CDC's Hospital-Onset Clostridioides difficile Prevention Framework in a Regional Hospital Network.

Importance: Despite modest reductions in the incidence of hospital-onset Clostridioides difficile infection (HO-CDI), CDI remains a leading cause of health care-associated infection. As no single intervention has proven highly effective on its own, a multifaceted approach to controlling HO-CDI is needed. Objective: To assess the effectiveness of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Strategies to Prevent Clostridioides difficile Infection in Acute Care Facilities Framework (hereafter, the Framework) in reducing HO-CDI incidence. Design, Setting, and Participants: This quality improvement study was performed within the Duke Infection Control Outreach Network from July 1, 2019, through March 31, 2022. In all, 20 hospitals in the network participated in an implementation study of the Framework recommendations, and 26 hospitals did not participate and served as controls. The Framework has 39 discrete intervention categories organized into 5 focal areas for CDI prevention: (1) isolation and contact precautions, (2) CDI confirmation, (3) environmental cleaning, (4) infrastructure development, and (5) antimicrobial stewardship engagement. Exposures: Monthly teleconferences supporting Framework implementation for the participating hospitals. Main Outcomes and Measures: Primary outcomes were HO-CDI incidence trends at participating hospitals compared with controls and postintervention HO-CDI incidence at intervention sites compared with rates during the 24 months before the intervention. Results: The study sample included a total of 2184 HO-CDI cases and 7 269 429 patient-days. In the intervention cohort of 20 participating hospitals, there were 1403 HO-CDI cases and 3 513 755 patient-days, with a median (IQR) HO-CDI incidence of 2.8 (2.0-4.3) cases per 10 000 patient-days. The first analysis included an additional 3 755 674 patient-days and 781 HO-CDI cases among the 26 controls, with a median (IQR) HO-CDI incidence of 1.1 (0.7-2.7) case per 10 000 patient-days. The second analysis included an additional 2 538 874 patient-days and 1751 HO-CDI cases, with a median (IQR) HO-CDI incidence of 5.9 (2.7-8.9) cases per 10 000 patient-days, from participating hospitals 24 months before the intervention. In the first analysis, intervention sites had a steeper decline in HO-CDI incidence over time relative to controls (yearly incidence rate ratio [IRR], 0.79 [95% CI, 0.67-0.94]; P = .01), but the decline was not temporally associated with study participation. In the second analysis, HO-CDI incidence was declining in participating hospitals before the intervention, and the rate of decline did not change during the intervention. The degree to which hospitals implemented the Framework was associated with steeper declines in HO-CDI incidence (yearly IRR, 0.95 [95% CI, 0.90-0.99]; P = .03). Conclusions and Relevance: In this quality improvement study of a regional hospital network, implementation of the Framework was not temporally associated with declining HO-CDI incidence. Further study of the effectiveness of multimodal prevention measures for controlling HO-CDI is warranted.

Declines in Influenza Vaccination Coverage Among Health Care Personnel in Acute Care Hospitals During the COVID-19 Pandemic - United States, 2017-2023.

Health care personnel (HCP) are recommended to receive annual vaccination against influenza to reduce influenza-related morbidity and mortality. Every year, acute care hospitals report receipt of influenza vaccination among HCP to CDC's National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN). This analysis used NHSN data to describe changes in influenza vaccination coverage among HCP in acute care hospitals before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. Influenza vaccination among HCP increased during the prepandemic period from 88.6% during 2017-18 to 90.7% during 2019-20. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the percentage of HCP vaccinated against influenza decreased to 85.9% in 2020-21 and 81.1% in 2022-23. Additional efforts are needed to implement evidence-based strategies to increase vaccination coverage among HCP and to identify factors associated with recent declines in influenza vaccination coverage.

Influenza and Up-to-Date COVID-19 Vaccination Coverage Among Health Care Personnel - National Healthcare Safety Network, United States, 2022-23 Influenza Season.

