Hypothalamic neurons that mirror aggression.

Social interactions require awareness and understanding of the behavior of others. Mirror neurons, cells representing an action by self and others, have been proposed to be integral to the cognitive substrates that enable such awareness and understanding. Mirror neurons of the primate neocortex represent skilled motor tasks, but it is unclear if they are critical for the actions they embody, enable social behaviors, or exist in non-cortical regions. We demonstrate that the activity of individual VMHvlPR neurons in the mouse hypothalamus represents aggression performed by self and others. We used a genetically encoded mirror-TRAP strategy to functionally interrogate these aggression-mirroring neurons. We find that their activity is essential for fighting and that forced activation of these cells triggers aggressive displays by mice, even toward their mirror image. Together, we have discovered a mirroring center in an evolutionarily ancient region that provides a subcortical cognitive substrate essential for a social behavior.

Primate Amygdala Neurons Simulate Decision Processes of Social Partners.

By observing their social partners, primates learn about reward values of objects. Here, we show that monkeys' amygdala neurons derive object values from observation and use these values to simulate a partner monkey's decision process. While monkeys alternated making reward-based choices, amygdala neurons encoded object-specific values learned from observation. Dynamic activities converted these values to representations of the recorded monkey's own choices. Surprisingly, the same activity patterns unfolded spontaneously before partner's choices in separate neurons, as if these neurons simulated the partner's decision-making. These "simulation neurons" encoded signatures of mutual-inhibitory decision computation, including value comparisons and value-to-choice conversions, resulting in accurate predictions of partner's choices. Population decoding identified differential contributions of amygdala subnuclei. Biophysical modeling of amygdala circuits showed that simulation neurons emerge naturally from convergence between object-value neurons and self-other neurons. By simulating decision computations during observation, these neurons could allow primates to reconstruct their social partners' mental states.

Specialized Networks for Social Cognition in the Primate Brain.

Primates have evolved diverse cognitive capabilities to navigate their complex social world. To understand how the brain implements critical social cognitive abilities, we describe functional specialization in the domains of face processing, social interaction understanding, and mental state attribution. Systems for face processing are specialized from the level of single cells to populations of neurons within brain regions to hierarchically organized networks that extract and represent abstract social information. Such functional specialization is not confined to the sensorimotor periphery but appears to be a pervasive theme of primate brain organization all the way to the apex regions of cortical hierarchies. Circuits processing social information are juxtaposed with parallel systems involved in processing nonsocial information, suggesting common computations applied to different domains. The emerging picture of the neural basis of social cognition is a set of distinct but interacting subnetworks involved in component processes such as face perception and social reasoning, traversing large parts of the primate brain.

The Role of the Medial Prefrontal Cortex in Moderating Neural Representations of Self and Other in Primates.

As a frontal node in the primate social brain, the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) plays a critical role in coordinating one's own behavior with respect to that of others. Current literature demonstrates that single neurons in the MPFC encode behavior-related variables such as intentions, actions, and rewards, specifically for self and other, and that the MPFC comes into play when reflecting upon oneself and others. The social moderator account of MPFC function can explain maladaptive social cognition in people with autism spectrum disorder, which tips the balance in favor of self-centered perspectives rather than taking into consideration the perspective of others. Several strands of evidence suggest a hypothesis that the MPFC represents different other mental models, depending on the context at hand, to better predict others' emotions and behaviors. This hypothesis also accounts for aberrant MPFC activity in autistic individuals while they are mentalizing others.

A familiar face and person processing area in the human temporal pole.

How does the brain process the faces of familiar people? Neuropsychological studies have argued for an area of the temporal pole (TP) linking faces with person identities, but magnetic susceptibility artifacts in this region have hampered its study with fMRI. Using data acquisition and analysis methods optimized to overcome this artifact, we identify a familiar face response in TP, reliably observed in individual brains. This area responds strongly to visual images of familiar faces over unfamiliar faces, objects, and scenes. However, TP did not just respond to images of faces, but also to a variety of high-level social cognitive tasks, including semantic, episodic, and theory of mind tasks. The response profile of TP contrasted with a nearby region of the perirhinal cortex that responded specifically to faces, but not to social cognition tasks. TP was functionally connected with a distributed network in the association cortex associated with social cognition, while PR was functionally connected with face-preferring areas of the ventral visual cortex. This work identifies a missing link in the human face processing system that specifically processes familiar faces, and is well placed to integrate visual information about faces with higher-order conceptual information about other people. The results suggest that separate streams for person and face processing reach anterior temporal areas positioned at the top of the cortical hierarchy.

