Advancing One human-animal-environment Health for global health security: what does the evidence say?

In this Series paper, we review the contributions of One Health approaches (ie, at the human-animal-environment interface) to improve global health security across a range of health hazards and we summarise contemporary evidence of incremental benefits of a One Health approach. We assessed how One Health approaches were reported to the Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN, the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH, formerly OIE), and WHO, within the monitoring and assessment frameworks, including WHO International Health Regulations (2005) and WOAH Performance of Veterinary Services. We reviewed One Health theoretical foundations, methods, and case studies. Examples from joint health services and infrastructure, surveillance-response systems, surveillance of antimicrobial resistance, food safety and security, environmental hazards, water and sanitation, and zoonoses control clearly show incremental benefits of One Health approaches. One Health approaches appear to be most effective and sustainable in the prevention, preparedness, and early detection and investigation of evolving risks and hazards; the evidence base for their application is strongest in the control of endemic and neglected tropical diseases. For benefits to be maximised and extended, improved One Health operationalisation is needed by strengthening multisectoral coordination mechanisms at national, regional, and global levels.

A closer look at the international health regulations capacities in Lebanon: a mixed method study.

BACKGROUND: Lebanon ratified the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005) in 2007, and since then, it has been facing complex political deadlocks, financial deterioration, and infectious disease emergencies. We aimed to understand the IHR capacities' scores of Lebanon in comparison to other countries, the IHR milestones and activities in Lebanon, the challenges of maintaining the IHR capacities, the refugee crisis's impact on the development of these capacities; and the possible recommendations to support the IHR performance in Lebanon. METHODS: We used a mixed-method design. The study combined the use of secondary data analysis of the 2020 State Party Self-Assessment Annual Report (SPAR) submissions and qualitative design using semi-structured interviews with key informants. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with nine key informants. The analysis of the data generated was based on inductive thematic analysis. RESULTS: According to SPAR, Lebanon had levels of 4 out of 5 (≤ 80%) in 2020 in the prevention, detection, response, enabling functions, and operational readiness capacities, pertaining that the country was functionally capable of dealing with various events at the national and subnational levels. Lebanon scored more than its neighboring countries, Syria, and Jordan, which have similar contexts of economic crises, emergencies, and refugee waves. Despite this high level of commitment to meeting IHR capacities, the qualitative findings demonstrated several gaps in IHR performance as resource shortage, governance, and political challenges. The study also showed contradictory results regarding the impact of refugees on IHR capacities. Some key informants agreed that the Syrian crisis had a positive impact, while others suggested the opposite. Whether refugees interfere with IHR development is still an area that needs further investigation. CONCLUSION: The study shows that urgent interventions are needed to strengthen the implementation of the IHR capacities in Lebanon. The study recommends 1) reconsidering the weight given to IHR capacities; 2) promoting governance to strengthen IHR compliance; 3) strengthening the multisectoral coordination mechanisms; 4) reinforcing risk communication strategies constantly; 5) mobilizing and advancing human resources at the central and sub-national levels; 6) ensuring sustainable financing; 7) integrating refugees and displaced persons in IHR framework and its assessment tools; 8) acknowledging risk mapping as a pre-requisite to a successful response; and 9) strengthening research on IHR capacities in Lebanon.

How an outbreak became a pandemic: a chronological analysis of crucial junctures and international obligations in the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Understanding the spread of SARS-CoV-2, how and when evidence emerged, and the timing of local, national, regional, and global responses is essential to establish how an outbreak became a pandemic and to prepare for future health threats. With that aim, the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response has developed a chronology of events, actions, and recommendations, from December, 2019, when the first cases of COVID-19 were identified in China, to the end of March, 2020, by which time the outbreak had spread extensively worldwide and had been characterised as a pandemic. Datapoints are based on two literature reviews, WHO documents and correspondence, submissions to the Panel, and an expert verification process. The retrospective analysis of the chronology shows a dedicated initial response by WHO and some national governments, but also aspects of the response that could have been quicker, including outbreak notifications under the International Health Regulations (IHR), presumption and confirmation of human-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV-2, declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, and, most importantly, the public health response of many national governments. The chronology also shows that some countries, largely those with previous experience with similar outbreaks, reacted quickly, even ahead of WHO alerts, and were more successful in initially containing the virus. Mapping actions against IHR obligations, the chronology shows where efficiency and accountability could be improved at local, national, and international levels to more quickly alert and contain health threats in the future. In particular, these improvements include necessary reforms to international law and governance for pandemic preparedness and response, including the IHR and a potential framework convention on pandemic preparedness and response.

