The geo domain: a review on the conceptualization of geographical and geopolitical entities.

Investigating how people represent the natural environment and abstract it into geographical (e.g., mountain) and geopolitical (e.g., city) categories is pivotal to comprehending how they move and interact with the places they inhabit. Yet, the conceptualization of geographical and geopolitical domains has received scant attention so far. To deal with that, we reviewed 50 articles tackling this topic. Most studies have focused on assessing the universality of these concepts-especially geographical ones-mainly using free-listing and ethnophysiographic methods. Current perspectives tend to favor a non-universalistic characterization of these kinds of concepts, emphasizing their high cross-linguistic and cross-cultural variability, especially when compared to other semantic domains. Since geographical and geopolitical features are not pre-segmented by nature, the role of categories imposed by humans is crucial for these concepts. Significantly, their variability does not only depend on "cross" differences: evidence suggests that the cognitive demand requested by the task, idiosyncratic characteristics of individuals such as expertise level, and the typology of inhabited environments are further factors impacting the conceptual flexibility of these domains. Exploring the factors influencing our understanding of geographical and geopolitical categories can provide valuable insights for instructing effective communication policies to enhance sustainable development and address ecological emergencies, taking into consideration diverse cultural backgrounds within different populations.

Past Adversity Influencing Now (PAIN): perspectives on the impact of temporal language on the persistence of pain.

Persistent pain is a significant healthcare issue, often unresponsive to traditional treatments. We argue for incorporating non-biomedical perspectives in understanding pain, promoting more comprehensive solutions. This article explores how language, specifically time-related terms, may affect the persistence (stickiness) of pain. We delve into how language influences one's experience of the world, especially in understanding pain through spatial metaphors. Notably, time perceptions differ across languages and cultures and there is no absolute construct of temporal pain experience. In English, time is viewed linearly as past, present, and future. We introduce a framework called Past Adversity Influencing Now (PAIN) which includes various temporal phases of pain; Past Perfect, Past Imperfect, Present, Future Imperfect, and Future Perfect. We suggest that past negative memories (emotional memory images) can "trap" individuals in a "sticky" pain state. We speculate that the process of diagnosing pain as "chronic" may solidify this "stickiness", drawing from the ancient Greek idea of "logos", where pain communicates a message across time and space needing recognition. Our PAIN framework encourages examining pain through a temporal lens, guiding individuals towards a more positive future.

Perspectives on the insidious nature of pain metaphor: we literally need to change our metaphors.

Metaphorical language is used to convey one thing as representative or symbolic of something else. Metaphor is used in figurative language but is much more than a means of delivering "poetic imagination". A metaphor is a conceptual tool for categorising, organizing, thinking about, and ultimately shaping reality. Thus, metaphor underpins the way humans think. Our viewpoint is that metaphorical thought and communication contribute to "painogenicity", the tendency of socio-ecological environments (settings) to promote the persistence of pain. In this perspectives article, we explore the insidious nature of metaphor used in pain language and conceptual models of pain. We explain how metaphor shapes mental organisation to govern the way humans perceive, navigate and gain insight into the nature of the world, i.e., creating experience. We explain how people use metaphors to "project" their private sensations, feelings, and thoughts onto objects and events in the external world. This helps people to understand their pain and promotes sharing of pain experience with others, including health care professionals. We explore the insidious nature of "warmongering" and damage-based metaphors in daily parlance and demonstrate how this is detrimental to health and wellbeing. We explore how metaphors shape the development and communication of complex, abstract ideas, theories, and models and how scientific understanding of pain is metaphorical in nature. We argue that overly simplistic neuro-mechanistic metaphors of pain contribute to fallacies and misnomers and an unhealthy focus on biomedical research, in the hope of developing medical interventions that "prevent pain transmission [sic]". We advocate reconfiguring pain language towards constructive metaphors that foster a salutogenic view of pain, focusing on health and well-being. We advocate reconfiguring metaphors to align with contemporary pain science, to encourage acceptance of non-medicalised strategies to aid health and well-being. We explore the role of enactive metaphors to facilitate reconfiguration. We conclude that being cognisant of the pervasive nature of metaphors will assist progress toward a more coherent conceptual understanding of pain and the use of healthier pain language. We hope our article catalyses debate and reflection.

