Context effects in cognitive effort evaluation.

When given a choice, people will avoid cognitively effortful courses of action because the experience of effort is evaluated as aversive and costly. At the same time, a body of work spanning psychology, economics, and neuroscience suggests that goods, actions, and experiences are often evaluated in the context in which they are encountered, rather in absolute terms. To probe the extent to which the evaluation of cognitive effort is also context-dependent, we had participants learn associations between unique stimuli and subjective demand levels across low-demand and high-demand contexts. We probed demand preferences and subjective evaluation using a forced-choice paradigm as well by examining effort ratings, taken both on-line (during learning) and off-line (after choice). When choosing between two stimuli objectively identical in terms of demand, participants showed a clear preference for the stimulus learned in the low- versus high-demand context and rated this stimulus as more subjectively effortful than the low-demand context in on-line but not off-line ratings, suggesting an assimilation effect. Finally, we observed that the extent to which individual participants who exhibited stronger assimilation effects in off-line demand ratings were more likely to manifest an assimilation effect in demand preferences. Broadly, our findings suggest that effort evaluations occur in a context-dependent manner and are specifically assimilated to the broader context in which they occur.

The Causes and Consequences of Drifting Expectations.

Awaiting news of uncertain outcomes is distressing because the news might be disappointing. To prevent such disappointments, people often "brace for the worst," pessimistically lowering expectations before news arrives to decrease the possibility of surprising disappointment (a negative prediction error, or PE). Computational decision-making research commonly assumes that expectations do not drift within trials, yet it is unclear whether expectations pessimistically drift in real-world, high-stakes settings, what factors influence expectation drift, and whether it effectively buffers emotional responses to goal-relevant outcomes. Moreover, individuals learn from PEs to accurately anticipate future outcomes, but it is unknown whether expectation drift also impedes PE-based learning. In a sample of students awaiting exam grades (N = 625), we found that expectations often drift and tend to drift pessimistically. We demonstrate that bracing is preferentially modulated by uncertainty; it transiently buffers the initial emotional impact of negative PEs but impairs PE-based learning, counterintuitively sustaining uncertainty into the future.

Proximity to rewards modulates parameters of effortful control exertion.

The now-classic goal-gradient hypothesis posits that organisms increase effort expenditure as a function of their proximity to a goal. Despite nearly a century having passed since its original formulation, goal-gradient-like behavior in human cognitive performance remains poorly understood: Are we more willing to engage in costly cognitive processing when we are near, versus far, from a goal state? Moreover, the computational mechanisms underpinning these potential goal-gradient effects-for example, whether goal proximity affects fidelity of stimulus encoding, response caution, or other identifiable mechanisms governing speed and accuracy-are unclear. Here, in two experiments, we examine the effect of goal proximity, operationalized as progress toward the completion of a rewarded task block, upon task performance in an attentionally demanding oddball task. Supporting the goal-gradient hypothesis, we found that participants responded more quickly, but not less accurately, when rewards were proximal than when they were distal. Critically, this effect was only observed when participants were given information about goal proximity. Using hierarchical drift diffusion modeling, we found that these apparent goal-gradient performance effects were best explained by a collapsing bound model, in which proximity to a goal reduced response caution and increased information processing. Taken together, these results suggest that goal gradients could help explain the oft-observed fluctuations in engagement of cognitively effortful processing, extending the scope of the goal-gradient hypothesis to the domain of cognitive tasks. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Distinguishing between intrinsic and instrumental sources of the value of choice.

Considerable evidence suggests that people value the freedom to choose. However, it is unclear whether this preference for choice stems purely from choice's intrinsic value, or whether people prefer to choose because it tends to provide instrumental information about desirable outcomes. To address this question, participants completed a novel choice task in which they could freely choose to exert choice or not, manipulating the level of instrumental contingency between participants' choices and eventual outcomes, which we operationalized using the information-theoretic concept of mutual information. Across two experiments (N = 100 each), we demonstrate a marked preference for choice, but importantly found that participants' preference for free choice is weakened when actions are decoupled from outcomes. Taken together, our results demonstrate that a significant factor in people's preference for choice is an assumption about the instrumental value of choice, suggesting against a purely intrinsic value of choice.

Greater reliance on model-free learning in adolescent anorexia nervosa: An examination of dual-system reinforcement learning.

