Mpox neglect and the smallpox niche: a problem for Africa, a problem for the world.

Mpox (formerly known as monkeypox) is a zoonotic viral disease endemic in parts of Africa. In May, 2022, the world was alerted to circulation of monkeypox virus in many high-income countries outside of Africa. Continued spread resulted in a WHO declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. Although there has been much attention on the global outbreak, most of the focus has been on high-income countries outside of Africa, despite the fact that monkeypox virus has been causing disease in parts of Africa for at least 50 years. Furthermore, the long-term consequences of this event, especially the risk that mpox fills the niche vacated through smallpox eradication, have not been sufficiently considered. The heart of the problem is the historical neglect of mpox in Africa where the disease is endemic, and the actual and potential consequences if this neglect is left uncorrected.

Global and regional governance of One Health and implications for global health security.

The apparent failure of global health security to prevent or prepare for the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need for closer cooperation between human, animal (domestic and wildlife), and environmental health sectors. However, the many institutions, processes, regulatory frameworks, and legal instruments with direct and indirect roles in the global governance of One Health have led to a fragmented, global, multilateral health security architecture. We explore four challenges: first, the sectoral, professional, and institutional silos and tensions existing between human, animal, and environmental health; second, the challenge that the international legal system, state sovereignty, and existing legal instruments pose for the governance of One Health; third, the power dynamics and asymmetry in power between countries represented in multilateral institutions and their impact on priority setting; and finally, the current financing mechanisms that predominantly focus on response to crises, and the chronic underinvestment for epidemic and emergency prevention, mitigation, and preparedness activities. We illustrate the global and regional dimensions to these four challenges and how they relate to national needs and priorities through three case studies on compulsory licensing, the governance of water resources in the Lake Chad Basin, and the desert locust infestation in east Africa. Finally, we propose 12 recommendations for the global community to address these challenges. Despite its broad and holistic agenda, One Health continues to be dominated by human and domestic animal health experts. Substantial efforts should be made to address the social-ecological drivers of health emergencies including outbreaks of emerging, re-emerging, and endemic infectious diseases. These drivers include climate change, biodiversity loss, and land-use change, and therefore require effective and enforceable legislation, investment, capacity building, and integration of other sectors and professionals beyond health.

SARS-CoV-2 Variants and Vaccines.

Viral variants of concern may emerge with dangerous resistance to the immunity generated by the current vaccines to prevent coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19). Moreover, if some variants of concern have increased transmissibility or virulence, the importance of efficient public health measures and vaccination programs will increase. The global response must be both timely and science based.

Diagnostics for COVID-19: moving from pandemic response to control.

Diagnostics have proven to be crucial to the COVID-19 pandemic response. There are three major methods for the detection of SARS-CoV-2 infection and their role has evolved during the course of the pandemic. Molecular tests such as PCR are highly sensitive and specific at detecting viral RNA, and are recommended by WHO for confirming diagnosis in individuals who are symptomatic and for activating public health measures. Antigen rapid detection tests detect viral proteins and, although they are less sensitive than molecular tests, have the advantages of being easier to do, giving a faster time to result, of being lower cost, and able to detect infection in those who are most likely to be at risk of transmitting the virus to others. Antigen rapid detection tests can be used as a public health tool for screening individuals at enhanced risk of infection, to protect people who are clinically vulnerable, to ensure safe travel and the resumption of schooling and social activities, and to enable economic recovery. With vaccine roll-out, antibody tests (which detect the host's response to infection or vaccination) can be useful surveillance tools to inform public policy, but should not be used to provide proof of immunity, as the correlates of protection remain unclear. All three types of COVID-19 test continue to have a crucial role in the transition from pandemic response to pandemic control.

Fragmented health systems in COVID-19: rectifying the misalignment between global health security and universal health coverage.

