How local partisan context conditions prosocial behaviors: Mask wearing during COVID-19.

Does local partisan context influence the adoption of prosocial behavior? Using a nationwide survey of 60,000 adults and geographic data on over 180 million registered voters, we investigate whether neighborhood partisan composition affects a publicly observable and politicized behavior: wearing a mask. We find that Republicans are less likely to wear masks in public as the share of Republicans in their zip codes increases. Democratic mask wearing, however, is unaffected by local partisan context. Consequently, the partisan gap in mask wearing is largest in Republican neighborhoods, and less apparent in Democratic areas. These effects are distinct from other contextual effects such as variations in neighborhood race, income, or education. In contrast, partisan context has significantly reduced influence on unobservable public health recommendations like COVID-19 vaccination and no influence on nonpoliticized behaviors like flu vaccination, suggesting that differences in mask wearing reflect the publicly observable and politicized nature of the behavior instead of underlying differences in dispositions toward medical care.

Personal hardship narrows the partisan gap in COVID-19 and climate change responses.

The COVID-19 pandemic in the United States was characterized by a partisan gap. Democrats were more concerned about this novel health threat, more willing to socially distance, and more likely to support policies aimed at mitigating the spread of the virus than Republicans. In cross-sectional analyses of three nationally representative survey waves in 2020, we find that adverse experience with COVID-19 is associated with a narrowing of the partisan gap. The mean difference between Republicans and Democrats in concern, policy support, and behavioral intentions narrows or even disappears at high levels of self-reported adverse experience. Reported experience does not depend on party affiliation and is predicted by local COVID-19 incidence rates. In contrast, analyses of longitudinal data and county-level incidence rates do not show a consistent relationship among experience, partisanship, and behavior or policy support. Our findings suggest that self-reported personal experience interacts with partisanship in complex ways and may be an important channel for concern about novel threats such as the COVID-19 pandemic. We find consistent results for self-reported experience of extreme weather events and climate change attitudes and policy preferences, although the association between extreme weather and experience and climate change is more tenuous.

Deeper Than You Think: Partisanship-Dependent Brain Responses in Early Sensory and Motor Brain Regions.

Recent political polarization has illustrated how individuals with opposing political views often experience ongoing events in markedly different ways. In this study, we explored the neural mechanisms underpinning this phenomenon. We conducted fMRI scanning of 34 right- and left-wing participants (45% females) watching political videos (e.g., campaign ads and political speeches) just before the elections in Israel. As expected, we observed significant differences between left- and right-wing participants in their interpretation of the videos' content. Furthermore, neuroimaging results revealed partisanship-dependent differences in activation and synchronization in higher-order regions. Surprisingly, such differences were also revealed in early sensory, motor, and somatosensory regions. We found that the political content synchronized the responses of primary visual and auditory cortices in a partisanship-dependent manner. Moreover, right-wing (and not left-wing) individuals' sensorimotor cortex was involved in processing right-wing (and not left-wing) political content. These differences were pronounced to the extent that we could predict political orientation from the early brain-response alone. Importantly, no such differences were found with respect to neutral content. Therefore, these results uncover more fundamental neural mechanisms underlying processes of political polarization.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The political sphere has become highly polarized in recent years. Would it be possible to identify the neural mechanisms underpinning such processes? In our study, left- and right-wing participants were scanned in fMRI while watching political video clips just before the elections in Israel. We found that political content was potent in synchronizing the brain responses of individuals holding similar views. This was far more pronounced in individuals holding right-wing views. Moreover, partisan-dependent differences in neural responses were identified already in early sensory, somatosensory, and motor regions, and only for political content. These results suggest that individuals' political views shape their neural responses at a very basic level.

Preregistered Replication and Extension of "Moral Hypocrisy: Social Groups and the Flexibility of Virtue".

The tendency for people to consider themselves morally good while behaving selfishly is known as moral hypocrisy. Influential work by Valdesolo and DeSteno (2007) found evidence for intergroup moral hypocrisy such that people were more forgiving of transgressions when they were committed by an in-group member than an out-group member. We conducted two experiments to examine moral hypocrisy and group membership in an online paradigm with Prolific workers from the United States: a direct replication of the original work with minimal groups (N = 610; nationally representative) and a conceptual replication with political groups (N = 606; 50% Democrats and 50% Republicans). Although the results did not replicate the original findings, we observed evidence of in-group favoritism in minimal groups and out-group derogation in political groups. The current research finds mixed evidence of intergroup moral hypocrisy and has implications for understanding the contextual dependencies of intergroup bias and partisanship.

Reducing mask resistance among White evangelical Christians with value-consistent messages.

