How Has the Affordable Care Act Affected Work and Wages?

In a review of the evidence, the authors find that the ACA had minimal effect on employment, hours of work, and compensation. This brief provides critical perspective on the effects of reforms on labor markets for federal and state policymakers as they consider changing or repealing the law.

Advancing the preparticipation physical evaluation (PPE): an ACSM and FIMS joint consensus statement.

While the preparticipation physical evaluation (PPE) is widely accepted, its usage and content are not standardized. Implementation is affected by cost, access, level of participation, participant age/sex, and local/regional/national mandate. PPE screening costs are generally borne by the athlete, family, or club. Screening involves generally agreed-upon questions based on expert opinion and tested over decades of use. No large-scale prospective controlled tracking programs have examined PPE outcomes. While the panel did not reach consensus on electrocardiogram screening as a routine part of PPE, all agreed that a history and physical exam focusing on cardiac risk is essential, and an ECG should be used where risk is increased. The many areas of consensus should help the American College of Sports Medicine and the Fédération Internationale du Médicine du Sport in developing a universally accepted PPE. An electronic PPE, using human-centered design, would be comprehensive, would provide a database given that PPE is mandatory in many locations, would simplify PPE administration, would allow remote access to clinical data, and would provide the much-needed data for prospective studies in this area.

Access to health insurance at small establishments: what can we learn from analyzing other fringe benefits?

Workers employed at small establishments are less likely to be offered health insurance than workers in larger establishments. They are also paid less and are less likely to be offered pensions, paid sick leave, and paid vacations. Using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, we examine the relationship between health insurance and other components of workers' compensation. We also propose an approach for identifying and prioritizing the reasons why workers in small establishments are less likely to be offered employer health insurance by comparing the provision of health insurance and how it changes with establishment size to the provision of these other fringe benefits and how they change with establishment size. We find that workers in larger establishments are not only more likely to be offered health insurance by their employer, but also are more likely to be offered retirement and paid vacation benefits. The results of our benefits comparison analysis suggest an important role for administrative costs as an obstacle to offering health insurance.

Estimating workers' marginal valuation of employer health benefits: would insured workers prefer more health insurance or higher wages?

In recent years the cost of health insurance has been increasing much faster than wages. In the face of these rising costs, many employers will have to make difficult decisions about whether to cut back health benefits or to compensate workers with lower wages or lower wage growth. In this paper, we ask the question, "Which do workers value more -- one additional dollar's worth of health benefits or one more dollar in their pockets?" Using a new approach to obtaining estimates of insured workers' marginal valuation of health benefits this paper estimates how much, on average, employees value the marginal dollar paid by employers for their workers' health insurance. We find that insured workers value the marginal health premium dollar at significantly less than the marginal wage dollar. However, workers value insurance generosity very highly. The marginal dollar spent on health insurance that adds an additional dollar's worth of observable dimensions of plan generosity, such as lower deductibles or coverage of additional services, is valued at significantly more than one dollar.

The effect of premiums on the decision to participate in health insurance and other fringe benefits offered by the employer: evidence from a real-world experiment.

In this paper, we investigate the effect of the out-of-pocket premium on the decision to enroll in employer health insurance and other benefits plans including dental insurance, vision care, long-term care insurance, and wellness benefits. Previous estimates of the effects of premium on takeup of health insurance could be biased toward zero due to a correlation between premium and unobservable demand or plan quality. We solve this problem using data representing hypothetical choices by employees under three different price regimes, providing price variation uncorrelated with either individual-specific or plan-specific unobservables. We find that workers are insensitive to price in health insurance takeup. Workers show much greater price sensitivity to decisions about dental insurance, vision plans, long-term care insurance, and wellness benefits. We conclude that premium subsidies are unlikely to have a substantial impact on increasing insurance rates of workers already offered employer insurance.

Does having two earners in the household matter for understanding how well employer-based health insurance works?

Using the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, the authors investigate differences between households with two earners and those with a single earner in households' access to employer-based health insurance and the generosity of insurance options. They examine whether a household has an offer of coverage, whether a household holds coverage, and whether all household members are covered. They also explore whether two-earner households have more generous options as measured by the number and types of plans available, as well as contribution requirements. The authors find that having a second earner in the household dramatically improves both access to employer health insurance and the generosity of health plan choices, particularly for workers generally acknowledged to have little access, such as part-time workers and workers in small establishments.

Measuring the Financial Exposure from Medical Care Spending Among Families with Employer Sponsored Insurance.

We develop an empirical method to assess the degree of financial exposure associated with medical care spending among non-elderly US families with employer-sponsored insurance. A key feature of this method is its simplicity - it only requires data on out-of-pocket (OOP) health care spending and total health care spending and does not require detailed knowledge of health insurance benefit design. We apply our method to assess whether families with a chronically ill member face more financial exposure given their level of total spending relative to families with no chronically ill members. We find that the insured chronically ill face more financial exposure than the insured non-chronically ill. Additional analyses suggest that the reason for this additional financial exposure is not that families with a chronically ill member are in different, less generous plans, on average. Rather, families with a chronically ill member have higher spending on certain types of medical services (e.g., pharmaceuticals) that face higher levels of coinsurance. Given recent work on value-based insurance design and coinsurance as an obstacle to medication adherence, our findings suggest that the current design of health plans could jeopardize both the health and the financial well-being of the chronically ill.

Moral hazard matters: measuring relative rates of underinsurance using threshold measures.

OBJECTIVE: To illustrate the impact of moral hazard for estimating relative rates of underinsurance and to present an adjustment method to correct for this source of bias. DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING: Secondary data from the 2005 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) are used in this study. We restrict attention to households that report having employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) for all members during the entire 2005 calendar year. STUDY DESIGN: Individuals or households are often classified as underinsured if out-of-pocket spending on medical care relative to income exceeds some threshold. In this paper, we show that, without adjustment, this common threshold measure of underinsurance will underestimate the number with low levels of insurance coverage due to moral hazard. We propose an adjustment method and apply it to the specific case of estimating the difference in rates of underinsurance among small- versus large-firm workers with full-year ESI. DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION: Data were abstracted from the MEPS website. All analyses were performed in Stata 9.2. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Applying the adjustment, we find that the underinsurance rate of small-firm households increases by approximately 20 percent with the adjustment for moral hazard and the difference in underinsurance rates between large-firm and small-firm households widens substantially. CONCLUSIONS: Adjusting for moral hazard makes a sizeable difference in the estimated prevalence of underinsurance using a threshold measure.