On truth and polarity in negation processing: language-specific effects in non-linguistic contexts.

Introduction: This study examines how negation is processed in a nonverbal context (e.g., when assessing ▲ ≠ ▲) by speakers of a truth-based system like Mandarin and a polarity-based system like English. In a truth-based system, negation may take longer to process because it is typically attached to the negation as a whole (it is not true that triangle does not equal triangle), whereas in polarity-based systems, negation is processed relatively faster because it is attached to just the equation symbol (triangle does not equal triangle), which is processed relatively faster. Our hypothesis was that negation processing routines previously observed for verbal contexts, namely that speakers of Mandarin get slowed down more when processing negative stimuli than positive stimuli compared to speakers of English, also extend to contexts when language use is not obligatory. Methods: To test this, we asked participants to agree/disagree with equations comprising simple shapes and positive '=' or negative '≠' equation symbols. English speakers showed a response-time advantage over Mandarin speakers in negation conditions. In a separate experiment, we also tested the contribution of equation symbols '≠'/'=' to the cognitive demands by asking participants to judge shape sameness in symbol-free trials, such as ▲ ■. This comparison allowed us to test whether crosslinguistic differences arise not because of shape congruence judgement but arguably due to negation attachment. Results and discussion: The effect of the '≠' symbol on shape congruence was language-specific, speeding up English speakers but slowing down Mandarin speakers when the two shapes differed. These findings suggest language-specific processing of negation in negative equations, interpreted as novel support for linguistic relativity.

Grounded Cognition Entails Linguistic Relativity: Response to Commentators.

In this paper, I respond to eight commentaries on my target article called "Grounded cognition entails linguistic relativity: A neglected implication of a major semantic theory." The commentaries span a broad range of disciplines and perspectives. I have organized my response around the following topics: (1) an introductory synopsis of my main argument; (2) grounded versus amodal theories of concepts; (3) language-specific versus language-independent concepts; (4) language, culture, and cognition; (5) language itself as a source of conceptual grounding; (6) abstract concepts, linguistic relativity, and contextual and individual variability; (7) word meanings as language-specific predictions; and (8) some final remarks about the importance of cross-linguistic diversity.

The Iconicity Ring Hypothesis Bridges the Gap Between Symbol Grounding and Linguistic Relativity.

Kemmerer captured the drastic change in theories of word meaning representations, contrasting the view that word meaning representations are amodal and universal, with the view that they are grounded and language-specific. However, he does not address how language can be simultaneously grounded and language-specific. Here, we approach this question from the perspective of language acquisition and evolution. We argue that adding a new element-iconicity-is critically beneficial and offer the iconicity ring hypothesis, which explains how language-specific, secondary iconicity might emerge from biologically grounded and universally shared iconicity in the course of language acquisition and evolution.

Language Entails Linguistic Relativity.

This commentary addresses the challenge of linking an individual-grounded theory of concepts to a phenomenon that assumes conceptual conventions at population level (linguistic relativity). We distinguish I-concepts (individual, interior, imagistic) from L-concepts (linguistic, labeled, local) and see that quite different causal processes are often conflated under the term "concepts." I argue that the Grounded Cognition Model (GCM) entails linguistic relativity only to the extent that it imports L-concepts into its scope, which it can hardly avoid doing given that practitioners require language to coordinate around their theory and findings. I conclude that what entails linguistic relativity is not the GCM but language itself.

Grounded Cognition, Linguistic Relativity, and Abstract Concepts.

