The Association Between Type of Insurance Plan, Out-of-Pocket Cost, and Adherence to Antihypertensive Medications in Medicare Supplement Insurance Enrollees.

BACKGROUND: Medicare supplement insurance, or Medigap, covers 21% of Medicare beneficiaries. Despite offsetting some out-of-pocket (OOP) expenses, remaining OOP costs may pose a barrier to medication adherence. This study aims to evaluate how OOP costs and insurance plan types influence medication adherence among beneficiaries covered by Medicare supplement plans. METHODS: We conducted a retrospective analysis of the Merative MarketScan Medicare Supplement Database (2017-2019) in Medigap enrollees (≥65 years) with hypertension. The proportion of days covered (PDC) was a continuous measure of medication adherence and was also dichotomized (PDC ≥0.8) to quantify adequate adherence. Beta-binomial and logistic regression models were used to estimate associations between these outcomes and insurance plan type and log-transformed OOP costs, adjusting for patient characteristics. RESULTS: Among 27,407 patients with hypertension, the average PDC was 0.68 ±â€…0.31; 47.5% achieved adequate adherence. A mean $1 higher in 30-day OOP costs were associated with a 0.06 (95% confidence intervals [CIs]: -0.09 to -0.03) lower probability of adequate adherence, or a 5% (95% CI: 4%-7%) decrease in PDC. Compared with comprehensive plan enrollees, the odds of adequate adherence were lower among those with point-of-service plans (odds ratio [OR]: 0.69, 95% CI: 0.62-0.77), but higher among those with preferred provider organization (PPO) plans (OR: 1.08, 95% CI: 1.01-1.15). Moreover, the association between OOP costs and PDC was significantly greater for PPO enrollees. CONCLUSIONS: While Medicare supplement insurance alleviates some OOP costs, different insurance plans and remaining OOP costs influence medication adherence. Reducing patient cost-sharing may improve medication adherence.

Traditional Medicare supplemental insurance and the rise of Medicare Advantage.

OBJECTIVES: Most Medicare beneficiaries obtain supplemental insurance or enroll in Medicare Advantage (MA) to protect against potentially high cost sharing in traditional Medicare (TM). We examined changes in Medicare supplemental insurance coverage in the context of MA growth. STUDY DESIGN: Repeated cross-sectional analysis of the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey from 2005 to 2019. METHODS: We determined whether Medicare beneficiaries 65 years and older were enrolled in MA (without Medicaid), TM without supplemental coverage, TM with employer-sponsored supplemental coverage, TM with Medigap, or Medicaid (in TM or MA). RESULTS: From 2005 to 2019, beneficiaries with TM and supplemental insurance provided by their former (or current) employer declined by approximately half (31.8% to 15.5%) while the share in MA (without Medicaid) more than doubled (13.4% to 35.1%). The decline in supplemental employer-sponsored insurance use was greater for White and for higher-income beneficiaries. Over the same period, beneficiaries in TM without supplemental coverage declined by more than a quarter (13.9% to 10.1%). This decline was largest for Black, Hispanic, and lower-income beneficiaries. CONCLUSIONS: The rapid rise in MA enrollment from 2005 to 2019 was accompanied by substantial changes in supplemental insurance with TM. Our results emphasize the interconnectedness of different insurance choices made by Medicare beneficiaries.

Traditional Medicare or Medicare Advantage? The Leukemia and Cancer Perspective.

Today, approximately 50% of patients eligible for Medicare have opted for Medicare Advantage as their primary coverage. Whereas Medicare Advantage is a reasonable option for healthy senior Americans, issues arise once they have serious or chronic medical problems, which are prevalent among older Americans. This review details the pros and cons of standard Medicare vs Medicare Advantage. The authors recommend considering standard Medicare as a better form of insurance coverage. In addition, patients should also enroll in Medicare Part D to get prescription drug coverage; buy a supplemental MediGap policy; and buy additional coverage for hearing, vision, and dental care. Although this is a more complicated process, it is also a better one until Medicare Advantage revises its plans to address the current issues facing Americans on such plans who have serious illnesses.

Pricing regulations in individual health insurance: Evidence from Medigap.

I compare two pricing regulations that protect those with health conditions-"community rating," which requires insurers to charge uniform premiums, and "guaranteed renewal," which requires insurers to increase future premiums uniformly. Using individual-level Medigap data from 2006-2010, I compare individuals within 25 miles of borders between 3 community rating and 6 guaranteed renewal states. Relative to guaranteed renewal, community rating (with guaranteed issue) leads to a decrease in Medigap enrollment of 9.70 pp (29.7%), or 26.8-33.7% for low-spending conditions (diabetes, heart disease) and 21.9-29.9% for high-spending conditions (cancer, kidney disease); an increase in annual Medigap premiums of $276 (10.1%); a decrease in the likelihood of an earlier purchase of 7.99 pp (50.3%); and an increase in purchase delay of 1.08 years (17.0%).