The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recommends that health care personnel (HCP) receive an annual influenza vaccine and that everyone aged ≥6 months stay up to date with recommended COVID-19 vaccination. Health care facilities report vaccination of HCP against influenza and COVID-19 to CDC's National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN). During January-June 2023, NHSN defined up-to-date COVID-19 vaccination as receipt of a bivalent COVID-19 mRNA vaccine dose or completion of a primary series within the preceding 2 months. This analysis describes influenza and up-to-date COVID-19 vaccination coverage among HCP working in acute care hospitals and nursing homes during the 2022-23 influenza season (October 1, 2022-March 31, 2023). Influenza vaccination coverage was 81.0% among HCP at acute care hospitals and 47.1% among those working at nursing homes. Up-to-date COVID-19 vaccination coverage was 17.2% among HCP working at acute care hospitals and 22.8% among those working at nursing homes. There is a need to promote evidence-based strategies to improve vaccination coverage among HCP. Tailored strategies might also be useful to reach all HCP with recommended vaccines and protect them and their patients from vaccine-preventable respiratory diseases.

A Review of Pediatric Central Line-Associated Bloodstream Infections Reported to the National Healthcare Safety Network: United States, 2016-2022.

Central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSIs) are common healthcare-associated infections in pediatrics. Children's hospital CLABSI standardized infection ratios decreased when comparing 2016-2019 (-26%, 95% CI [-31%, -20%]), and increased from 2019 to 2022 (18%, 95% CI [9%, 26%]). Resilient pediatric CLABSI prevention initiatives are needed.

Assessing the Impact of 2-Step Clostridioides difficile Testing at the Healthcare Facility Level.

BACKGROUND: Two-step testing for Clostridioides difficile infection (CDI) aims to improve diagnostic specificity but may also influence reported epidemiology and patterns of treatment. Some providers fear that 2-step testing may result in adverse outcomes if C. difficile is underdiagnosed. METHODS: Our primary objective was to assess the impact of 2-step testing on reported incidence of hospital-onset CDI (HO-CDI). As secondary objectives, we assessed the impact of 2-step testing on C. difficile-specific antibiotic use and colectomy rates as proxies for harm from underdiagnosis or delayed treatment. This longitudinal cohort study included 2 657 324 patient-days across 8 regional hospitals from July 2017 through March 2022. Impact of 2-step testing was assessed by time series analysis with generalized estimating equation regression models. RESULTS: Two-step testing was associated with a level decrease in HO-CDI incidence (incidence rate ratio, 0.53 [95% confidence interval {CI}, .48-.60]; P < .001), a similar level decrease in utilization rates for oral vancomycin and fidaxomicin (utilization rate ratio, 0.63 [95% CI, .58-.70]; P < .001), and no significant level (rate ratio, 1.16 [95% CI, .93-1.43]; P = .18) or trend (rate ratio, 0.85 [95% CI, .52-1.39]; P = .51) change in emergent colectomy rates. CONCLUSIONS: Two-step testing is associated with decreased reported incidence of HO-CDI, likely by improving diagnostic specificity. The parallel decrease in C. difficile-specific antibiotic use offers indirect reassurance against underdiagnosis of C. difficile infections still requiring treatment by clinician assessment. Similarly, the absence of any significant change in colectomy rates offers indirect reassurance against any rise in fulminant C. difficile requiring surgical management.

Continued increases in the incidence of healthcare-associated infection (HAI) during the second year of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.

Data from the National Healthcare Safety Network were analyzed to assess the impact of COVID-19 on the incidence of healthcare-associated infections (HAI) during 2021. Standardized infection ratios were significantly higher than those during the prepandemic period, particularly during 2021-Q1 and 2021-Q3. The incidence of HAI was elevated during periods of high COVID-19 hospitalizations.

Making a C-DIFFerence: Implementation of a prevention collaborative to reduce hospital-onset Clostridioides difficile infection rates.

