RESUMEN
We study an opinion formation model by the means of a coevolving complex network where the vertices represent the individuals, characterized by their evolving opinions, and the edges represent the interactions among them. The network adapts to the spreading of opinions in two ways: not only connected agents interact and eventually change their thinking but an agent may also rewire one of its links to a neighborhood holding the same opinion as his. The dynamics, based on a global majority rule, depends on an external parameter that controls the plasticity of the network. We show how the information entropy associated to the distribution of group sizes allows us to locate the phase transition between a phase of full consensus and another, where different opinions coexist. We also determine the minimum size of the most informative sampling. At the transition the distribution of the sizes of groups holding the same opinion is scale free.
RESUMEN
We study the dynamics of a generalized minority game (GMG) and of the bar attendance model (BAM) in which a number of agents self-organize to match an attendance that is fixed externally as a control parameter. We compare the usual dynamics used for the minority game with one for the BAM that makes a better use of the available information. We study the asymptotic states reached in both frameworks. We show that states that can be assimilated to either thermodynamic equilibrium or quenched configurations can appear in both models, but with different settings. We discuss the relevance of the parameter G that measures the value of the prize for winning in units of the fine for losing. We also provide an annealing protocol by which the quenched configurations of the GMG can progressively be modified to reach an asymptotic equilibrium state that coincides with the one obtained with the BAM.