An ecological study on the association between International Health Regulations (IHR) core capacity scores and the Universal Health Coverage (UHC) service coverage index.

BACKGROUND: The pandemic situation due to COVID-19 highlighted the importance of global health security preparedness and response. Since the revision of the International Health Regulations (IHR) in 2005, Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and States Parties Self-Assessment Annual Reporting (SPAR) have been adopted to track the IHR implementation stage in each country. While national IHR core capacities support the concept of Universal Health Coverage (UHC), there have been limited studies verifying the relationship between the two concepts. This study aimed to investigate empirically the association between IHR core capacity scores and the UHC service coverage index. METHOD: JEE score, SPAR score and UHC service coverage index data from 96 countries were collected and analyzed using an ecological study design. The independent variable was IHR core capacity scores, measured by JEE 2016-2019 and SPAR 2019 from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the dependent variable, UHC service coverage index, was extracted from the 2019 UHC monitoring report. For examining the association between IHR core capacities and the UHC service coverage index, Spearman's correlation analysis was used. The correlation between IHR core capacities and UHC index was demonstrated using a scatter plot between JEE score and UHC service coverage index, and the SPAR score and UHC service coverage index were also presented. RESULT: While the correlation value between JEE and SPAR was 0.92 (p < 0.001), the countries' external evaluation scores were lower than their self-evaluation scores. Some areas such as available human resources and points of entry were mismatched between JEE and SPAR. JEE was associated with the UHC score (r = 0.85, p < 0.001) and SPAR was also associated with the UHC service coverage index (r = 0.81, p < 0.001). The JEE and SPAR scores showed a significant positive correlation with the UHC service coverage index after adjusting for several confounding variables. CONCLUSION: The study result supports the premise that strengthening national health security capacities would in turn contribute to the achievement of UHC. With the help of the empirical result, it would further guide each country for better implementation of IHR.

Strengthening global health security - lessons learned from public health England's international health regulations strengthening project.

BACKGROUND: Country experiences of responding to the challenges of COVID-19 in 2020 highlighted how critical it is to have strong, in-country health security capacity. The UK government has invested in health security capacity development through various projects and agencies, including the UK Department of Health and Social Care, whose Global Health Security Programme provides funding to Public Health England (PHE) to implement health security support. This article describes the results and conclusions of the midterm evaluation, undertaken by Itad, of one of Public Health England's global health projects: International Health Regulations Strengthening, which operates across six countries and works with the Africa Centres for Disease Control. It also highlights some of the key lessons learned for the benefit of other agencies moving into supporting national health security efforts. RESULTS: The Itad team found strong evidence that the IHR Project is well aligned with, and responding to, partners' capability strengthening needs and that the three workstreams - systems coordination, workforce development and technical systems strengthening are implementing relevant and appropriate action to support national priorities. The IHR Project is also aligned with and complementary to other relevant UK development assistance although the Project could strengthen the strategic collaboration with WHO, US CDC and other UK government projects in countries. The Itad team also found that the IHR Project could be more effective if the technical assistance activities were accompanied by relevant materials and equipment while maintaining its supportive role. There was evidence of where technical assistance in the form of training and follow-up mentoring had led to improvements in practice and in IHR compliance, but these were not being systematically captured by the Project's routine reporting. CONCLUSIONS: There was good evidence that the project was doing the right things and aligning its work in the right way, with more limited evidence at the time of the midterm evaluation that it was making progress towards achieving the right results.