Public health experts have advocated for wearing protective face masks to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, yet some populations are resistant. Can certain messages shift attitudes toward masks? We investigate the effect of value-consistent messages within a mask-skeptical population: White evangelicals in the United States. An experiment within a national survey of White evangelicals (n = 1,212) assigned respondents to one of three conditions: One group was given a religious message equating mask use with loving your neighbor, another was given a message by Donald Trump saying mask use is patriotic, and a control group received no message. Those exposed to the religious message were more likely to see mask use as important and were more supportive of mask mandates. Republican evangelicals exposed to the patriotism message had similar responses. These findings show that messages that align with individuals' core values-in this case, religious tenets and patriotism-can shift certain views on mask use and government mask policies to combat COVID-19, even among a comparatively mask-resistant group.

Shared partisanship dramatically increases social tie formation in a Twitter field experiment.

Americans are much more likely to be socially connected to copartisans, both in daily life and on social media. However, this observation does not necessarily mean that shared partisanship per se drives social tie formation, because partisanship is confounded with many other factors. Here, we test the causal effect of shared partisanship on the formation of social ties in a field experiment on Twitter. We created bot accounts that self-identified as people who favored the Democratic or Republican party and that varied in the strength of that identification. We then randomly assigned 842 Twitter users to be followed by one of our accounts. Users were roughly three times more likely to reciprocally follow-back bots whose partisanship matched their own, and this was true regardless of the bot's strength of identification. Interestingly, there was no partisan asymmetry in this preferential follow-back behavior: Democrats and Republicans alike were much more likely to reciprocate follows from copartisans. These results demonstrate a strong causal effect of shared partisanship on the formation of social ties in an ecologically valid field setting and have important implications for political psychology, social media, and the politically polarized state of the American public.

The association of conspiracy beliefs and the uptake of COVID-19 vaccination: a cross-sectional study.

The COVID-19 pandemic revealed that health denialism might be an important determinant of adherence to preventive measures during epidemic challenges. Conspiracy beliefs seem to be one of the most visible manifestations of denialism in society. Despite intensive efforts to promote COVID-19 vaccinations, the number of citizens reluctant to get vaccinated was very large in many countries. The main aim of this study was the analysis of the association between the acceptance of the COVID-19 vaccination and conspiracy beliefs among adult Internet users in Poland. The analysis was based on data from a survey performed on a sample of 2008 respondents in October 2021. Uni- and multivariable logistic regression models were applied to evaluate the association between attitudes towards COVID-19 vaccination and generic conspiracist, vaccine-conspiracy, and COVID-19-related conspiracy beliefs. In the multivariable model, the effect of conspiracy beliefs was adjusted for the level of vaccine hesitancy, future anxiety, political sympathies, and socio-demographic variables. Univariate regression models showed that COVID-19 vaccination acceptance is significantly lower among respondents with higher levels of all three types of conspiracy beliefs. In the multivariable model, the effect of COVID-19-related and vaccine conspiracy beliefs, but not generic conspiracist beliefs, was maintained after adjusting for vaccine hesitancy. We conclude that conspiracy beliefs should be treated as a potential indicator of lower adherence to preventive measures during epidemic challenges. The respondents revealing a high level of conspirational thinking are a potential group for intensified actions which employ health educational and motivational interventions.

America's electorate is increasingly polarized along partisan lines about voting by mail during the COVID-19 crisis.

Are voters as polarized as political leaders when it comes to their preferences about how to cast their ballots in November 2020 and their policy positions on how elections should be run in light of the COVID-19 outbreak? Prior research has shown little party divide on voting by mail, with nearly equal percentages of voters in both parties choosing to vote this way where it is an option. Has a divide opened up this year in how voters aligned with the Democratic and Republican parties prefer to cast a ballot? We address these questions with two nationally diverse, online surveys fielded from April 8 to 10 and June 11 to 13, of 5,612 and 5,818 eligible voters, respectively, with an embedded experiment providing treated respondents with scientific projections about the COVID-19 outbreak. We find a nearly 10 percentage point difference between Democrats and Republicans in their preference for voting by mail in April, which had doubled in size to nearly 20 percentage points in June. This partisan gap is wider still for those exposed to scientific projections about the pandemic. We also find that support for national legislation requiring states to offer no-excuse absentee ballots has emerged as an increasingly polarized issue.

Political partisanship influences behavioral responses to governors' recommendations for COVID-19 prevention in the United States.