Objective: To assist hospitals in reducing Clostridioides difficile infections (CDI), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) implemented a collaborative using the CDC CDI prevention strategies and the Targeted Assessment for Prevention (TAP) Strategy as foundational frameworks. Setting: Acute-care hospitals. Methods: We invited 400 hospitals with the highest cumulative attributable differences (CADs) to the 12-month collaborative, with monthly webinars, coaching calls, and deployment of the CDC CDI TAP facility assessments. Infection prevention barriers, gaps identified, and interventions implemented were qualitatively coded by categorizing them to respective CDI prevention strategies. Standardized infection ratios (SIRs) were reviewed to measure outcomes. Results: Overall, 76 hospitals participated, most often reporting CDI testing as their greatest barrier to achieving reduction (61%). In total, 5,673 TAP assessments were collected across 46 (61%) hospitals. Most hospitals (98%) identified at least 1 gap related to testing and at least 1 gap related to infrastructure to support prevention. Among 14 follow-up hospitals, 64% implemented interventions related to infrastructure to support prevention (eg, establishing champions, reviewing individual CDIs) and 86% implemented testing interventions (eg, 2-step testing, testing algorithms). The SIR decrease between the pre-collaborative and post-collaborative periods was significant among participants (16.7%; P < .001) but less than that among nonparticipants (25.1%; P < .001). Conclusions: This article describes gaps identified and interventions implemented during a comprehensive CDI prevention collaborative in targeted hospitals, highlighting potential future areas of focus for CDI prevention efforts as well as reported challenges and barriers to prevention of one of the most common healthcare-associated infections affecting hospitals and patients nationwide.

Health Care Personnel Exposures to Subsequently Laboratory-Confirmed Monkeypox Patients - Colorado, 2022.

The risk for monkeypox transmission to health care personnel (HCP) caring for symptomatic patients is thought to be low but has not been thoroughly assessed in the context of the current global outbreak (1). Monkeypox typically spreads through close physical (often skin-to-skin) contact with lesions or scabs, body fluids, or respiratory secretions of a person with an active monkeypox infection. CDC currently recommends that HCP wear a gown, gloves, eye protection, and an N95 (or higher-level) respirator while caring for patients with suspected or confirmed monkeypox to protect themselves from infection† (1,2). The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) evaluated HCP exposures and personal protective equipment (PPE) use in health care settings during care of patients who subsequently received a diagnosis of Orthopoxvirus infection (presumptive monkeypox determined by a polymerase chain reaction [PCR] DNA assay) or monkeypox (real-time PCR assay and genetic sequencing performed by CDC). During May 1-July 31, 2022, a total of 313 HCP interacted with patients with subsequently diagnosed monkeypox infections while wearing various combinations of PPE; 23% wore all recommended PPE during their exposures. Twenty-eight percent of exposed HCP were considered to have had high- or intermediate-risk exposures and were therefore eligible to receive postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) with the JYNNEOS vaccine§; among those, 48% (12% of all exposed HCP) received the vaccine. PPE use varied by facility type: HCP in sexually transmitted infection (STI) clinics and community health centers reported the highest adherence to recommended PPE use, and primary and urgent care settings reported the lowest adherence. No HCP developed a monkeypox infection during the 21 days after exposure. These results suggest that the risk for transmission of monkeypox in health care settings is low. Infection prevention training is important in all health care settings, and these findings can guide future updates to PPE recommendations and risk classification in health care settings.

Remote Infection Control Assessments of US Nursing Homes During the COVID-19 Pandemic, April to June 2020.

BACKGROUND: Nursing homes (NHs) provide care in a congregate setting for residents at high risk of severe outcomes from SARS-CoV-2 infection. In spring 2020, NHs were implementing new guidance to minimize SARS-CoV-2 spread among residents and staff. OBJECTIVE: To assess whether telephone and video-based infection control assessment and response (TeleICAR) strategies could efficiently assess NH preparedness and help resolve gaps. DESIGN: We incorporated Centers for Disease Control and Prevention COVID-19 guidance for NH into an assessment tool covering 6 domains: visitor restrictions; health care personnel COVID-19 training; resident education, monitoring, screening, and cohorting; personal protective equipment supply; core infection prevention and control (IPC); and communication to public health. We performed TeleICAR consultations on behalf of health departments. Adherence to each element was documented and recommendations provided to the facility. SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS: Health department-referred NHs that agreed to TeleICAR consultation. METHODS: We assessed overall numbers and proportions of NH that had not implemented each infection control element (gap) and proportion of NH that reported making ≥1 change in practice following the assessment. RESULTS: During April 13 to June 12, 2020, we completed TeleICAR consultations in 629 NHs across 19 states. Overall, 524 (83%) had ≥1 implementation gap identified; the median number of gaps was 2 (interquartile range: 1-4). The domains with the greatest number of facilities with gaps were core IPC practices (428/625; 68%) and COVID-19 education, monitoring, screening, and cohorting of residents (291/620; 47%). CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS: TeleICAR was an alternative to onsite infection control assessments that enabled public health to efficiently reach NHs across the United States early in the COVID-19 pandemic. Assessments identified widespread gaps in core IPC practices that put residents and staff at risk of infection. TeleICAR is an important strategy that leverages infection control expertise and can be useful in future efforts to improve NH IPC.