A pandemic treaty, revised international health regulations, or both?

BACKGROUND: A special session of the World Health Assembly (WHA) will be convened in late 2021 to consider developing a WHO convention, agreement or other international instrument on pandemic preparedness and response - a so-called 'Pandemic Treaty'. Consideration is given to this treaty as well as to reform of the International Health Regulations (IHR) as our principal governing instrument to prevent and mitigate future pandemics. MAIN BODY: Reasons exist to continue to work with the IHR as our principal governing instrument to prevent and mitigate future pandemics. All WHO member states are party to it. It gives the WHO the authority to oversee the collection of surveillance data and to issue recommendations on trade and travel advisories to control the spread of infectious diseases, among other things. However, the limitations of the IHR in addressing the deep prevention of future pandemics also must be recognized. These include a lack of a regulatory framework to prevent zoonotic spillovers. More advanced multi-sectoral measures are also needed. At the same time, a pandemic treaty would have potential benefits and drawbacks as well. It would be a means of addressing the gross inequity in global vaccine distribution and other gaps in the IHR, but it would also need more involvement at the negotiation table of countries in the Global South, significant funding, and likely many years to adopt. CONCLUSIONS: Reform of the IHR should be undertaken while engaging with WHO member states (and notably those from the Global South) in discussions on the possible benefits, drawbacks and scope of a new pandemic treaty. Both options are not mutually exclusive.

Trust, risk, and the challenge of information sharing during a health emergency.

Information sharing is a critical element of an effective response to infectious disease outbreaks. The international system of coordination established through the World Health Organization via the International Health Regulations largely relies on governments to communicate timely and accurate information about health risk during an outbreak. This information supports WHO's decision making process for declaring a public health emergency of international concern. It also aides the WHO to work with governments to coordinate efforts to contain cross-border outbreaks.Given the importance of information sharing by governments, it is not surprising that governments that withhold or delay sharing information about outbreaks within their borders are often condemned by the international community for non-compliance with the International Health Regulations. The barriers to rapid and transparent information sharing are numerous. While governments must be held accountable for delaying or withholding information, in many cases non-compliance may be a rational response to real and perceived risks rather than a problem of technical incapacity or a lack of political commitment. Improving adherence to the International Health Regulations will require a long-term process to build trust that incorporates recognizing and mitigating the potential and perceived risks of information sharing.

Evaluating implementation of International Health Regulations core capacities: using the Electronic States Parties Self-Assessment Annual Reporting Tool (e-SPAR) to monitor progress with Joint External Evaluation indicators.

BACKGROUND: The International Health Regulations (IHR) are a legally binding instrument designed to improve Global Health Security by limiting the cross boarder spread of health risks. All 196 signatories to the IHR (2005) are required to report progress towards IHR core capacity implementation through an annual multi-sectoral self-assessment process known as the State Parties Self-Assessment Annual Reporting (SPAR). This mandatory process sits alongside the voluntary, external, peer-reviewed Joint External Evaluations (JEE) as two core components of the IHR monitoring and evaluation framework. JEEs are intended to occur once every 4-5 years following a voluntary request from the member state. This means that interim monitoring of IHR core capacity compliance, can be challenging and additional data sources are required. The outputs of the SPAR process represent one such source. Although the JEE and SPAR tools are intended to be complimentary, there has been no publicly available mapping of JEE indicators to SPAR indicators in order to inform progress on IHR compliance. RESULTS: This paper mapped JEE indicators to SPAR indicators and found a high level of correlation suggesting the SPAR process offers a method for countries and technical assistance programmes to monitor progress on IHR compliance and identify gaps in between JEE visits. However, coverage was not complete, and several gaps were identified most notably in antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and vaccinations. CONCLUSION: Enhancing alignment between JEE and SPAR could offer a more consistent and complete way of assessing compliance with IHR.