Voluntary physical distancing is essential for preventing the spread of COVID-19. We assessed the role of political partisanship in individuals' compliance with physical distancing recommendations of political leaders using data on mobility from a sample of mobile phones in 3,100 counties in the United States during March 2020, county-level partisan preferences, information about the political affiliation of state governors, and the timing of their communications about COVID-19 prevention. Regression analyses examined how political preferences influenced the association between governors' COVID-19 communications and residents' mobility patterns. Governors' recommendations for residents to stay at home preceded stay-at-home orders and led to a significant reduction in mobility that was comparable to the effect of the orders themselves. Effects were larger in Democratic- than in Republican-leaning counties, a pattern more pronounced under Republican governors. Democratic-leaning counties also responded more strongly to recommendations from Republican than from Democratic governors. Political partisanship influences citizens' decisions to voluntarily engage in physical distancing in response to communications by their governor.

Universal vote-by-mail has no impact on partisan turnout or vote share.

In response to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), many scholars and policy makers are urging the United States to expand voting-by-mail programs to safeguard the electoral process. What are the effects of vote-by-mail? In this paper, we provide a comprehensive design-based analysis of the effect of universal vote-by-mail-a policy under which every voter is mailed a ballot in advance of the election-on electoral outcomes. We collect data from 1996 to 2018 on all three US states that implemented universal vote-by-mail in a staggered fashion across counties, allowing us to use a difference-in-differences design at the county level to estimate causal effects. We find that 1) universal vote-by-mail does not appear to affect either party's share of turnout, 2) universal vote-by-mail does not appear to increase either party's vote share, and 3) universal vote-by-mail modestly increases overall average turnout rates, in line with previous estimates. All three conclusions support the conventional wisdom of election administration experts and contradict many popular claims in the media.

Political Partisanship, Trust, and Attitudes toward COVID-19 Vaccines in Indonesia.

CONTEXT: This study examines the extent to which political partisanship-measured as support for either the incumbent candidate for Indonesia's presidency, Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi), or for Jokowi's challenger, Prabowo-affects individuals' risk perception of COVID-19 and COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy and refusal as well as beliefs about the safety and efficacy of the COVID-19 vaccine. METHODS: The authors performed multinomial logistic and ordinary least squares regression analyses on a nationally representative sample of a national survey on public trust in COVID-19 vaccines and vaccinations that was conducted in December 2020. FINDINGS: Individuals who voted for Prabowo in the 2019 presidential election were more likely to have a lower level of willingness and a higher level of hesitancy to get the COVID-19 vaccine than those who cast their ballot for Jokowi as the Indonesian president. CONCLUSIONS: Political partisanship does matter in shaping individuals' hesitancy or refusal to receive the COVID-19 vaccine in Indonesia. The effect of partisanship is also significant in shaping individuals' trust in the efficacy and safety of the COVID-19 vaccine, but it is not significantly associated with individuals' risk perceptions.

Medicaid by Any Other Name? Investigating Malleability of Partisan Attitudes Toward the Public Program.

CONTEXT: Medicaid is the largest health insurance program by enrollment in the United States. The program varies across states across a variety of dimensions, including what it's called; some states use state-specific naming conventions (e.g., MassHealth in Massachusetts). METHODS: In a pre-registered online survey experiment (n = 5,807), we test whether public opinion shifts in response to the use of state-specific Medicaid program names or the provision of information about program enrollment. FINDINGS: We find that replacing "Medicaid" with a state-specific name results in a large increase in the share of respondents reporting that they "haven't heard enough to say" how they feel about the program. This corresponds to a decrease in both favorable and unfavorable attitudes toward the program. Though confusion increases among all partisan groups, there is evidence that the state-specific names may also strengthen positive perceptions among Republicans. Providing enrollment information generally does not affect public opinion. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings offer suggestive evidence that state-specific program names may muddle understanding of the program as a government-provided benefit. Policymakers seeking to bolster support for the program or claim credit for expanding or improving it may be better served simply referring to it as "Medicaid."

More Than Words? How Highlighting Target Populations Affects Public Opinion about the Medicaid Program.

CONTEXT: The Medicaid program provides health insurance coverage to a diverse set of demographics. We know little about how the policy community describes these populations (e.g., on Medicaid-related websites or in public opinion polls and policy writings) or whether and how these descriptions may affect perceptions of the program, its beneficiaries, and potential policy changes. METHODS: To investigate this issue, we developed and fielded a nationally representative survey of 2,680 Americans that included an experiment for priming respondents by highlighting different combinations of target populations of the Medicaid program as found in the Medicaid policy discourse. FINDINGS: Overall, we find that Americans view Medicaid and its beneficiaries rather favorably. However, there are marked differences based on partisanship and racial animosity. Emphasizing citizenship and residency requirements at times improved these perceptions. CONCLUSIONS: Racial perceptions and partisanship are important correlates in Americans' views about Medicaid and its beneficiaries. However, perceptions are not immutable. In general, the policy community should shift toward using more comprehensive descriptions of the Medicaid population that go beyond the focus on low income and that include citizenship and residency requirements. Future research should expand this work by studying descriptions in the broader public discourse.