Kemmerer's paper convincingly claims that the grounded cognition model (GCM) entails linguistic relativity. Here, we underline that tackling linguistic relativity and cultural differences is vital for GCM. First, it allows GCM to focus more on flexible rather than stable aspects of cognition. Second, it highlights the centrality of linguistic experience for human cognition. While GCM-inspired research underscored the similarity between linguistic and nonlinguistic concepts, it is now paramount to understand when and how language(s) influence knowledge. To this aim, we argue that linguistic variation might be particularly relevant for more abstract concepts-which are more debatable and open to revisions.

Language is a Source of Grounding and a Mode of Action.

Kemmerer argues that grounded cognition explains how language-specific semantic structures can influence nonlinguistic cognition. In this commentary, I argue that his proposal fails to fully consider the possibility that language itself can serve as a source of grounding. Our concepts are not merely shaped by a disembodied language system; they emerge in the context of linguistic experience and action. This inclusive approach to grounded cognition offers an expanded conception of the phenomena associated with linguistic relativity. I provide empirical and theoretical reasons to adopt this theoretical perspective.

Not When But Whether: Modality and Future Time Reference in English and Dutch.

Previous research on linguistic relativity and economic decisions hypothesized that speakers of languages with obligatory tense marking of future time reference (FTR) should value future rewards less than speakers of languages which permit present tense FTR. This was hypothesized on the basis of obligatory linguistic marking (e.g., will) causing speakers to construe future events as more temporally distal and thereby to exhibit increased "temporal discounting": the subjective devaluation of outcomes as the delay until they will occur increases. However, several aspects of this hypothesis are incomplete. First, it overlooks the role of "modal" FTR structures which encode notions about the likelihood of future outcomes (e.g., might). This may influence "probability discounting": the subjective devaluation of outcomes as the probability of their occurrence decreases. Second, the extent to which linguistic structures are subjectively related to temporal or probability discounting differences is currently unknown. To address these, we elicited FTR language and subjective ratings of temporal distance and probability from speakers of English, which exhibits strongly grammaticized FTR, and Dutch, which does not. Several findings went against the predictions of the previous hypothesis: Framing an FTR statement in the present ("Ellie arrives later on") versus the future tense ("…will arrive…") did not affect ratings of temporal distance; English speakers rated future statements as relatively more temporally proximal than Dutch speakers; and English and Dutch speakers rated future tenses as encoding high certainty, which suggests that obligatory future tense marking might result in less discounting. Additionally, compared with Dutch speakers, English speakers used more low-certainty terms in general (e.g., may) and as a function of various experimental factors. We conclude that the prior cross-linguistic observations of the link between FTR and psychological discounting may be caused by the connection between low-certainty modal structures and probability discounting, rather than future tense and temporality.

Colour Categorization and its Effect on Perception: A Conceptual Replication.

The presented study examines the question of colour categorization in relation to the hypothesis of linguistic relativity. The study is based on research conducted by Gilbert et al. (2006) and their claim that linguistic colour categorization in a particular language helps colour recognition and speeds the process of colour discrimination for colours from different linguistic categories but only for the right visual field. Our study approached the research question differently. We used the same methodology as Gilbert's team et al. (2006), but we used different colour categories in the Czech language and significantly enlarged the number of participants to 106 undergraduate psychology students. Our results show that the fastest reaction times were in trials when the target was located in the left visual field, quite opposite from the Gilbert's et al. (2006) study. We argue that this finding is based on different processes than simple colour linguistic categorisation and attentional processes actually play an important role in the task.

A language compatibility effect in fraction processing.

A language compatibility effect occurs when there is a match between what a language provides and what a mathematical task demands. Here, we investigated whether such an effect exists for fraction processing in English, which names the numerator first, versus Korean, which names the denominator first. We developed two new tasks: a fraction span task where participants view and then recall four fractions and a fraction identification task where they view one fraction and then another and judge whether the two fractions are the same or not. We generally found that English speakers were advantaged when the numerator drove task performance and Korean speakers were advantaged when the denominator was critical. These findings, particularly from the fraction identification task, were inconsistent with the attentional focus hypothesis, which proposes that the serialisation bias of a language guides which fraction component is attended to first. Rather, they were better explained by the verbal encoding hypothesis, which states that a necessary condition for observing language compatibility effects may be that the fraction components must be encoded in verbal working memory and rehearsed there.