A survey of International Health Regulations National Focal Points experiences in carrying out their functions.

BACKGROUND: The 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR (2005)) require States Parties to establish National Focal Points (NFPs) responsible for notifying the World Health Organization (WHO) of potential events that might constitute public health emergencies of international concern (PHEICs), such as outbreaks of novel infectious diseases. Given the critical role of NFPs in the global surveillance and response system supported by the IHR, we sought to assess their experiences in carrying out their functions. METHODS: In collaboration with WHO officials, we administered a voluntary online survey to all 196 States Parties to the IHR (2005) in Africa, Asia, Europe, and South and North America, from October to November 2019. The survey was available in six languages via a secure internet-based system. RESULTS: In total, 121 NFP representatives answered the 56-question survey; 105 in full, and an additional 16 in part, resulting in a response rate of 62% (121 responses to 196 invitations to participate). The majority of NFPs knew how to notify the WHO of a potential PHEIC, and believed they have the content expertise to carry out their functions. Respondents found training workshops organized by WHO Regional Offices helpful on how to report PHEICs. NFPs experienced challenges in four critical areas: 1) insufficient intersectoral collaboration within their countries, including limited access to, or a lack of cooperation from, key relevant ministries; 2) inadequate communications, such as deficient information technology systems in place to carry out their functions in a timely fashion; 3) lack of authority to report potential PHEICs; and 4) inadequacies in some resources made available by the WHO, including a key tool - the NFP Guide. Finally, many NFP representatives expressed concern about how WHO uses the information they receive from NFPs. CONCLUSION: Our study, conducted just prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, illustrates key challenges experienced by NFPs that can affect States Parties and WHO performance when outbreaks occur. In order for NFPs to be able to rapidly and successfully communicate potential PHEICs such as COVID-19 in the future, continued measures need to be taken by both WHO and States Parties to ensure NFPs have the necessary authority, capacity, training, and resources to effectively carry out their functions as described in the IHR.

Mind the gap: an analysis of core capacities of the international health regulations (2005) to respond to outbreaks in Yemen.

BACKGROUND: Yemen that has been devastated by war is facing various challenges to respond to the recent potential outbreaks and other public health emergencies due to lack of proper strategies and regulations, which are essential to public health security. The aim of this study is to assess the implementation of the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) core capacities under the current ongoing conflict in Yemen. METHODS: The study simulated the World Health Organization (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool to assess the IHR core capacities in Yemen. Qualitative research methods were used, including desk reviews, in-depth interviews with key informants and analysis of the pooled data. RESULT: Based on the assessment of the three main functions of the IHR framework (prevention, detection, and response), Yemen showed a demonstrated or developed capacity to detect outbreaks, but nevertheless limited or no capacity to prevent and respond to outbreaks. CONCLUSION: This study shows that there has been poor implementation of IHR in Yemen. Therefore, urgent interventions are needed to strengthen the implementation of the IHR core capacities in Yemen. The study recommends 1) raising awareness among national and international health staff on the importance of IHR; 2) improving alignment of INGO programs with government health programs and aligning both towards better implementation of the IHR; 3) improving programmatic coordination, planning and implementation among health stakeholders; 4) increasing funding of the global health security agenda at country level; 5) using innovative approaches to analyze and address gaps in the disrupted health system, and; 6) addressing the root cause of the collapse of the health services and overall health system in Yemen by ending the protracted conflict situation.

Is countries' transparency associated with gaps between countries' self and external evaluations for IHR core capacity?