Demonstratives as attention tools: Evidence of mentalistic representations within language.

Linguistic communication is an intrinsically social activity that enables us to share thoughts across minds. Many complex social uses of language can be captured by domain-general representations of other minds (i.e., mentalistic representations) that externally modulate linguistic meaning through Gricean reasoning. However, here we show that representations of others' attention are embedded within language itself. Across ten languages, we show that demonstratives-basic grammatical words (e.g., "this"/"that") which are evolutionarily ancient, learned early in life, and documented in all known languages-are intrinsic attention tools. Beyond their spatial meanings, demonstratives encode both joint attention and the direction in which the listener must turn to establish it. Crucially, the frequency of the spatial and attentional uses of demonstratives varies across languages, suggesting that both spatial and mentalistic representations are part of their conventional meaning. Using computational modeling, we show that mentalistic representations of others' attention are internally encoded in demonstratives, with their effect further boosted by Gricean reasoning. Yet, speakers are largely unaware of this, incorrectly reporting that they primarily capture spatial representations. Our findings show that representations of other people's cognitive states (namely, their attention) are embedded in language and suggest that the most basic building blocks of the linguistic system crucially rely on social cognition.

Dynamic brain communication underwriting face pareidolia.

Face pareidolia is a tendency to seeing faces in nonface images that reflects high tuning to a face scheme. Yet, studies of the brain networks underwriting face pareidolia are scarce. Here, we examined the time course and dynamic topography of gamma oscillatory neuromagnetic activity while administering a task with nonface images resembling a face. Images were presented either with canonical orientation or with display inversion that heavily impedes face pareidolia. At early processing stages, the peaks in gamma activity (40 to 45 Hz) to images either triggering or not face pareidolia originate mainly from the right medioventral and lateral occipital cortices, rostral and caudal cuneus gyri, and medial superior occipital gyrus. Yet, the difference occurred at later processing stages in the high-frequency range of 80 to 85 Hz over a set of the areas constituting the social brain. The findings speak rather for a relatively late neural network playing a key role in face pareidolia. Strikingly, a cutting-edge analysis of brain connectivity unfolding over time reveals mutual feedforward and feedback intra- and interhemispheric communication not only within the social brain but also within the extended large-scale network of down- and upstream regions. In particular, the superior temporal sulcus and insula strongly engage in communication with other brain regions either as signal transmitters or recipients throughout the whole processing of face-pareidolia images.

Self-views converge during enjoyable conversations.

Based on current research, it is evident that the way people see themselves is shaped by their conversation partners. Historically, this literature focuses on how one individual's expectations can shape another person's self-views. Given the reciprocal nature of conversation, we wondered whether conversation partners' self-views may mutually evolve. Using four-person round-robin conversation networks, we found that participants tended to have more similar self-views post-conversation than pre-conversation, an effect we term "inter-self alignment." Further, the more two partners' self-views aligned, the more they enjoyed their conversation and were inclined to interact again. This effect depended on both conversation partners becoming aligned. These findings suggest that the way we see ourselves is coauthored in the act of dialogue and that as shared self-views develop, the desire to continue the conversation increases.

The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex prioritizes social learning during rest.

Sociality is a defining feature of the human experience: We rely on others to ensure survival and cooperate in complex social networks to thrive. Are there brain mechanisms that help ensure we quickly learn about our social world to optimally navigate it? We tested whether portions of the brain's default network engage "by default" to quickly prioritize social learning during the memory consolidation process. To test this possibility, participants underwent functional MRI (fMRI) while viewing scenes from the documentary film, Samsara. This film shows footage of real people and places from around the world. We normed the footage to select scenes that differed along the dimension of sociality, while matched on valence, arousal, interestingness, and familiarity. During fMRI, participants watched the "social" and "nonsocial" scenes, completed a rest scan, and a surprise recognition memory test. Participants showed superior social (vs. nonsocial) memory performance, and the social memory advantage was associated with neural pattern reinstatement during rest in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), a key node of the default network. Moreover, it was during early rest that DMPFC social pattern reinstatement was greatest and predicted subsequent social memory performance most strongly, consistent with the "prioritization" account. Results simultaneously update 1) theories of memory consolidation, which have not addressed how social information may be prioritized in the learning process, and 2) understanding of default network function, which remains to be fully characterized. More broadly, the results underscore the inherent human drive to understand our vastly social world.