The COVID-19 pandemic has placed enormous strain on countries around the world, exposing long-standing gaps in public health and exacerbating chronic inequities. Although research and analyses have attempted to draw important lessons on how to strengthen pandemic preparedness and response, few have examined the effect that fragmented governance for health has had on effectively mitigating the crisis. By assessing the ability of health systems to manage COVID-19 from the perspective of two key approaches to global health policy-global health security and universal health coverage-important lessons can be drawn for how to align varied priorities and objectives in strengthening health systems. This Health Policy paper compares three types of health systems (ie, with stronger investments in global health security, stronger investments in universal health coverage, and integrated investments in global health security and universal health coverage) in their response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and synthesises four essential recommendations (ie, integration, financing, resilience, and equity) to reimagine governance, policies, and investments for better health towards a more sustainable future.

Militaries and global health: peace, conflict, and disaster response.

Many countries show a growing willingness to use militaries in support of global health efforts. This Series paper summarises the varied roles, responsibilities, and approaches of militaries in global health, drawing on examples and case studies across peacetime, conflict, and disaster response environments. Militaries have many capabilities applicable to global health, ranging from research, surveillance, and medical expertise to rapidly deployable, large-scale assets for logistics, transportation, and security. Despite this large range of capabilities, militaries also have limitations when engaging in global health activities. Militaries focus on strategic, operational, and tactical objectives that support their security and defence missions, which can conflict with humanitarian and global health equity objectives. Guidelines-both within and outside militaries-for military engagement in global health are often lacking, as are structured opportunities for military and civilian organisations to engage one another. We summarise policies that can help close the gap between military and civilian actors to catalyse the contributions of all participants to enhance global health.

SARS to novel coronavirus - old lessons and new lessons.

The response to the novel coronavirus outbreak in China suggests that many of the lessons from the 2003 SARS epidemic have been implemented and the response improved as a consequence. Nevertheless some questions remain and not all lessons have been successful. The national and international response demonstrates the complex link between public health, science and politics when an outbreak threatens to impact on global economies and reputations. The unprecedented measures implemented in China are a bold attempt to control the outbreak - we need to understand their effectiveness to balance costs and benefits for similar events in the future.

Building the case for embedding global health security into universal health coverage: a proposal for a unified health system that includes public health.

In the wake of the recent west African Ebola epidemic, there is global consensus on the need for strong health systems; however, agreement is less apparent on effective mechanisms for establishing and maintaining these systems, particularly in resource-constrained settings and in the presence of multiple and sustained stresses (eg, conflict, famine, climate change, and globalisation). The construction of the International Health Regulations (2005) guidelines and the WHO health systems framework, has resulted in the separation of public health functions and health-care services, which are interdependent in actuality and must be integrated to ensure a continuous, unbroken national health system. By analysing efforts to strengthen health systems towards attaining universal health coverage and investments to improve global health security, we examine areas of overlap and offer recommendations for construction of a unified national health system that includes public health. One way towards achieving universal health coverage is to broaden the definition of a health system.

Syndromic surveillance: two decades experience of sustainable systems - its people not just data!

Syndromic surveillance is a form of surveillance that generates information for public health action by collecting, analysing and interpreting routine health-related data on symptoms and clinical signs reported by patients and clinicians rather than being based on microbiologically or clinically confirmed cases. In England, a suite of national real-time syndromic surveillance systems (SSS) have been developed over the last 20 years, utilising data from a variety of health care settings (a telehealth triage system, general practice and emergency departments). The real-time systems in England have been used for early detection (e.g. seasonal influenza), for situational awareness (e.g. describing the size and demographics of the impact of a heatwave) and for reassurance of lack of impact on population health of mass gatherings (e.g. the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games).We highlight the lessons learnt from running SSS, for nearly two decades, and propose questions and issues still to be addressed. We feel that syndromic surveillance is an example of the use of 'big data', but contend that the focus for sustainable and useful systems should be on the added value of such systems and the importance of people working together to maximise the value for the public health of syndromic surveillance services.

Lessons From the West Africa Ebola Epidemic: A Systematic Review of Epidemiological and Social and Behavioral Science Research Priorities.