BACKGROUND: This study aims to evaluate the gap between countries' self-evaluation and external evaluation regarding core capacity of infectious disease control required by International Health Regulations and the influence factors of the gap. METHODS: We collected countries' self-evaluated scores (International Health Regulations Monitoring tool, IHRMT) of 2016 and 2017, and external evaluation scores (Joint External Evaluation, JEE) from WHO website on 4rd and 27rd November, 2018. There were 127 and 163 countries with IHRMT scores in 2016 and in 2017, and 74 countries with JEE scores included in the analysis. The gap between countries' self-evaluation and external evaluation was represented by the difference between condensed IHR scores and JEE. Civil liberties (CL) scores were collected as indicators of the transparency of each country. The Human Development Index (HDI) and data indicating the density of physicians and nurses (HWD) were collected to reflect countries' development and health workforce statuses. Then, chi-square test and logistic regression were performed to determine the correlation between the gap of IHRMT and JEE, and civil liberties, human development, and health workforce status. RESULTS: Countries' self-evaluation scores significantly decreased from 2016 to 2017. Countries' external evaluation scores are consistently 1 to 1.5 lower than self-evaluation scores. There were significantly more countries with high HDI status, high CL status and high HWD status in groups with bigger gap between IHRMT and JEE. And countries with higher HDI status presented a higher risk of having bigger gap between countries' self and external scores (OR = 3.181). CONCLUSION: Our study result indicated that countries' transparency represented by CL status do play a role in the gap between IHR and JEE scores. But HDI status is the key factor which significantly associated with the gap. The main reason for the gap in the current world is the different interpretation of evaluation of high HDI countries, though low CL countries tended to over-scored their capacity.

Simulation exercises and after action reviews - analysis of outputs during 2016-2019 to strengthen global health emergency preparedness and response.

BACKGROUND: Under the International Health Regulations (2005) [IHR (2005)] Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, after action reviews (AAR) and simulation exercises (SimEx) are two critical components which measure the functionality of a country's health emergency preparedness and response under a "real-life" event or simulated situation. The objective of this study was to describe the AAR and SimEx supported by the World Health Organization (WHO) globally in 2016-2019. METHODS: In 2016-2019, WHO supported 63 AAR and 117 SimEx, of which 42 (66.7%) AAR reports and 56 (47.9%) SimEx reports were available. We extracted key information from these reports and created two central databases for AAR and SimEx, respectively. We conducted descriptive analysis and linked the findings according to the 13 IHR (2005) core capacities. RESULTS: Among the 42 AAR and 56 SimEx available reports, AAR and SimEx were most commonly conducted in the WHO African Region (AAR: n = 32, 76.2%; SimEx: n = 32, 52.5%). The most common public health events reviewed or tested in AAR and SimEx, respectively, were epidemics and pandemics (AAR: n = 38, 90.5%; SimEx: n = 46, 82.1%). For AAR, 10 (76.9%) of the 13 IHR core capacities were reviewed at least once, with no AAR conducted for food safety, chemical events, and radiation emergencies, among the reports available. For SimEx, all 13 (100.0%) IHR capacities were tested at least once. For AAR, the most commonly reviewed IHR core capacities were health services provision (n = 41, 97.6%), risk communication (n = 39, 92.9%), national health emergency framework (n = 39, 92.9%), surveillance (n = 37, 88.1%) and laboratory (n = 35, 83.3%). For SimEx, the most commonly tested IHR core capacity were national health emergency framework (n = 56, 91.1%), followed by risk communication (n = 48, 85.7%), IHR coordination and national IHR focal point functions (n = 45, 80.4%), surveillance (n = 31, 55.4%), and health service provision (n = 29, 51.8%). For AAR, the median timeframe between the end of the event and AAR was 125 days (range = 25-399 days). CONCLUSIONS: WHO has recently published guidance for the planning, execution, and follow-up of AAR and SimEx. Through the guidance and the simplified reporting format provided, we hope to see more countries conduct AAR and SimEx and standardization in their methodology, practice, reporting and follow-up.

The International Health Regulations (2005), the threat of populism and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The global response to the COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare weaknesses and major challenges in the international approach to managing public health emergencies. Populist sentiment is spreading globally as democratic nations are increasing their support for or electing governments that are perceived to represent "traditional" native interests. Measures need to be taken to proactively address populist sentiment when reviewing the IHR (2005) effectiveness in the COVID-19 pandemic. We discuss how populism can impact the IHR (2005) and conversely how the IHR (2005) may be able to address populist concerns if the global community commits to helping states address public health threats that emerge within their borders.