Actions chains and intention understanding in 3- to 6-year-old children.

In intentional behavior, the final goal of an action is crucial in determining the entire sequence of motor acts. Neurons have been described in the inferior parietal lobule of monkeys, which besides encoding a specific motor act (e.g., grasping), have their discharge modulated by the final goal of the intended action (e.g., grasping-to-eat). Many of these "action-constrained" neurons have mirror properties responding to the observation of the motor act they encode, provided that this is embedded in a specific action. Thanks to this mechanism, the observers have an internal copy of the whole action before its execution and may, in this way, understand the agent's intention. The chained organization of motor acts has been demonstrated in schoolchildren. Here, we examined whether this organization is already present in very young children. To this purpose, we recorded EMG from the mylohyoid (MH) muscle in the children aged 3 to 6 y. The results showed that preschoolers, like older children, possess the chained organization of motor acts in execution. Interestingly, in comparison to older children, they have a delayed ability to use this mechanism to infer others' intentions by observation. Finally, we found a significant negative association between the children's age and the activation of the MH muscle during the grasp-to-eat phase in the observation condition. We, tentatively, interpreted it as a sign of an immature control of motor acts.

Predicting the attention of others.

As social animals, people are highly sensitive to the attention of others. Seeing someone else gaze at an object automatically draws one's own attention to that object. Monitoring the attention of others aids in reconstructing their emotions, beliefs, and intentions and may play a crucial role in social alignment. Recently, however, it has been suggested that the human brain constructs a predictive model of other people's attention that is far more involved than a moment-by-moment monitoring of gaze direction. The hypothesized model learns the statistical patterns in other people's attention and extrapolates how attention is likely to move. Here, we tested the hypothesis of a predictive model of attention. Subjects saw movies of attention displayed as a bright spot shifting around a scene. Subjects were able to correctly distinguish natural attention sequences (based on eye tracking of prior participants) from altered sequences (e.g., played backward or in a scrambled order). Even when the attention spot moved around a blank background, subjects could distinguish natural from scrambled sequences, suggesting a sensitivity to the spatial-temporal statistics of attention. Subjects also showed an ability to recognize the attention patterns of different individuals. These results suggest that people possess a sophisticated model of the normal statistics of attention and can identify deviations from the model. Monitoring attention is therefore more than simply registering where someone else's eyes are pointing. It involves predictive modeling, which may contribute to our remarkable social ability to predict the mind states and behavior of others.

Teachers recruit mentalizing regions to represent learners' beliefs.

Teaching enables humans to impart vast stores of culturally specific knowledge and skills. However, little is known about the neural computations that guide teachers' decisions about what information to communicate. Participants (N = 28) played the role of teachers while being scanned using fMRI; their task was to select examples that would teach learners how to answer abstract multiple-choice questions. Participants' examples were best described by a model that selects evidence that maximizes the learner's belief in the correct answer. Consistent with this idea, participants' predictions about how well learners would do closely tracked the performance of an independent sample of learners (N = 140) who were tested on the examples they had provided. In addition, regions that play specialized roles in processing social information, namely the bilateral temporoparietal junction and middle and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, tracked learners' posterior belief in the correct answer. Our results shed light on the computational and neural architectures that support our extraordinary abilities as teachers.

Hostile Attribution Bias Shapes Neural Synchrony in the Left Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex during Ambiguous Social Narratives.