This systematic literature review compared the epidemiological (EPI) research and the qualitative social and behavioral science (SBS) research published during the West Africa Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic. Beginning with an initial capture of over 2000 articles, we extracted 236 EPI and 171 SBS studies to examine how disciplinary priorities affected research conducted during the EVD response, with implications for epidemic response effectiveness. Building on this research, we set forth a roadmap for the closer integration of EPI and SBS research in all aspects of epidemic preparedness and response that incorporates the lessons of the West Africa EVD outbreak. Key priorities include the following: (1) developing the capacity to systematically quantify qualitative sociocultural variables; (2) establishing interdisciplinary collaborations to improve "risk segmentation" practices; (3) creating and prepositioning qualitative indicators and composite sociocultural indexes for rapid deployment in outbreaks; (4) integrating novel systems with community resources; (5) developing new techniques for modeling social mobilization and community engagement; (6) prioritizing good data and complex analyses early in emergencies; and (7) learning from past experiences. Our findings support a program of action that situates data collection and analysis in real-time, recursive, integrated efforts to move community attitudes, behaviors, and responses into epidemiological research. We offer recommendations to improve coordinated, multidisciplinary approaches to health emergencies.

Ebola Virus Neutralizing Antibodies Detectable in Survivors of theYambuku, Zaire Outbreak 40 Years after Infection.

The first reported outbreak of Ebola virus disease occurred in 1976 in Yambuku, Democratic Republic of Congo. Antibody responses in survivors 11 years after infection have been documented. However, this report is the first characterization of anti-Ebola virus antibody persistence and neutralization capacity 40 years after infection. Using ELISAs we measured survivor's immunological response to Ebola virus Zaire (EBOV) glycoprotein and nucleoprotein, and assessed VP40 reactivity. Neutralization of EBOV was measured using a pseudovirus approach and plaque reduction neutralization test with live EBOV. Some survivors from the original EBOV outbreak still harbor antibodies against all 3 measures. Interestingly, a subset of these survivors' serum antibodies could still neutralize live virus 40 years postinitial infection. These data provide the longest documentation of both anti-Ebola serological response and neutralization capacity within any survivor cohort, extending the known duration of response from 11 years postinfection to at least 40 years after symptomatic infection.

International cooperation to improve access to and sustain effectiveness of antimicrobials.

Securing access to effective antimicrobials is one of the greatest challenges today. Until now, efforts to address this issue have been isolated and uncoordinated, with little focus on sustainable and international solutions. Global collective action is necessary to improve access to life-saving antimicrobials, conserving them, and ensuring continued innovation. Access, conservation, and innovation are beneficial when achieved independently, but much more effective and sustainable if implemented in concert within and across countries. WHO alone will not be able to drive these actions. It will require a multisector response (including the health, agriculture, and veterinary sectors), global coordination, and financing mechanisms with sufficient mandates, authority, resources, and power. Fortunately, securing access to effective antimicrobials has finally gained a place on the global political agenda, and we call on policy makers to develop, endorse, and finance new global institutional arrangements that can ensure robust implementation and bold collective action.

Exploring the evidence base for national and regional policy interventions to combat resistance.

The effectiveness of existing policies to control antimicrobial resistance is not yet fully understood. A strengthened evidence base is needed to inform effective policy interventions across countries with different income levels and the human health and animal sectors. We examine three policy domains-responsible use, surveillance, and infection prevention and control-and consider which will be the most effective at national and regional levels. Many complexities exist in the implementation of such policies across sectors and in varying political and regulatory environments. Therefore, we make recommendations for policy action, calling for comprehensive policy assessments, using standardised frameworks, of cost-effectiveness and generalisability. Such assessments are especially important in low-income and middle-income countries, and in the animal and environmental sectors. We also advocate a One Health approach that will enable the development of sensitive policies, accommodating the needs of each sector involved, and addressing concerns of specific countries and regions.