The cost burden of metastatic prostate cancer in the US populations covered by employer-sponsored health insurance.

BACKGROUND: Recent advancements in the clinical management of metastatic prostate cancer include several costly therapies and diagnostic tests. The objective of this study was to provide updated information on the cost to payers attributable to metastatic prostate cancer among men aged 18 to 64 years with employer-sponsored health plans and men aged 18 years or older covered by employer-sponsored Medicare supplement insurance. METHODS: By using Merative MarketScan commercial and Medicare supplemental data for 2009-2019, the authors calculated differences in spending between men with metastatic prostate cancer and their matched, prostate cancer-free controls, adjusting for age, enrollment length, comorbidities, and inflation to 2019 US dollars. RESULTS: The authors compared 9011 patients who had metastatic prostate cancer and were covered by commercial insurance plans with a group of 44,934 matched controls and also compared 17,899 patients who had metastatic prostate cancer and were covered by employer-sponsored Medicare supplement plans with a group of 87,884 matched controls. The mean age of patients with metastatic prostate cancer was 58.5 years in the commercial samples and 77.8 years in the Medicare supplement samples. Annual spending attributable to metastatic prostate cancer was $55,949 per person-year (95% confidence interval [CI], $54,074-$57,825 per person-year) in the commercial population and $43,682 per person-year (95% CI, $42,022-$45,342 per person-year) in the population covered by Medicare supplement plans, both in 2019 US dollars. CONCLUSIONS: The cost burden attributable to metastatic prostate cancer exceeds $55,000 per person-year among men with employer-sponsored health insurance and $43,000 among those covered by employer-sponsored Medicare supplement plans. These estimates can improve the precision of value assessments of clinical and policy approaches to the prevention, screening, and treatment of prostate cancer in the United States.

Comparing spending across Medicare programs.

As Medicare Advantage increasingly becomes the dominant form of Medicare, meaningful and accurate comparisons with traditional fee-for-service Medicare will be increasingly important for both beneficiaries and policy makers. Recent debate among policy experts, government advisory bodies, and health plans highlights the need to create standardized comparison between the 2 Medicare programs. Supplemental benefits, Part B cost-sharing differences, and prescription drug benefits should be valued with a series of structured comparisons. Making this information transparent to beneficiaries through the plan finder would improve beneficiary decision-making. Finally, pragmatic comparisons would support policy makers in making improvements to Medicare Advantage program policy, undertaking comparative program evaluation, and engaging in Medigap plan oversight.

Medicare Must Provide Additional Cost and Access Information to Enhance Decision Making Around Trade Offs Between Medicare Advantage and Medigap.

Health insurance coverage options are complicated and often leave Medicare beneficiaries, families, advocates, and brokers confused. Medicare should make small changes to its existing "Compare Coverage Options" tool that would enhance the public's understanding of the trade-offs between Medicare Advantage and supplemental Medigap with Fee-for-Service Medicare. For cost considerations, Medicare should include a projection of annual out-of-pocket (OOP) spending, whether an OOP cap applies and whether the ability to alter OOP for additional clinical benefit is offered. For access considerations, Medicare should provide access to information to educate the public on coverage and costs associated with dental, vision, and hearing benefits, network adequacy, prior authorization, and supplemental benefits. These changes will enhance transparency and decision making.

Insurance coverage and health care spending by state-level Medigap regulations.

OBJECTIVES: Medigap protects traditional Medicare (TM) beneficiaries against catastrophic expenses. Federal regulations around Medigap enrollment and pricing are limited to the first 6 months after turning 65 years old. Eight states institute regulations that apply to later enrollment; half use community rating (charging everyone the same premium) and half use both community rating and guaranteed issue (requiring insurers to accept any beneficiary irrespective of health conditions). We examined the impact of state-level Medigap regulations on insurance coverage and health care spending for Medicare beneficiaries. STUDY DESIGN: We used a retrospective cohort study design. Using the 2010-2016 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, we identified beneficiaries with TM only, TM + Medigap, or Medicare Advantage (MA) by state-level Medigap regulations. METHODS: Outcomes were insurance coverage and health care spending. We used an instrumental variable approach to address endogenous insurance choice. We conducted 2-stage least squares regression while controlling for individual-level characteristics and area-level demographic characteristics. Then we used the recycled prediction methods to predict enrollment and spending outcomes for the 3 state-level Medigap regulation scenarios. RESULTS: Although enrollment in TM only was consistent across regulation scenarios, the scenario with community rating and guaranteed issue had lower Medigap enrollment and higher MA enrollment than the no-regulation scenario. Despite negligible health differences, TM + Medigap beneficiaries had higher Medicare spending than TM-only beneficiaries, suggesting moral hazard. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest a link between additional regulations and lower Medigap and higher MA enrollment. Policy makers should consider the potential effects on insurance coverage, premiums, financial protection, and moral hazard when designing Medigap regulations.

