Ministerial Autonomy, Parliamentary Scrutiny and Government Reform Output in Parliamentary Democracies.

One of the most important decisions coalition partners make when forming a government is the division of ministries. Ministerial portfolios provide the party in charge with considerable informational and agenda-setting advantages, which parties can use to shape policies according to their preferences. Oversight mechanisms in parliaments play a central role in mitigating ministerial policy discretion, allowing coalition partners to control each other even though power has been delegated to individual ministers. However, we know relatively little about how such mechanisms influence the agenda-setting and gatekeeping powers of ministers and how much influence minister parties have on policy output relative to the government as a whole in different institutional settings. We fill this gap by analyzing original data on over 2000 important social and economic policy reform measures adopted in nine Western European countries over 20 years, based on a coding of more than 1200 country reports issued by the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). We find that parliaments with strong oversight powers constrain the agenda-setting capacity of minister parties but have limited impact on their gatekeeping capacity. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of policy-making and democratic accountability.

Emotions during the Covid-19 pandemic: Fear, anxiety, and anger as mediators between threats and policy support and political actions.

The Covid-19 pandemic has significantly changed the lives of most people. It has been described as the most severe global health disaster of modern times by the United Nations. No doubt such a major crisis influences what citizens think of different policies, and how they become politically active, not to mention, the forceful emotional experiences that the Covid-19 pandemic brings. This study evaluates how emotions affect support for policies related to restricting the spread of the virus and economic assistance, and how emotions affect intentions to engage politically. In an experiment (N = 1,072), we manipulated emotional reactions to threat by highlighting different aspects of the pandemic. Our findings show that different experimental treatments elicit different emotions, and that fear, anxiety, and anger are all related to policy support and political action intentions, but in different ways. Fear and anger predict support for restrictive policies to limit the spread of the virus, while anxiety predicts support for economic policies. Anger and anxiety, but not fear, increase intentions to engage politically. Hence, we find support for a mechanism where different aspects of the Covid-19 crisis evoke different emotional reactions, which in turn affects policy support and political actions differently.

Group belongingness and collective action: Effects of need to belong and rejection sensitivity on willingness to participate in protest activities.

Engaging in political protests are becoming increasingly common, and considering the potential, individual, costs and the low probability of affecting the political outcome, it is necessary to understand the motivations behind such actions. The desire to be part of a social group is deeply rooted in human nature, and previous research proposes that the groups one belongs to may influence the decision to engage in protests. We build on this research and suggest that social exclusion, individual fear of exclusion and need to belong interact in explaining who is likely to become engaged. In two studies, one natural experiment and one lab-experiment, we show that social exclusion increase willingness to participate in protests for individuals high in both rejection sensitivity and need to belong. We conclude that contextual factors, such as exclusion or marginalization should be considered in relation to individual level personality factors when explaining who is likely to become engaged in political protests. These results are important since they suggest that some people engage in politics simply due to social reasons and are less ideologically motivated.

Intergenerational altruism and climate policy preferences.

Climate mitigation constitutes an intergenerational moral dilemma; the decisions we make today will inevitably shape the prospects for generations to come. Yet, we still know little about the relationship between intergenerational altruism (IGA)-our concerns for the well-being of future generations-and support for costly climate mitigation policies. In this study, we present an approach to measuring IGA through an intergenerational dilemma, where participants allocate resources across generations. First, we describe how IGA depends on the temporal (social) distance between generations and demonstrate robust correlations between IGA and support for several climate policies. Then, we leverage randomized participation in the intergenerational dilemma to show that it causally increases climate policy support, an effect we attribute to higher worries about human-induced climate change among treated subjects. An exploratory heterogeneity analysis suggests that the impact of the intergenerational dilemma is primarily driven by female and nonbinary participants. In sum, this study presents both a novel measurement strategy and robust evidence of a malleable moral basis of climate policy preferences.

Anxiety, Compassion and Pride. How Emotions Elicited by the Government's Handling of Covid-19 Influences Health-Promoting Behavior.

This article explores how emotions connected to the Government's handling of the Covid-19 outbreak in Sweden relates to behaviors to stop the spread of the virus, and which emotions functions as mediators in this relationship. The Swedish approach to handling the outbreak greatly differed from how many other Western European countries handled the situation and thus makes an important case to study. In a large representative survey (N = 2449), we found that satisfaction with how the Government handled the situation was related to more positive and less negative emotions. Anxiety, compassion and pride mediated the effect of satisfaction on compliance with the national recommendations such that anxiety and compassion increased compliance, while pride decreased it. Importantly though, satisfaction increased compassion and pride, but only compassion led to more compliant behaviors. In fact, satisfaction was indirectly related to less compliant behaviors via anxiety and pride. Shame mediated the effect on the tendency to wear face masks, a behavior that was explicitly not endorsed by the Swedish Public Health Agency. We speculate if the face mask, which was intensely debated, became a politicized symbol of dissatisfaction with the Swedish approach. In sum, it seems that individuals who were dissatisfied with how the government handled the Covid-19 outbreak were in fact engaging more in health-promotional behaviors to stop the spread of the virus.

Veto player theory and reform making in Western Europe.

Veto player theory generates predictions about governments' capacity for policy change. Due to the difficulty of identifying significant laws needed to change the policy status quo, evidence about governments' ability to change policy has been mostly provided for a limited number of reforms and single-country studies. To evaluate the predictive power of veto player theory for policy making across time, policy areas and countries, a dataset was gathered that incorporates about 5,600 important government reform measures in the areas of social, labour, economic and taxation policy undertaken in 13 Western European countries from the mid-1980s until the mid-2000s. Veto player theory is applied in a combined model with other central theoretical expectations on policy change derived from political economy (crisis-driven policy change) and partisan theory (ideology-driven policy change). Robust support is found that governments introduce more reform measures when economic conditions are poor and when the government is positioned further away from the policy status quo. No empirical support is found for predictions of veto player theory in its pure form, where no differentiation between government types is made. However, the findings provide support for the veto player theory in the special case of minimal winning cabinets, where the support of all government parties is sufficient (in contrast to minority cabinets) and necessary (in contrast to oversized cabinets) for policy change. In particular, it is found that in minimal winning cabinets the ideological distance between the extreme government parties significantly decreases the government's ability to introduce reforms. These findings improve our understanding of reform making in parliamentary democracies and highlight important issues and open questions for future applications and tests of the veto player theory.