Malaria epidemiology in central Myanmar: identification of a multi-species asymptomatic reservoir of infection.

BACKGROUND: The spread of artemisinin-resistant Plasmodium falciparum is a global health concern. Myanmar stands at the frontier of artemisinin-resistant P. falciparum. Myanmar also has the highest reported malaria burden in Southeast Asia; it is integral in the World Health Organization's plan to eliminate malaria in Southeast Asia, yet few epidemiological data exist for the general population in Myanmar. METHODS: This cross-sectional, probability household survey was conducted in Phyu township, Bago Region (central Myanmar), during the wet season of 2013. Interviewers collected clinical and behavioural data, recorded tympanic temperature and obtained dried blood spots for malaria PCR and serology. Plasmodium falciparum positive samples were tested for genetic mutations in the K13 region that may confer artemisinin resistance. Estimated type-specific malaria PCR prevalence and seroprevalence were calculated, with regression analysis to identify risk factors for seropositivity to P. falciparum. Data were weighted to account for unequal selection probabilities. RESULTS: 1638 participants were sampled (500 households). Weighted PCR prevalence was low (n = 41, 2.5%) and most cases were afebrile (93%). Plasmodium falciparum was the most common species (n = 19. 1.1%) and five (26%) P. falciparum samples harboured K13 mutations. Plasmodium knowlesi was detected in 1.0% (n = 16) and Plasmodium vivax was detected in 0.4% (n = 7). Seroprevalence was 9.4% for P. falciparum and 3.1% for P. vivax. Seroconversion to P. falciparum was 0.003/year in the whole population, but 16-fold higher in men over 23 years old (LR test p = 0.016). DISCUSSION: This is the first population-based seroprevalence study from central Myanmar. Low overall prevalence was discovered. However, these data suggest endemic transmission continues, probably associated with behavioural risk factors amongst working-age men. Genetic mutations associated with P. falciparum artemisinin resistance, the presence of P. knowlesi and discrete demographic risk groups present opportunities and challenges for malaria control. Responses targeted to working-age men, capable of detecting sub-clinical infections, and considering all species will facilitate malaria elimination in this setting.

Discovery and Description of Ebola Zaire Virus in 1976 and Relevance to the West African Epidemic During 2013-2016.

BACKGROUND: In 1976, the first cases of Ebola virus disease in northern Democratic Republic of the Congo (then referred to as Zaire) were reported. This article addresses who was responsible for recognizing the disease; recovering, identifying, and naming the virus; and describing the epidemic. Key scientific approaches used in 1976 and their relevance to the 3-country (Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia) West African epidemic during 2013-2016 are presented. METHODS: Field and laboratory investigations started soon after notification, in mid-September 1976, and included virus cell culture, electron microscopy (EM), immunofluorescence antibody (IFA) testing of sera, case tracing, containment, and epidemiological surveys. In 2013-2016, medical care and public health work were delayed for months until the Ebola virus disease epidemic was officially declared an emergency by World Health Organization, but research in pathogenesis, clinical presentation, including sequelae, treatment, and prevention, has increased more recently. RESULTS: Filoviruses were cultured and observed by EM in Antwerp, Belgium (Institute of Tropical Medicine); Porton Down, United Kingdom (Microbiological Research Establishment); and Atlanta, Georgia (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). In Atlanta, serological testing identified a new virus. The 1976 outbreak (280 deaths among 318 cases) stopped in <11 weeks, and basic clinical and epidemiological features were defined. The recent massive epidemic during 2013-2016 (11 310 deaths among 28 616 cases) has virtually stopped after >2 years. Transmission indices (R0) are higher in all 3 countries than in 1976. CONCLUSIONS: An international commission working harmoniously in laboratories and with local communities was essential for rapid success in 1976. Control and understanding of the recent West African outbreak were delayed because of late recognition and because authorities were overwhelmed by many patients and poor community involvement. Despite obstacles, research was a priority in 1976 and recently.