Children's associations between space and pitch are differentially shaped by language.

Musical properties, such as auditory pitch, are not expressed in the same way across cultures. In some languages, pitch is expressed in terms of spatial height (high vs. low), whereas others rely on thickness vocabulary (thick = low frequency vs. thin = high frequency). We investigated how children represent pitch in the face of this variable linguistic input by examining the developmental trajectory of linguistic and non-linguistic space-pitch associations in children who acquire Dutch (a height-pitch language) or Turkish (a thickness-pitch language). Five-year-olds, 7-year-olds, 9-year-olds, and 11-year-olds were tested for their understanding of pitch terminology and their associations of spatial dimensions with auditory pitch when no language was used. Across tasks, thickness-pitch associations were more robust than height-pitch associations. This was true for Turkish children, and also Dutch children not exposed to thickness-pitch vocabulary. Height-pitch associations, on the other hand, were not reliable-not even in Dutch-speaking children until age 11-the age when they demonstrated full comprehension of height-pitch terminology. Moreover, Turkish-speaking children reversed height-pitch associations. Taken together, these findings suggest thickness-pitch associations are acquired in similar ways by children from different cultures, but the acquisition of height-pitch associations is more susceptible to linguistic input. Overall, then, despite cross-cultural stability in some components, there is variation in how children come to represent musical pitch, one of the building blocks of music. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Children from diverse cultures differ in their understanding of music vocabulary and in their nonlinguistic associations between spatial dimensions and auditory pitch. Height-pitch mappings are acquired late and require additional scaffolding from language, whereas thickness-pitch mappings are acquired early and are less susceptible to language input. Space-pitch mappings are not static from birth to adulthood, but change over development, suggesting music cognition is shaped by cross-cultural experience.

Grounded Cognition Entails Linguistic Relativity: A Neglected Implication of a Major Semantic Theory.

According to the popular Grounded Cognition Model (GCM), the sensory and motor features of concepts, including word meanings, are stored directly within neural systems for perception and action. More precisely, the core claim is that these concrete conceptual features reuse some of the same modality-specific representations that serve to categorize experiences involving the relevant kinds of objects and events. Research in semantic typology, however, has shown that word meanings vary significantly across the roughly 6500 languages in the world. I argue that this crosslinguistic semantic diversity has significant yet previously unrecognized theoretical consequences for the GCM. In particular, to accommodate the typological data, the GCM must assume that the concrete features of word meanings are not merely stored within sensory/motor brain systems, but are represented there in ways that are, to a nontrivial degree, language-specific. Moreover, it must assume that these conceptual representations are also activated during the nonlinguistic processing of the relevant kinds of objects and events (e.g., during visual perception and action planning); otherwise, they would not really be grounded, which is to say, embedded inside sensory/motor systems. Crucially, however, such activations would constitute what is traditionally called linguistic relativity-that is, the influence of language-specific semantic structures on other forms of cognition. The overarching aim of this paper is to elaborate this argument more fully and explore its repercussions. To that end, I discuss in greater detail the key aspects of the GCM, the evidence for crosslinguistic semantic diversity, pertinent work on linguistic relativity, the central claim that the GCM entails linguistic relativity, some initial supporting results, and some important limitations and future directions.

Influence of language on perception and concept formation in a brain-constrained deep neural network model.