Alterations in learning and decision-making systems are thought to contribute to core features of anorexia nervosa (AN), a psychiatric disorder characterized by persistent dietary restriction and weight loss. Instrumental learning theory identifies a dual-system of habit and goal-directed decision-making, linked to model-free and model-based reinforcement learning algorithms. Difficulty arbitrating between these systems, resulting in an over-reliance on one strategy over the other, has been implicated in compulsivity and extreme goal pursuit, both of which are observed in AN. Characterizing alterations in model-free and model-based systems, and their neural correlates, in AN may clarify mechanisms contributing to symptom heterogeneity (e.g., binge/purge symptoms). This study tested whether adolescents with restricting AN (AN-R; n = 36) and binge/purge AN (AN-BP; n = 20) differentially utilized model-based and model-free learning systems compared to a healthy control group (HC; n = 28) during a Markov two-step decision-making task under conditions of reward and punishment. Associations between model-free and model-based learning and resting-state functional connectivity between neural regions of interest, including orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), nucleus accumbens (NAcc), putamen, and sensory motor cortex (SMC) were examined. AN-R showed higher utilization of model-free learning compared to HC for reward, but attenuated model-free and model-based learning for punishment. In AN-R only, higher model-based learning was associated with stronger OFC-to-left NAcc functional connectivity, regions linked to goal-directed behavior. Greater utilization of model-free learning for reward in AN-R may differentiate this group, particularly during adolescence, and facilitate dietary restriction by prioritizing habitual control in rewarding contexts.

Cognitive fatigue weakens the effects of distraction on pain.

ABSTRACT: Perceived pain can be viewed because of a competition between nociceptive inputs and other competing goals, such as performing a demanding cognitive task. Task performance, however, suffers when cognitively fatigued. We therefore predicted that cognitive fatigue would weaken the pain-reducing effects of performing a concurrent cognitive task, which would indicate a causal link between fatigue and heightened pain sensitivity. In this study, 2 groups of pain-free adults performed cognitive tasks while receiving painful heat stimuli. In 1 group, we induced cognitive fatigue before performing the tasks. We found that fatigue led to more pain and worse performance when the task was demanding, suggesting that fatigue weakens one's ability to distract from pain. These findings show that cognitive fatigue can impair performance on subsequent tasks and that this impairment can lower a person's ability to distract from and reduce their pain.

More than a feeling: physiological measures of affect index the integration of effort costs and rewards during anticipatory effort evaluation.

The notion that humans avoid effortful action is one of the oldest and most persistent in psychology. Influential theories of effort propose that effort valuations are made according to a cost-benefit trade-off: we tend to invest mental effort only when the benefits outweigh the costs. While these models provide a useful conceptual framework, the affective components of effort valuation remain poorly understood. Here, we examined whether primitive components of affective response-positive and negative valence, captured via facial electromyography (fEMG)-can be used to better understand valuations of cognitive effort. Using an effortful arithmetic task, we find that fEMG activity in the corrugator supercilii-thought to index negative valence-1) tracks the anticipation and exertion of cognitive effort and 2) is attenuated in the presence of high rewards. Together, these results suggest that activity in the corrugator reflects the integration of effort costs and rewards during effortful decision-making.

Individual differences in naturalistic learning link negative emotionality to the development of anxiety.

Organisms learn from prediction errors (PEs) to predict the future. Laboratory studies using small financial outcomes find that humans use PEs to update expectations and link individual differences in PE-based learning to internalizing disorders. Because of the low-stakes outcomes in most tasks, it is unclear whether PE learning emerges in naturalistic, high-stakes contexts and whether individual differences in PE learning predict psychopathology risk. Using experience sampling to assess 625 college students' expected exam grades, we found evidence of PE-based learning and a general tendency to discount negative PEs, an "optimism bias." However, individuals with elevated negative emotionality, a personality trait linked to the development of anxiety disorders, displayed a global pessimism and learning differences that impeded accurate expectations and predicted future anxiety symptoms. A sensitivity to PEs combined with an aversion to negative PEs may result in a pessimistic and inaccurate model of the world, leading to anxiety.

Context-dependent choice and evaluation in real-world consumer behavior.

A body of work spanning neuroscience, economics, and psychology indicates that decision-making is context-dependent, which means that the value of an option depends not only on the option in question, but also on the other options in the choice set-or the 'context'. While context effects have been observed primarily in small-scale laboratory studies with tightly constrained, artificially constructed choice sets, it remains to be determined whether these context effects take hold in real-world choice problems, where choice sets are large and decisions driven by rich histories of direct experience. Here, we investigate whether valuations are context-dependent in real-world choice by analyzing a massive restaurant rating dataset as well as two independent replication datasets which provide complementary operationalizations of restaurant choice. We find that users make fewer ratings-maximizing choices in choice sets with higher-rated options-a hallmark of context-dependent choice-and that post-choice restaurant ratings also varied systematically with the ratings of unchosen restaurants. Furthermore, in a follow-up laboratory experiment using hypothetical choice sets matched to the real-world data, we find further support for the idea that subjective valuations of restaurants are scaled in accordance with the choice context, providing corroborating evidence for a general mechanistic-level account of these effects. Taken together, our results provide a potent demonstration of context-dependent choice in real-world choice settings, manifesting both in decisions and subjective valuation of options.