Physician Trust in the News Media and Attitudes toward COVID-19.

CONTEXT: Previous research has established the importance of primary care physicians in communicating public health directives. The implicit assumption is that, because of their expertise, doctors provide accurate and up-to-date information to their patients independent of partisan affiliation or media trust. METHODS: The authors conducted an online survey of 625 primary care physicians and used the results to test (1) whether physician trust in media outlets is consistent with their political partisanship, and (2) whether trust in media outlets influences (a) personal concern that someone in their family will get sick, (b) perceptions about the seriousness of the pandemic as portrayed in the media, and (c) trust in federal government agencies and scientists. FINDINGS: Physicians are better positioned to critically evaluate health-related news, but they are subject to the same biases that influence public opinion. Physicians' partisan commitments influence media trust, and media trust influences concern that a family member will get sick, perceptions regarding the seriousness of the pandemic, and trust in federal government agencies and scientists. CONCLUSIONS: Physician trust in specific media outlets shapes their understanding of the pandemic, and-to the extent that they trust conservative media outlets-it may limit their effectiveness as health policy messengers.

The Politics of the Gender Gap in COVID-19: Partisanship, Health Behavior, and Policy Preferences in the US.

Several studies demonstrate gender and partisan differences among Americans in COVID-19 socioeconomic consequences, attitudes, and behaviors. Using six waves of panel survey data, this article explores the intersection of gender and party across COVID-19 mitigation behaviors, concerns, and policy preferences. We observe small gender gaps on several measures; however, partisan differences are larger than gender differences when considering the interaction between gender and partisanship. Democratic women are more similar to Democratic men on these measures than to Republican women. On virtually all measures, Republican women report lower levels of mitigation behaviors, worries, and support for expansive government policies compared to Democratic women and men. Analyzing the interaction of gender and partisanship illuminates how individuals navigated the pandemic with respect to identity factors that often pull in different directions. These findings suggest that one's partisan identity is more consequential than gender when it comes to COVID behaviors, concerns, and policy preferences.

The interplay between partisanship, risk perception, and mental distress during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States.

COVID-19 is a profoundly partisan issue in the U.S., with increasing polarization of the Republicans' and Democrats' responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and their precautionary actions to reduce virus transmission. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether and how partisan gaps in many aspects of the pandemic are linked to mental health, which has increasingly been a major concern. This study examined the association between political partisanship and mental health by assessing the mediating and moderating relationships between risk perception, expected infection severity of COVID-19, and partisanship in terms of mental health during the early stages of the pandemic. The data were drawn from a cross-sectional web survey conducted between March 20 and 30, 2020, with a sample of U.S. adults (N = 4,327). Of those participants, 38.9% and 29.6% were Democrats and Republicans, respectively. The results indicate that Democrats were more likely to experience COVID-induced mental distress than Republicans, and higher risk perception and expected infection severity were associated with mental distress. Furthermore, risk perception and expected infection severity of COVID-19 mediated approximately 24%-34% of the associations between political partisanship and mental distress. Finally, the adverse mental health impact of risk perception and expected infection severity appeared to be much stronger for Republicans than Democrats. The findings suggest that political partisanship is a key factor to understanding mental health consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak in the U.S.

COVID-19 as an undesirable political issue: Conspiracy beliefs and intolerance of uncertainty predict adhesion to prevention measures.

Conspiracy theories thrive in moments of crises because they provide straightforward answers that assist individuals in coping with threats. The COVID-19 outbreak is such a crisis and is boosted by the political turmoil related to the politicization of the pandemic in some countries. To assess the role of political partisanship, intolerance of uncertainty (IU), and conspiracy beliefs in our two criterion variables (support for COVID-19 prevention measures and compliance with social distancing), we applied an online questionnaire to 662 participants. Our results indicate direct effects of political partisanship on support for COVID-19 prevention measures and non-compliance with social distancing while IU has not directly affected any of them. We have also found a significant effect of political partisanship on conspiracy theory dimensions involving personal wellbeing (PW) and control of information (CI) but not government malfeasance (GM) ones. Moreover, beliefs in CI theories predicted non-compliance with social distancing. Intolerance of uncertainty, on its turn, predicted the three dimensions of conspiracy beliefs. As to interaction effects, belief in GM, PW, and CI conspiracy theories moderated the effect of political partisanship on support for COVID-19 prevention measures whereas only belief in GM and PW theories moderated the effect of IU on past non-compliance with social distancing. Overall, our results suggest the relevance of diminishing politicization around the virus, providing basic scientific knowledge to the general population, and assisting individuals in coping with uncertainty. Besides, these findings provide insights into developing information campaigns to instruct the population to cope with the pandemic, producing behavioral change at societal and individual levels.

