Investigation of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission Associated With a Large Indoor Convention - New York City, November-December 2021.

During November 19-21, 2021, an indoor convention (event) in New York City (NYC), was attended by approximately 53,000 persons from 52 U.S. jurisdictions and 30 foreign countries. In-person registration for the event began on November 18, 2021. The venue was equipped with high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration, and attendees were required to wear a mask indoors and have documented receipt of at least 1 dose of a COVID-19 vaccine.* On December 2, 2021, the Minnesota Department of Health reported the first case of community-acquired COVID-19 in the United States caused by the SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.529 (Omicron) variant in a person who had attended the event (1). CDC collaborated with state and local health departments to assess event-associated COVID-19 cases and potential exposures among U.S.-based attendees using data from COVID-19 surveillance systems and an anonymous online attendee survey. Among 34,541 attendees with available contact information, surveillance data identified test results for 4,560, including 119 (2.6%) persons from 16 jurisdictions with positive SARS-CoV-2 test results. Most (4,041 [95.2%]), survey respondents reported always wearing a mask while indoors at the event. Compared with test-negative respondents, test-positive respondents were more likely to report attending bars, karaoke, or nightclubs, and eating or drinking indoors near others for at least 15 minutes. Among 4,560 attendees who received testing, evidence of widespread transmission during the event was not identified. Genomic sequencing of 20 specimens identified the SARS-CoV-2 B.1.617.2 (Delta) variant (AY.25 and AY.103 sublineages) in 15 (75%) cases, and the Omicron variant (BA.1 sublineage) in five (25%) cases. These findings reinforce the importance of implementing multiple, simultaneous prevention measures, such as ensuring up-to-date vaccination, mask use, physical distancing, and improved ventilation in limiting SARS-CoV-2 transmission, during large, indoor events.†.

Identification and Monitoring of International Travelers During the Initial Phase of an Outbreak of COVID-19 - California, February 3-March 17, 2020.

The threat of introduction of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) into the United States with the potential for community transmission prompted U.S. federal officials in February 2020 to screen travelers from China, and later Iran, and collect and transmit their demographic and contact information to states for follow-up. During February 5-March 17, 2020, the California Department of Public Health (CDPH) received and transmitted contact information for 11,574 international travelers to 51 of 61 local health jurisdictions at a cost of 1,694 hours of CDPH personnel time. If resources permitted, local health jurisdictions contacted travelers, interviewed them, and oversaw 14 days of quarantine, self-monitoring, or both, based on CDC risk assessment criteria for COVID-19. Challenges encountered during follow-up included errors in the recording of contact information and variation in the availability of resources in local health jurisdictions to address the substantial workload. Among COVID-19 patients reported to CDPH, three matched persons previously reported as travelers to CDPH. Despite intensive effort, the traveler screening system did not effectively prevent introduction of COVID-19 into California. Effectiveness of COVID-19 screening and monitoring in travelers to California was limited by incomplete traveler information received by federal officials and transmitted to states, the number of travelers needing follow-up, and the potential for presymptomatic and asymptomatic transmission. More efficient methods of collecting and transmitting passenger data, including electronic provision of flight manifests by airlines to federal officials and flexible text-messaging tools, would help local health jurisdictions reach out to all at-risk travelers quickly, thereby facilitating timely testing, case identification, and contact investigations. State and local health departments should weigh the resources needed to implement incoming traveler monitoring against community mitigation activities, understanding that the priorities of each might shift during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Travel-Associated Zika Cases and Threat of Local Transmission during Global Outbreak, California, USA.

Zika and associated microcephaly among newborns were reported in Brazil during 2015. Zika has since spread across the Americas, and travel-associated cases were reported throughout the United States. We reviewed travel-associated Zika cases in California to assess the potential threat of local Zika virus transmission, given the regional spread of Aedes aegypti and Ae. albopictus mosquitoes. During November 2015-September 2017, a total of 588 travel-associated Zika cases were reported in California, including 139 infections in pregnant women, 10 congenital infections, and 8 sexually transmitted infections. Most case-patients reported travel to Mexico and Central America, and many returned during a period when they could have been viremic. By September 2017, Ae. aegypti mosquitoes had spread to 124 locations in California, and Ae. albopictus mosquitoes had spread to 53 locations. Continued human and mosquito surveillance and public health education are valuable tools in preventing and detecting Zika virus infections and local transmission in California.

Male-to-Female Sexual Transmission of Zika Virus-United States, January-April 2016.

We report on 9 cases of male-to-female sexual transmission of Zika virus in the United States occurring January-April 2016. This report summarizes new information about both timing of exposure and symptoms of sexually transmitted Zika virus disease, and results of semen testing for Zika virus from 2 male travelers.

The Eco-epidemiology of Pacific Coast Tick Fever in California.

Rickettsia philipii (type strain "Rickettsia 364D"), the etiologic agent of Pacific Coast tick fever (PCTF), is transmitted to people by the Pacific Coast tick, Dermacentor occidentalis. Following the first confirmed human case of PCTF in 2008, 13 additional human cases have been reported in California, more than half of which were pediatric cases. The most common features of PCTF are the presence of at least one necrotic lesion known as an eschar (100%), fever (85%), and headache (79%); four case-patients required hospitalization and four had multiple eschars. Findings presented here implicate the nymphal or larval stages of D. occidentalis as the primary vectors of R. philipii to people. Peak transmission risk from ticks to people occurs in late summer. Rickettsia philipii DNA was detected in D. occidentalis ticks from 15 of 37 California counties. Similarly, non-pathogenic Rickettsia rhipicephali DNA was detected in D. occidentalis in 29 of 38 counties with an average prevalence of 12.0% in adult ticks. In total, 5,601 ticks tested from 2009 through 2015 yielded an overall R. philipii infection prevalence of 2.1% in adults, 0.9% in nymphs and a minimum infection prevalence of 0.4% in larval pools. Although most human cases of PCTF have been reported from northern California, acarological surveillance suggests that R. philipii may occur throughout the distribution range of D. occidentalis.

Public Health Response to Aedes aegypti and Ae. albopictus Mosquitoes Invading California, USA.

Aedes aegypti and Ae. albopictus mosquitoes, primary vectors of dengue and chikungunya viruses, were recently detected in California, USA. The threat of potential local transmission of these viruses increases as more infected travelers arrive from affected areas. Public health response has included enhanced human and mosquito surveillance, education, and intensive mosquito control.

Biodefense and public health preparedness in Virginia.

Since 2001, much research has examined national- and state-level preparedness against bioterrorism or naturally occurring epidemics. Few studies, however, have adequately addressed preparedness at the local level, and research to date indicates the difficulty of accurately assessing preparedness at any level. This study examined preparedness across the 35 health districts of Virginia in 4 defined categories of preparedness: personnel, services, technology, and emergency preparedness. Preparedness indicators were examined with respect to demographic, geographic, and critical infrastructure characteristics at the county and city levels. In all 4 categories of preparedness, the models obtained statistically significant results relating factors of demography, geography, and critical infrastructure to higher or lower levels of preparedness across Virginia. This study presents a methodology for public health researchers who wish to determine the preparedness of local health districts across the United States. It is intended that the combination of such research, based on local data, with larger, more general studies will paint a more accurate and constructive picture of preparedness.