Distraction from pain depends on task demands and motivation.

Introduction: Pain captures attention automatically, yet we can inhibit pain when we are motivated to perform other tasks. Previous studies show that engaging in a cognitively demanding task reduces pain compared with a task that is minimally demanding, yet the effects of motivation on this pain-reducing effect remain largely unexplored. Objectives: In this study, we hypothesized that motivating people to engage in a task with high demands would lead to more cognitive resources directed toward the task, thereby amplifying its pain-reducing effects. Methods: On different trials, participants performed an easy (left-right arrow discrimination) or demanding (2-back) cognitive task while receiving nonpainful or painful heat stimuli. In half of the trials, monetary rewards were offered to motivate participants to engage and perform well in the task. Results: Results showed an interaction between task demands and rewards, whereby offering rewards strengthened the pain-reducing effect of a distracting task when demands were high. This effect was reinforced by increased 2-back performance when rewards were offered, indicating that both task demands and motivation are necessary to inhibit pain. Conclusions: When task demands are low, motivation to engage in the task will have little impact on pain because performance cannot further increase. When motivation is low, participants will spend minimal effort to perform well in the task, thus hindering the pain-reducing effects of higher task demands. These findings suggest that the pain-reducing properties of distraction can be optimized by carefully calibrating the demands and motivational value of the task.

TMS reveals distinct patterns of proactive and reactive inhibition in motor system activity.

Response inhibition is our ability to suppress or cancel actions when required. Deficits in response inhibition are linked with a range of psychopathological disorders including addiction and OCD. Studies on response inhibition have largely focused on reactive inhibition-stopping an action when explicitly cued. Less work has examined proactive inhibition-preparation to stop ahead of time. In the current experiment, we studied both reactive and proactive inhibition by adopting a two-step continuous performance task (e.g., "AX"-CPT) often used to study cognitive control. By combining a dot pattern expectancy (DPX) version of this task with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), we mapped changes in reactive and proactive inhibition within the motor system. Measured using motor-evoked potentials, we found modulation of corticospinal excitability at critical timepoints during the DPX when participants were preparing in advance to inhibit a response (at step 1: during the cue) and while inhibiting a response (at step 2: during the probe). Notably, motor system activity during early timepoints was predicted by a behavioural index of proactive capacity and could predict whether participants would later successfully inhibit their response. Our findings demonstrate that combining TMS with a two-step CPT such as the DPX can be useful for studying reactive and proactive inhibition, and reveal that successful inhibition is determined earlier than previously thought.

The Average Reward Rate Modulates Behavioral and Neural Indices of Effortful Control Allocation.

People tend to avoid exerting cognitive effort, and findings from recent behavioral studies suggest that effort allocation is in part determined by the opportunity cost of slothful responding-operationalized as the average reward rate per unit time. When the average rate of reward is high, individuals make more errors in cognitive control tasks, presumably owing to a withdrawal of costly cognitive processing. An open question remains whether the presumed modulations of cognitively effortful control processes are observable at the neural level. Here, we measured EEG while participants completed the Simon task, a well-known response conflict task, while the experienced average reward rate fluctuated across trials. We examined neural activity associated with the opportunity cost of time by applying generalized eigendecomposition, a hypothesis-driven source separation technique, to identify a midfrontal component associated with the average reward rate. Fluctuations in average reward rate modulated not only component amplitude but also, most importantly, component theta power (4-8 Hz). Higher average reward rate was associated with reduced theta power, suggesting that the opportunity of time modulates effort allocation. These neural results provide evidence for the idea that people strategically modulate the amount of cognitive effort they exert based on the opportunity cost of time.

Dopaminergic medication increases motivation to exert cognitive control by reducing subjective effort costs in Parkinson's patients.