Monkeypox in a Traveler Returning from Nigeria - Dallas, Texas, July 2021.

Monkeypox is a rare, sometimes life-threatening zoonotic infection that occurs in west and central Africa. It is caused by Monkeypox virus, an orthopoxvirus similar to Variola virus (the causative agent of smallpox) and Vaccinia virus (the live virus component of orthopoxvirus vaccines) and can spread to humans. After 39 years without detection of human disease in Nigeria, an outbreak involving 118 confirmed cases was identified during 2017-2018 (1); sporadic cases continue to occur. During September 2018-May 2021, six unrelated persons traveling from Nigeria received diagnoses of monkeypox in non-African countries: four in the United Kingdom and one each in Israel and Singapore. In July 2021, a man who traveled from Lagos, Nigeria, to Dallas, Texas, became the seventh traveler to a non-African country with diagnosed monkeypox. Among 194 monitored contacts, 144 (74%) were flight contacts. The patient received tecovirimat, an antiviral for treatment of orthopoxvirus infections, and his home required large-scale decontamination. Whole genome sequencing showed that the virus was consistent with a strain of Monkeypox virus known to circulate in Nigeria, but the specific source of the patient's infection was not identified. No epidemiologically linked cases were reported in Nigeria; no contact received postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) with the orthopoxvirus vaccine ACAM2000.

Impact of COVID-19 pandemic on central-line-associated bloodstream infections during the early months of 2020, National Healthcare Safety Network.

Data reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Healthcare Safety Network (CDC NHSN) were analyzed to understand the potential impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on central-line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSIs) in acute-care hospitals. Descriptive analysis of the standardized infection ratio (SIR) was conducted by location, location type, geographic area, and bed size.

Gaps in infection prevention practices for catheter-associated urinary tract infections and central line-associated bloodstream infections as identified by the Targeted Assessment for Prevention Strategy.

BACKGROUND: Catheter-associated urinary tract infections (CAUTI) and central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI) represent a substantial portion of health care-associated infections (HAIs) reported in the United States. The Targeted Assessment for Prevention Strategy is a quality improvement framework to reduce health care-associated infections. Data from the Targeted Assessment for Prevention Facility Assessments were used to determine common infection prevention gaps for CAUTI and CLABSI. METHODS: Data from 2,044 CAUTI and 1,680 CLABSI assessments were included in the analysis. Items were defined as potential gaps if ≥33% respondents answered Unknown, ≥33% No, or ≥50% No or Unknown or Never, Rarely, Sometimes, or Unknown to questions pertaining to those areas. Review of response frequencies and stratification by respondent role were performed to highlight opportunities for improvement. RESULTS: Across CAUTI and CLABSI assessments, lack of physician champions (<35% Yes) and nurse champions (<55% Yes), along with lack of awareness of competency assessments, audits, and feedback were reported. Lack of practices to facilitate timely removal of urinary catheters were identified for CAUTI and issues with select device insertion practices, such as maintaining aseptic technique, were perceived as areas for improvement for CLABSI. CONCLUSIONS: These data suggest common gaps in critical components of infection prevention and control programs. The identification of these gaps has the potential to inform targeted CAUTI and CLABSI prevention efforts.

Candida auris Outbreak in a COVID-19 Specialty Care Unit - Florida, July-August 2020.

