Detection of vaccinia virus DNA, but not infectious virus, in the blood of smallpox vaccine recipients.

The authors of a recent study [Savona MR, Dela Cruz WP, Jones MS, Thornton JA, Xia D, Hadfield TL, et al. Detection of vaccinia DNA in the blood following smallpox vaccination. JAMA 2006; 295:1898-1900] suggested that the duration of deferral for blood donations by smallpox vaccinees should be extended, based on detection of vaccinia virus DNA in five blood samples by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and the potential for viremia. We found that 4 of 202 blood specimens (from 3 of 27 smallpox vaccinees) were positive for vaccinia virus DNA by PCR; none were positive for virus by culture. Throat swabs were negative by PCR and culture. Thus, while some blood specimens contained vaccinia virus DNA, infectious virus was not detected. Current guidelines for deferral of blood donation in vaccinees seem appropriate.

Comparison of methods for detection of vaccinia virus in patient specimens.

We analyzed a shell vial culture assay (SVA), real-time PCR, and a direct fluorescent antibody assay (DFA) for rapid detection of vaccinia virus from vaccination sites of Dryvax vaccine recipients. Of 47 samples assayed, 100% were positive by PCR, 89% were positive by SVA, and 40% were positive by DFA. DFA was limited by the need for adequate numbers of cells, with 32% of samples inadequate for interpretation. DFA performed better with specimens from patients who had not previously received the vaccine. PCR was positive for longer times postvaccination than was SVA. Infectious virus could be recovered after 45 min of acetone fixation of shell vial coverslips. Commercially available polyclonal antibodies cross-reacted with other orthopoxviruses and herpes simplex 1, but commercially available monoclonal antibodies were specific for vaccinia virus. In summary, PCR was the most sensitive test for detecting vaccinia virus in clinical specimens, while the DFA was the most rapid but the least sensitive test.

Large-scale screening of nasal swabs for Bacillus anthracis: descriptive summary and discussion of the National Institutes of Health's experience.

In October 2001, a letter containing a large number of anthrax spores was sent through the Brentwood post office in Washington, D.C., to a United States Senate office on Capitol Hill, resulting in contamination in both places. Several thousand people who worked at these sites were screened for spore exposure by collecting nasal swab samples. We describe here a screening protocol which we, as a level A laboratory, used on very short notice to process a large number of specimens (3,936 swabs) in order to report preliminary results as quickly as possible. Six isolates from our screening met preliminary criteria for Bacillus anthracis identification and were referred for definitive testing. Although none of the isolates was later confirmed to be B. anthracis, we studied these isolates further to define their biochemical characteristics and 16S rRNA sequences. Four of the six isolates were identified as Bacillus megaterium, one was identified as Bacillus cereus, and one was an unidentifiable Bacillus sp. Our results suggest that large-scale nasal-swab screening for potential exposure to anthrax spores, particularly if not done immediately postexposure, may not be very effective for detecting B. anthracis but may detect a number of Bacillus spp. that are phenotypically very similar to B. anthracis.