State-to-State Variation in Medicaid Reimbursement for Neurosurgical Procedures: Implications for Healthcare Access in Vulnerable Populations.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: Medicaid payment for healthcare services traditionally reimburses less than Medicare and commercial insurance. This disparity in reimbursement seems to be an important driver of limited access to care among Medicaid beneficiaries. This study seeks to examine the degree of variation in Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement for the most common neurosurgical current procedural terminology codes and determine its potential impact on provider accessibility. METHODS: In this cross-sectional study, maximum allowed physician reimbursement fees for 20 common neurosurgical codes reported in the literature were obtained from the 2022 Medicare Physician Fee Schedule and individual state Medicaid Fee-for-Service Schedules. The Medicaid-Medicare Index (MMI), which measures Medicaid reimbursement as a fraction of Medicare allowed amounts, was calculated for each procedure across 49 states and the District of Columbia. Lower MMI indicates a greater disparity, or "discount," between Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement. The proportion of providers accepting new Medicaid patients and total Medicaid enrollment were compared across states as a function of MMI. RESULTS: The average national MMI was 0.79, with a range of 0.37 in NY/NJ to 1.43 in NE. Maximum allowed amounts for Medicare reimbursement (coefficient of variation = 0.09) were less variable than those for Medicaid (coefficient of variation = 0.26, P < .01). The largest absolute disparity was observed for intracranial aneurysm clipping in NY, where the maximum Medicaid reimbursement is $3496.52 less than that of Medicare. Higher MMI was associated with a significantly larger proportion of providers accepting new Medicaid patients (R2 = 0.43, P < .01). Moreover, MMI varied inversely with the number of Medicaid beneficiaries (R2 = 0.12, P = .01). CONCLUSION: Medicaid reimbursement varies between states reflecting the disparate methods of fee schedule calculation. Lower reimbursement is associated with more limited provider enrollment, especially in states with a greater number of beneficiaries.

Health Care Lobbying, Political Action Committees, and Spine Surgery.

STUDY DESIGN: Retrospective review. OBJECTIVE: The aim of this study was to analyze the political contributions and strategies of the Political Action Committee (PACs) lobbying for the political interests of spine surgeons. SUMMARY OF BACKGROUND DATA: In 2016, a presidential election year, $514,224,628 was spent on health care lobbying. Only 16% ($85,061,148) was on behalf of health professionals providing care. Below we chronicle the overlapping contributions between the three different physician-based Political Action Committee (PAC) lobbying entities as it relates specifically to spine surgery. METHODS: Data were abstracted for the PACs of the American Association of Neurological Surgeons (AANS), American Association of Orthopedic Surgeons (AAOS), and the North American Spine Society (NASS). These data were obtained using OpenSecrets (opensecrets.org), and the Federal Election Commission (fec.gov) website. All data points were collected biannually from 2006 to 2018 and statistically analyzed as appropriate. RESULTS: In 2016, the AAOS PAC contributed $2,648,218, the AANS PAC $348,091, and the NASS PAC $183,612. After accounting for respective group size, the AAOS spent >2.34 times that of the AANS. Orthopedists were 3.84 times (95% confidence interval 3.42-4.3) more likely to donate to their PAC than neurosurgeons (P < 0.001) during the 2016 election. The majority of contributions among the three different lobbyist organizations were to federal candidates, followed by fundraising committees, and finally to the national party. Eighty-eight percent of AANS donations went to Republican candidates, whereas AAOS and NASS were 63% and 67%, respectively. From 2008 to 2016, the AAOS PAC had a highest political contributions spend per active member of parent organization ($126.39) as compared to AANS ($80.52) and NASS ($17.81). The AAOS had five surgeons for every donor to the AAOS PAC, whereas the AANS had 14 surgeons and NASS 38 members per each donor. The AANS had a higher percentage of Republican donations with 78.9% of donations going to Republicans as compared to 61.8% of AAOS contributions and 67.9% of NASS contributions. CONCLUSION: Spine surgery is unique in that three different physician-based lobbyist organizations seek to influence legislative priorities with the AAOS having the most substantial fiscal impact and greatest participation. Choreography of donation strategies is essential to maximize physician voice at the policy level. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: 5.