Hostile attribution bias refers to the tendency to interpret social situations as intentionally hostile. While previous research has focused on its developmental origins and behavioral consequences, the underlying neural mechanisms remain underexplored. Here, we employed functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) to investigate the neural correlates of hostile attribution bias. While undergoing fNIRS, male and female participants listened to and provided attribution ratings for 21 hypothetical scenarios where a character's actions resulted in a negative outcome for the listener. Ratings of hostile intentions were averaged to measure hostile attribution bias. Using intersubject representational similarity analysis, we found that participants with similar levels of hostile attribution bias exhibited higher levels of neural synchrony during narrative listening, suggesting shared interpretations of the scenarios. This effect was localized to the left ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and was particularly prominent in scenarios where the character's intentions were highly ambiguous. We then grouped participants into high and low bias groups based on a median split of their hostile attribution bias scores. A similarity-based classifier trained on the neural data classified participants as having high or low bias with 75% accuracy, indicating that the neural time courses during narrative listening was systematically different between the two groups. Furthermore, hostile attribution bias correlated negatively with attributional complexity, a measure of one's tendency to consider multifaceted causes when explaining behavior. Our study sheds light on the neural mechanisms underlying hostile attribution bias and highlights the potential of using fNIRS to develop nonintrusive and cost-effective neural markers of this sociocognitive bias.

A Multidimensional Neural Representation of Face Impressions.

From a glimpse of a face, people form trait impressions that operate as facial stereotypes, which are largely inaccurate yet nevertheless drive social behavior. Behavioral studies have long pointed to dimensions of trustworthiness and dominance that are thought to underlie face impressions due to their evolutionarily adaptive nature. Using human neuroimaging (N = 26, 19 female, 7 male), we identify a two-dimensional representation of faces' inferred traits in the middle temporal gyrus (MTG), a region involved in domain-general conceptual processing including the activation of social concepts. The similarity of neural-response patterns for any given pair of faces in the bilateral MTG was predicted by their proximity in trustworthiness-dominance space, an effect that could not be explained by mere visual similarity. This MTG trait-space representation occurred automatically, was relatively invariant across participants, and did not depend on the explicit endorsement of face impressions (i.e., beliefs that face impressions are valid and accurate). In contrast, regions involved in high-level social reasoning (the bilateral temporoparietal junction and posterior superior temporal sulcus; TPJ-pSTS) and entity-specific social knowledge (the left anterior temporal lobe; ATL) also exhibited this trait-space representation but only among participants who explicitly endorsed forming these impressions. Together, the findings identify a two-dimensional neural representation of face impressions and suggest that multiple implicit and explicit mechanisms give rise to biases based on facial appearance. While the MTG implicitly represents a multidimensional trait space for faces, the TPJ-pSTS and ATL are involved in the explicit application of this trait space for social evaluation and behavior.

Dissociable contributions of the hippocampus and orbitofrontal cortex to representing task space in a social context.

The hippocampus (HC) and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) jointly encode a map-like representation of a task space to guide behavior. It remains unclear how the OFC and HC interact in encoding this map-like representation, though previous studies indicated that both regions have different functions. We acquired the functional magnetic resonance imaging data under a social navigation task in which participants interacted with characters in a two-dimensional "social space." We calculate the social relationships between the participants and characters and used a drift-diffusion model to capture the inner process of social interaction. Then we used multivoxel pattern analysis to explore the brain-behavior relationship. We found that (i) both the HC and the OFC showed higher activations during the selective trial than the narrative trial; (ii) the neural pattern of the right HC was associated with evidence accumulation during social interaction, and the pattern of the right lateral OFC was associated with the social relationship; (iii) the neural pattern of the HC can decode the participants choices, while the neural pattern of the OFC can decode the task information about trials. The study provided evidence for distinct roles of the HC and the OFC in encoding different information when representing social space.

Noninvasive brain stimulation in autism: review and outlook for personalized interventions in adult patients.

Noninvasive brain stimulation (NIBS) has been increasingly investigated during the last decade as a treatment option for persons with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Yet, previous studies did not reach a consensus on a superior treatment protocol or stimulation target. Persons with ASD often suffer from social isolation and high rates of unemployment, arising from difficulties in social interaction. ASD involves multiple neural systems involved in perception, language, and cognition, and the underlying brain networks of these functional domains have been well documented. Aiming to provide an overview of NIBS effects when targeting these neural systems in late adolescent and adult ASD, we conducted a systematic search of the literature starting at 631 non-duplicate publications, leading to six studies corresponding with inclusion and exclusion criteria. We discuss these studies regarding their treatment rationale and the accordingly chosen methodological setup. The results of these studies vary, while methodological advances may allow to explain some of the variability. Based on these insights, we discuss strategies for future clinical trials to personalize the selection of brain stimulation targets taking into account intersubject variability of brain anatomy as well as function.