COVID-19 Risk Perception and Support for COVID-19 Mitigation Measures among Local Government Officials in the U.S.: A Test of a Cultural Theory of Risk.

This study relies on a cultural theory of risk to examine how cultural biases (hierarchy, individualism, egalitarianism, and fatalism) of local government officials affect their COVID-19 risk perception and support for COVID-19 mitigation measures. After controlling for partisanship, religiosity, and other factors, the analysis of survey data from county governments in the U.S. revealed that cultural biases matter. Officials with egalitarian and hierarchical cultural biases report higher support for adopting COVID-19 mitigation measures, while those with individualistic cultural biases report lower support. These findings highlight the need to understand cultural worldviews and develop cultural competencies necessary for governing traumatic events.

State-level political partisanship strongly correlates with health outcomes for US children.

The Cook Partisan Voting Index (PVI) determines how strongly a state leans toward the Democratic or Republican Party in US presidential elections compared to the nation. We set out to determine the correlation between childhood health outcomes and state-level partisanship using PVI. Sixteen measures of childhood health were obtained from several US governmental agencies for 2003-2017. The median PVI for every state was calculated for the same time period. Pearson's rho determined the correlation between PVI and each health outcome. Multiple regression was also conducted, adjusting for educational attainment and percentage of non-White residents. We also compared childhood health in moderately Democratic and Republican states (5-9.9% more Democratic/Republican than the national mean) and, similarly, for extremely Democratic and Republican states (10% or more Democratic/Republican than the national mean), using Wilcoxon tests. For all 16 health measures, the median values in Democratic-leaning states represented better outcomes than Republican-leaning states (9/16 had a beta value for linear regression associated with P < 0.05). When compared to Republican states, the median values in moderately Democratic states represented better outcomes for 14 of 16 health measures (9/14 associated with P < 0.05). Similarly, the median values for extremely Democratic states represented better outcomes with regard to all 16 health measures, when compared to Republican-leaning states (8/16 associated with P < 0.05).Conclusions: Democratic-leaning states displayed superior outcomes for multiple childhood health measures when compared to Republican counterpart states. Future research should investigate the significance of these findings and attempt to determine which state-level policies may have contributed to such disparate health outcomes. What is Known: • In the United States, many health disparities exist among children along racial, economic and geographic lines. • Many US states lean strongly towards either the Democratic or Republican political parties in federal elections. What is New: • Trends for multiple measures of childhood health vary in association with the political partisanship of the state being examined. • Multiple barometers of childhood health are superior in Democratic-leaning states, while no measures are better in Republican-leaning states.

Political ideology shapes the amplification of the accomplishments of disadvantaged vs. advantaged group members.

Recent years have witnessed an increased public outcry in certain quarters about a perceived lack of attention given to successful members of disadvantaged groups relative to equally meritorious members of advantaged groups, exemplified by social media campaigns centered around hashtags, such as #OscarsSoWhite and #WomenAlsoKnowStuff. Focusing on political ideology, we investigate here whether individuals differentially amplify successful targets depending on whether these targets belong to disadvantaged or advantaged groups, behavior that could help alleviate or entrench group-based disparities. Study 1 examines over 500,000 tweets from over 160,000 Twitter users about 46 unambiguously successful targets varying in race (white, black) and gender (male, female): American gold medalists from the 2016 Olympics. Leveraging advances in computational social science, we identify tweeters' political ideology, race, and gender. Tweets from political liberals were much more likely than those from conservatives to be about successful black (vs. white) and female (vs. male) gold medalists (and especially black females), controlling for tweeters' own race and gender, and even when tweeters themselves were white or male (i.e., advantaged group members). Studies 2 and 3 provided experimental evidence that liberals are more likely than conservatives to differentially amplify successful members of disadvantaged (vs. advantaged) groups and suggested that this is driven by liberals' heightened concern with social equality. Addressing theorizing about ideological asymmetries, we observed that political liberals are more responsible than conservatives for differential amplification. Our results highlight ideology's polarizing power to shape even whose accomplishments we promote, and extend theorizing about behavioral manifestations of egalitarian motives.