Are countries' self-reported assessments of their capacity for infectious disease control reliable? Associations among countries' self-reported international health regulation 2005 capacity assessments and infectious disease control outcomes.

BACKGROUND: This study aimed to evaluate associations among countries' self-reported International Health Regulation 2005 (IHR 2005) capacity assessments and infectious disease control outcomes. METHODS: Countries' self-reported assessments implemented by percentages as IHR Monitoring Tools (IHRMT) in 2016 and 2017 were used to represent national capacity regarding infectious disease control. WHO Disease Outbreak News and matched diseases reports on ProMED-mail were collected in 2016 to represent disease control outcomes of countries. Disease control outcomes were divided in good, normal and bad groups based on the development of outbreaks listed in the reports. The Human Development Index (HDI), density of physicians and nurses, health expenditure, number of arrivals of international tourists were also collected for control. Chi-square test and logistic regression were applied for analysis. RESULTS: A total of 907 cases occurred in 92 countries. For all diseases, cases occurring in high international travel volume countries presented twice the risk of having a bad disease control outcomes than cases occurring in low international travel volume countries (OR = 2.19 for IHR 2016, OR = 2.97 for IHR 2017). Cases occurring in low IHR average score countries had significant higher risk (OR = 7.83 for IHR 2016 and OR = 2.23 for IHR 2017) of having a bad disease control outcomes than countries with high IHR average scores. For only human diseases, cases occurring in high international travel volume countries presented twice the risk of having a bad disease control outcomes than cases occurring in low international travel volume countries for IHR 2017 (OR = 2.79). Cases occurring in low IHR average score countries had significant higher risk (OR = 11.16 for IHR 2016 and OR = 3.45 for IHR 2017) of having a bad disease control outcomes than countries with high IHR average scores. The HDI, health workforce density and total health expenditure were all positively associated with disease control outcomes. CONCLUSIONS: Countries' self-reported infectious disease control capacities positively correlated with their disease control outcomes. While the self-reported IHR scores were accountable to some degree, this approach was useful for understanding global capacity in infectious disease control and in allocating resources for future preparedness.

Genetic Material and Sequence Data to Protect Global Health in the Light of Pandemic Outbreaks: Mapping the Legal Landscape under European and International Law.

The current pandemic outbreak of corona virus SARS-CoV-2 shows the need for comprehensive European cooperation in drug development and the importance of genetic material and sequence data in research concerning this unknown disease. As corona virus SARS-CoV-2 is spreading across Europe and worldwide, national authorities and the European Union (EU) institutions do their utmost to address the pandemic and accelerate innovation to protect global health. In order to be prepared and to be able to respond immediately to serious epidemic and pandemic diseases, the EU has already adopted the Decision No (EU) 1082/2013 on serious cross-border threats to health. The World Health Organization (WHO) has established a global system to collect genetic material and information to protect a global influenza pandemic outbreak. The article describes the current legal landscape under EU and international law.

Investigation of a cross-border case of Lassa fever in West Africa.

BACKGROUND: Infectious disease prevention and control strategies require a coordinated, transnational approach. To establish core capacities of the International Health Regulations (IHR), the World Health Organization (WHO) developed the Integrated Diseases Surveillance and Response (IDSR) strategy. Epidemic-prone Lassa fever, caused by Lassa virus, is an endemic disease in the West African countries of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Benin, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo and Nigeria. It's one of the major public health threats in these countries. Here it is reported an epidemiological investigation of a cross-border case of Lassa fever, which demonstrated the importance of strengthened capacities of IHR and IDSR. CASE PRESENTATION: On January 9th, 2018 a 35-year-old Guinean woman with fever, neck pain, body pain, and vomiting went to a hospital in Ganta, Liberia. Over the course of her illness, the case visited various health care facilities in both Liberia and Guinea. A sample collected on January 10th was tested positive for Lassa virus by RT-PCR in a Liberian laboratory. The Guinean Ministry of Health (MoH) was officially informed by WHO Country Office for Guinea and for Liberia. CONCLUSION: This case report revealed how an epidemic-prone disease such as Lassa fever can rapidly spread across land borders and how such threat can be quickly controlled with communication and collaboration within the IHR framework.