A neurobiologically constrained model of semantic learning in the human brain was used to simulate the acquisition of concrete and abstract concepts, either with or without verbal labels. Concept acquisition and semantic learning were simulated using Hebbian learning mechanisms. We measured the network's category learning performance, defined as the extent to which it successfully (i) grouped partly overlapping perceptual instances into a single (abstract or concrete) conceptual representation, while (ii) still distinguishing representations for distinct concepts. Co-presence of linguistic labels with perceptual instances of a given concept generally improved the network's learning of categories, with a significantly larger beneficial effect for abstract than concrete concepts. These results offer a neurobiological explanation for causal effects of language structure on concept formation and on perceptuo-motor processing of instances of these concepts: supplying a verbal label during concept acquisition improves the cortical mechanisms by which experiences with objects and actions along with the learning of words lead to the formation of neuronal ensembles for specific concepts and meanings. Furthermore, the present results make a novel prediction, namely, that such 'Whorfian' effects should be modulated by the concreteness/abstractness of the semantic categories being acquired, with language labels supporting the learning of abstract concepts more than that of concrete ones. This article is part of the theme issue 'Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences'.

Over-reliance on English hinders cognitive science.

English is the dominant language in the study of human cognition and behavior: the individuals studied by cognitive scientists, as well as most of the scientists themselves, are frequently English speakers. However, English differs from other languages in ways that have consequences for the whole of the cognitive sciences, reaching far beyond the study of language itself. Here, we review an emerging body of evidence that highlights how the particular characteristics of English and the linguistic habits of English speakers bias the field by both warping research programs (e.g., overemphasizing features and mechanisms present in English over others) and overgeneralizing observations from English speakers' behaviors, brains, and cognition to our entire species. We propose mitigating strategies that could help avoid some of these pitfalls.

Linguistic Skill and Stimulus-Driven Attention: A Case for Linguistic Relativity.

How does the language we speak affect our perception? Here, we argue for linguistic relativity and present an explanation through "language-induced automatized stimulus-driven attention" (LASA): Our respective mother tongue automatically influences our attention and, hence, perception, and in this sense determines what we see. As LASA is highly practiced throughout life, it is difficult to suppress, and even shows in language-independent non-linguistic tasks. We argue that attention is involved in language-dependent processing and point out that automatic or stimulus-driven forms of attention, albeit initially learned as serving a linguistic skill, account for linguistic relativity as they are automatized and generalize to non-linguistic tasks. In support of this possibility, we review evidence for such automatized stimulus-driven attention in language-independent non-linguistic tasks. We conclude that linguistic relativity is possible and in fact a reality, although it might not be as powerful as assumed by some of its strongest proponents.

Linguistic typology of motion events in visual narratives.

Languages use different strategies to encode motion. Some use particles or "satellites" to describe a path of motion (Satellite-framed or S-languages like English), while others typically use the main verb to convey the path information (Verb-framed or V-languages like French). We here ask: might this linguistic variation lead to differences in the way paths are depicted in visual narratives like comics? We analyzed a corpus of 85 comics originally created by speakers of S-languages (comics from the United States, China, Germany) and V-languages (France, Japan, Korea) for both their depictions of path segments (source, route, and goal) and the visual cues signaling these paths and manner information (e.g., motion lines and postures). Panels from S-languages depicted more path segments overall, especially routes, than those from V-languages, but panels from V-languages more often isolated path segments into their own panels. Additionally, comics from S-languages depicted more motion cues than those from V-languages, and this linguistic typology also interacted with panel framing. Despite these differences across typological groups, analysis of individual countries' comics showed more nuanced variation than a simple S-V dichotomy. These findings suggest a possible influence of spoken language structure on depicting motion events in visual narratives and their sequencing.

Lexical Color Categories.

Color is a continuous variable, and humans can distinguish more than a million colors, yet world color lexicons contain no more than a dozen basic color terms. It has been understood for 160 years that the number of color terms in a lexicon varies greatly across languages, yet the lexical color categories defined by these terms are similar worldwide. Starting with the seminal study by Berlin and Kay, this review considers how and why this is so. Evidence from psychological, linguistic, and computational studies has advanced our understanding of how color categories came into being, how they contribute to our shared understanding of color, and how the resultant categories influence color perception and cognition. A key insight from the last 50 years of research is how human perception and the need for communication within a society worked together to create color lexicons that are somewhat diverse, yet show striking regularities worldwide.