U.S. Public Health Service STD Experiments in Guatemala (1946-1948) and Their Aftermath.

The U.S. Public Health Service's sexually transmitted disease (STD) experiments in Guatemala are an important case study not only in human subjects research transgressions but also in the response to serious lapses in research ethics. This case study describes how individuals in the STD experiments were tested, exposed to STDs, and exploited as the source of biological specimens-all without informed consent and often with active deceit. It also explores and evaluates governmental and professional responses that followed the public revelation of these experiments, including by academic institutions, professional organizations, and the U.S. federal government, pushing us to reconsider both how we prevent such lapses in the future and how we respond when they are first revealed.

Historical Origins of the Tuskegee Experiment: The Dilemma of Public Health in the United States.

The Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male was an observational study on African-American males in Tuskegee, Alabama between 1932 and 1972. The U. S. Public Health Service ran this study on more than 300 people without notifying the participants about their disease nor treating them even after the introduction of penicillin. The study included recording the progress of disease and performing an autopsy on the deaths. This paper explores historical backgrounds enabled this infamous study, and discusses three driving forces behind the Tuskegee Study. First, it is important to understand that the Public Health Service was established in the U. S. Surgeon General's office and was operated as a military organization. Amidst the development of an imperial agenda of the U.S. in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the PHS was responsible for protecting hygiene and the superiority of "the American race" against infectious foreign elements from the borders. The U.S. Army's experience of medical experiments in colonies and abroad was imported back to the country and formed a crucial part of the attitude and philosophy on public health. Secondly, the growing influence of eugenics and racial pathology at the time reinforced discriminative views on minorities. Progressivism was realized in the form of domestic reform and imperial pursuit at the same time. Major medical journals argued that blacks were inclined to have certain defects, especially sexually transmitted diseases like syphilis, because of their prodigal behavior and lack of hygiene. This kind of racial ideas were shared by the PHS officials who were in charge of the Tuskegee Study. Lastly, the PHS officials believed in continuing the experiment regardless of various social changes. They considered that black participants were not only poor but also ignorant of and even unwilling to undergo the treatment. When the exposure of the experiment led to the Senate investigation in 1973, the participating doctors of the PHS maintained that their study offered valuable contribution to the medical research. This paper argues that the combination of the efficiency of military medicine, progressive and imperial racial ideology, and discrimination on African-Americans resulted in the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment.

Unit 731 and moral repair.

Unit 731, a biological warfare research organisation that operated under the authority of the Imperial Japanese Army in the 1930s and 1940s, conducted brutal experiments on thousands of unconsenting subjects. Because of the US interest in the data from these experiments, the perpetrators were not prosecuted and the atrocities are still relatively undiscussed. What counts as meaningful moral repair in this case-what should perpetrators and collaborator communities do decades later? We argue for three non-ideal but realistic forms of moral repair: (1) a national policy in Japan against human experimentation without appropriate informed and voluntary consent; (2) the establishment of a memorial to the victims of Unit 731; and (3) US disclosure about its use of Unit 731 data and an apology for failing to hold the perpetrators accountable.

Stowaways in the history of science: the case of simian virus 40 and clinical research on federal prisoners at the US National Institutes of Health, 1960.

In 1960, J. Anthony Morris, a molecular biologist at the US National Institutes of Health conducted one of the only non-therapeutic clinical studies of the cancer virus SV40. Morris and his research team aimed to determine whether SV40 was a serious harm to human health, since many scientists at the time suspected that SV40 caused cancer in humans based on evidence from in vivo animal studies and experiments with human tissue. Morris found that SV40 had no significant effect but his claim has remained controversial among scientists and policymakers through the present day--both on scientific and ethical grounds. Why did Morris only conduct one clinical study on the cancer-causing potential of SV40 in healthy humans? We use the case to explain how empirical evidence and ethical imperatives are, paradoxically, often dependent on each other and mutually exclusive in clinical research, which leaves answers to scientific and ethical questions unsettled. This paper serves two goals: first, it documents a unique--and uniquely important--study of clinical research on SV40. Second, it introduces the concept of "the stowaway," which is a special type of contaminant that changes the past in the present moment. In the history of science, stowaways are misfortunes that nonetheless afford research that otherwise would have been impossible specifically by creating new pasts. This case (Morris' study) and concept (the stowaway) bring together history of science and philosophy of history for productive dialog.

The race to discover the insect vector of kala-azar: a great saga of tropical medicine 1903-1942.

In the 19(th) century, a devastating epidemic of visceral leishmaniasis (kala-azar) swept through northeast India. After identification of the pathogenic agent, Leishmania donovani, in 1903, the question of its transmission remained to be resolved. In 1904, thanks to work by L. Rogers on cultures of this parasite it became probable that a haematophagous arthropod was responsible for transmission. J.A. Sinton suggested, in 1925, the distribution of the sand fly Phlebotomus argentipes was similar to that of the disease and, thereafter, two independent teams led by H.E. Shortt in Assam and R. Knowles and L. Napier in Calcutta concentrated on this potential vector. Parallel work was in progress in China, directed by E. Hindle and W. S. Patton for the Royal Society Kala-azar Commission, on another species of sand fly. In 1942 the Assam workers transmitted L. donovani to five human volunteers by the bites of colonised P. argentipes and the race was over.

Does pediatrics need its own bioethics?

Pediatric bioethics raises unique issues because children are constantly growing, developing, and changing. The ethical issues that arise for newborns are different from those that arise for seven-year-olds or 17-year-olds. Furthermore, children do not develop cognitive capacities or moral reasoning skills at the same rate. Thus, it is difficult to generalize about what is appropriate or inappropriate for children in either the clinical or the research setting. This article responds to some of the issues raised by a new volume of essays about pediatric bioethics. It puts these issues into historical context by examining the implications of Saul Krugman's famous studies on the etiology and prevention of hepatitis at New York's Willowbrook State School.