Preparedness and management of global public health threats at points of entry in Ireland and the EU in the context of a potential Brexit.

Health security in the European Union (EU) aims to protect citizens from serious threats to health such as biological agents and infectious disease outbreaks- whether natural, intentional or accidental. Threats may include established infections, emerging diseases or chemical and radiological agents. Co-ordinated international efforts attempt to minimize risks and mitigate the spread of infectious disease across borders.We review the current situation (March 2019) with respect to detection and management of serious human health threats across Irish borders- and what may change for Ireland if/when the United Kingdom (UK) withdraws from the EU (Brexit).Specifically, this paper reviews international legislation covering health threats, and its national transposition; and EU legislation and processes, especially the relevant European Decision No. 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on serious cross border threats to health with repeal of Decision No 2119/98/EC. We enumerate European surveillance systems and agencies which relate to port health security; we consider consortia and academic arrangements within the EU framework and established collaboration with the World Health Organization. We describe current Health Services Executive port health structures in Ireland which address preparedness and management of human health threats at points of entry. We appraise risks which Brexit could bring, reviewing literature on shared concerns about these risks, and we evaluate post-Brexit challenges for the EU, and potential opportunities to remain within current structures in shared health threat preparedness and response.It is imperative that the UK, Ireland and the EU work together to mitigate these risks using some agreed joint coordination mechanisms for a robust, harmonised approach to global public health threats at points of entry.

One Health operations: a critical component in the International Health Regulations Monitoring and Evaluation Framework.

Under the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005), a legally binding document adopted by 196 States Parties, countries are required to develop their capacity to rapidly detect, assess, notify and respond to unusual health events of potential international concern. To support countries in monitoring and enhancing their capacities and complying with the IHR (2005), the World Health Organization (WHO) developed the IHR Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (IHR MEF). This framework comprises four complementary components: the State Party Annual Report, the Joint External Evaluation, after-action reviews and simulation exercises. The first two are used to review capacities and the second two to help to explore their functionality. The contribution of different disciplines, sectors, and areas of work, joining forces through a One Health approach, is essential for the implementation of the IHR (2005). Therefore, WHO, in partnership with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), and other international and national partners, has actively worked on facilitating the inclusion of the relevant sectors, in particular the animal health sector, in each of the four components of the IHR MEF. Other tools complement the IHR MEF, such as the WHO/OIE IHR-PVS [Performance of Veterinary Services] National Bridging Workshops, which facilitate the optimal use of the results of the IHR MEF and the OIE Performance of Veterinary Services Pathway and create an opportunity for stakeholders from animal health and human health services to work on the coordination of their efforts. The results of these various tools are used in countries' planning processes and are incorporated in their National Action Plan for Health Security to accelerate the implementation of IHR core capacities. The present article describes how One Health is incorporated in all components of the IHR MEF.