Get out of my head: social evaluative brain states carry over into post-feedback rest and influence remembering how others view us.

Learning how others perceive us helps us tune our behavior to form adaptive relationships. But which perceptions stick with us? And when in the learning process are they codified in memory? We leveraged a popular television series-The Office-to answer these questions. Prior to their functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) session, viewers of The Office reported which characters they identified with, as well as which characters they perceived another person (i.e. counterpart) was similar to. During their fMRI scan, participants found out which characters other people thought they and the counterpart were like, and also completed rest scans. Participants remembered more feedback inconsistent with their self-views (vs. views of the counterpart). Although neural activity while encoding self-inconsistent feedback did not meaningfully predict memory, returning to the inconsistent self feedback during subsequent rest did. During rest, participants reinstated neural patterns engaged while receiving self-inconsistent feedback in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC). DMPFC reinstatement also quadratically predicted self-inconsistent memory, with too few or too many reinstatements compromising memory performance. Processing social feedback during rest may impact how we remember and integrate the feedback, especially when it contradicts our self-views.

The Neuroscience of Human and Artificial Intelligence Presence.

Two decades of social neuroscience and neuroeconomics research illustrate the brain mechanisms that are engaged when people consider human beings, often in comparison to considering artificial intelligence (AI) as a nonhuman control. AI as an experimental control preserves agency and facilitates social interactions but lacks a human presence, providing insight into brain mechanisms that are engaged by human presence and the presence of AI. Here, I review this literature to determine how the brain instantiates human and AI presence across social perception and decision-making paradigms commonly used to realize a social context. People behave toward humans differently than they do toward AI. Moreover, brain regions more engaged by humans compared to AI extend beyond the social cognition brain network to all parts of the brain, and the brain sometimes is engaged more by AI than by humans. Finally, I discuss gaps in the literature, limitations in current neuroscience approaches, and how an understanding of the brain correlates of human and AI presence can inform social science in the wild.

Young children infer and manage what others think about them.

We care about what others think of us and often try to present ourselves in a good light. What cognitive capacities underlie our ability to think (or even worry) about reputation, and how do these concerns manifest as strategic self-presentational behaviors? Even though the tendency to modify one's behaviors in the presence of others emerges early in life, the degree to which these behaviors reflect a rich understanding of what others think about the self has remained an open question. Bridging prior work on reputation management, communication, and theory of mind development in early childhood, here we investigate young children's ability to infer and revise others' mental representation of the self. Across four experiments, we find that 3- and 4-y-old children's decisions about to whom to communicate (Experiment 1), what to communicate (Experiments 2 and 3), and which joint activity to engage in with a partner (Experiment 4) are systematically influenced by the partner's observations of the children's own past performance. Children in these studies chose to present self-relevant information selectively and strategically when it could revise the partner's outdated, negative representation of the self. Extending research on children's ability to engage in informative communication, these results demonstrate the sophistication of early self-presentational behaviors: Even young children can draw rich inferences about what others think of them and communicate self-relevant information to revise these representations.

Infants infer potential social partners by observing the interactions of their parent with unknown others.

Infants are born into networks of individuals who are socially connected. How do infants begin learning which individuals are their own potential social partners? Using digitally edited videos, we showed 12-mo-old infants' social interactions between unknown individuals and their own parents. In studies 1 to 4, after their parent showed affiliation toward one puppet, infants expected that puppet to engage with them. In study 5, infants made the reverse inference; after a puppet engaged with them, the infants expected that puppet to respond to their parent. In each study, infants' inferences were specific to social interactions that involved their own parent as opposed to another infant's parent. Thus, infants combine observation of social interactions with knowledge of their preexisting relationship with their parent to discover which newly encountered individuals are potential social partners for themselves and their families.