Medicaid Coverage 'Cliff' Increases Expenses And Decreases Care For Near-Poor Medicare Beneficiaries.

Cost sharing in traditional Medicare can consume a substantial portion of the income of beneficiaries who do not have supplemental insurance from Medicaid, an employer, or a Medigap plan. Near-poor Medicare beneficiaries (with incomes more than 100 percent but less than 200 percent of the federal poverty level) are ineligible for Medicaid but frequently lack alternative supplemental coverage, resulting in a supplemental coverage "cliff" of 25.8 percentage points just above the eligibility threshold for Medicaid (100 percent of poverty). We estimated that beneficiaries affected by this supplemental coverage cliff incurred an additional $2,288 in out-of-pocket spending over the course of two years, used 55 percent fewer outpatient evaluation and management services per year, and filled fewer prescriptions. Lower prescription drug use was partly driven by low take-up of Part D subsidies, which Medicare beneficiaries automatically receive if they have Medicaid. Expanding eligibility for Medicaid supplemental coverage and increasing take-up of Part D subsidies would lessen cost-related barriers to health care among near-poor Medicare beneficiaries.

Excess Risk for Atherosclerotic Cardiovascular Outcomes Among US Adults With HIV in the Current Era.

Background In the 2000s, adults with HIV had a higher risk for atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease (ASCVD) compared with those without HIV. There is uncertainty if this excess risk still exists in the United States given changes in antiretroviral therapies and increased statin use. Methods and Results We compared the risk for ASCVD events between US adults aged ≥19 years with and without HIV who had commercial or supplemental Medicare health insurance between January 1, 2011, and December 31, 2016. Beneficiaries with HIV (n=82 426) were frequency matched 1:4 on age, sex, and calendar year to those without HIV (n=329 704). Beneficiaries with and without HIV were followed up through December 31, 2016, for ASCVD events, including myocardial infarction, stroke, and lower extremity artery disease hospitalizations. Most beneficiaries were aged <55 years (79%) and men (84%). Over a median follow-up of 1.6 years (maximum, 6 years), there were 3287 ASCVD events, 2190 myocardial infarctions, 891 strokes, and 322 lower extremity artery disease events. The rate per 1000 person-years among beneficiaries with and without HIV was 5.53 and 3.49 for ASCVD, respectively, 3.58 and 2.34 for myocardial infarction, respectively, 1.49 and 0.94 for stroke, respectively, and 0.65 and 0.31 for lower extremity artery disease hospitalizations, respectively. The multivariable-adjusted hazard ratio (95% CI) for ASCVD, myocardial infarction, stroke, and lower extremity artery disease hospitalizations comparing beneficiaries with versus without HIV was 1.29 (1.18-1.40), 1.26 (1.13-1.39), 1.30 (1.11-1.52), and 1.46 (1.11-1.92), respectively. Conclusions Adults with HIV in the United States continue to have a higher ASCVD risk compared with their counterparts without HIV.

System Failure: Houston Practices Fight WellCare for Payment.

Several Houston-area practices say a botched technology conversion by insurer WellCare after it acquired a Medicare Advantage plan led to prior authorization and network confusion, undue denials, and unpaid claims by the barrelful.

Limited Medigap Consumer Protections Are Associated With Higher Reenrollment In Medicare Advantage Plans.

In all but eight states, Medicare supplemental coverage (or Medigap) plans may deny coverage or charge higher premiums on the basis of preexisting health conditions. This may particularly affect chronically ill or high-need Medicare Advantage enrollees who switch to traditional Medicare and subsequently discover that they are unable to purchase affordable Medigap coverage. We found that in states with no Medigap consumer protections, high-need Medicare Advantage enrollees had a 16.9-percentage-point higher reenrollment rate in Medicare Advantage in the year after switching to traditional Medicare, compared to high-need enrollees in states with strong Medigap consumer protections-namely, guaranteed issue and community rating (charging all enrollees the same premium regardless of health condition). Expanding protections in the Medigap market may increase consumers' access to this type of supplemental coverage.

In-gap discounts in Medicare Part D and specialty drug use.