Engaging in demanding mental activities requires the allocation of cognitive control, which can be effortful and aversive. Individuals thus tend to avoid exerting cognitive effort if less demanding behavioral options are available. Recent accounts propose a key role for dopamine in motivating behavior by increasing the sensitivity to rewards associated with effort exertion. Whether dopamine additionally plays a specific role in modulating the sensitivity to the costs of cognitive effort, even in the absence of any incentives, is much less clear. To address this question, we assessed cognitive effort avoidance in patients (n = 38) with Parkinson's disease, a condition characterized by loss of midbrain dopaminergic neurons, both ON and OFF dopaminergic medication and compared them to healthy controls (n = 24). Effort avoidance was assessed using the Demand Selection Task (DST), in which participants could freely choose between performing a high-demand or a low-demand version of a task-switching paradigm. Critically, participants were not offered any incentives to choose the more effortful option, nor for good performance. While healthy controls and patients OFF their dopaminergic medications consistently preferred the low-demand option, effort avoidance in patients ON dopaminergic medications was reduced compared to patients OFF, a difference which seems to lessen over trials. These differences in preference could not be explained by altered task-switching performance. Although patients ON were less accurate at detecting the different effort levels, as measured during instructed forced-choice blocks, their detection ability was not associated with effort avoidance, unlike in the healthy controls and the patients OFF. Our findings provide evidence that dopamine replacement in Parkinson's patients increases the willingness to engage in cognitively demanding behavior, and that this cannot be explained by possible effects of dopamine replacement on performance nor on the ability to detect effort demands. These results suggest that dopamine plays a role in reducing the sensitivity to effort costs that is independent of its role in enhancing the sensitivity to the benefits of effort exertion.

Is the juice worth the squeeze? Learning the marginal value of mental effort over time.

In keeping with the view that individuals invest cognitive effort in accordance with its relative costs and benefits, reward incentives typically improve performance in tasks that require cognitive effort. At the same time, increasing effort investment may confer larger or smaller performance benefits-that is, the marginal value of effort-depending on the situation or context. On this view, we hypothesized that the magnitude of reward-induced effort modulations should depend critically on the marginal value of effort for the given context, and furthermore, the marginal value of effort of a context should be learned over time as a function of direct experience in the context. Using two well-characterized cognitive control tasks and simple computational models, we demonstrated that individuals appear to learn the marginal value of effort for different contexts. In a task-switching paradigm (Experiment 1), we found that participants initially exhibited reward-induced switch cost reductions across contexts-here, task switch rates-but over time learned to only increase effort in contexts with a comparatively larger marginal utility of effort. Similarly, in a flanker task (Experiment 2), we observed a similar learning effect across contexts defined by the proportion of incongruent trials. Together, these results enrich theories of cost-benefit effort decision-making by highlighting the importance of the (learned) marginal utility of cognitive effort. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Information about task progress modulates cognitive demand avoidance.

People tend to avoid engaging in cognitively demanding tasks unless it is 'worth our while'-that is, if the benefits outweigh the costs of effortful action. Yet, we seemingly partake in a variety of effortful mental activities (e.g. playing chess, completing Sudoku puzzles) because they impart a sense of progress. Here, we examine the possibility that information about progress-specifically, the number of trials completed of a demanding cognitive control task, relative to the total number of trials to be completed-reduces individuals' aversion to cognitively effort activity, across four experiments. In Experiment 1, we provide an initial demonstration that presenting progress information reduces individuals' avoidance of cognitively demanding activity avoidance using a variant of the well-characterized Demand Selection Task (DST). The subsequent experiments buttress this finding using a more sophisticated within-subjects versions of the DST, independently manipulating progress information and demand level to further demonstrate that, 1) people prefer receiving information about temporal progress in a task, and 2) all else being equal, individuals will choose to engage in tasks that require greater levels of cognitive effort when the more demanding option confers information about their progress in a task. Together, these results suggest that progress information can motivate cognitive effort expenditure and, in some cases, override individuals' default bias towards demand avoidance.

Cognitive effort exertion enhances electrophysiological responses to rewarding outcomes.

Recent work has highlighted neural mechanisms underlying cognitive effort-related discounting of anticipated rewards. However, findings on whether effort exertion alters the subjective value of obtained rewards are inconsistent. Here, we provide a more nuanced account of how cognitive effort affects subsequent reward processing in a novel task designed to assess effort-induced modulations of the Reward Positivity, an event-related potential indexing reward-related neural activity. We found that neural responses to both gains and losses were significantly elevated in trials requiring more versus less cognitive effort. Moreover, time-frequency analysis revealed that these effects were mirrored in gain-related delta, but not in loss-related theta band activity, suggesting that people ascribed more value to high-effort outcomes. In addition, we also explored whether individual differences in behavioral effort discounting rates and reward sensitivity in the absence of effort may affect the relationship between effort exertion and subsequent reward processing. Together, our findings provide evidence that cognitive effort exertion can increase the subjective value of subsequent outcomes and that this effect may primarily rely on modulations of delta band activity.