In July 2020, the Florida Department of Health was alerted to three Candida auris bloodstream infections and one urinary tract infection in four patients with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) who received care in the same dedicated COVID-19 unit of an acute care hospital (hospital A). C. auris is a multidrug-resistant yeast that can cause invasive infection. Its ability to colonize patients asymptomatically and persist on surfaces has contributed to previous C. auris outbreaks in health care settings (1-7). Since the first C. auris case was identified in Florida in 2017, aggressive measures have been implemented to limit spread, including contact tracing and screening upon detection of a new case. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, hospital A conducted admission screening for C. auris and admitted colonized patients to a separate dedicated ward.

Update: Characteristics of Health Care Personnel with COVID-19 - United States, February 12-July 16, 2020.

As of September 21, 2020, the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic had resulted in 6,786,352 cases and 199,024 deaths in the United States.* Health care personnel (HCP) are essential workers at risk for exposure to patients or infectious materials (1). The impact of COVID-19 on U.S. HCP was first described using national case surveillance data in April 2020 (2). Since then, the number of reported HCP with COVID-19 has increased tenfold. This update describes demographic characteristics, underlying medical conditions, hospitalizations, and intensive care unit (ICU) admissions, stratified by vital status, among 100,570 HCP with COVID-19 reported to CDC during February 12-July 16, 2020. HCP occupation type and job setting are newly reported. HCP status was available for 571,708 (22%) of 2,633,585 cases reported to CDC. Most HCP with COVID-19 were female (79%), aged 16-44 years (57%), not hospitalized (92%), and lacked all 10 underlying medical conditions specified on the case report form† (56%). Of HCP with COVID-19, 641 died. Compared with nonfatal COVID-19 HCP cases, a higher percentage of fatal cases occurred in males (38% versus 22%), persons aged ≥65 years (44% versus 4%), non-Hispanic Asians (Asians) (20% versus 9%), non-Hispanic Blacks (Blacks) (32% versus 25%), and persons with any of the 10 underlying medical conditions specified on the case report form (92% versus 41%). From a subset of jurisdictions reporting occupation type or job setting for HCP with COVID-19, nurses were the most frequently identified single occupation type (30%), and nursing and residential care facilities were the most common job setting (67%). Ensuring access to personal protective equipment (PPE) and training, and practices such as universal use of face masks at work, wearing masks in the community, and observing social distancing remain critical strategies to protect HCP and those they serve.

Testing and Clinical Management of Health Care Personnel Potentially Exposed to Hepatitis C Virus - CDC Guidance, United States, 2020.

Exposure to hepatitis viruses is a recognized occupational risk for health care personnel (HCP). This report establishes new CDC guidance that includes recommendations for a testing algorithm and clinical management for HCP with potential occupational exposure to hepatitis C virus (HCV). Baseline testing of the source patient and HCP should be performed as soon as possible (preferably within 48 hours) after the exposure. A source patient refers to any person receiving health care services whose blood or other potentially infectious material is the source of the HCP's exposure. Two options are recommended for testing the source patient. The first option is to test the source patient with a nucleic acid test (NAT) for HCV RNA. This option is preferred, particularly if the source patient is known or suspected to have recent behaviors that increase risk for HCV acquisition (e.g., injection drug use within the previous 4 months) or if risk cannot be reliably assessed. The second option is to test the source patient for antibodies to hepatitis C virus (anti-HCV), then if positive, test for HCV RNA. For HCP, baseline testing for anti-HCV with reflex to a NAT for HCV RNA if positive should be conducted as soon as possible (preferably within 48 hours) after the exposure and may be simultaneous with source-patient testing. If follow-up testing is recommended based on the source patient's status (e.g., HCV RNA positive or anti-HCV positive with unavailable HCV RNA or if the HCV infection status is unknown), HCP should be tested with a NAT for HCV RNA at 3-6 weeks postexposure. If HCV RNA is negative at 3-6 weeks postexposure, a final test for anti-HCV at 4-6 months postexposure is recommended. A source patient or HCP found to be positive for HCV RNA should be referred to care. Postexposure prophylaxis of hepatitis C is not recommended for HCP who have occupational exposure to blood and other body fluids. This guidance was developed based on expert opinion (CDC. Updated U.S. Public Health Service guidelines for the management of occupational exposures to HBV, HCV, and HIV and recommendations for postexposure prophylaxis. MMWR Recommend Rep 2001;50[No. RR-11]; Supplementary Figure, https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/90288) and reflects updated guidance from professional organizations that recommend treatment for acute HCV infection. Health care providers can use this guidance to update their procedures for postexposure testing and clinical management of HCP potentially exposed to hepatitis C virus.

Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of N95 Filtering Facepiece Respirators During the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic.

N95 respirators are personal protective equipment most often used to control exposures to infections transmitted via the airborne route. Supplies of N95 respirators can become depleted during pandemics or when otherwise in high demand. In this paper, we offer strategies for optimizing supplies of N95 respirators in health care settings while maximizing the level of protection offered to health care personnel when there is limited supply in the United States during the 2019 coronavirus disease pandemic. The strategies are intended for use by professionals who manage respiratory protection programs, occupational health services, and infection prevention programs in health care facilities to protect health care personnel from job-related risks of exposure to infectious respiratory illnesses. Consultation with federal, state, and local public health officials is also important. We use the framework of surge capacity and the occupational health and safety hierarchy of controls approach to discuss specific engineering control, administrative control, and personal protective equipment measures that may help in optimizing N95 respirator supplies.

Implementation of the Targeted Assessment for Prevention Strategy in a healthcare system to reduce Clostridioides difficile infection rates.

BACKGROUND: Prevention of Clostridioides difficile infection (CDI) is a national priority and may be facilitated by deployment of the Targeted Assessment for Prevention (TAP) Strategy, a quality improvement framework providing a focused approach to infection prevention. This article describes the process and outcomes of TAP Strategy implementation for CDI prevention in a healthcare system. METHODS: Hospital A was identified based on CDI surveillance data indicating an excess burden of infections above the national goal; hospitals B and C participated as part of systemwide deployment. TAP facility assessments were administered to staff to identify infection control gaps and inform CDI prevention interventions. Retrospective analysis was performed using negative-binomial, interrupted time series (ITS) regression to assess overall effect of targeted CDI prevention efforts. Analysis included hospital-onset, laboratory-identified C. difficile event data for 18 months before and after implementation of the TAP facility assessments. RESULTS: The systemwide monthly CDI rate significantly decreased at the intervention (ß2, -44%; P = .017), and the postintervention CDI rate trend showed a sustained decrease (ß1 + ß3; -12% per month; P = .008). At an individual hospital level, the CDI rate trend significantly decreased in the postintervention period at hospital A only (ß1 + ß3, -26% per month; P = .003). CONCLUSIONS: This project demonstrates TAP Strategy implementation in a healthcare system, yielding significant decrease in the laboratory-identified C. difficile rate trend in the postintervention period at the system level and in hospital A. This project highlights the potential benefit of directing prevention efforts to facilities with the highest burden of excess infections to more efficiently reduce CDI rates.

Pathogens causing central-line-associated bloodstream infections in acute-care hospitals-United States, 2011-2017.

OBJECTIVE: To describe pathogen distribution and rates for central-line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSIs) from different acute-care locations during 2011-2017 to inform prevention efforts. METHODS: CLABSI data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) were analyzed. Percentages and pooled mean incidence density rates were calculated for a variety of pathogens and stratified by acute-care location groups (adult intensive care units [ICUs], pediatric ICUs [PICUs], adult wards, pediatric wards, and oncology wards). RESULTS: From 2011 to 2017, 136,264 CLABSIs were reported to the NHSN by adult and pediatric acute-care locations; adult ICUs and wards reported the most CLABSIs: 59,461 (44%) and 40,763 (30%), respectively. In 2017, the most common pathogens were Candida spp/yeast in adult ICUs (27%) and Enterobacteriaceae in adult wards, pediatric wards, oncology wards, and PICUs (23%-31%). Most pathogen-specific CLABSI rates decreased over time, excepting Candida spp/yeast in adult ICUs and Enterobacteriaceae in oncology wards, which increased, and Staphylococcus aureus rates in pediatric locations, which did not change. CONCLUSIONS: The pathogens associated with CLABSIs differ across acute-care location groups. Learning how pathogen-targeted prevention efforts could augment current prevention strategies, such as strategies aimed at preventing Candida spp/yeast and Enterobacteriaceae CLABSIs, might further reduce national rates.