OBJECTIVES: Specialty drugs can bring significant benefits to patients, but they can be expensive. Medicare Part D plans charge relatively high cost-sharing costs for specialty drugs. A provision in the Affordable Care Act reduced cost sharing in the Part D coverage gap phase in an attempt to mitigate the financial burden of beneficiaries with high drug spending. We examined the early impact of the Part D in-gap discount on specialty cancer drug use and patients' out-of-pocket (OOP) spending. STUDY DESIGN: Natural experimental design. METHODS: We compared changes in outcomes before and after the in-gap discount among beneficiaries with and without low-income subsidies (LIS). Beneficiaries with LIS, who were not affected by the in-gap discount, made up the control group. We studied a random sample of elderly standalone prescription drug plan enrollees with relatively uncommon cancers (eg, leukemia, skin, pancreas, kidney, sarcomas, and non-Hodgkin lymphoma) between 2009 and 2013. We constructed 4 outcome variables annually: 1) use of any specialty cancer drug, 2) the number of specialty cancer drug fills, 3) total specialty drug spending, and 4) OOP spending for specialty cancer drugs. RESULTS: The in-gap discount did not influence specialty cancer drug use, but reduced annual OOP spending for specialty cancer drugs among users without LIS by $1108. CONCLUSIONS: In-gap discounts in Part D decreased patients' financial burden to some extent, but resulted in no change in specialty drug use. As demand for specialty drugs increases, it will be important to ensure patients' access to needed drugs, while simultaneously reducing their financial burden.

Care Coordination Challenges Among High-Needs, High-Costs Older Adults in a Medigap Plan.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY: Many adults 65 years or older have high health care needs and costs. Here, we describe their care coordination challenges. PRIMARY PRACTICE SETTING: Individuals with an AARP Medicare Supplement Insurance plan insured by UnitedHealthcare Insurance Company (for New York residents, UnitedHealthcare Insurance Company of New York). METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE: The three groups included the highest needs, highest costs (the "highest group"), the high needs, high costs (the "high group"), and the "all other group." Eligibility was determined by applying an internally developed algorithm based upon a number of criteria, including hierarchical condition category score, the Optum ImpactPro prospective risk score, as well as diagnoses of coronary artery disease, congestive heart failure, or diabetes. RESULTS: The highest group comprised 2%, although consumed 12% of health care expenditures. The high group comprised 20% and consumed 46% of expenditures, whereas the all other group comprised 78% and consumed 42% of expenditures. On average, the highest group had $102,798 in yearly health care expenditures, compared with $34,610 and $7,634 for the high and all other groups, respectively. Fifty-seven percent of the highest group saw 16 or more different providers annually, compared with 21% and 2% of the high and all other groups, respectively. Finally, 28% of the highest group had prescriptions from at least seven different providers, compared with 20% and 5% of the high and all other groups, respectively. IMPLICATIONS FOR CASE MANAGEMENT PRACTICE: Individuals with high health care needs and costs have visits to numerous health care providers and receive multiple prescriptions for pharmacotherapy. As a result, these individuals can become overwhelmed trying to manage and coordinate their health care needs. Care coordination programs may help these individuals coordinate their care.

Adverse and Advantageous Selection in the Medicare Supplemental Market: A Bayesian Analysis of Prescription drug Expenditure.

This paper develops an extended specification of the two-part model, which controls for unobservable self-selection and heterogeneity of health insurance, and analyzes the impact of Medicare supplemental plans on the prescription drug expenditure of the elderly, using a linked data set based on the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey data for 2003-2004. The econometric analysis is conducted using a Bayesian econometric framework. We estimate the treatment effects for different counterfactuals and find significant evidence of endogeneity in plan choice and the presence of both adverse and advantageous selections in the supplemental insurance market. The average incentive effect is estimated to be $757 (2004 value) or 41% increase per person per year for the elderly enrolled in supplemental plans with drug coverage against the Medicare fee-for-service counterfactual and is $350 or 21% against the supplemental plans without drug coverage counterfactual. The incentive effect varies by different sources of drug coverage: highest for employer-sponsored insurance plans, followed by Medigap and managed medicare plans.

Disparities Among Those With Advance Directives in a Medicare Supplement Population.

Advance directives (ADs) detail patients' end-of-life (EOL) care preferences. We estimated AD prevalence rates among a Medicare Supplement population and determined characteristics associated with having ADs. We also estimated the impact of having an AD on EOL Medicare expenditures among respondents who later died. Survey respondents with an AD (72%) were significantly more likely to be female, older, nonminority, higher income and education, and have more comorbid conditions. Following regression adjustments, EOL expenditures were significantly lower for those with ADs in the last 3 months (-US$11 189) and 1 month (-US$6092) prior to death. Patients with ADs specifying their wishes for EOL care had significantly lower medical expenditures during the last few months of life. However, disparities exist among those with ADs that may warrant interventions.