad/métodosRESUMEN
Zoonotic tuberculosis in humans is caused by infection with bacteria of the Mycobacterium tuberculosis complex acquired from animals, most commonly cattle. India has the highest burden of human tuberculosis in the world and any zoonotic risk posed by tuberculosis in bovines needs to be managed at the source of infection as a part of efforts to end human tuberculosis. Zoonotic tuberculosis in humans can be severe and is clinically indistinguishable from non-zoonotic tuberculosis. As a consequence, zoonotic tuberculosis remains under-recognised and the significance of its contribution to human tuberculosis is poorly understood. This study aimed to explore any association between bovine density, bovine ownership, and human tuberculosis reporting in India using self-reported tuberculosis data in households and officially reported tuberculosis cases while controlling for common confounders for human tuberculosis. We find an association between human tuberculosis reporting, bovine density and bovine ownership in India. Buffalo density was significantly associated with an increased risk of self-reported tuberculosis in households (odds ratio (OR) = 1.23 (95% credible interval (CI): 1.10-1.39) at household level; incidence rate ratio (IRR) = 1.17 (95% CI: 1.04-1.33) at district level), while cattle density (OR = 0.80, 95% CI: 0.71-0.89; IRR = 0.78, 95% CI: 0.70-0.87) and ownership of bovines in households (OR = 0.94, 95% CI: 0.9-0.99; IRR = 0.67, 95% CI: 0.57-0.79) had a protective association with tuberculosis reporting. It is unclear whether this relates to differences in tuberculosis transmission dynamics, or perhaps an association between bovines and other unexplored confounders for tuberculosis reporting in humans. Our study highlights a need for structured surveillance to estimate the prevalence of tuberculosis in cattle and buffaloes, characterisation of Mycobacterium tuberculosis complex species present in bovines and transmission analyses at the human-animal interface to better assess the burden and risk pathways of zoonotic tuberculosis in India.
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Bison , Mycobacterium bovis , Tuberculosis Bovina , Tuberculosis , Humanos , Bovinos , Animales , Tuberculosis Bovina/epidemiología , Propiedad , Tuberculosis/epidemiología , Tuberculosis/veterinaria , Búfalos , India/epidemiologíaRESUMEN
Between 2 September and 1 December 2023, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) outbreaks were reported in domestic (88) and wild (175) birds across 23 countries in Europe. Compared to previous years, the increase in the number of HPAI virus detections in waterfowl has been delayed, possibly due to a later start of the autumn migration of several wild bird species. Common cranes were the most frequently affected species during this reporting period with mortality events being described in several European countries. Most HPAI outbreaks reported in poultry were primary outbreaks following the introduction of the virus by wild birds, with the exception of Hungary, where two clusters involving secondary spread occurred. HPAI viruses identified in Europe belonged to eleven different genotypes, seven of which were new. With regard to mammals, the serological survey conducted in all fur farms in Finland revealed 29 additional serologically positive farms during this reporting period. Wild mammals continued to be affected mostly in the Americas, from where further spread into wild birds and mammals in the Antarctic region was described for the first time. Since the last report and as of 1 December 2023, three fatal and one severe human A(H5N1) infection with clade 2.3.2.1c viruses have been reported by Cambodia, and one A(H9N2) infection was reported from China. No human infections related to the avian influenza detections in animals in fur farms in Finland have been reported, and human infections with avian influenza remain a rare event. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general population in the EU/EEA. The risk of infection remains low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people to infected birds or mammals (wild or domesticated); this assessment covers different situations that depend on the level of exposure.
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The emergence of a novel pathogen in a susceptible population can cause rapid spread of infection. High prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 infection in white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus) has been reported in multiple locations, likely resulting from several human-to-deer spillover events followed by deer-to-deer transmission. Knowledge of the risk and direction of SARS-CoV-2 transmission between humans and potential reservoir hosts is essential for effective disease control and prioritisation of interventions. Using genomic data, we reconstruct the transmission history of SARS-CoV-2 in humans and deer, estimate the case finding rate and attempt to infer relative rates of transmission between species. We found no evidence of direct or indirect transmission from deer to human. However, with an estimated case finding rate of only 4.2%, spillback to humans cannot be ruled out. The extensive transmission of SARS-CoV-2 within deer populations and the large number of unsampled cases highlights the need for active surveillance at the human-animal interface.