En vertu du Règlement sanitaire international (RSI, 2005), instrument juridique ayant force obligatoire pour les 196 États Parties dans le monde, les pays s'engagent à renforcer leurs capacités de détection, d'évaluation, de notification et de réaction en cas d'événements sanitaires inhabituels ou présentant une dimension internationale inquiétante. Le Cadre de suivi et d'évaluation du RSI (2005) a été élaboré par l'Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS) afin de soutenir les pays souhaitant évaluer et améliorer leurs capacités et leur niveau de conformité avec le RSI (2005). Ce cadre comprend quatre composantes complémentaires : le rapport annuel de l'État Partie, l'Évaluation extérieure conjointe, les examens « après action¼ et les exercices de simulation. Les deux premières composantes permettent de faire le point sur les capacités tandis que les deux dernières visent une connaissance détaillée de leur fonctionnement. La mise en oeuvre du RSI (2005) demande aux différentes disciplines, secteurs et domaines d'activités de fédérer leurs forces dans une approche Une seule santé. Par conséquent, en partenariat avec l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture (FAO), avec l'Organisation mondiale de la santé animale (OIE) et avec d'autres partenaires internationaux et nationaux, l'OMS a fait en sorte de faciliter l'intégration de tous les secteurs concernés, en particulier celui de la santé animale, dans les diverses composantes du Cadre d'évaluation du RSI. D'autres outils complètent celui-ci, en particulier les ateliers de liaison nationaux OMS/OIE sur le RSI et le Processus d'évaluation des performances des Services vétérinaires (PVS), dont le but est de faciliter l'utilisation optimale des résultats du Cadre d'évaluation du RSI et du Processus PVS de l'OIE et de fournir aux acteurs des services de santé animale et de santé publique la possibilité de se concerter sur les modalités d'une synergie de leur action. Les résultats de ces outils sont ensuite pris en compte par les pays lors des procédures de planification et intégrés dans les Plans d'action nationaux pour la sécurité sanitaire afin d'accélérer la mise en oeuvre des capacités fondamentales décrites dans le RSI. Les auteurs décrivent l'intégration du concept Une seule santé dans chacune des composantes du Cadre d'évaluation du RSI.

Según lo dispuesto en el Reglamento Sanitario Internacional (RSI, 2005), documento jurídicamente vinculante suscrito por 196 Estados Partes, los países están obligados a dotarse de la capacidad necesaria para detectar, evaluar, notificar y afrontar con rapidez todo evento sanitario inusual que pueda revestir importancia internacional. Para ayudar a los países a dotarse de mejores capacidades, a seguir de cerca su evolución al respecto y a dar cumplimiento al RSI (2005), la Organización Mundial de la Salud (OMS) elaboró el marco de seguimiento y evaluación del RSI, que consta de cuatro elementos complementarios: el informe anual que debe presentar cada Estado Parte; la evaluación externa conjunta; exámenes posteriores a las intervenciones; y ejercicios de simulación. Los dos primeros sirven para examinar las capacidades, y los dos segundos para ayudar a estudiar su funcionalidad. Para la aplicación del RSI (2005) es fundamental la contribución de diferentes disciplinas, sectores y ámbitos de trabajo, que aúnen esfuerzos actuando desde los postulados de Una sola salud. Por ello la OMS, en colaboración con la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Alimentación y la Agricultura (FAO), la Organización Mundial de Sanidad Animal (OIE) y otros asociados internacionales y nacionales, ha trabajado activamente para facilitar la integración de los sectores pertinentes, en particular el de la sanidad animal, en cada uno de los cuatro componentes del marco de seguimiento y evaluación del RSI. Hay otros dispositivos que vienen a complementar este marco, por ejemplo los talleres nacionales dedicados a la creación de nexos entre el RSI y el proceso PVS (Prestaciones de los Servicios Veterinarios) de la OIE, organizados conjuntamente por la OMS y la OIE, que facilitan un uso idóneo de los resultados del marco de seguimiento y evaluación del RSI y del proceso PVS y brindan a las partes interesadas de los servicios sanitarios y zoosanitarios la oportunidad de trabajar sobre la coordinación de sus respectivas actividades. Los resultados de estas diversas herramientas alimentan después los procesos de planificación de los países y son incorporados a su Plan de acción nacional de seguridad sanitaria para acelerar la implantación de las capacidades básicas prescritas en el RSI. Los autores explican cómo se incorpora la filosofía de Una sola salud a todos los componentes del marco de seguimiento y evaluación del RSI.