RESUMEN
Introduction: Outer membrane vesicles (OMVs) of Neisseria meningitidis in the group B-directed vaccine MenB-4C (BexseroR) protect against infections with Neisseria gonorrhoeae. The immunological basis for protection remains unclear. N. meningitidis OMV vaccines generate human antibodies to N. meningitidis and N. gonorrhoeae lipooligosaccharide (LOS/endotoxin), but the structural specificity of these LOS antibodies is not defined. Methods: Ten paired human sera obtained pre- and post-MenB-4C immunization were used in Western blots to probe N. meningitidis and N. gonorrhoeae LOS. Post-MenB-4C sera (7v5, 19v5, and 17v5), representing individual human variability in LOS recognition, were then used to interrogate structurally defined LOSs of N. meningitidis and N. gonorrhoeae strains and mutants and studied in bactericidal assays. Results and discussion: Post-MenB-4C sera recognized both N. meningitidis and N. gonorrhoeae LOS species, ~10% of total IgG to gonococcal OMV antigens. N. meningitidis and N. gonorrhoeae LOSs were broadly recognized by post-IgG antibodies, but with individual variability for LOS structures. Deep truncation of LOS, specifically a rfaK mutant without α-, ß-, or γ-chain glycosylation, eliminated LOS recognition by all post-vaccine sera. Serum 7v5 IgG antibodies recognized the unsialyated L1 α-chain, and a 3-PEA-HepII or 6-PEA-HepII was part of the conformational epitope. Replacing the 3-PEA on HepII with a 3-Glc blocked 7v5 IgG antibody recognition of N. meningitidis and N. gonorrhoeae LOSs. Serum 19v5 recognized lactoneotetrose (LNT) or L1 LOS-expressing N. meningitidis or N. gonorrhoeae with a minimal α-chain structure of Gal-Glc-HepI (L8), a 3-PEA-HepII or 6-PEA-HepII was again part of the conformational epitope and a 3-Glc-HepII blocked 19v5 antibody binding. Serum 17v5 LOS antibodies recognized LNT or L1 α-chains with a minimal HepI structure of three sugars and no requirement for HepII modifications. These LOS antibodies contributed to the serum bactericidal activity against N. gonorrhoeae. The MenB-4C vaccination elicits bactericidal IgG antibodies to N. gonorrhoeae conformational epitopes involving HepI and HepII glycosylated LOS structures shared between N. meningitidis and N. gonorrhoeae. LOS structures should be considered in next-generation gonococcal vaccine design.
Asunto(s)
Inmunoglobulina G , Lipopolisacáridos , Neisseria gonorrhoeae , Humanos , Polisacáridos , Antibacterianos , Antígenos Bacterianos , EpítoposRESUMEN
This report updates the 2009 recommendations from the CDC Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) regarding use of anthrax vaccine in the United States (Wright JG, Quinn CP, Shadomy S, Messonnier N. Use of anthrax vaccine in the United States: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP)], 2009. MMWR Recomm Rep 2010;59[No. RR-6]). The report 1) summarizes data on estimated efficacy in humans using a correlates of protection model and safety data published since the last ACIP review, 2) provides updated guidance for use of anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA) for preexposure prophylaxis (PrEP) and in conjunction with antimicrobials for postexposure prophylaxis (PEP), 3) provides updated guidance regarding PrEP vaccination of emergency and other responders, 4) summarizes the available data on an investigational anthrax vaccine (AV7909), and 5) discusses the use of anthrax antitoxins for PEP. Changes from previous guidance in this report include the following: 1) a booster dose of AVA for PrEP can be given every 3 years instead of annually to persons not at high risk for exposure to Bacillus anthracis who have previously received the initial AVA 3-dose priming and 2-dose booster series and want to maintain protection; 2) during a large-scale emergency response, AVA for PEP can be administered using an intramuscular route if the subcutaneous route of administration poses significant materiel, personnel, or clinical challenges that might delay or preclude vaccination; 3) recommendations on dose-sparing AVA PEP regimens if the anthrax vaccine supply is insufficient to vaccinate all potentially exposed persons; and 4) clarification on the duration of antimicrobial therapy when used in conjunction with vaccine for PEP. These updated recommendations can be used by health care providers and guide emergency preparedness officials and planners who are developing plans to provide anthrax vaccine, including preparations for a wide-area aerosol release of B. anthracis spores. The recommendations also provide guidance on dose-sparing options, if needed, to extend the supply of vaccine to increase the number of persons receiving PEP in a mass casualty event.