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COVID-19 , Ciervos , SARS-CoV-2 , Zoonosis Virales , Animales , COVID-19/epidemiología , COVID-19/prevención & control , COVID-19/transmisión , COVID-19/veterinaria , Ciervos/virología , Monitoreo del Ambiente , Humanos , Medición de Riesgo , SARS-CoV-2/genética , SARS-CoV-2/aislamiento & purificación , Zoonosis Virales/epidemiología , Zoonosis Virales/transmisión , Zoonosis Virales/virologíaRESUMEN
The presence of free-grazing ducks (FGD) has consistently been shown to be associated with highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 outbreaks in South-East Asia. However, the lack of knowledge about the transmission pathways limits the effectiveness of control efforts. To address this gap, we developed a probabilistic transmission model of HPAIV H5N1 in the nomadic FGD production system in Viet Nam, assuming different scenarios to address parameter uncertainty. Results suggested that HPAIV H5N1 could spread within the nomadic FGD production system, with an estimated flock-level effective reproduction number (re) ranging from 2.16 (95% confidence interval (CI): 1.39-3.49) to 6.10 (95%CI: 3.93-9.85) depending on the scenario. Indirect transmission via boats and trucks was shown to be the main transmission route in all scenarios. Results suggest that re could be reduced below one with 95% confidence if 86% of FGD flocks were vaccinated in the best-case scenario or 95% in the worst-case scenario. If vaccination was combined with cleaning and disinfection of transport vehicles twice a week, vaccination coverage could be lowered to 60% in the best-case scenario. These findings are of particular relevance for prioritising interventions for effective control of HPAIV in nomadic free-grazing duck production systems.
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Subtipo H5N1 del Virus de la Influenza A/inmunología , Vacunas contra la Influenza/inmunología , Gripe Aviar/prevención & control , Gripe Aviar/transmisión , Vacunación/veterinaria , Animales , Control de Enfermedades Transmisibles/métodos , Brotes de Enfermedades/prevención & control , Desinfección , Patos/virología , Gripe Aviar/epidemiología , Vehículos a Motor , Vietnam/epidemiologíaRESUMEN
Lameness in pigs is a major welfare concern and one of the most commonly reported reasons for premature culling of breeding sows. In this study, the prevalence of lameness in sows was estimated using data from 76 pig breeding units in England and risk factors associated with the occurrence of lameness were examined. The prevalence of lameness in sows was 4.5% (farm median 5.0%, range 0-40%), with at least one lame sow being observed at 54% of the 76 farms. Relative risk (RR) of lameness was determined by multivariable Poisson regression analysis. Farms with high producing sows had a lower rate of lame sows than farms with a medium level of production (P=0.01). However, medium levels of production on a farm were associated with higher levels of lameness than farms having the lowest level of production (P=0.02). Farms where the stockman had responsibility for more sows resulted in an increased risk of lameness (P=0.0062). When indoor units were considered, the area of the pen and younger sows (two parities or less) had higher risk of lameness (P=0.001 and P=0.026 respectively). An increased awareness of the risk factors behind lameness is essential in farm management and can be useful when designing housing areas as well as developing future prevention plans for lameness.
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Cojera Animal/fisiopatología , Enfermedades de los Porcinos/fisiopatología , Animales , Inglaterra/epidemiología , Femenino , Vivienda para Animales , Cojera Animal/epidemiología , Variaciones Dependientes del Observador , Prevalencia , Análisis de Regresión , Factores de Riesgo , Porcinos , Enfermedades de los Porcinos/epidemiologíaRESUMEN
Bluetongue (BT) is a vector-borne viral disease of ruminants. The infection is widespread globally with major implications for international animal trade and production. In 2006, BT virus serotype 8 (BTV-8) was encountered in Europe for the first time, causing extensive production losses and death in susceptible livestock. Following the appearance of BTV-8 in Switzerland in 2007, a compulsory vaccination programme was launched in the subsequent year. Due to social factors and difficulties to reach animals on high pasture, the regional vaccination coverage varied across the country in both 2008 and 2009. In this study, the effect of vaccination on the spatial occurrence of BTV-8 and the associated relative disease risk in Switzerland in 2008 and 2009 were investigated by a spatial Bayesian hierarchical approach. Bayesian posterior distributions were obtained by integrated nested Laplace approximations, a promising alternative to commonly used Markov chain Monte Carlo methods. The number of observed BTV-8 outbreaks in Switzerland decreased notably from 2008 to 2009. However, only a non-significant association between vaccination coverage and the probability of a spatial unit being infected with BTV-8 was identified using the model developed for this study. The relative disease risk varied significantly across the country, with a higher relative risk of BTV-8 infection in western and north-western Switzerland where environmental conditions are more suitable for vector presence and viral transmission. Examination of the spatial correlation between disease occurrence, control measures and associated ecological factors can be valuable in the evaluation and development of disease control programmes, allowing prioritisation of areas with a high relative risk of disease.