Reward at encoding but not retrieval modulates memory for detailed events.

Much of the evidence suggesting that rewards improve memory performance has focused on how explicit rewards facilitate encoding of simplistic stimuli. To expand beyond this focus, the current study tested how explicit rewards presented at encoding as well as retrieval facilitate memory for information contained within complex events. In a single experimental session, participants (N = 88) encoded videos depicting naturalistic events (e.g., getting dressed) and then completed a recognition test probing their memory for different detail types (i.e., event, perceptual, or contextual) from the video stimuli. We manipulated the explicit reward associated with each video, such that accurate memory responses for half the videos were associated with high monetary incentives and half were associated with low monetary incentives. This reward manipulation was presented at either encoding or retrieval during a recognition memory test. The reward manipulation only affected memory when presented at encoding and this effect did not depend on the type of detail probed. Drift Diffusion Modelling further revealed that presenting reward information at encoding engendered greater encoding fidelity-indexed by an increase in drift rate-but did not change response caution at the time of retrieval-indexed by response threshold. Together, our results suggest that presenting reward information when encoding but not retrieving complex events has a general facilitatory effect, likely via attentional processing, on the ability to later remember precise details from the event.

The impact of pandemic-related worry on cognitive functioning and risk-taking.

Here, we sought to quantify the effects of experienced fear and worry, engendered by the COVID-19 pandemic, on both cognitive abilities-speed of information processing, task-set shifting, and proactive control-as well as economic risk-taking. Leveraging a repeated-measures cross-sectional design, we examined the performance of 1517 participants, collected during the early phase of the pandemic in the US (April-June 2020), finding that self-reported pandemic-related worry predicted deficits in information processing speed and maintenance of goal-related contextual information. In a classic economic risk-taking task, we observed that worried individuals' choices were more sensitive to the described outcome probabilities of risky actions. Overall, these results elucidate the cognitive consequences of a large-scale, unpredictable, and uncontrollable stressor, which may in turn play an important role in individuals' understanding of, and adherence to safety directives both in the current crisis and future public health emergencies.

Seizing the opportunity: Lifespan differences in the effects of the opportunity cost of time on cognitive control.

Previous work suggests that lifespan developmental differences in cognitive control reflect maturational and aging-related changes in prefrontal cortex functioning. However, complementary explanations exist: It could be that children and older adults differ from younger adults in how they balance the effort of engaging in control against its potential benefits. Here we test whether the degree of cognitive effort expenditure depends on the opportunity cost of time (average reward rate per unit time): if the average reward rate is high, participants should withhold cognitive effort whereas if it is low, they should invest more. In Experiment 1, we examine this hypothesis in children, adolescents, younger, and older adults, by applying a reward rate manipulation in two cognitive control tasks: a modified Erikson Flanker and a task-switching paradigm. We found that young adults and adolescents reflexively withheld effort when the opportunity cost of time was high, whereas older adults and, to a lesser degree children, invested more resources to accumulate reward as quickly as possible. We tentatively interpret these results in terms of age- and task-specific differences in the processing of the opportunity cost of time. We qualify our findings in a second experiment in younger adults in which we address an alternative explanation of our results and show that the observed age differences in effort expenditure may not result from differences in task difficulty. To conclude, we think that our results present an interesting first step at relating opportunity costs to motivational processes across the lifespan. We frame the implications of further work in this area within a recent developmental model of resource-rationality, which points to developmental sweet spots in cognitive control.

Acute Psychosocial Stress Increases Cognitive-Effort Avoidance.

Adverse effects following acute stress are traditionally thought to reflect functional impairments of central executive-dependent cognitive-control processes. However, recent evidence demonstrates that cognitive-control application is perceived as effortful and aversive, indicating that stress-related decrements in cognitive performance could denote decreased motivation to expend effort instead. To investigate this hypothesis, we tested 40 young, healthy individuals (20 female, 20 male) under both stress and control conditions in a 2-day study that had a within-subjects design. Cognitive-effort avoidance was assessed using the demand-selection task, in which participants chose between performing low-demand and high-demand variants of a task-switching paradigm. We found that acute stress indeed increased participants' preference for less demanding behavior, whereas task-switching performance remained intact. Additional Bayesian and multiverse analyses confirmed the robustness of this effect. Our findings provide novel insights into how stressful experiences shape behavior by modulating our motivation to employ cognitive control.